

KATARZYNA PISARSKA

THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

EVALUATING SUCCESS THROUGH
CIVIL ENGAGEMENT



The Domestic Dimension of Public Diplomacy

Katarzyna Pisarska

The Domestic Dimension of Public Diplomacy

Evaluating Success through Civil Engagement

palgrave
macmillan

Katarzyna Pisarska
Warsaw School of Economics
Poland

ISBN 978-1-137-54678-4 ISBN 978-1-137-54679-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54679-1

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016952809

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Cover Illustration: © Denys Kovtun / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd. London.

To my friend, partner and husband, Zbigniew

PREFACE

My academic interest in public diplomacy comes primarily from my professional practice. For over a decade now I have been running one of the first not-for-profit, non-governmental diplomatic academies in Europe: the European Academy of Diplomacy (EAD) in Warsaw. Throughout the years of its development from a small, student start-up into an internationally recognized institution, there have been many lessons I have acquired. One which stands out, however, is that the most life-changing experiences, that deeply influence our perceptions of other nations and cultures, come from direct people-to-people contacts. These contacts are most credible when organized outside of the realm of government and with genuine grassroot support of civil society in both hosting and sending countries. Having seen hundreds of EAD international Alumni continuing to work with Poland after they returned home, I could not help but wonder whether governments understand the intrinsic value that such non-governmental initiatives have for a country's reputation abroad? And if they do acknowledge such projects as part of the country's public diplomacy effort, what are the best practices of cooperation between the domestic civil society actors and Ministries of Foreign Affairs? Finally, how can such cooperation move beyond "NGOs as contractors" paradigm into real dialogue and partnership where inspiration and influence work both ways and where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are treated as independent public diplomacy actors? During my time as a Visiting Scholar in Washington, DC, in 2010, I presented all these questions to a local partner institution, with whom we were operating a joint Polish-American youth exchange, sponsored by the US Government.

The answers I received were fascinating and made me want to find out more about the value of civil engagement in foreign policy practice. Other interviews soon followed. At that time, I would not have expected that this journey would take me to three different continents, allow me to interview over 80 public diplomacy practitioners and experts and finally inspire me to write this book.

Katarzyna Pisarska
Mazowieckie, Poland

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is the culmination of several years of hard work and would not have been written without the assistance of many different individuals and institutions. First, I gratefully acknowledge the support and guidance of Professor Joachim Osipiński and Professor Piotr Ostaszewski, from my home institution, the Collegium Of Socio-Economics at the Warsaw School of Economics. The Collegium has provided me with the much-needed creative space for scientific inquiry as well as financial support for different stages of this study. Second, I express my warm thanks to the three institutions that have accepted me as a Visiting Scholar and provided the infrastructure and environment for research and interviewing. These were the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, directed by Professor Dan Hamilton; the Department of Political Studies at the University of Oslo represented by Professor Jostein Rosfjord Askim; and the Center for European Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra led by Professor Jacqueline Lo. I would like to acknowledge that my three-month fellowship in Australia was generously supported by the Go8 Group, which granted me a full scholarship for the duration of my stay “Down Under.”

I would like to thank all the research participants of this study. In the years 2011–2015, I was fortunate to meet and speak to over 80 inspiring individuals—diplomats and representatives of various NGOs from Norway, Australia and the USA. I am grateful for their time, effort and critical insights which form the backbone of this book. I also thank Professor Giles Scott-Smith, Professor Alan Hendrikson as well as several

anonymous reviewers, who have shared their comments on the draft proposal of the book and specific chapters, helping me to improve the methodological and conceptual part of the research. I am also thankful to Palgrave MacMillan and John Wiley & Sons for granting me permission to reuse some of my authorship material which appeared in 2015 in two scientific journals: *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* and the *Scandinavian Political Studies*. I am also in debt to the College of Europe Natolin Campus Library in Warsaw for offering me a “safe haven” to complete this monograph.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family for their love and patience, especially in the last, most demanding months of writing. I am particularly thankful to my husband, Zbigniew Pisarski, who has taken over many of my responsibilities (both family and professional), enabling me to finish this monograph. More importantly, however, he has continuously inspired me to move beyond my comfort zone and ask questions others would not.

CONTENTS

1	Introduction	1
2	Public Diplomacy and Its Domestic Dimension	13
3	Norway as a Peace Nation	51
4	Australia's Ambivalent Engagement with Asia	91
5	US Government-Sponsored Educational Exchange Programs	145
6	Summary of Findings	187
	References	201
	Index	203

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ACCESS	English Access Microscholarship Program
ACFID	Australian Council for International Development
AHRC	Australian Human Rights Commission
ANCP	Australian NGO Cooperation Program
ANZAC	Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUSAID	Australian Agency for International Development
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government
EAD	European Academy of Diplomacy
ECA	Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, US Department of State
EU	European Union
FLEX	Future Leaders Exchange Program
GNI	Gross National Income
GONGO	Governmental–Non-Governmental Organization
IAWG	Interagency Working Group, US Department of State
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IVLP	International Visitor Leadership Program
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPD	New Public Diplomacy
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PD	Public Diplomacy
PR	Public Relations
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
YES	The Kennedy-Lugar Youth Exchange and Study

LIST OF FIGURE

Fig. 2.1	Three platforms of public diplomacy's domestic outreach	35
----------	---	----

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1	International relations theories and the development of public diplomacy	29
Table 6.1	Foreign policy tradition and PD practice in Norway, Australia and USA	188
Table 6.2	Government–domestic civil society cooperation in PD in Norway, Australia and USA	191
Table 6.3	Implementation of PD domestic dimension platforms in Norway, Australia and USA	193

Introduction

COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PD'S DOMESTIC DIMENSION

Diplomacy, as an art of building, maintaining and using relations, has entered new grounds. With the dynamic processes of globalization, governments are losing their monopoly on sovereignty in areas from communication to economy. This is because they are inadequately equipped to independently face the growing number of challenges that transcend borders—from environmental change, financial instabilities, migrations to international crime and terrorism. The collapsing of sovereignties is coupled with mutations of identity, which today are less of a national nature and increasingly more of transnational ideas/values type. This new international context has had a significant impact on the diplomatic practice, posing many new challenges for Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) around the world. Today, diplomacy has to combine its more traditional functions of inter-state representation, negotiation and protection of interest with messaging and relationship building between societies and groups. It needs to also adjust to the ever blurring line between domestic and international frontiers, where foreign policy has often substantial implications at home. Finally, MFAs must learn to share the diplomatic space, with think tanks, universities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other groups engaged in international activities. With these three challenges combined, diplomatic practice indeed seems more and more the practice of public diplomacy (PD) (Gregory 2012, 372).

Traditionally, PD has been understood as government effort to influence foreign publics in order to attain certain foreign policy goals. Just like the general practice of diplomacy, however, also PD has significantly transformed over time. Changes in the global communication sphere have to some extent downgraded the efficiency of propaganda, promotional campaigns or even direct contacts between government officials and foreign publics (Melissen 2005a). Instead, because of their authentic character, the development of relations between civil society actors abroad and at home comes to the forefront of PD, with the state playing only a facilitative role in the process. Alterations in PD instruments have been accompanied by changes in modes of communication. A movement from monologue, to dialogue, to collaboration has now become a fact (Cowan and Arsenault 2008). In this new context, the definition of PD audience also needs to broaden, with “strategic publics” identified both among foreign publics and at home.

This book is dedicated to the newest developments in the practice of public diplomacy, namely the policy’s domestic dimension. The author defines the phenomena as “government’s ability to engage its own society in foreign policy practices through information, collaboration and identity-defining.” Such engagement requires however a profound change in the way states think about PD. It involves a paradigm shift from monological/dialogical PD to **collaborative PD**. This is because the domestic society and non-governmental stakeholders can only be truly engaged through collaboration, which is defined in this book as undertaking projects, in a spirit of mutual partnership for common good. Such collaboration at home also transcends into foreign policy and PD practice. Instead of professing image cultivation or spreading ideologies and norms, the aim of the New Public Diplomacy (NPD) is to “explain fully one’s policies and show how they contribute to the delivery of global public goods, such as peace, security, respect for human rights and international law, prosperity, sustainable development, and more” (Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos 2012, 734). When a genuine **collaborative PD** is implemented, the policy ceases to be a uniquely state activity (Melissen 2005b, 8) and becomes one of a multitude of domestic actors (including NGOs), which work together with foreign audiences to address transnational challenges.

The study shows that the outliers of public diplomacy’s domestic outreach are countries with the strongest collaborative culture at home. Such culture should be understood not only as the government’s ability to work with domestic civil society but most importantly as the state’s willingness

to foster trust between a multitude of stakeholders and promote civil engagement in foreign policy practice. As the role of non-traditional actors increases, countries which know how to meaningfully engage with their domestic publics significantly enhance the efficiency of PD activities abroad. As studies show, this is because:

- a) effectiveness of PD increasingly flourishes in inverse proportion to the degree of visible state interference (Huijgh 2012), thus the need to have convinced non-governmental domestic partners as intermediaries with foreign audiences.
- b) communication with one's society bridges the growing gap between foreign policy objectives and domestic public sentiment toward the outside world (Zaharna 2010), which in turn increases the credibility of PD initiatives.

The book presents empirical data derived from three country case-studies (Norway, Australia and the USA), which highlight challenges in developing the different platforms of domestic dimension of PD: informative, cooperative and identity-defining. First, as shown on the Norwegian and Australian examples, the broad PD messaging needs to enjoy domestic legitimacy and self-identification with the cause. Second, foreign policy-makers need to learn to involve the domestic public in both formulation and implementation of PD initiatives (*Case-study 3: U.S. Government-sponsored educational exchange programs*) but also increasingly acknowledge and support PD activities that are undertaken independently by domestic civil society (*Case-study 1: Norway as a Peace Nation*). Finally, state PD practitioners need to see domestic publics as “strategic publics” with which two-way communication is as important as it is with foreign publics. Comparing these three case-studies allows drawing preliminary conclusions about the variables that predispose countries to take on a more **collaborative PD**. Among these are the foreign policy tradition, the domestic democratic culture and the relations between government and non-governmental actors.

Theoretical Framework and Study Design

In the study of PD, practice often precedes theory. The recent theoretical developments related to the “New Public Diplomacy” and PD’s Domestic Dimension are of no exception. They skillfully describe what has

become a reality in the field: a movement from monologue, to dialogue, to collaboration (Cowan and Arsenault 2008). Scholars begin to appreciate domestic engagement in PD initiatives not only as ways for these initiatives to gain credibility and access (Riordan 2005), but also as a way to bridge the growing gap between foreign policy objectives and domestic public sentiment toward the outside world (Zaharna 2010). Although researchers have focused for many years now on how domestic non-governmental actors can influence foreign policy outcomes (Nye and Keohane 1971; Clarke 1998; Edwards 1999; Reimann 2006), only a few direct their attention to the rising role of domestic civil society in the field of PD (Riordan 2005; Cull 2009; Fitzpatrick 2012; Huijgh 2013). Even less consideration is paid to the explanatory power of sociological approaches, which introduce into PD theory concepts such as social capital, identity and inter-group collaboration. The aim of this book is to fill the gap by providing evidence that states that can profoundly engage with their publics and build policy in synchronization with society's identity enhance the efficiency of their diplomacy activities abroad.

The book takes public diplomacy scholarship forward by adding three case-studies, based on over 80 interviews with practitioners, which scrutinize how the policy's domestic outreach is understood and exercised in Norway, Australia and the USA. In addition, the study provides the following contributions to the field:

- First, it offers evidence that for PD messaging to be efficient abroad, it needs to enjoy domestic legitimacy and the society's self-identification with the cause (*Case-study 1: Norway as a Peace Nation and Case-study 2: Australia's Ambivalent Engagement with Asia*).
- Second, it argues that successful PD program implementation relies heavily on the level of engagement of the domestic civil society in the policy process (*Case-study 3: United States and Government-sponsored exchange programs*), which in turn is dependent on the quality of relations between NGOs and government in a given state (*Case-study 1 and Case-study 2*).
- Third, it introduces a three-dimensional model for PD domestic outreach assessment, arguing that state's engagements with its own society is a holistic endeavor, which includes an informative, cooperative and identity-defining platform.
- Fourth, by acknowledging that non-state actors begin to initiate PD and interviewing over 30 NGO representatives from three different

countries, it provides a glimpse into such practice in the area of development aid.

- Finally, by comparing the three case-studies, the book concludes that states with good working relationship with civil society and a more advanced collaborative culture at home will be the outliers of the new **collaborative PD** abroad.

By taking as the baseline for analysis the three major contemporary theoretical approaches to international relations (IR), this book has argued that **constructivism** has been able to deliver one of the most promising approaches to the study of PD. From a constructivist perspective, PD is not a manipulative tool of statecraft but instead a channel of finding common-grounds, building common-identities and strengthening collaboration. The theory's openness to explore change in the basic mechanism of IR provides space for the inclusion of sociological approaches and gives way to deliberations about the NPD and PD's Domestic Dimension.

Methodology and Limitations

By presenting three case-studies, the book not only provides insights into diplomatic practice of Norway, Australia and the USA, but more importantly offers the first **comparative analysis** of PD's Domestic Dimension. As observed by Eytan Gilboa (2008, 72) "comparative analysis contributes more to generalization than single case studies because it avoids the danger of overemphasizing the unique features of each case." While case-studies presented in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 prepare the grounds for such generalization, Chap. 6 compares these practices and draws conclusions about the state performance in executing PD's Domestic Dimension. Such comparison is made against the backdrop of the three platforms of domestic engagement, thus using variables, which include government–NGO relations and the level of societal trust and cooperative culture.

When analyzing the specific country case-studies, the research has been based on primary and secondary sources, as well as on the **qualitative method of elite interviewing**. The rationale of an elite interview is to "acquire information and context that only that person can provide about some event or process" (Hochschild 2009). For the research purpose, the author has selected a group of 80 Norwegian, Australian and American diplomats and non-governmental activists involved in PD activities of their states. The reason for choosing such a research population is that

diplomats and their non-governmental partners, through day-to-day work are the best-equipped observers of government–domestic public communication practices. Each side (governmental and non-governmental) might assess state’s performance from a different angle; however, both provide invaluable insights into PD cooperative practices. In the interviewing process and beyond, I have made all possible efforts to guarantee the universality of the insights collected. This included, first and foremost, assuring consistency in the conduct of all interviews (Denzin and Lincoln 2003a, b). The interviews were semi-structured: each interviewee was asked the same set of questions, presented in the same order, with space provided for the discussion to be free-flowing, allowing new ideas to be brought up during the interview. This way the goal of reaching a point of saturation and repetition of information from the respondents could be successfully accomplished.

There are three types of **limitations to this study** which must be addressed. First, this book does not attempt to make a detailed analysis or evaluation of all American, Norwegian or Australian public diplomacy efforts. Instead it focuses on specific government practices and contexts of involving (or not) the domestic society in PD realization. Second, although the growing role of non-state actors has led to the questioning of the primacy of the state in international affairs, this book still places governments at the center of deliberations. As a practitioner-oriented book, it perceives the state as the central authority in the strategic decisions in foreign policy decision-making. It does however acknowledge that non-state actors begin to initiate PD and through the case-studies provides a glimpse into such practice in the area of development assistance. Last but not least, the study focuses on practice in countries that are liberal democracies with a long-standing civil society development tradition. The selection was made on the assumption that fair comparisons can only be based on examples of states with similar levels of participatory-democracy. Contrasting the levels of civil engagement in foreign policy between democracies and non-democracies would be counterproductive from the start. Scholars have argued that in PD practice “illiberal democracies” often limit themselves to activities that involve elites closely associated with the government (Wiseman 2010, 47). This is because such systems are by nature distrustful of independent civil society actors and grassroot movements, sometimes simply dismissing them as subversive liberal concepts that endanger regime survival (Walker 2016). Such an approach, coupled with a general closeness of non-democratic systems, leads to a significant weakening of the

role and position of non-governmental actors, which play only a marginal role in influencing domestic policies, and even more so foreign policy. This does not mean that the findings of this study have no implications for semi-democracies and non-democracies. On the contrary, as shown in detail in Chap. 6 and in other studies (Wang 2012) the domestic constituencies remain vital for PD regardless of the political system in place.

Evaluating Public Diplomacy Success

Measuring and evaluating success in PD has inherently been a challenge in the field. As acknowledged by scholars, what defines success has eluded even practitioners (Johnson 2006). The difficulties in effective evaluations are numerous. In his *Resource Guide to Public Diplomacy* Robert Banks mentions the traditional obstacles such as the fact that impact of PD efforts can be seen only over the long term; the results may be attributed to other factors/actions; or that PD tries to measure concepts that are intangible (Banks 2011). Others scholars identify as evaluation impediments the lack of clear goals, widespread confusion between outputs and outcomes, limited resources, flawed or insufficient audience information and analysis, and over-reliance on and/or misuse of polling data (Pahlavi 2007; McDowell 2008).

The measurement of PD success largely depends on the policy's objective and thus the way it is defined in a given context. For countries professing PD primarily as an instrument of image cultivation or national branding, the benchmark for evaluation might be seeing a raise in polling of positive foreign public attitudes toward a practitioner state. For states perceiving mutual understanding as the main goal of PD activities, the intensity of people-to-people cooperation may be a better measurement of performance. Some countries, like the USA, which have multiple PD objectives, use different evaluation tools for each of its goals. Regardless however of what motivates PD actions, the majority of measurements have focused on either program level—considered by many as a primary unit of PD (Banks 2011, 25–26)—or at the national level through polls and indexes. Only recently, some scholars (Brown 2011) have acknowledged the need to create a whole new evaluation approach that takes into account an increase in the influence of non-state actors and a decrease in the power of states. For example, the “theory of change,” inspired by the international development community, proposes as a method the articulation of how and why a given intervention will lead to specific change (Stein

and Valters 2012, 2). In a multi-stakeholder environment, this approach allows planners to evaluate joint assumptions and highlight measurement and evaluation points throughout the process.

This book quantifies success first and foremost by embracing PD as a tool for collaboration, understood however not as a mean but an end in itself. It argues that close cooperation between key domestic stakeholders (including NGOs) on PD objectives, improves information flow, leading to a shift in policy to accommodate a bigger number of stakeholders. This in turn strengthens PD effort by assuring the commitment of a multitude of parties (buy-in effect), synergies of activities and a raise of policy's credibility abroad. The proposed evaluation benchmark is a country's progress in introducing the three platforms of domestic outreach: informative, cooperative and identity-building. To succeed, the government's engagement with the domestic dimension in the realization of PD has to be threefold. First, PD messaging needs to enjoy domestic legitimacy. Second, foreign policy-makers need to learn to involve the domestic public in both formulation and implementation of PD initiatives and acknowledge and support PD activities that are undertaken independently by domestic civil society. Finally, state PD practitioners need to see domestic publics as "strategic publics" with which communication is as important as it is with foreign publics.

Summary of Chapters

Overall, the book comprises of six chapters: a theoretical introduction, three case-studies and final findings of the study.

Chapter 2 theoretically conceptualizes PD by applying the three main approaches of IR: realism, liberalism and constructivism. It also introduces the most important concepts derived from communication theory (propaganda, public relations, national branding, public affairs) and sociological science (social capital, socialization, collaboration). The chapter argues that constructivism holds the most potential for explaining the new developments in PD. Its openness to explore change in the basic mechanism of IR gives way to deliberations about **collaborative PD**, as reflected by NPD and PD's Domestic Dimension. In the new paradigm, PD ceases to be a uniquely state activity and becomes one of a multitude of domestic actors (including NGOs), which work together with foreign audiences to address transnational challenges. As the chapter suggests, in this new context, understanding of PD's domestic outreach needs to be broadened. The author proposes a model of three state activity platforms, which serve

(a) explaining foreign policy to domestic publics (informative platform); (b) engaging domestic civil society actors in state PD and supporting their independent PD efforts (cooperative platform); (c) soul-searching in order to define national characteristics/identity for PD message purpose (identity-defining platform). Finally, the chapter presents the major challenges that accompany the inclusion of a domestic dimension into PD.

Chapter 3 introduces the first case-study, devoted to the practice of PD in Norway. By focusing on the internal conditions and rationale behind the development of Norwegian Peace Diplomacy, it challenges the common assumption that this PD initiative is merely a pre-calculated foreign policy effort aimed at reinforcing a positive image of Norway among foreign publics. Instead, the study shows that the peace engagement is collaborative in nature and strongly linked to the very identity of the Norwegian nation. By analyzing the instruments of Norwegian Peace Diplomacy, as well as NGO–government relations in the area of foreign policy, Chap. 3 argues that the efficiency of Norwegian PD can be attributed to its holistic domestic outreach. First, when dealing with PD messaging Norway is using the identity-defining platform and capitalizing on Norwegian society's belief that the country is a Peace Nation with a missionary obligation. Second, thanks to the “Norwegian Model” of cooperation with civil society around foreign policy goals, as well as the country's openness to International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), Norway is able to make the most of the cooperative platform of PD. Finally, through continuous dialogue with its own society (within the informative platform) Norway is assuring domestic constituencies support and identification with state actions abroad, thus strengthening the country's soft power outreach. The Norwegian example supports the underlying hypothesis of the book which says that the key to efficient PD lies in the ability to make the most of the strengths and characteristics of one's society, by choosing PD instruments which are in synchronization with the society.

Chapter 4 continues investigating the link between the domestic dimension and state's ability to deliver PD success. It looks at the challenges Australia has faced in its effort to shape positive perceptions among foreign publics in Asia. The chapter argues that there are two primary sins of Australian PD efforts—both requiring strengthening its domestic outreach. These are (a) the lack of clarity about the message Australia is sending to the outside world in general and to Asia in particular; and at times, a clear ambivalence in the messaging (identity-defining platform); (b) The inability to mobilize the country civic resources for the good of Australia's

reputation (cooperative platform). The chapter explores links between the inconsistent PD messaging and the challenges of defining Australia's identity both as a nation and as part of Asia. It also looks at the state of relations between the Australian government and the NGOs in assuring successful PD performance. The chapter argues that Australia's PD effort has been severely hampered by a fickle and fluctuating engagement with Australia's domestic society—both on the conceptual and implementation levels.

Chapter 5 discusses the final case-study, aiming to demonstrate the importance of involving the non-governmental actors in both formulation and implementation of public diplomacy initiatives. By analyzing the use of exchange programs in the American PD practice, the author argues that the implementation efficiency of these programs relies heavily on the level of engagement of the domestic civil society in the policy process. The chapter also reveals that with time the NGO/civil society engagement can move from playing an implementing role into influencing the program design and policy formulation. By presenting the dynamics of US government–NGOs cooperation in the field of international exchanges, the case-study serves as an inspiration for other dimensions of American domestic outreach, in the state's ongoing effort to adjust to the ongoing internal democratization of foreign policy.

Chapter 6 of the book summarizes findings from the three case-studies and structures an argument on behalf of the book's hypothesis. It argues that the openness to PD innovations such as **collaborative PD** depends on countries' foreign policy tradition, domestic democratic culture and the relationships between government and its civil society. While exploring these variables, the final chapter summarizes Norwegian, Australian and American performance in implementing the three platforms of PD domestic outreach (informative, cooperative and identity-building). It also discusses whether the study findings about PD's Domestic Dimension are applicable to countries of a non-democratic nature. It finally draws the conclusion that states with the most advanced collaborative culture at home will be the natural outliers of the new **collaborative PD** abroad.

It is my anticipation that by detecting specific patterns in diplomatic practice, this comparative analysis will contribute in the future to the development of empirically grounded theories of public diplomacy. More importantly, however, I hope it will serve PD practitioners—both state and non-governmental—in their continuous struggle to be ahead of the ever-changing realities of the modern world.

REFERENCES

- Banks, R. (2011). A resource guide to public diplomacy evaluation. In *CDP perspectives on public diplomacy*. Los Angeles, CA: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School.
- Brown, R. (2011, March 31). Measurement and evaluation in public diplomacy. *Public Diplomacy, Networks, and Influence Website*. Available online at: <http://pdnetworks.wordpress.com/2011/03/31/measurement-and-evaluation-in-public-diplomacy/>.
- Clarke, G. (1998). Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and politics in the developing world. *Political Studies*, 46, 36–52.
- Cowan, G., & Arsenault, A. (2008). Moving from monologue to dialogue to collaboration: The three layers of public diplomacy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 10–30.
- Cull, N. J. (2009). Public diplomacy: Lessons from the past. In *CDP Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*. Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School.
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2003a). *Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (2003b). *Strategies of qualitative inquiry*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Edwards, M. (1999). International development NGOs: Agents of foreign aid or vehicles for international cooperation? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 28, 25–37.
- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2012). Defining strategic publics in a networked world: Public diplomacy's challenge at home and abroad. *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 421–40.
- Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 55–77.
- Gregory, B. (2012). American public diplomacy: Enduring characteristics elusive transformation. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 6, 351–72.
- Hochschild, J. L. (2009). *Conducting intensive interviews and Elite interviews*. Cambridge, MA: National Science Foundation.
- Huijgh, E. (2012). Public diplomacy in flux: Introducing the domestic dimension. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7, 359–67.
- Huijgh, E. (2013). Changing tunes for public diplomacy: Exploring the domestic dimension. *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 2(1), 62–74.
- Johnson, J. (2006). How does public diplomacy measure up? *Foreign Service Journal*, 83(12), 44–52.
- McDowell, M. (2008). Public diplomacy at the crossroads: Definitions and challenges in the 'Open Source' Era. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 32(3), 7–15.

- Melissen, J. (2005a). The New public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations* (pp. 3–27). Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Melissen, J. (2005b). *Wielding soft power: The new public diplomacy* (pp. 19–22) (Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 2).
- Nye, J. S., Jr., & Keohane, R. (1971). Transnational relations and world politics: An introduction. *International Organization*, 25(3), 329–49.
- Pahlavi, P. (2007). Evaluating public diplomacy programs. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 2(3), 255–81.
- Proedrou, F., & Frangonikolopoulos, C. (2012). Refocusing Public Diplomacy: The Need for Strategic Discursive Public Diplomacy. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 23(4), 728–45.
- Reimann, K. (2006). A view from the top: International politics, norms, and the worldwide growth of NGOs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50, 45–57.
- Riordan, S. (2005). Dialogue-based public diplomacy: A new foreign policy paradigm? In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations* (pp. 180–95). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stein, D., & Valters, C. (2012, August). *Understanding theory of change in international development* (The Justice and Security Research Program Paper 1).
- Walker, C. (2016). The Authoritarian Threat. The Hijacking of ‘Soft Power’. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 49–63.
- Wang, J. (2012). Domestic constraints on the rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 459–72.
- Wiseman, G. (2010). Polyilateralism: Diplomacy’s third dimension. *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, 4(1), 24–39.
- Zaharna, R. S. (2010). *Battles to bridges: U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy after 9/11*. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Public Diplomacy and Its Domestic Dimension

THE THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The understanding of PD has evolved over time, along with the changes to the systemic environment of governments. The term, first coined by Edmund Gullion in 1965, was traditionally understood as “the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions” (Cull 2006). In that sense, PD was seen as an activity beyond traditional diplomacy, yet with a clear goal of influencing foreign policies of other countries. Non-governmental actors, although recognized as entities with an influencing potential, were mere instruments of a wider governmental policy.

With time, more contextual information was added to the definition of PD, stressing that the aim of this communication was not only “to influence” but also to foster understanding for the nation’s “ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies” (Tuch 1990, 3). This was to be accomplished with a variety of tools which would first and foremost include listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting (Cull 2008). By the end of the twentieth century, as a result of three interrelated revolutions in communication (Internet), politics (democratization) and IR (globalization), PD’s definition has been enriched by the latest theories from the field of both IR and communication. These included utilization of such

concepts as “soft power,” two-way communication, strategic PD, media framing, information management, Public Relations (PR) and nation branding (Gilboa 2008, 56). In addition, the revolutions have witnessed a change of approach to non-state actors, which were now seen—along with state actors—to directly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of a country’s “soft power” (Gonesh and Melissen 2005, 7).

Today, even more so changes in the global communication sphere have visibly downgraded the importance of messaging, promotional campaigns or even direct contacts between government officials and foreign publics (Melissen 2005a). Instead, the development of relations between civil society actors abroad and at home comes to the forefront of PD, with the state playing only a facilitative role in the process. The concept of a “new public diplomacy” skillfully describes what has become reality in the field: a movement from monologue, to dialogue, to collaboration (Cowan and Arsenault 2008). In that sense, PD evolves around building relationships not only to strengthen mutual understanding but also with a goal of finding a common good. As described in the study by Leonard et al. (2002, 8), PD is about “understanding the needs of other countries, cultures and peoples; communicating our points of view; correcting misperceptions; looking for areas where we can find common cause.”

Analyzing PD is not an easy task for at least three reasons. First, as pointed out by Gilboa (2008, 56) the field of PD is “probably one of the most multidisciplinary areas in modern scholarship.” Its analysis is possible only through combining theoretical approaches coming from the study of IR, communication, PR, branding and even cultural anthropology (Ociepka 2012). As a result, PD scholarship becomes increasingly wide-ranging and fragmented, with many areas still underexplored (Auer and Srugies 2013, 11). Second, the literature on PD lacks proper theoretical infrastructure (Entman 2008) with research focusing heavily on practical considerations related to measuring success and failure. Third, as PD practice often precedes theory, scholars seem to be constantly catching up with ongoing developments. In consequence, the meaning of PD is continuously evolving, but also contested by both scholars and practitioners (Gregory 2008, 274).

The following chapter undertakes the task of presenting the new developments in PD—particularly the phenomena of PD’s domestic dimension—by taking into account the multidisciplinary character of the concept. The baseline for analysis will be the three major contemporary theoretical approaches to IR: realism, liberalism and constructivism. This is because

IR theories can best shed light on the revolutionary changes happening within the system International System, including such phenomena as foreign policy democratization or the raising role of non-state actors. At the same time, the chapter makes an attempt to enshrine in the taxonomy the major concepts developed within the field of communication (propaganda, PR, branding and grand strategies).

REALISM AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Realism institutes the very foundational school of thought about international politics. Throughout centuries, it has been built on the works of such great minds as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber, Edward H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau or Kenneth Waltz (Gilpin 1986: 307). Realism assumes that the anarchic nature of the International System disqualifies the existence of any supranational authority that would be able to provide security. Consequently, states remain the primary actors of international politics, engaging in an ongoing struggle for power among nations. Because of anarchy at the international level, states revert to “state of nature” and act in their own self-interest (Hobbes 2008). Classical Realists viewed states as inherently aggressive, checked only by other powers, while neorealists stress their rational and material characteristics (unitary actors). The neorealism subschool approach differs from its classical predecessor also in the assumption that international anarchy does not always imply disorder or conflict. Rather, it is a framework for interpreting other “players” actions. Although states remain the key actors of IR (Viotti and Kauppi 1999), neorealists show interest in examining how non-state structures influence decisions (Keohane 1986).

Realism undertakes a very pragmatic approach toward PD seeing it as a policy in service of power politics and national security. First and foremost, in PD efforts, realists use foreign publics only instrumentally, in order to attain specific state goals. These publics are mere subjects of a *realpolitik* game between states in which the outcome is not as much to change the opinions of the societies as it is to change the behavior of their governments (Malone 1985). As described by Yun and Toth (2009, 494) “this two-step flow conception of public diplomacy ... resonates among contemporary realists as electoral democracies have been proliferating in the world, where public opinion is a major determinant in foreign policy making.” Second, as realists show skepticism toward any professed aims of foreign policy other than the state interest, they also largely distrust the idea

of PD based on strengthening mutual understanding and collaboration between nations or searching for a common good. As they argue, humankind is unlikely to ever transcend power politics through power of reason, thus investing state's resources in endeavors with no immediate effect for national security is unwise at best. Third, as realism supports the Groupism theory, which claims that humans face one another mainly as members of groups (i.e. as nations); realists are less interested in dialogue. At the international level, they see PD narratives and identity projections as "selling an image" to strengthen the state's bargaining position. At the domestic level, they use these projections as tools of differentiating "us" from the "others." Finally, with an assumption that states form the core of IR, realists dismiss the role of non-state actors in PD, significantly decreasing the number of communicators in the process.

From a communication theory perspective, realism appreciates first and foremost the utility of **propaganda** (Yun and Toth 2009, 494–495). The concept has traditionally been understood as an attempt to influence an audience, often by presenting facts selectively in order to serve the interest of the propagandist. In this sense, propaganda lays at the other side of the spectrum than information, which seeks to transmit facts objectively (Welch 1999, 24–26). Realists see PD as an outgrowth of propaganda and use the word often interchangeably (Zaharna 2004, 1) with "public diplomacy" to characterize all foreign information activities. As famously stated by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke (2001) in his piece for *Washington Post* "Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or—if you really want to be blunt—propaganda." Although some scholars have recently tried to broaden the definition of propaganda to adjust to the realities and divest it of its pejorative connotations (Cull et al. 2003; Mor 2006) comparing it to PD seems to be missing the point. By its very nature PD is a form of an open, interactive global communication, which ceases to have an effect (or can even have a countereffect) if the target audience senses deception, inaccuracy or contradictions in the message. Meanwhile, effective propaganda has coercion and deception at the very heart of its activities (Zaharna 2004, 4).

Apart from propaganda, another concept which reflects realist thinking about PD is **strategic PD**. Coined by Jarol Manheim (1994, 7), the term has been defined as "acquiring influence through impression management, not only as damage control—to protect a threatened image—but as an integral part of policy planning" (Mor 2006, 157). Strategic PD is a realist response to the growing relevance of "soft power" in state's

international conduct and the pragmatic necessity for countries to project a positive image or to counteract distorted images in foreign countries. As Manheim has defined it, strategic PD is the ability to use capabilities of new communication technologies, but also to provide a protective buffer against the cultural distortion of messages. If necessary, the message and positive image can be projected via information campaigns, advocacy or broadcast framing,¹ in a manipulative way (Kunczik 1997).

There are many examples, illustrating a realist approach to PD. The most famous described by Jarol Manheim in his book *Strategic public diplomacy and American foreign policy* was the Kuwaiti monarchs in exile campaign (executed by the PR firm Hill and Knowlton), aimed at assuring sufficient support among the US public and Congress for the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict. Other campaigns—this time to improve the countries’ tarnished images—were launched by Saudi Arabia in the USA, directly following the 9/11 attacks (Singer 2004) or by the Russian Federation in several EU countries, following the illegal annexation of Crimea from Ukraine (2014). Also the USA, faced with the growing challenge of combating terrorism, has tried to effectively use a combination of soft and hard power means to improve its image, harmed by the 2003 invasion in Iraq (Mor 2006). In all these cases, information is used as a tool of one-way communication, which largely disregards the aspect of listening to or engaging with the target audience of the message. A country soft power is a mere extension of hard power by different means.

LIBERALISM AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Liberalism stems from the Age of Enlightenment (seventeenth and eighteenth century), thus its intellectual heritage is much shorter than that of realism. With a strong faith in human reason, classical liberalism, as a political philosophy, has been based on the notions of individual freedom, political participation, private property and equality of opportunity (Doyle 1986). Liberal foreign relations see the world in a distinctively different way than realists do. Although liberalists agree with realists that the nature of the International System is in essence anarchic (with no supranational authority able to enforce agreements), liberalism is optimistic about the prospects of cooperation. As the International System is pluralistic by nature, the primary actors are no longer only states, but also corporations, international organizations and NGOs. States cooperate with non-state entities when in their personal interest, perceiving such collaboration as

one bearing a potential of a win-win game. The key interest of actors is no longer survival or even security but preferences. Even in situations where partners make relatively greater gains, cooperation on common interests creates “sticky” alliances. National security is perceived “from a wide perspective of transnational economic, social, and ecological issues emanating from the growth of globalism” (Yun and Toth 2009, 494). Liberal foreign relations are based on a somewhat idealistic belief of historical progress and the possibility of reforming IR. They are also deeply imbedded into the liberal ideology of protecting and expanding the range of international freedom (Kaufman 2013, 53–54). Liberal foreign policy rejects the realist balance of power and believes that membership in the liberal community should imply accepting a duty to defend other members of liberal community, as well as to rescue human beings from intolerable oppressions such as genocide and ethnic cleaning as a key role in liberalism is played by Institutions which hold states to cooperative agreements.

Two of liberalism’s modern theorists—Joseph S. Nye and Robert Keohane (1971)—have laid the very foundations for today’s thinking about PD. By acknowledging that the world has entered an era of complex interdependence in which the significance of military power has been diluted, it has opened the discussion about the value of a new type of power: soft power.

Soft Power and Public Diplomacy

In his book *Soft Power. The Means of Success in the World of Politics* Joseph Nye argues that the traditional understanding of power as the ability to wage war has changed. With nuclear weapons significantly raising the cost of direct inter-state conflict, there is a decrease in acceptance of high war casualties among domestic populations and economic growth’s dependence on reputation and relations with others, and traditional military power has lost its allure (Nye 2002: 5–7). Instead, power is diffused and projected on three different levels, creating a three-dimensional chessboard of power (Nye 2004, 4). On the top level (military power) the classical struggle between states occurs, with threats and force remaining the primary currency. States use coercion, deterrence and protection to safeguard their interest. Government activities center on security policy, alliance building and maintenance of a balance of power. On the second level, states exercise their economic power. Also here, inducement and cohesion are accepted with payments and sanctioning being two sides of the same

coin. Government policies toward other states span from providing aid to imposing sanctions. Finally, at the bottom board level the notion of soft power is introduced (Nye 2004, 31). Understood as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment” (Nye 2008, 94), soft power rests on three core elements: values, culture and policies. Naturally, there is an interplay between all three chessboards. Each influences the other, and using only one type of power without acknowledging the effects for the other in today’s world can only be counterproductive.

Against the backdrop of the traditional forms of hard power—military and economic—soft power stands out for two reasons. First, unlike the two it cannot and should not be fully controlled by the state. On the domestic level, values and culture—the core elements of soft power—are not created by the governments but are a reflection of their societies’ identity and development. Projecting culture and values to the outside world demands thus close cooperation and collaboration with a number of domestic actors—artists, journalists, activists—who by their independent actions express best what a given country stands for. On the international level, the democratization of technology has created space for non-traditional actors to obtain soft power resources—sometimes against the will and to the detriment of nation-states. Among these, new international actors exercising soft power are NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and even organized terrorist networks. By conducting their own advocacy campaigns and pursuing their own agendas, these actors can become friends or foes to the state—strengthening or weakening its soft power. Second, soft power differs from military and (to some extend) economic power as it heavily relies on the credibility of the message sent to the general public. If a state lives up to expectations and practice what it preaches, its chances of gaining soft power in the long run significantly increase (Nye 2002, 69–73).

In Nye’s chessboard power model, PD is a government policy used to wield soft power. It differs from the realist thinking of PD because its role is to attract focus on the positive sides of a country not through mere propaganda but rather through dialogue (Nye 2004, 105–107). As Nye noted “by definition, soft power means getting others to want the same outcomes you want, and that requires understanding how they are hearing your message, and fine tuning it accordingly” (Nye 2004, 111). In the process of listening, mutual understanding is created, which can in some instances also change the perception of the listener. The key words in the

liberal approach to PD are “attraction” and “credibility.” Attraction is understood as creating allure for the country’s culture, ideals and policies. This is done by presenting a true picture of the country and matching words (messages on policies) with actions (policies) (Leonard et al. 2005). Both the domestic and international performance can and should enhance the state’s credibility.

Liberalists show a great interest in information globalism where “old and new communication technologies circulate information on cultures, values, and ideals” (Yun and Toth 2009, 497). They acknowledge that the challenge for state’s communication with the outside world lies not in the lack of information but in the lack of attention (Nye 2002, 2004). They also understand that government’s channels are only one of multiple channels existing between states and societies. PD is thus seen as a complex interaction between the state and foreign citizens or other non-state global entities (Yun and Toth 2009, 496). This two-way communication is exercised on three dimensions: daily, strategic and that of developing long-lasting relationships (Nye 2008, 101–102). In this context, two concepts deserve particular attention when speaking about liberal PD. These are public relations (PR) and cultural relations.

Within communication theories, **PR** is the way organizations, companies and individuals communicate with the public and media. A PR specialist connects with the target audience directly or indirectly through media with an aim not only to create and maintain a positive image, but also to create a strong relationship with the audience. In the 1950s and 1960s, the term public relations and propaganda has been used rather interchangeably (L’Etang 2008, 268). According, however, to modern PR theory, organizational goals are best accomplished through symmetrical rather than asymmetrical communication. This approach thus favors active engagement and empathy with audiences over one-way statements (Entman 2008, 100). Throughout the last two decades, several scholars have pointed instead to the convergence of PR and PD (Signitzer and Coombs 1992; Fitzpatrick et al. 2013; Sevin 2015). They have noted that PR and PD share the same objective of affecting public opinion for the benefit of the client or organization. In that sense PD can be seen as a PR activity carried out by states (Sevin 2015, 562). Also, knowledge and skills needed in PR activities resemble those used by PD practitioners. As shown by one recent study conducted by Katherine Fitzpatrick et al. (2013, 16) “while one-way and two-way practices are prevalent in both public diplomacy and public relations ... practitioners in both fields share

the view that interactive approaches involving engagement with publics are most effective.” They also reject propaganda, as a tool undermining credibility and integrity of both fields.

Despite these similarities, one cannot dismiss the negative societal perceptions of the so-called political public relations (Strömbäck and Kiouisis 2013). The development of PR activities for political purpose is too often associated with leaders’ fears of democratization (L’Etang 2009) and their desire to control domestic public opinion by creating a “spin” and imposing often deceiving narratives. In that sense, equating PD (which is a governmental policy) with PR can only hurt the former. It is thus more beneficial to speak about PD, as a communication tool which might have some functional resemblance to PR, but in essence is a policy used to advance states’ national interests and its foreign policy goals (Sevin 2015, 562).

The second concept associated closely with the liberal approach to PD is **cultural relations**. As stressed by Joseph Nye (2011, 105) “conveying information and selling a positive image are part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relations that create an enabling environment for government policies.” While PR might be useful in conducting daily and strategic communication, it has little value for building long-term relations. Here a critical role can be played by cultural relations which includes both **cultural diplomacy** (facilitating exchange and spread of culture and values it represents around the world) and **educational exchanges** (promoting mutual understanding through direct scholarship encounters). While traditional, cultural and educational activities focused on promoting art, science or the history of a given country, modern cultural relations have expanded its interest into promoting human rights, good governance or even environmental sustainability. Unlike PR or propaganda, the governmental actors play only a facilitating role in the exchange. The primary role is given to civil society actors—be it NGOs, universities or cultural institutions—as they are the one able to establish the necessary networks and promote dialogue between people across borders. A true dialogue of course has an impact on both parties of the communication process, even if they agree to disagree with each other. As underlined by Cowan and Arsenault (2008, 19) “dialogue should first and foremost be approached as a method for improving relationships and increasing understanding, not necessarily for reaching consensus or for winning an argument.” In that sense, cultural relations overlap with the concept of NPD (Melissen 2005b, 25) and alternative approaches such as a relational approach to PD (Taylor 2000). They see both PR and cultural

relations as relationship management, which instead of image cultivation should be the real focus of PD (Yang et al. 2011, 10).

Overall, although skillfully used by realists, PD is in its essence a liberal notion of communication (Melissen 2005b, 22). As defined by Yun and Toth (2009, 496) “*for liberalists, the role of public diplomacy is to create attraction for a country’s culture (values), ideals (political, economic, social systems), and policies to build an enabling environment for national interests.*” PD remains a tool of state policy, with its main goal to wield soft power. Finally, the mainstream of liberal thinking about PD assumes that if only foreign elites and publics had better information, they would become more supportive of the country’s policy decisions.

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Constructivism—a bi-product of post-Cold War global realities—is also the youngest of the three IR theories. It has challenged the dominant discourse of Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism by seeing IR not as an anarchic system, but one that is “socially constructed” and a “world of our making” (Onuf 1989). Constructivists argue that foreign affairs are created through the process of interaction between agents and the structures of their broader environment. Agents are by no means only states. These can be individuals, international organizations or non-state actors. Power revolves around actors’ ability to persuade others to accept their ideas. The material aspects of IR, so important for realists and liberalists, give way to the social meaning they carry. In consequence, it is the ability to influence these social meanings that is the main source of power (Sevin 2015, 564).

In its research, constructivism emphasizes the social dimensions of IR, underlining the importance of norms, rules and language (Dunne et al. 2013, 189). For Constructivists, key actors are not states or non-state actors, but ideas which have a critical role to play in shaping IR. Key interests on the contrary are not survival or security of states, but defining by agents’ core ideas and in consequence cooperating to redefine the International System. Constructivism argues that identities and interests of actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. To understand the behavior of agents, one needs to look at values, norms, identity, behaviors as well as practices (Lord 2005). Constructivism thus has the ability to capture these elements of global politics that are missed by others.

By breaking away for liberalism and neorealism, constructivism has arguably been able to deliver one of the most promising approaches to the study

of PD. As we will discuss later on in this chapter, its openness to exploring change in the basic mechanism of IR gives way to deliberations about the “new public diplomacy” and PD’s domestic dimension. In essence, by acknowledging that social constructs (such as norms, values, identities) are the real sources of power (Van Ham 2003) PD can use them in shaping the state’s image abroad, as well as public debate in foreign countries (Gilboa 2008). From a constructivist perspective, PD is not, however, a manipulative tool but one of finding common-grounds and strengthening collaboration. **Collaboration** (understood as joint initiatives on common projects in which participants from different countries take part) becomes the main form of PD communication (Cowan and Arsenault 2008, 21; Fisher 2013). As stressed by Yang et al. (2011, 4), “public diplomacy is a relationship building function that ultimately will create more commonalities among nations. When the focus is on creating shared values then public relations/public diplomacy practice and theory can transcend the limitations of image cultivation.” Much of the new thinking about PD is indeed heading in this direction with scholars stressing that national reputation is more about negotiating understanding than about projecting a certain image (Wang 2006, 94) and with countries such as Canada or Norway at the forefront of cooperative partnership thinking about PD audiences (Yun and Toth 2009, 497). Not only one-way messaging but also promoting cultural and educational links is downgraded and deemed as not being able to deliver the anticipated results. Instead, the future of PD is to engage foreign publics in an open debate where both sides listen, influence each other and act for a common good. As a consequence of this paradigm shift, PD ceases to be a uniquely state activity (Melissen 2005b, 8) and becomes one of a multitude of domestic actors (including NGOs), which work together with foreign audiences to address transnational challenges. As explained by Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos (2012, 734), the new aim of PD is then to “explain fully one’s policies and show how they contribute to the delivery of global public goods, such as peace, security, respect for human rights and international law, prosperity, sustainable development, and more.”

The greatest contribution of constructivism to the study of PD comes from the fact that it does not neglect the power of sociological approaches, among which are such phenomena as socialization, social capital accumulation and identity-building. In a process of political and bureaucratic **socialization**, being a result of close collaboration, interests and identities of states are created and modified by interactions with others (Wendt 1992,

404–407). As described by Sevin (2015, 565) from a socialization pathway perspective “the main aim is not to make a country more favorable in the eyes of the public. The objective is to **change the nature of relationship** between the practitioner and host country by undertaking projects.” This naturally affects the ways in which PD practitioners think about their role and interactions with the host society. The process of socialization is taking place also (or even more so) among different societies. Some scholars, such as sociologist Manuel Castells, claim that in fact PD ought to be the diplomacy of the people themselves—rather than that of states. The idea of “global governance without government” is surely a radical one. It, however, reflects the prominent roles that elements of civil society play in international affairs today. They are also a response to the information and communications technology revolutions which have created a network society which challenges organizational hierarchies (Castells 1996, 2008).

Collaboration also contributes to another sociological phenomenon, namely, the **accumulation of social capital**, which in essence are “norms and networks that enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 3). Scholars such as James Coleman (1988) and Robert Putnam (2000) have argued that networks and partnerships, both within and between communities breed social trust, foster norms and create stocks of goodwill, which can be invaluable in times of crisis. There are numerous advantages of high stocks of social capital among which are an increased ability of individuals to cooperate, an improved monitoring and enforcement of contracts and reduced free-riding (Fidrmuc and Gerxhani 2008, 265). It has been argued that social capital fosters pluralism and helps create democracy. For a society to advance, high levels of social capital within particular groups is however not sufficient. Instead, inter-group bridges are necessary to allow spreading its real benefits for society (Merickova 2014, 356). In the same way, for social capital to develop between societies such bridges can be created through PD activities which promote collaboration as the main form of PD communication. The connection between PD and social capital was first discussed by Cowan and Arsenault (2008). Among the more traditional (state-driven) fields of PD actions contributing to the creation of social capital between societies are culture, sports and education. These however serve first and foremost channeling (through intensified dialogue) certain ideas and values of a given country to the society of another country. In a new paradigm of PD, however, as argued by Laura Merickova “instead of spreading the ideologies

and norms, states should focus on developing functioning societies in the world and intergroup connections between social groups which is crucial for a society to prosper” (2014, 363). Such paradigm results in a greater focus of PD on general well-being of societies but also, according to the so-called **contact hypothesis**, contributes to the strengthening of mutual understanding between nations. In general, the hypothesis argues that “more contact between individuals belonging to antagonistic social groups ... tends to undermine negative stereotypes and reduce prejudice, thus improving inter-group relations by making people more willing to deal with each other as equals” (Forbes 1997, 116). This is only possible however if groups have equal status and share common goals. For this reason, a more prominent role is given to collaborative PD in general and to non-state actors leading such initiatives in particular. Through global advocacy campaigns or humanitarian and development aid distribution, domestic NGOs have mastered the art of collaboration on equal terms with their foreign partners. Through that they create an environment of trust and credibility, so necessary to accumulate social capital between societies.

Finally, the third sociological effect of international collaboration is **strengthening old and creating new group identities**. General studies on identity show how people form in- and out-groups in order to differentiate “us” from “the other.” Within one’s own group, individuals find it easier to extend empathy, cooperation and good will, remaining less likely to offer help or express trust toward other groups (Brewer 2001). Constructivists see however identities as “inter-subjectively negotiated, fluid, and multiple” (Browning 2013, 7). This relates also to national identities, understood as the sense of belonging to one state or one nation. The concepts of group and national identity are critical for both dialogical and collaborative PD. In the first case (dialogical PD), creating an image of a country requires that practitioners reach out to their own society in order to define the core characteristics and thus the message/image a country is trying to generate. As argued by Browning (2013, 4) today “political leaders are expected to provide a coherent narrative of society, its nature and place in the world, through the outlining of a sense of national mission and purpose.” By highlighting the national values and characteristics, the national identity may actually be strengthened or even modified through PD messaging. In that sense, although directed to foreign audiences, in its more traditional form PD may in fact serve domestic purposes by providing new mechanisms (such as national branding discussed below) for achieving national dignity. This approach

also strengthens PD itself. As maintained by Gonesh and Melissen (2005, 4) “*public diplomacy is perhaps more effective, and more lasting, when it is related to broad national values and interests rather than serving short-term policy objectives.*” In the second case (collaborative PD), an intense interaction between societies on common goals may witness the emergence of new, supranational identities. Such identities may serve certain national PD causes and be non-conflicting with national identities (ex environmentalists, humanitarian workers), yet in extreme cases may work to the detriment of the nation-states (terrorist networks). As stressed by Evans and Steven (2008) “Bin Laden is the quintessential public diplomat, not least in how he speaks past governments.”

An interesting communication theory that can be linked to both constructivism and the study of identity is **national branding**. Traditionally understood as a marketing strategy, which involved creating a specific image of a country in the mind of the foreign audience, national branding has evolved over time. Today it is also related to defining “identity, status, and recognition in a context where a lack of visibility is seen as inherently problematic” (Browning 2013, 2). As described by Van Ham (2002, 252), national branding also means a “shift in political paradigms from the modern world of geopolitics and power to the postmodern world of images and influence.” In trying to generate soft power, countries no longer see “otherness” as enmity. Instead they specialize more and more in communicating positive value and identity narrative to both foreign and domestic publics. They strengthen certain self-image and self-esteem of the domestic society (e.g. Norway as a Peace Nation), at the same time projecting such value image to foreign audiences. Some scholars call for a clear differentiation between national branding and PD (Melissen 2005b; Szondi 2008; Browning 2013; Merickova 2014). The enthusiasts of national branding argue that it moves beyond simple policy as the focus is on actively constituting national identities. Its target audience is no longer only foreign audiences (as in the case of PD) but more importantly domestic audiences (Melissen 2005b, 24). While PD has clear limitations set by policy-makers, nation branding is driven by a range of sectors and multiple stakeholders (Fan 2010, 102). In this sense, national branding formulates policy instead of simply selling it (as PD does) (Browning 2013, 7–8). For critics, however, national branding is effective only for economic goals such as attracting more investment or tourism to a country. It does not serve strengthening mutual understanding or promoting collaborative approaches across cultures. It cannot thus spread real influence or

to even diffuse (as would PD) values and norms (Merickova 2014, 351). It is instead an image promotion tool of one-way communication with foreign audiences. Some scholars go as far as to claim that nations cannot be branded at all. Simon Anholt, a governmental policy advisor widely credited for the creation of the term, has lately claimed that in fact national branding does not exist. Instead, he offered a new concept of “competitive identity” which merges PD and brand management. In accordance with the new thinking about PD, Anholt (2009) claims that reputation of a country can only be earned and that “the idea that it is possible to ‘do branding’ to a country (or to a city or region) in the same way that companies ‘do branding’ to their products and services, is vain and foolish.” Some scholars also add to this criticism by noting that it is very difficult for any country to create a single core message which could be used by different domestic stakeholders (business, NGOs, government) in different countries (Fan 2010, 102). The middle-ground between enthusiasts and critics of national branding is that both of these concepts are largely complementary, particularly in the area of relationship building (Szondi 2008, 2010). It has been even suggested that PD can bridge the concepts of constructivism, branding and communication studies (Gilboa 2008, 68).

The development of constructivism theories has had a profound meaning for the study of PD. It has helped to understand and explain the twentieth-century **interrelated revolutions in communication, politics and IR** and their impact on the practice of modern diplomacy. First, the information revolution has dramatically decreased the costs of communication and lowered barriers of entry to world politics (Nye 2011). This has in turn forced nations to mobilize wider coalitions, enhance dialogue within international institutions, communicate better with foreign publics and as a result begin to perceive international politics as a positive-sum game. Second, the political revolution and the democratization of foreign policy has incentivized states (particularly the MFAs) to work more closely with domestic audience as both the source (identity) and implementers (policies) of PD. In this regard, foreign policy becomes part of domestic policy, with people obtaining the right to be involved and co-decide. Third and final, the revolution in IR, known also as globalization, has broadened the definition of diplomacy beyond a government-to-government affair and opened up the field to a number of non-state actors, who become more and more relevant in the conduct of foreign policy. Globalization has also contributed to the internationalization of all domestic policies, with multiple ministries and state agencies exposed to international contacts and representing their country

abroad. MFAs are no longer the only actor in the realization of foreign policy objectives but more and more a coordinating one. Apart from placing PD in a completely new international context, constructivism has also influenced the interpretation of terms such as “strategic public diplomacy.” As described by Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos (2012, 733), under the new paradigm “strategic ... refers to the need to re-focus the thematic orientation of PD: instead of working predominantly on issues of culture, education and identity, PD should focus on the mounting threats common for and relevant to most, if not all, parts of the global population.”

In PD studies, theory tends to follow practice. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the deepening of the three intertwined revolutions has resulted in a new understanding of PD. The theoretical developments related to the so-called **New Public Diplomacy (NPD)** are a primary example. They skillfully describe what has become reality in the field: a movement from monologue (preferred by realists), to dialogue (chosen by liberalist), to collaboration (professed by constructivists). The concept of NPD has been explored by a number of prominent scholars (Melissen 2005a, b, 2011; Zaharna 2004, 2007, 2012; Cowen and Arsenaault 2008, Fitzpatrick 2007) and constitutes a significant development in thinking about contemporary diplomatic practice. In general, NPD refers to PD activities that promote collaborative and reciprocal engagement with foreign publics, originating from not so much government officials but domestic civil society (Graham 2014, 527). There are three main features of NPD. First, it sees the **development of relations between civil society actors abroad and at home** as activities at the forefront of PD, with the state playing only a facilitative role in the process (Melissen 2005a). Other public diplomacy activities such as one-way messaging, promotional campaigns (branding) or even direct contacts between government officials and foreign publics are downgraded in their importance. Second, NPD promotes the **network method of communication** (instead of the hierarchical or mass communication one), as the main way to assure honest and reliable information flow. As described by Zaharna (2007, 221) such approach, originating from the work of advocacy NGOs is *“inherently relations-centred in that it focuses on message exchange, relationship-building and network creation.”* This new method of communication means also a deep shift in thinking about PD messaging. Social relations become an end in itself, which reduces the importance of changing opinions and behaviors of foreign audiences (Graham 2014, 527). Third and final, NPD tries to assure coherence between PD work at home and abroad. The concept

of “**Domestic Dimension**”—discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter—comes to the forefront of PD thinking. Unsurprisingly, NPD ontology resonates very well with constructivist thinking about IR and diplomacy, which brings us to the conclusion that this IR theory is best suited to explain the new phenomena in the field.

SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL MODELS

Overall, the three grand theories of IR contribute to a better understanding of the development in thinking about the practice of diplomacy, including PD. Table 2.1 summarizes the main differences in perceptions of the international environment and PD’s role in foreign policy, as expressed by realists, liberalists and constructivists. With a few simplifications, the graph vividly illustrates the gradual evolution of PD throughout the last few decades—from a policy understood as a synonym of propaganda to becoming a collaborative process of negotiating understanding between nations.

The presented model of PD evolution relates in some ways to earlier attempts by other scholars to develop a theoretical framework for diplomacy,

Table 2.1 International relations theories and the development of public diplomacy

	<i>Realism</i>	<i>Liberalism</i>	<i>Constructivism</i>
Key actors	States	States and non-state actors	Ideas, values
Key interests	Survival/Security	Preferences	Cooperate to redefine International System
Preferred sources of power	Hard power	Soft power	Power-sharing schemes
Main goal of PD	Creating a positive image	Building relations	Negotiating understanding/ contributing to public global good
Preferred mode of PD communication	Monologue/ Bilateral	Dialogue/ Multilateral	Collaboration/ Network
Preferred instrument of PD	International broadcasting	Cultural and Educational exchanges	Humanitarian and development aid
Main PD concepts	Propaganda	Traditional public diplomacy	New Public Diplomacy/Domestic Dimension

including PD. For once it bears some similarities with the works of British academic Wight, who in the 1950s presented three sets of underpinning assumptions about the international order and the role of civil (international) society. First, he discussed the competitive Realist approach, where power and greed lead to the conclusion that no international society is possible and cooperation is limited only to states. Second, he analyzes the Rationalist model where state relations are based on the notion of trust and mutuality with international society playing an important role. Finally, he goes on to discuss the somewhat utopian Revolutionist model in which the influence of nation-states is limited to serving the international society, which forms a moral and cultural entity (L'Etang 2009, 16–17). Power comes not from sovereign states but from a world order that serves the interest of the people. Another taxonomy, this time specifically tailored for PD, is offered by Ethan Gilboa (2000, 2001). PD evolution is studied again within the framework of three models. In the Basic Cold War model, PD is exploited as an instrument in an antagonistic rivalry between two blocks. The main notions are persuasion and pressure—mainly through international broadcasting—in order to create a favorable image of the other side. The next, Non-state Transnational model acknowledges the changes in international affairs and examines PD activities of groups, NGOs and individuals (Gilboa 2008, 59). The final, Domestic PR model studies cases when governments prefer to use external PR agencies or local lobbyists (instead of government-sponsored PD), in order to reach out to foreign publics.

The Gilboa taxonomy acknowledges the new approach of states toward non-state actors, but sees it only as a tool of enhancing the effectiveness of PD strategies. In this sense, it is deeply rooted in the realist versus liberal thinking about PD. The findings of the following chapters move however beyond this paradigm. Although they do not go as far as to predict Wight's Revolutionary Model to come to life, they give firm grounds to argue that successful PD is no longer a state affair, but needs to be seen as a part of a larger, global collaboration of societies and groups which are redefining the International System. In order to navigate in these trouble waters, states will first and foremost have to further enhance dialogue and cooperation with their own, domestic societies and see it not only as an object of PD but indeed its subject.

The Domestic Dimension of Public Diplomacy

As argued by Kathy R. Fitzpatrick “domestic publics qualify as legitimate stakeholders who are affected by, or have the potential to affect, a nation's

ability to accomplish its public diplomacy goals” (Fitzpatrick 2012, 432). By acknowledging the existence of the “domestic dimension” of PD, scholars and practitioners move beyond the boundaries of traditional PD understanding as means of governmental communication with foreign publics. They also surpass the liberal PD paradigm, which singles out only one element of what constitutes modern domestic outreach, namely citizens’ support in carrying out governmental PD initiatives abroad. As defined by Jan Melissen, PD’s domestic dimension requires the government to engage “with one’s own domestic constituency with a view to foreign policy development and external identity-building” (Melissen 2005b, 9). This means that the civil society at home, depending on the circumstances, becomes a public, partner, source of inspiration and finally an actor of PD (Huijgh 2012, 363).

Traditionally, the domestic society has not been perceived as an audience, and even less so an actor of PD efforts. On the contrary, some states have undertaken legal measures to separate their own societies from the messaging sent abroad. For example, the Smith–Mundt Act passed by the US Congress in 1948 has specifically prohibited domestic dissemination of materials intended for foreign audiences (Metzgar 2012). Foreign Ministries, seen as state agencies without any domestic constituencies, had very little incentive to communicate with its domestic society. The general governmental communication would take place in the framework of the so-called **public affairs**, a PR branch which included the building and development of relations between an organization and politicians, governments and other decision-makers.

As discussed earlier, the twentieth century’s changes in the global system brought by the revolution in technology and mass communication resulted in a new understanding of PD (Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos 2012, 731). With the democratization of information space, emergence of non-state actors, spread of governance beyond the state and new phenomena such as cyber information warfare on civilian populations by state and non-state contenders (Gregory 2008, 283), a new set of instruments and approaches became necessary to navigate the waters of international politics. Responding to these challenges required also improving cooperation between different actors, as well as enhancing domestic legitimacy for foreign policy. During the first stage of changes within the MFAs, came the realization that the ultimate success of PD efforts heavily relies on engaging its own citizens in the realization of specific PD initiatives. This process is well illustrated in the USA’s example, where already from

the early 1950s the Department of State was extending its partnership in the realization of educational and cultural exchanges to universities, NGO operators as well as local governments (see Chap. 5). As the “strategic partnership” practice spread across Western countries, many MFAs began to use “public affairs” tools to engage with a growing number of domestic stakeholders such as journalists, activists or the business community. Although predominantly one-way, the communication based on newsletters, bulletins or statements served its purpose of explaining the complexities of the outside world and the state’s foreign policy to broader domestic publics.

In the twenty-first century, the thinking about the relationship between the domestic publics and PD has become even more profound. The internal **democratization of foreign policy** has significantly increased the importance of accountability of decision-makers to its voters. As presented in the two-level game contribution of Robert Putnam (1988) “the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics” (Moravcsik 1997, 513). On the one hand, domestic constituencies press the government to pursue policies that they favor, while the government builds coalitions among its voters. On the other hand, at the international level, the state is obliged to fulfill domestic expectations, while acquiring a minimum of damage to foreign relations as it is possible. The pressure to satisfy both domestic and international obligations forces states to play a two-level game, which in itself constrains foreign policy behavior. Although Putnam’s primarily goal was to explain states’ negotiating behavior, the model elucidates well the domestic influence on foreign policy decisions (Dosch 2006, 45). As underlined by Ellen Huijgh (2011, 64) from a PD perspective, the influence exercised by the domestic society requires moving “beyond the notion of electing representatives ... towards the continuous participation of domestic constituencies in foreign policy formation, debate, cooperation and the conduct of diplomatic affairs.” In that sense, domestic publics should receive as much of attention of foreign policy-makers as do foreign publics. Only then truly the supportive relations can be built.

PD scholars (Zaharna 2010, Huijgh 2011, Fitzpatrick 2012) as well as practitioners stress the importance of enhanced domestic engagement, citing three core reasons. First, such engagement gives ways for state PD initiatives to **gain greater credibility abroad** (Riordan 2005). As “post-modern publics are generally skeptical of authority” (Nye 2008, 105)

internal legitimacy often becomes a precondition for international respect and credibility. Especially in potentially hostile population segments, PD initiatives, which are supported, promoted or realized by different representatives of the domestic civil society, create an aura of greater trust and partnership. This is particularly important when building long-term relationships between societies remains the main goal of PD activities (Gonesh and Melissen 2005, 7). Second, a strong domestic dimension, based on partnership with a number of at-home stakeholders, means **greater access for state PD**. This is because the flexibility of people-to-people and NGO networks opens many doors and has proven to be particularly effective in penetrating states without regard to borders. What is sometimes unmanageable for the governments (i.e. promoting interreligious dialogue among societies, reaching out to publics in conflict areas, etc.) is possible for civil society actors who interact, sometimes on daily basis, with influential stakeholders in other countries. Finally, enhancing PD's domestic dimension is a way to **bridge the growing gap between foreign policy objectives and domestic public sentiment** toward the outside world (Zaharna 2010). As underlined by Evan Potter (2009, 48–49) “with publics ... demanding greater transparency and input into policy making, governments can no longer count on ‘spin’ to overcome communication challenges.” Instead they need to engage in information-based decision-making, where citizens form opinion and make judgments grounded in knowledge they receive among others from the government (Gonesh and Melissen 2005, 3). By doing so, governments not only enhance general transparency and accountability of foreign policy but most importantly win over domestic constituencies’ support for their policies abroad. This can significantly decrease the two-level game states need to play when conducting foreign policy.

The abovementioned arguments, although important from a governmental perspective, miss the part of the collaborative element that moves beyond the state-centered paradigm. They forget to acknowledge the growing need among different populations to interact on topics of common interest, independently from government (Huijgh 2011, 67). Because of this, as accentuated by Teresa La Porte (2012, 444) today PD definitions need to recognize “the blurring of limits between domestic and international interests, which have been raised by the so-called ‘inter-mestic’ players, meaning those that have domestic interests with international projection.” In many cases, representatives of the domestic societies become themselves actors of PD, with goals that go beyond or even

against those of the state. By resolving global challenges or responding to the needs of certain transnational groups, these actors gain the credibility which sometimes matches that of a state. Governments need to accept these new PD actors and explore ways of constructive collaboration. This requires widening the definition of domestic outreach to what concerns—as defined by Ellen Huijgh (2011, 64)—“longer-term goals that are at public diplomacy’s heart: supporting civil society initiatives that encourage relationship-building, understanding, and influence.” The Domestic Dimension of PD is no longer perceived as a public affairs exercise of the government, but instead includes a relational component where the state assists and coordinates with other actors PD efforts.

THE THREE PLATFORMS OF PD’S DOMESTIC DIMENSION

The engagement of government with its domestic constituency around PD efforts cannot be perceived as a one- or even two-way channel of communication. In fact, it is easier to explain the complexity of PD’s domestic outreach, by illustrating it as a set of three platforms—each with multiple channels of communication. These three platforms serve (a) explaining foreign policy to domestic publics and receiving feedback from citizens (informative platform); (b) engaging domestic civil society in specific state PD efforts as well as supporting PD activities undertaken independently by the domestic non-state actors (cooperative platform); (c) soul-searching in order to define national characteristics/identity for PD message purpose or to form such identity through PD campaigns (identity-defining platform) (Fig. 2.1).

The Informative Platform

The informative platform of domestic outreach serves first and foremost communicating with at-home society about international developments and the state’s foreign policy activities. Citizens should not however be perceived as passive recipients of state message but instead active participants in both domestic and foreign politics (Zaharna 2007, Melissen 2005b). In its most advanced form, the informative platform is an institutionalized public dialog in which domestic audience gains a voice in the foreign policy debate. The most important activities undertaken by government within this platform are those of educational, consultative or information-gathering nature. There is a growing importance of public feedback which is collected in surveys, public meetings or focus groups.




Fig. 2.1 Three platforms of public diplomacy's domestic outreach

Melissa Conley Tyler and et al. (2012) have identified three types of models for general MFA engagement with the domestic public—all falling under the informative platform concept. The most traditional, “one-way” communication is done through media, fact sheets, brochures, websites, statements or other publications. It is used by the majority of Ministries around the world in order to introduce the wider public to foreign policy topics. Within this model, the government may also co-finance speakers or courses at campuses (New Zealand) or run a YouTube channel to promote government’s international policies (Japan). The second model is based on dialogue with the public, which is to lead to stronger relationships between the MFA and the civil society representatives. Such dialogue can be conducted “face-to-face” or through online interactions. Among initiatives undertaken within this model are meetings of MFA representatives, including the Minister with wider publics (Canada), launching forums between actors in the public and private sector to exchange opinions and expertise (Norway, Australia) or opening the MFA buildings to citizens for special “diplomacy days” or “citizens events” (Poland, Finland). They also can comprise online projects such as the Chinese “Meet the Diplomats Online,” MFA blogs or even e-consultations on particular international issues (Finland). The final, third model evolves around the idea of partnership. This model, employed only by a handful of Ministries, requires close cooperation with specialized professionals for a more efficient policy

elaboration. Activities might include working with IT specialists to enhance e-diplomacy (USA); with representatives or arts and culture to bring new ideas to cultural diplomacy efforts (Korea, Norway) or through internship and volunteer programs to encourage the young generation to engage diplomatically and internationally.

Working with the domestic society, in the framework of the informative platform, can create at least three direct benefits for state's PD. First, it contributes to an increased understanding of state's international policy among the general public and thus gives the policy stronger legitimacy at home (and indirectly also abroad). Second, it provides government with direct citizen feedback on its foreign policy activities, which can then be used when evaluating performance and setting new goals. Third, it advances public comprehension of complex-global issues, preparing citizens to cope with future challenges and crisis (Huijgh 2011, 67). Finally, it fosters attentive publics and enhances interests in global issues, encouraging citizens to engage in direct contacts with foreign publics in the future (so-called **citizen diplomacy**). These contacts are later supported by the government within the collaborative platform of the domestic outreach.

The Cooperative Platform

The Cooperative Platform of PD's domestic outreach is the next step in state's engagement with its own society and a natural extension of activities undertaken within the informative platform. Here representatives of the domestic civil society² (in particular NGOs) no longer play only informative and consultancy roles for government but become effective government-policy implementers (state PD partners) or even independent actors pursuing their own PD activities (citizen diplomacy, NGO diplomacy).

The growing importance of state's activities within the cooperative platform can be again explained by the rapid changes brought by globalization. Over the last two decades, governments' ability to influence opinions in third countries in order to create a more positive environment for certain political deals have proven quite limited (Melissen 2005b, 12). In addition, disposable financial resources necessary for effective foreign affairs have been decreasing (van Ham 2003: 432–433). Messaging, promotional campaigns or even direct contact between government officials and foreign publics have not yield the expected long-term results. At the same time, as noted by Zaharna (2007, 218) "interpersonal communication with trusted or valued sources remains the most persuasive medium."

The increasing number of international interactions between societies, as well as privately sponsored initiatives enhancing these contacts, is forcing states to take a more holistic approach to working with non-state partners. This particularly concerns NGOs, which stand out because they recognize their role in PD (Snow 2008). These evolving patterns of diplomatic interactions between governments and non-state actors have been conceptualized by Geoffrey Wiseman in his definition of **Polylatateralism**. As argued by Wiseman (2010, 37) “the diplomat of the future will need to operate at the bilateral level (the conduct of relations between two states, usually via resident missions); the multilateral level (diplomacy between three or more states, at permanent or ad hoc international conferences); and, increasingly, the ‘polylateral’ level (relations between states and other entities).” The redefined role of diplomats and diplomacy is probably best illustrated by the evolution of PD and the growing importance of a collaborative approach also (or maybe especially) at the domestic level.

The Domestic Dimension’s cooperative platform should be seen as one made up of two separate, yet interconnected layers. Within the first layer, the state encourages the engagement of domestic civil society actors in ongoing state PD activities. At a minimum, this means holding open public tenders for PD project operators, which are then chosen from domestic NGOs and other non-state institutions. In its more advance forms, it allows NGOs and other domestic partners (ex universities, art centers) to influence the process of formulation of specific PD goals. This practice is well illustrated by the example of international exchange programs organized by the US Department of State. As discussed in detail in Chap. 5, best practices in both formulation and implementation of American Government-sponsored exchange programs heavily involve the domestic component. Not only are the NGO operators consulted on the content of these programs and the American public involved in key elements of the agenda; but in time, non-governmental actors can move from playing an implementing role into influencing the program design and policy formulation process. As maintained by Bruce Gregory (2008, 276), what happens is that “PD imports methods and discourse norms from civil society and depends on thick relationships with civil society to succeed.”

Within the second layer of the cooperative platform, the state supports independent, private initiatives pursued by domestic NGOs or local community that encourage international collaboration and dialogue with specific countries. It may do so through financial contribution, on-the-ground assistance (through Embassies and the consular network) or sometimes

simply by refraining from any actions—particularly if people-to-people cooperation concerns sensitive inter-societal issues where governmental and political interference might not be welcomed by the local society. For such support to be most effective, states need to follow the recent trends that characterize government–non-profit relations in other areas of domestic politics. These trends can be distinguished by the process of downgrading of the predominant instrumentalist/efficiency-oriented approach, where NGOs were seen by government as simply service providers (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002, 10). Instead, relations between government and NGOs, particularly in the PD domain, should be characterized by an emphasis on values, developing social capital (both at home and abroad) and promoting civic engagement in international cooperation.

Among the many domestic groups which can become partners of PD efforts are also **diaspora communities**. As acknowledged by Yun and Toth (2009, 498) “migrants, being carriers of information, values, and cultures, have functioned in human history as a powerful agent of inter-country and intercultural communications.” Unlike in the past, however, today migrants are no longer isolated and separated from their homelands. Some come to a country only for temporary work and later serve as information multipliers about that country when they return home. But even permanent immigrants continue to be closely connected to their homeland through communication and low-cost transportation. The ability to work and partner with such communities significantly raises the credibility of the message that reaches foreign audiences. One of the examples of positive cooperation involves the Australian Indian diaspora, which in the recent years actively participated in countering the negative image of Australia created by the 2009 Indian Melbourne bashing incident (see Chap. 5). Working with diasporas can have however also a downside effect, especially if the diaspora is not positively predisposed to their home countries’ governments. Then such communities can even become a liability for state PD, as they “actively oppose their home countries’ regimes and lobby their host governments against their home countries’ policies” (Potter 2009, 55).

Last but not least, the cooperative platform is a space where governments interact also with INGOs. Estimated to have reached the number of 40,000 (Union of International Associations 2016), INGOs engage many domestic citizens in advocacy and humanitarian projects that span across borders. Some of these organizations, such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace or Human Rights Watch are experienced international players, proposing alternative solutions to global issues and impacting directly and

indirectly national policy-making. Others (such as CARE, Caritas, Oxfam, Save the Children or World Vision)—as discussed in detail in Chaps. 3 and 4—are operating partners for the state’s international development aid redistribution. Government–INGO relations are developed in the so-called noosphere, which has been described as a “sphere of ideas, values, norms, and arguments within which both state and non-state actors are engaged; politics cease being only power-maximising but also adopt power-sharing aspects; and national interests are re-defined taking into account the interests and preferences of the wider society” (Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos 2012, 736). For governments to effectively cooperate with these partners it is not enough to acknowledge their impact and thus grant them recognition. It also requires opening up to the constructivist arguments where power is no longer only material but is based also on knowledge and ideas (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2009, 355) and where cooperation can and should serve larger “global public good.” From a governmental perspective, the cooperative platform gives a unique opportunity for a paradigm shift from a self-serving *realpolitik* to *noopolitik* where global development is seen as an important foreign policy goal for all states (Sfeir-Younis 2004, 31–32).

There are several reasons why a collaborative approach to working with both domestic civil society and INGOs is critical for government PD efforts. Today NGOs are the important referees for credibility of the main sources of soft power: values, culture and to some extent also foreign policy. As stressed by Joseph Nye (2008, 105–107) “although governments control policy, culture & values are embedded in civil societies.” Social capital and trust cannot be created through state direction or control, but need to be based on long-term collaboration of civic actors with shared values and interests. In that sense, NGOs become the real masters of PD, creating an informal atmosphere, where relationships are formed. Moreover, non-governmental actors are the drivers of new communication strategies and influence (La Porte 2012, 446). Their ability to work at home and abroad with numerous actors and with often very limited resources have made them front-runners in innovative solutions. NGOs continue to be more effective in humanitarian activities and more knowledgeable and influential in the local realities and cultures (Zateplina 2009; Merickova 2014). In that sense they continue to inspire state PD, which by its nature is constraint and even bureaucratic. Finally, if and when NGOs choose to work with their state government, they help to demonstrate internationally that also regular citizens support official foreign policy; which adds to its credibility and outreach (La Porte 2012, 457).

Although domestic civil society and INGO initiatives can complement and inspire state PD efforts, they also have the potential of undermining these efforts. This happens particularly when the interests and goals of both parties clash. Most recent examples involve Greenpeace bashing Australia for its negligence in protecting the Great Barrier Reef (more in Chap. 4) or Amnesty International (2016) staunchly opposing Denmark in its changes to refugee law. Such activities of non-state actors highlight state shortcomings and often damage the reputation build by years of PD efforts. States need to acknowledge however that—at least in liberal democracies—civil society organizations remain independent actors which escape state control. Moreover, many NGOs and INGO players have earned their reputation exactly by criticizing the government. Limiting their freedom of expression hampers their credibility and can only back-lash on state's soft power. As Joseph Nye (2008, 106) wrote “it is sometimes domestically difficult for the government to support presentation of views that are critical of its own policies. Yet such criticism is often the most effective way of establishing credibility.”

In sum, as the era of globalization has blurred the distinction between what is domestic and what is international, the cooperative platform of PD's domestic outreach is becoming essential to strengthening state foreign policy in general and PD in particular. It shows best the strategic values of aligning with NGOs in an efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of foreign audiences. This is done however not through image or argument, but by actually accounting for the interests and needs of these publics and serving a greater, global good.

The Identity-Defining Platform

The third and final area of PD communication and cooperation between the domestic public and government is the identity-defining platform. This space, largely neglected by most governments, gives an opportunity for all actors to conduct a soul-searching exercise with an aim of defining the nation/group identity for PD message purpose. If such message is already defined, the platform serves the reinforcing of the message within the society. In that sense, it creates an area where both national branding (discussed earlier) and PD meet.

Successful PD requires formulating a clear message, which a country wants to project to foreign audiences. In the case of larger powers (with developed PD outreach and a large supply of images), the messages can be

multiple, depending on the region or target audience. In the case of small and medium states, however, where visibility and distinctiveness is the key problem, clear and coherent messages, preferably focusing on “niche” areas of diplomacy, tend to yield the best results (Henrikson 2005, Fisher 2011).³ Such messages can carry certain characteristics of a specific nation, but even more importantly should reflect the intrinsic values of a given society. They must also reflect universal values that are recognized globally. Crafting such a message requires then a profound internal introspection and answering the key questions about “who we are” as a society, “how do we want to be perceived” (Gonesh and Melissen 2005, 17) and finally “what do we bring to the world” that others might value? Once a message or messages are defined, its target audience is no longer only foreign audiences but more importantly domestic audiences (Melissen 2005b, 24). While projected abroad the message is simultaneously used by a range of sectors and multiple stakeholders in a process of strengthening national identity and society’s sense of pride. This in turn creates a spiral of co-ownership where the message becomes a part of international activities undertaken by domestic civil society independently from government.

The two countries’ examples discussed in Chaps. 3 and 4 illustrate well the opportunities and challenges that come from defining national identities for PD purposes. On the one hand, the concept of “Norway as a Peace Nation” reveals a message formed in a process of self-examining the nature of Norwegian society, but also one that foreign audiences can easily identify with. This concept not only falls in line with general Norwegian self-identity discourse, but also creates a co-ownership spiral where governmental effort mingles with domestic public involvement. On the other hand, the clear lack of consensus on what constitutes Australia’s national identity creates a situation in which PD misses a coherent umbrella for its activities. Moreover, without a clear self-projection, it is very hard to counteract negative stereotypes which exist against Australian in many Asian countries. In other cases, a major challenge for PD might come from multiple identities or internal disagreements on history interpretations. As emphasized by Jan Melissen (2011, 12) “when different political factions have their own reading of a country’s social and political history, the past can be an obstacle in framing a future-oriented public diplomacy.”

In general, PD outliers such as Norway or Canada see the identity-defining platform as an inseparable part of PD and one of the main goals of domestic outreach. These states specialize more and more in communicating positive value and identity narrative to both foreign and domestic publics.

Although it has been acknowledged that “differences in value perceptions can inadvertently backfire if publics respond to a foreign value campaign by reaffirming their own value,” (Zaharna 2012:14) building value platforms as part of identity-defining brings the most preferable results. They strengthen certain self-image and self-esteem of the domestic society, at the same time projecting such value image to foreign audiences.

Overall the three platforms—informative, cooperative and identity-defining—form a coherent picture of the comprehensive efforts that states need to undertake to fully benefit from public diplomacy’s domestic dimension. They show the complexity of the process, which is arguably as difficult as working with foreign audiences. Yet through the multi-stakeholder synergy it creates, it contributes to a truly collaborative PD and one that can meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.

CHALLENGES FOR PD’S DOMESTIC DIMENSION

As a new concept in the field, the domestic dimension of PD has already encountered criticism. As a constructivist idea, it is in principle dismissed by most neorealists as a “Boys-Scout Good Deeds” construct, with little value for “true” national interest. Yet also liberalists of a more traditional mindset argue that linking diplomacy to domestic publics is controversial at best. They point out to the flawed logic of realizing foreign policy goals at home (Huijgh 2012, 360). Even those convinced of the necessity of a domestic outreach in the field, point out to numerous challenges it poses for the state, as well as the stakeholders involved.

For once, there is a potential threat of politicizing the domestic dimension and using dialogue with citizens for short-sighted electoral advantages. If vote-seeking drives the effort then there is a real danger of introducing a false international image to domestic publics in order to boost approval ratings. This means either “fear mongering” or “sugar-coating” the realities—both manipulative strategies which later backfire domestically. In addition, as observed by Nicolas Cull (2011, 130) a “state which is running its public diplomacy to please a home audience will tend to select activities which show the most easily demonstrable results.” Cull speaks also about the “Brezhnev syndrome,” when PD conduct is not motivated by the international objectives in mind but by short-term domestic calculations. China’s (2008) or Russia’s (2014) organization of Olympic games as a way to strengthen the domestic narrative of these countries “return to the world stage” is just one of many recent examples.

At the end, both powers have proven that the external soft power effect of the Olympic endeavor was marginal in their calculations. China has only harshened its discourse on the issue of Tibet and tightened its grip over dissidents; while Russia—a few hours after closing of the Olympics—invaded Ukrainian Crimea. The problem is that conducting PD based on domestic considerations not only undermines the effort abroad but also has long-term consequences related to the deception of one's own population (Cull 2011, 117–118). For this reason, the domestic outreach activities should be placed in the hands of PD practitioners (vs. politicians) and institutionalized as part of the MFAs “daily business.”

Second, as underscored by Al Fisher (2011, 278) “for genuine dialogue to occur there must be an element in which both sides are prepared to shift their position, yet public diplomacy practitioners rarely risk suggesting to their political masters that the domestic audience must shift their position or identity rather than just the foreign audience.” Indeed, the challenge is that the domestic messaging serves only strengthening the pre-conceived ideas, already existing in the society, rarely challenging the mainstream discourse. Diplomats and even Ministers of Foreign Affairs do not feel as legitimate actors to shape public perceptions and understanding. Without taking such a responsibility, however, conducting domestic outreach activities becomes an obsolete effort, with only the domestic pressure framing the end message and no dialogue in place.

Finally, the domestic dimension creates serious challenges for non-state domestic stakeholders—particularly NGOs. When partnering with governments on PD initiatives, NGOs often fear that their activities will become indistinguishable from PD and the perception of their independence will be tarnished. NGOs do not wish to be advocates of any political interests and the balancing act they have to perform in supporting specific state foreign policy initiatives is surely a difficult one.

CONCLUSIONS

By taking as the baseline for analysis the three major contemporary theoretical approaches to IR, this chapter has argued that constructivism has been able to deliver one of the most promising approaches to the study of PD. From a constructivist perspective, PD is not a manipulative tool of statecraft but instead a channel of finding common-grounds and strengthening collaboration. Collaboration—understood as joint initiatives on common projects in which participants from different countries take

part—becomes then the main form of PD communication. Its utilization creates new phenomena in PD such as international socialization, the creation of social capital or redefinition of state/group identities.

The openness of constructivism to explore change in the basic mechanism of IR gives way to deliberations about the NPD and PD's Domestic Dimension. NPD refers to PD activities that promote collaborative and reciprocal engagement with foreign publics, originating from not so much government officials but domestic civil society (Graham 2014, 527). To cooperate with the domestic civil society a new concept has been introduced, known as PD's "Domestic Dimension." This idea spans far beyond the traditional "public affairs" communication between domestic society and government. Unlike the previous forms of communication, the domestic outreach includes a relational component where the state assists and coordinates with other domestic actors' PD efforts. This chapter divides these activities into three platforms, which serve (a) explaining foreign policy to domestic publics and receiving feedback from citizens (informative platform); (b) engaging domestic civil society in specific state PD efforts as well as supporting PD activities undertaken independently by the domestic non-state actors (cooperative platform); (c) soul-searching in order to define national characteristics/identity for PD message purpose or to form such identity through PD campaigns (identity-defining platform). These three platforms show the complexity of the process, which is arguably as demanding for PD practitioners as working with foreign audiences.

In sum, the chapter has described the evolution of PD throughout the last few decades—from a policy understood as a synonym of propaganda to becoming a collaborative process of negotiating understanding between nations. It has argued that successful PD is no longer a state affair, but needs to be seen as a part of a larger, global collaboration of societies and groups which are redefining the International System. In order to navigate in these trouble waters, states will first and foremost have to further enhance dialogue and cooperation with their own, domestic societies and see civil engagement as a benchmark of PD success. As we will illustrate in the following chapters, the outliers of PD will be those states that can make the most of collaboration with domestic societies, with an outlook for a greater global public good.

NOTES

1. Framing is defined as selecting and highlighting some aspects of a situation to promote a particular interpretation.

2. Civil society embraces a broad range of actors and organizations. Among them, the most recognizable are NGOs which are independent, not-for-profit, voluntary organizations operating at a local, national and /or transnational levels. Apart from NGOs, civil society is also made up of local communities, including religious and diaspora communities that are independent from government (Hutter 2006, 7).
3. Niche diplomacy is defined as specializing and focusing its resources within one area so to yield the best returns (Henrikson 2005: 67). The vital part of niche diplomacy is that it can be presented as “beyond national self-interest” subsuming the national into the collective effort (Fisher 2011, 281).

REFERENCES

- Amnesty International. (2016, January 20). *Danish Parliament should reject cruel and regressive changes to refugee law*. Press Release. Available online at: <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/danish-parliament-should-reject-cruel-and-regressive-changes-to-refugee-law>
- Anholt, S. (2009). *Why nation branding does not exist*. Available online at: <http://kommunikationsmaaling.dk/artikel/why-nation-branding-does-not-exist/>
- Auer, C., & Srugies, A. (2013). *Public Diplomacy in Germany* (CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 5 USC). Center on Public Diplomacy.
- Brewer, M. B. (2001). In group Identification and Intergroup conflict: When does in group love become outgroup hate? In R. D. Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), *Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brinkerhoff, J. M., & Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2002). Government-nonprofit relations in comparative perspective: Evolution. *Themes and New Directions', Public Administration and Development*, 22, 3–18.
- Browning, C. (2013) Nation Branding, National Self-Esteem, and the Constitution of Subjectivity in Late Modernity. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1–20.
- Castells, M. (1996). *The rise of the network society. The information age: Economic, society and culture* (Vol. I). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (2008). The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global governance. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 78–93.
- Coleman, J. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 95–120.
- Conley Tyler, M., Abbasov, A., Gibson, N., & Teo, F. (2012, April 30). *Domestic public diplomacy*. Discussion Paper: International Experience. Australian

- Institute of International Affairs. Available online at: <http://apo.org.au/resource/domestic-public-diplomacy-discussion-paper-international-experience>
- Cowan, G., & Arsenault, A. (2008). Moving from monologue to dialogue to collaboration: The three layers of public diplomacy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 10–30.
- Cull, N. (2006, April 18). *Public diplomacy before Gullion: The evolution of a phrase*. USC Center on Public Diplomacy. Available online at: http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/060418_public_diplomacy_before_gullion_the_evolution_of_a_phrase
- Cull, N. J. (2008). Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 31–54.
- Cull, N. J. (2011). ‘Karen Hughes and the Brezhnev Syndrome: The trial of public diplomacy as domestic performance. In A. Fischer, & S. Lucas (Eds.), *Trials of engagement: The future of U.S. public* (pp. 111–133).
- Cull, N., Culbert, D. H., & Welch, D. (Eds.). (2003). *Propaganda and mass persuasion: A historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the present*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio.
- Dosch, J. (2006). The impact of democratization on the making of foreign policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. *Südostasien aktuell: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 25(5), 42–70.
- Doyle, M. W. (1986). Liberalism and world politics. *American Political Science Review*, 80(4), 1152.
- Dunne, T., Kurki, M., & Smith, S. (2013). *International relations theories. Discipline and diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Entman, R. M. (2008). Theorizing mediated public diplomacy: The U.S. case. *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13, 87–102.
- Evans, A., & Steven, D. (2008). Towards a theory of influence for twenty-first century foreign policy: The new public diplomacy in a globalized world. In *Engagement—Public diplomacy in a globalized world*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- Fan, Y. (2010). ‘Branding the nation: Towards a better understanding. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 6, 97–103.
- Fidrmuc, J., & Gerxhani, K. (2008). Mind the gap! Social capital, East and West. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 36, 264–86.
- Fisher, A. (2011). Looking at the man in the mirror: Understanding of power and influence in public diplomacy. In A. Fischer & S. Lucas (Eds.), *Trials of engagement: The future of U.S. Public* (pp. 271–97).
- Fisher, A. (2013). *Collaborative public diplomacy. How transnational networks influenced American Studies in Europe*. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2007). Advancing the new public diplomacy: A public relations perspective. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 2, 187–211.
- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2012). Defining strategic publics in a networked world: Public diplomacy’s challenge at home and abroad. *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 421–40.

- Fitzpatrick, K., Fullerton, J., & Kendrick, A. (2013). Public relations and public diplomacy: Conceptual and practical connections. *Public Relations Journal*, 7(4), 1–21.
- Forbes, H. D. (1997). *Ethnic conflict: Commerce, culture and the contact hypothesis*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gilboa, E. (2000). Mass communication and diplomacy: A theoretical framework?. *Communication Theory*, 10(3), 275–309.
- Gilboa, E. (2001). Diplomacy in the media age: Three models of uses and effects. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 12(2), 1–28.
- Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a theory of public diplomacy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 55–77.
- Gilpin, R. G. (1986). The richness of the tradition of political realism. In R. O. Keohane (Ed.), *Neorealism and its critics* (pp. 301–21). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gonesh, A., & Melissen, J. (2005). *Public diplomacy: Improving practice* (Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 5). Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.
- Graham, S. E. (2014). Emotion and public diplomacy: Dispositions in international communications, dialogue, and persuasion. *International Studies Review*, 16, 522–39.
- Gregory, B. (2008). Public diplomacy sunrise of an academic field. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 274–90.
- Henrikson, A. (2005). Niche diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The global “Corners” of Canada and Norway. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.
- Hobbes, T. (2008). *Leviathan*. London: Forgotten Books.
- Holbrooke, R. (2001). Get the message out. *Washington Post*, B07.
- Huijgh, E. (2011). Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension, *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 1(2), 62–74.
- Huijgh, E. (2012). Public diplomacy in flux: Introducing the domestic dimension. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7, 359–67.
- Hutter, B. M. (2006). *The role of non-state actors in regulation* (Discussion Paper No. 37). London: Economic and Social Research Council, London School of Economics.
- Kaufman, J. P. (2013). *Introduction to international relations: Theory and practice*. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Keohane, R. O. (1986). *Neo-realism and its critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kunczik, M. (1997). *Images of nations and international public relations*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- L’Etang, J. (2008). Public relations, persuasion and propaganda: Truth, knowledge, spirituality and mystique. In A. Zerfass, B. van Ruler, & K. Sriramesh

- (Eds.), *Public relations research: Innovative approaches, European perspectives and International challenges* (pp. 252–69). Wiesbaden: Springer.
- L'Etang, J. (2009). Public relations and diplomacy in a globalized world: An issue of public communication. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(4), 607–26.
- La Porte, T. (2012). The impact of “Intermestic” non-state actors on the conceptual framework of public diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7, 441–58.
- Leonard, M., Small, A., & Rose, M. (2005). *British public diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
- Leonard, M., Smewing, C., & Stead, C. (2002). *Public diplomacy*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
- Lord, K. M. (2005, August 31). *What academics (should have to say) about public diplomacy*. Paper presented at the APSA Political Communication Conference on International Communication and Conflict, Washington, DC. Available online at: <http://media.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01559f.html>
- Malone, G. (1985). Managing public diplomacy. *Washington Quarterly*, 8(3), 199–213.
- Manheim, J. B. (1994). *Strategic public diplomacy and American foreign policy: The evolution of influence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Melissen, J. (2005a). The New public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations* (pp. 3–27). Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Melissen, J. (2005b). *Wielding soft power: The new public diplomacy* (pp. 19–22) (Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 2).
- Melissen, J. (2011). *Beyond the new public diplomacy* (pp. 1–30) (Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 3).
- Merickova, L. (2014). Alternative approaches to public diplomacy. *Polish Sociological Review*, 3(187), 351–65.
- Metzgar, E. T. (2012). Public diplomacy, Smith-Mundt and the American Public. *Communication Law and Policy*, 17(1), 67–101.
- Mor, B. D. (2006). Public diplomacy in grand strategy. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2(2), 157–76.
- Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. *International Organization*, 51(4), 513–53.
- Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004). *Soft power—The means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye, J. S., Jr. (2002). *The Paradox of American Power—Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nye, J. S., Jr. (2008). Public diplomacy and soft power. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 94–109.
- Nye, J. S., Jr. (2011). *The future of power*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye Jr, J. S. & Keohane, R. (1971). ‘Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction’, *International Organization*, 25(3), 329–49.

- Ociepka, B. (2012). Nowa Dyplomacja Publiczna—perspektywa teorii stosunków międzynarodowych i komunikowania politycznego. *Przegląd Strategiczny, Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNPiD UAM*, 1, 129–40.
- Onuf, N. (1989). *World of our making. Rules and rule in social theory and international relations*. Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Potter, E. (2009). *Branding Canada: Projecting Canada's soft power through public diplomacy*. Montreal, QC and Kingston, ON: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Proedrou, F., & Frangonikolopoulos, C. (2012). Refocusing Public Diplomacy: The Need for Strategic Discursive Public Diplomacy. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 23(4), 728–45.
- Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427–60.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
- Riordan, S. (2005). Dialogue-based public diplomacy: A new foreign policy paradigm? In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations* (pp. 180–95). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ronfeldt, D., & Arquilla, J. (2009). Noopolitik: A new paradigm for public diplomacy. In N. Snow & P. Taylor (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy* (pp. 352–359). New York and London: Routledge.
- Sevin, E. (2015). Pathways of connection: An analytical approach to the impacts of public diplomacy. *Public Relations Review*, 41(4), 562–8.
- Sfeir-Younis, A. (2004). The role of civil society in foreign policy: A new conceptual framework. *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, (Summer/Fall), 29–32.
- Signitzer, B. H., & Coombs, T. (1992). Public relations and public diplomacy: Conceptual convergences. *Public Relations Review*, 18(2), 137–47.
- Singer, P. (2004). The Saudis' \$20 million image campaign. *National Journal*, 36, 2248–9.
- Snow, C., Jr. (2008). The privatization of US public diplomacy. *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 32(1), 189–99.
- Strömbäck, J., & Kioussis, S. (2013). Public relations society of America political public relations: Old practice, new theory-building. *Public Relations Journal*, 7(4), 1–17.
- Szondi, G. (2008). *Public diplomacy and nation branding: Conceptual similarities and differences*. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
- Szondi, G. (2010). From image management to relationship building: A public relations approach to nation branding. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 6, 333–43.
- Taylor, M. (2000). Toward a public relations approach to nation building. *Journal of Public Relations Research*, 12(2), 179–210.

- Tuch, H. N. (1990). *Communicating with the World: US public diplomacy overseas*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Union of International Associations. (2016). Accessed January 17, 2016, from <http://www.uia.org/yearbook> (homepage).
- Van Ham, P. (2002). Branding territory: Inside the wonderful worlds of PR and IR theory. *Millennium*, 31(2), 49–69.
- Van Ham, P. (2003). War, lies, and videotape: Public diplomacy and the USA's War on Terrorism. *Security Dialogue*, 34(4), 427–44.
- Viotti, P. R., & Kauppi, M. V. (1999). *International relations theory*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Wang, J. (2006). Managing national reputation and international relations in the global era: Public diplomacy revisited. *Public Relations Review*, 32(2), 91–6.
- Welch, D. (1999). Powers of propaganda. *History Today*, 49(8), 24–6.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46(2) (World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 391–425
- Wiseman, G. (2010). Polylateralism: Diplomacy's third dimension. *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, 4(1), 24–39.
- Woolcock, M., & Narayan, D. (2000). Social capital: Implications for development theory, research and policy. *World Bank Research Observer*, 15(2), 225–49.
- Yang, A., Klyueva, A., & Taylor, M. (2011). *A relational approach to public diplomacy in a multipolar world: Understanding the U.S.—China—Russia relationship concerning Libya through the People's Daily Newspaper*. Paper presented at the 'The Future of U.S.-Chinese Media Communication and Public Diplomacy in a Post-Crisis World', Amherst, MA, August 23–25, 2011.
- Yun, S.-H., & Toth, E. (2009). Future sociological public diplomacy and the role of public relations: Evolution of public diplomacy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(4), 493–503.
- Zaharna, R. S. (2004). From propaganda to public diplomacy in the information age. In N. Snow & Y. Kamalipour (Eds.), *War, media, and propaganda: A global perspective*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Zaharna, R. S. (2007). The Soft Power Differential: Network Communication and Mass Communication in Public Diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 2(3), 213–28.
- Zaharna, R. S. (2010). *Battles to bridges: U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy after 9/11*. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zaharna, R.S. (2012). *The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*, Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.
- Zatepilina, O. (2009). Non-state Ambassadors: NGOs Contribution to America's public diplomacy. *Place Branding and Diplomacy*, 5(2), 156–68.

Norway as a Peace Nation

INTRODUCTION

With a population of only five million and a location “somewhere in Scandinavia,” Norway sometimes struggles with the problem of invisibility and lack of distinction from other states of the region. Yet on the diplomatic front, Norwegian presence is felt more strongly than the country’s size and assets would otherwise suggest. For almost two decades now, Norway has consistently been able to punch above its weight and influence the international agenda in ways that go beyond the hard power resources it possesses. This is because Norway has prioritized its PD efforts into presenting Norway as a force for peace in the world (Leonard and Small 2003; Batora 2005). By pursuing niche diplomacy in a single area and consequently assuring resources for this purpose, Norway has skillfully used its comparative advantage (peace tradition and culture of consensus), as well as what others would see as a disadvantage (the small size of the state) to its credit.

Norwegian peace efforts are manifold and have a long tradition dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century (Skånland 2010). They encompass different types of activity. The country tries to prevent conflict through humanitarian and development aid, peace mediations and facilitations, but also by contributing to international peacekeeping efforts. Its role in brokering the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine and its later engagement in Guatemala, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Philippines, Haiti and Columbia have elevated Norway’s reputation as a “good international

citizen” (Mack 2007). This reputation has been strengthened by Norway continuing to be one of the largest Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development donors of foreign aid to poor countries (OECD 2014). Finally, with a strong track-record in supporting the United Nations (UN), Norway has also played an important role in developing international humanitarian law.

From a realist theory perspective, Norwegian PD can be evaluated as a long-term, cohesive foreign and security policy effort, based on the assumption that only through supporting peace in the world, can peace for Norway be assured (Støre 2006). It can also be seen as a carefully crafted diplomacy endeavor that resonates with foreign publics. In these two cases, any analysis of the phenomenon can call upon the abundant research available on Scandinavian foreign policy (Jacobsen 2009; Lee-Ohlsson 2009). This chapter takes a different approach and analyzes Norwegian foreign policy through the prism of new developments in the field of PD, including the “domestic dimension.” It attempts to answer a wider research question about the importance of domestic society involvement in formulating a credible PD message. By bringing forward the Norwegian example, it is argued that the real strength of any PD effort lies in the unequivocal support of the domestic public, as well as its engagement in the formulation and realization of the diplomacy effort. The “Norway as a Peace Nation” concept not only falls in line with general Norwegian self-identity discourse, but creates a co-ownership spiral where governmental effort mingles with domestic public involvement. In this sense, Norwegian PD and the so-called Norwegian Model of foreign policy realization reflect the core principles of NPD, which puts civil society—domestic and foreign—at the forefront of PD (Melissen 2005a, 2007; Cull 2009; Rugh 2011).

The chapter concentrates on the internal (social and political) conditions and rationale behind the development of Norwegian PD as seen by Norwegian diplomats and representatives of the non-governmental sector. It provides an insider’s account of the country’s PD efforts. By asking 18 Norwegian diplomats and NGO representatives about their opinions on Norwegian PD efforts, this case-study finds that the high level of the country’s engagement in international peace efforts and its success in pursuing this “niche diplomacy” (Batora 2005; Henrikson 2005) can be attributed to two factors: the ability of the government to capitalize on the belief that Norwegians are a Peace Nation with a missionary obligation, and the existence of the so-called Norwegian Model, which allows

the creation of efficient interaction between government, civil society and research institutions in specific foreign policy efforts (Egeland 1988). Both factors combined to make Norwegian PD a model example of NPD, where domestic civil society remains both an audience (the “We are a Peace Nation” notion) and a driver (the Norwegian model of cooperation) of state PD efforts.

THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF PEACE ENGAGEMENT IN NORWEGIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Historical Outlook on Norway’s Peace Diplomacy

As in the case of almost all states, Norway’s foreign policy objectives have been largely determined by historical and geopolitical factors. As a result of a political union with Denmark, later replaced by a personal union with Sweden, Norway until 1904 would not pursue an independent foreign policy (Simensen 2000, 93). The later 1814 union with Sweden, had however important consequences for the future of the Norwegian foreign policy discourse. On the one hand, as most diplomats in Norway remained Swedish, no systematic thinking of Norway’s place in the world could have been formed. On the other hand, when the first Norwegian parliamentary government was established in 1870 and questions regarding the divergence of Norwegian and Swedish interest in the world arose, they were formed aside from the real-politic tradition of thinking about IR (Holst 1985). As explained by one of the respondents to this study at that time “Norway had no nobility. Aristocracy was abolished in 1821, so there were no people carrying the traditional thinking of foreign-affairs. When in most of the countries the base-line was *real-politik*, in Norway the baseline established around 1890 is liberal. The default way of thinking about the world is liberal” (Interview, 18 June 2012a).

By actively advocating against wars, the nineteenth-century national liberal opposition produced the first powerful peace discourse in Norwegian foreign policy. When in 1904 Norway declares the dissolution of the union with Sweden, the principle of neutrality becomes a natural choice of the newly independent state. The years 1904–1919 are a time when nation-building process is at the forefront of Norwegian politics and the focus is placed on differentiating Norway culturally from Denmark and politically from Sweden. The very limited traditions and resources to pursue foreign policy result in pushing international affairs to the margins of

political debate. In an effort to avoid getting involved in wars, Norway refrains from alliances, stressing its neutrality and interest only in trade cooperation. As was clearly stated by the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Jørgen Løvland, during a 1905 debate in the Storting: “If one looks at external affairs, it is always said with great force: we do not want a foreign policy. I have used the same expression, and can agree with it” (after: Leira 2010). Norway departs from its official policy of isolation only in 1920, when it joins the League of Nations. As represented within the League by statesmen such as Carl Joachim Hambro¹ or Fridtjof Nansen,² Norway promotes international arbitration agreements and international humanitarian relief solutions (Ingebritsen 2006). It also closely cooperates with other Nordic nations in supporting peacekeeping measures.

The liberal foreign policy discourse is dramatically challenged by the events of World War II. In the first year of the war, Norway makes attempts to gather other small, neutral nations and broker peace for Europe. Yet the invasion of Nazi Germany on its territory in 1940 reveals the state’s complete vulnerability to geopolitics at work and has two direct consequences for the later Norwegian self-image. On the one hand, the war creates a strong sense of national unity and produces important memories of heroic resistance against the Nazis. On the other hand, it brings the realization that isolation and neutrality are not viable options for Norway. It thus opens the way for a new era of Norwegian activism, which is first defined by Norwegian foreign minister in exile Trygve Lie.³ From 1941, he speaks of Norway’s role of “bridge building” (Udgaard 1973, 177) and expresses the new philosophy as follows: “The smaller nations have a great part to play in cementing peace. They are disinterested in many political disputes;

¹ Carl Joachim Hambro (1885–1964) was a leading Norwegian politician representing the Conservative Party, serving for 20 years as President of the Parliament. He was actively engaged in international affairs, including work with the League of Nations (where he served as its last President) and delegate to the UN General Assembly.

² Fridtjof Nansen (1861–1930) was a polar explorer, artist, statesmen and Nobel Peace Prize winner. He became internationally recognized for his innovative humanitarian relief work. In 1922, under his leadership, an international agreement was adopted which created the “Nansen passports” for displaced people. The agreement had helped 500,000 refugees to return to their homeland. Nansen was also Norway’s diplomatic representative to London and the League of Nations.

³ Trygve Lie (1896–1968) was a Norwegian politician, labor leader and government official. He served as Norwegian Foreign minister during the critical years of the Norwegian government in exile in London from 1940 to 1945. From 1946 to 1952 he was the first Secretary-General of the UN.

their ambitions are cultural and economic (...), their foreign policy should aim at making a sincere contribution to the mutual understanding and confidence of the great powers” (Lie 1969, 29–32). The new activism of Norway would be defined from now as fostering multilateral solutions to world’s problems and undertaking concrete measures to promote peace worldwide. In that sense, despite the World War II experience, the liberal tradition of foreign policy is preserved, with Norway becoming one of the staunchest supporters of the newly created UN System and a norm entrepreneur in world politics.

Norway has entered the Cold War period with a wish to remain outside bloc formations. Yet the increasing East–West tension and Norway’s geographical position soon proved such policy to be unsustainable. The decision to join North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) as a founding member in 1949 was thus not a consequence of experience of the World War II but rather a response to a growing threat from its direct neighbor, the Soviet Union. Interestingly enough, joining a military alliance did not seem to harm the concept of Norway as a peace nation—either internally or externally. Throughout the Cold War period, the state continued its multilateral “third way” strategy between the East and West divide (Dörfer 1997, 59–91). The strategy was based on active participation in the UN and a limited NATO engagement.

The end of the Cold War marks an end of the semi non-alignment policy skillfully pursued by Norway for the previous 150 years. Although objectively speaking after 1989 Norway’s security vastly improves, the country has problems with adjusting to the new geopolitical situation (Greager 2007, 95–96). With the disappearance of NATO’s “North flank,” Norway perceives itself first as “security Cinderella” (Petersen 2000) and begins a search for a clearer identity in foreign policy. The 1994 referendum, in which Norwegians vote against EU membership, becomes a decisive factor in motivating the state to step up in its international activities (Houben 2005, 100). As argued by one of the respondents to this study: “The fact that Norway is out of the European Union, creates the need to compensate the lack of presence by engaging and trying to strengthen other forums including OECD, NATO and the United Nations” (Interview, 22 June 2012a).

In search of what Joseph Nye (2004) called an “attractive cause” Norway decides to capitalize its efforts on the strengths it already possesses: namely, its commitment to multilateral solutions, international solidarity and experience in peace processes. In the 1990s, the multilateral aspect of its activities is strengthened, with Norway becoming a driving force for UN reforms

and later UN peace-building efforts. Norway also increases its engagement in peace and reconciliation efforts, not only playing a supporting role in processes led by other players, but also becoming an honest peace-broker itself. As we will see throughout the chapter, Norwegian peace efforts are pursued alongside and in synergy with humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peacekeeping activities within NATO and the UN. With a credo that “it is sometimes possible for a country to do very well by doing good” (Hendrikson 2005, 68), Norway pursues a niche diplomacy, skillfully utilizing its comparative advantage of tradition in peace efforts.

The “Peace Nation” Concept and Norwegian Identity

The concept of “Norway as a Peace Nation” refers to a society that does not adhere to violence, either internally or externally, but instead actively engages in peace efforts around the globe. Previous research indicates that the notion has helped Norway to develop an efficient niche diplomacy tool of a small state (Batora 2005; Henrikson 2005)—one which challenges the realist view that middle powers are mere followers of great powers on global security issues (Behringer 2005; Neumann 2011). It has been argued that the “Peace Nation” concept is discursively constructed, and dominant media and political representation have a profound influence on how Norwegians look upon their engagement (Skånland 2010). This in turn has resulted in the creation of a foreign policy competitive advantage, which, as Henrikson (2005, 71) points out, “is inherited from past commitments and is reconfirmed by years of faithful observance.”

As the chapter will show, however, what assures the policy’s continuous realization and faithful observance is not a dominant public discourse, but rather the fact that the peace engagement is strongly linked to the very identity of the Norwegian nation (Egeland 1988; Riste 2001). By “national identity” I mean not just the sense of belonging to one state or nation, but also an “awareness of difference” from other groups, experienced both on the domestic and international levels (Lee-Ohlsson 2009). In Norway this strong sense of “being different” even has its own term: *Annerledeslandet* (“odd country”).⁴

⁴The concept of *Annerledeslandet*, inspired by a Rolf Jacobsen poem, was first used in the public discourse in Norway prior to the EU membership referendum in 1994. Opponents of membership argued that Norwegian political values of environmental sustainability, social egalitarianism and global solidarity would best be kept intact if it remained outside the EU.

Indeed, most respondents of the study admitted that they do not consider Norwegian PD to be a pre-debated and calculated foreign policy choice undertaken by the Norwegian MFA. Instead, it is more of an organic development, reflecting the actions and expectations of Norway's society (Interview, 18 June 2012c). As contended by one respondent representing the Norwegian think tank community: "The image of Norway as a Peace Nation goes back to the moment when Norwegians started to think about themselves as such. It is not something imposed by Norwegian politicians. If the Peace Nation concept is indeed pushed by the politicians, it is done so to a very receptive audience" (Interview, 18 June 2012a). This thesis has been reconfirmed in a number of interviews. As acknowledged by one of the representatives of the MFA of Norway: "The image of a Peace Nation is not a choice. It is part of our history of a travelling, missionary, reaching-out nation. It is not a brand or strategy but our national characteristic. It is a story that is living its own life" (Interview, 18 June 2012b).

If PD is indeed pursued on the basis of the society's identity and its most intrinsic traits, then what are the characteristics of Norway and Norwegian society that contribute to the country's success in its international engagement on behalf of peace in the world? An in-depth analysis points to three elements—all confirmed by respondents—that can explain Norway's advantage in pursuing a niche diplomacy agenda in peace and reconciliation efforts worldwide.

First is the **tradition of solidarity and liberal internationalism**. From early childhood, Norwegians are taught that a little less than 100 years ago the country was one of the poorest ones in Europe. Yet even then, Norway—a nation of farmers and sailors—cultivated a strong tradition of solidarity and wealth-sharing (Epland and Kirkeberg 2012). As a result of the influence exercised by two important twentieth-century popular movements—the Labor and the Christian movements—Norwegian solidarity culture has been extended to outside the country. The Labor movement (promoting a concept of solidarity through international aid) and the Lutheran State Church (evoking a missionary tradition expressing itself through values of Christian compassion) have created an interesting coalition merging the interests of people with fundamentally different backgrounds (Helgesen 2003). These two traditions combined have produced lasting popular support for the idea of global justice and Norway's international engagement on its behalf (Leiren 2005). As described by a high representative of the state-run Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) "If you go to the Norwegian countryside there

are many people who are very skeptical regarding development assistance. Yet if you explain to them that it is unfair that some people in the world are in war or are very poor, most society is very responsive because of our equality tradition. People here have a strong sense of fairness” (Interview, 21 June 2012a). The absence of strong societal divisions throughout its history and the attachment to ideas of justice and equality have made Norwegian society receptive to new concepts of international order. Among them is liberal internationalism, which argues that liberal states should intervene (militarily or through humanitarian aid) in other sovereign states in order to pursue liberal objectives. The liberal internationalism tradition has allowed Norway to continue to commit ever-increasing funding to humanitarian and development efforts. It also explains the popular consensus on Norway’s involvement in the out-of-area missions of NATO, as long as they can be labeled “humanitarian” and have the legitimacy of the international community. The traditions of liberal internationalism have been followed by the idea of “liberal institutionalism,” which describes a general orientation toward multilateralism and the belief that nations should cooperate because their long-term mutual interests are of greater value than their individual short-term needs. In that sense, Norway’s foreign policy is more globally oriented than foreign policies of most of its European counterparts. As argued in a book co-authored by Michael Emerson (2002, 87–88), “The humanistic activism is conceived in global terms, and has led to the claim that Norway has more foreign policy per capita than other nations. To the extent that when average Norwegians today think about Norway’s international role, it is usually with a global rather than a European perspective.”

The second identity characteristic explaining Norway’s advantage in pursuing a niche diplomacy agenda is its **cooperative culture and high level of social trust**. Norwegian society’s cooperative culture remains one of its fundamental characteristics and is present at all levels. It is defined by a comparatively high level of trust between citizens and between citizens and government, with a general attitude of co-ownership and efficient democratic control (Archer and Joenniemi 2003). The existence of a strong cooperative culture leads to more vibrant civil society, measured in terms of membership affiliation and active civic engagement.⁵ When put

⁵ According to the NGO Norway Partnership Portal, in 2004, 80 percent of Norwegians were members of one or more organizations, with a total of ten million memberships (in a country of five million people). Furthermore, 48 percent of the adult Norwegian population

to use in the foreign policy context, cooperative culture can operate in a twofold manner. On the one hand, it allows all Norwegian actors—both governmental and non-governmental—to work together to attain concrete foreign policy goals. On the other hand, it makes Norway an attractive honest broker in multilateral settings. As described by Terje Tvedt (1992), this cooperative culture results in the execution of foreign policy within the Norwegian Model, with NGOs actively engaging in the implementation of certain foreign policy objectives abroad. Externally, the existence of a cooperative culture allows Norwegians to more easily build extensive personal networks and contacts across the globe. This is done not only by government officials, but more importantly by Norwegian civil society, which reaches out to its counterparts through humanitarian, religious and other organizations (Interview, 19 June 2012a; Interview 19 June 2012b).

The third and final characteristic of Norwegian society is the **small size and noble history of the country**. Norway has made the most of its small size and the lack of imperial or colonial traditions. Stressing on both of these facts in foreign policy messaging serves to play down any potential prejudice against Norway and builds up the image of a well-intentioned partner. As underlined by a Norwegian diplomat: “As we are a small nation with no history of wrong-doing, it is easier for us to start from a neutral position and from there convince others that our intentions are good. In peace and reconciliation processes our counterparts do not suspect we have any hidden-agenda or benefits from our mediator position” (Interview, 19 June 2012c). Indeed, as a fairly young nation, with only a little more than 100 years of history, Norway has been often characterized as a humble humanitarian actor seeking to promote what it knows best—peace and a cooperative culture (Simensen 2000). Finally, Norway’s size explains its advocacy efforts on behalf of the stronger role of international organizations, such as the UN, in world affairs. As pointed out by one NGO representative: “Our support for strong international law and institutions that both regulate relations between countries and can influence countries to be more law-abiding internally and externally is a consequence of our thinking about Norway as a small, vulnerable member of the international society” (Interview, 22 June 2012b).

participates in voluntary work annually. For more on this, see <http://www.ngonorway.org/Norwegian-NGOs/Norwegian-civilsociety.html>

The Rationale Behind Pursuing an International Peace Agenda

There are a number of underlying motivations for the Norwegian government to pursue multi-track peace efforts. As we have seen in the previous parts of this chapter, the rationale behind choosing to specialize in “peace niche diplomacy” can be justified by Norway’s history, its foreign policy traditions and the character of society. Yet all the motivations represented by the respondents can be classified into three categories of arguments: those Interest-driven, those Idealist-driven and those Demand-driven. It is useful to analyze all three, as none seems to be less important than the other when it comes to Norwegian foreign policy considerations.

The **Interest-driven motivations** are multifold. Firstly, as many respondents (Interview, 18 June 2012a; Interview, 19 June 2012c; Interview, 22 June 2012b) have argued that it is in the interest of Norway to have a better organized world with rules and regulations which are predictable, fair and seen as legitimate. Anarchy and geopolitical shifts in IR serve mainly the large players. Small countries need to assure they are somehow protected from consequences of global uncertainties by international law. As stressed by one of Norwegian diplomats “Our self-interest lies in establishing a regime that in the next phase will protect us” (Interview, 19 June 2012c). In that sense, Norway is pursuing a **long-term, cohesive security policy**, based on the assumption that only through supporting peace in the world, can peace for Norway be assured. The “world is safer, Norway is safer” approach is an old liberal argument that is deeply embedded in Norwegian foreign policy discourse. As former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Store (2010) has put it “our global engagement in conflict resolution is a cost-effective and forward-looking approach to security policy.”

Secondly, the peace and reconciliation work **enhances Norway’s credibility** vis-à-vis other nations and strengthens its PD outreach. Having both governmental and non-governmental representatives involved in peace processes and development assistance worldwide increases the familiarity of third countries with Norway. It does so by presenting a country driven by a “better argument” which remains an integral concept of efficient PD (Hendrikson 2005, 69).

Thirdly, Norwegian peace efforts allow the country to **gain access** to international forums and decision-making processes, which it would otherwise not have. As acknowledged by one of the respondents “Thanks to our international engagement on behalf of peace, Norway has access to the foreign ministers of the biggest countries, particularly the United States. It gives our country a larger political role which can be good for the national

political interest” (Interview, 20 June 2012). This argument reflects the need of recognition and status, which is particularly important for small states with limited resources. As noted by one of the representatives of the Norwegian NGO community “Not being an EU member state and with the decreasing role of NATO, our international engagement through development and humanitarian aid gives us access to important people, forums and process, which would be otherwise closed to us” (Interview, 22 June 2012c). In that sense, by pursuing peace diplomacy Norway becomes more relevant in the multilateral global setting of the twenty-first century.

Apart from the abovementioned Interest-driven motivations, Norway’s engagement abroad and its foreign policy have a clear missionary quality which, as we will argue later on, is probably one of its greatest assets. The **Idealist-driven motivation**, presented by a number of respondents, is grounded in a peculiar belief that “Norway has no direct self-interest in the countries it is engaged, other than contributing to sustainable peace in the world” (Interview, 19 June 2012b). An argument often brought to the table to explain Norwegian idealist approach was naïveté as a positive societal trait strengthening Norway’s credibility worldwide. As described by a Norwegian foreign policy expert “Some people tend to question Norway’s motivations of international engagement, asking what does Norway get out of it? Yet when they scratch the surface they realize that these ‘crazy Norwegians’ tend to believe in it, at least up to a point. There is credibility in the blue-eye naïveté” (Interview, 18 June 2012a). Surprisingly, the Idealist approach to pursuing peace diplomacy is shared not only by NGO stakeholders but also by representatives of governmental institutions. As argued by a high-level official from the state-run NORAD “being naïve is not a bad thing. This is because a naïve person listens and more easily gains confidence. The counterparts know that we will trust in what they say. We also get a good start in establishing cooperation: because of our history and because of this approach” (Interview, 21 June 2012a). Even diplomats, who cannot dismiss the self-interest argument so natural for state diplomacy, stress that it is not in conflict with the idealistic motivations behind Norwegian peace engagement. As described by a Norwegian MFA official “Of course we have self-interest in areas such as trade, energy, defense policy, fisheries etc. They are however seldom at stake when we speak about our policy vis-à-vis countries far away. Our interest lays territorially somewhere else: in the High North, with Russia, with the US and their military cooperation. Our peace efforts concentrate elsewhere” (Interview, 19 June 2012c).

Finally, there is the **Demand-driven motivation**, which is grounded in the belief that there is a niche and a demand in the International System for someone to deliver the services that Norway offers in peace and reconciliation processes. As the anecdote goes, when taking office, the Conservative Party Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen (2001–2005) was determined to minimize Norwegian peace and reconciliation efforts, considering it a bazaar policy with no real policy gains for Norway. Yet during his first official visit to the UK the only question that his counterpart Jack Straw had for him was: “When will Norway reengage in peace efforts in Sri Lanka?” As commented by one of Petersen’s advisors at that time “The story with Jack Straw has showed us that there is a clear expectation among Norway’s allies for its engagement in peace efforts. So what we did is firm this policy up, systematized it and established a section for peace and reconciliation within the MFA. All this was done because we saw a clear external demand for what we have offered before” (Interview, 17 June 2012). This demand comes not only from outside but can come from within the Norwegian society as a reaction to external atrocities or as a result of advocacy from the growing Norwegian immigrant community. For example, the activities of the Sri Lankan and Somalia-Eritrean communities on behalf of their causes have influenced the decision of Norwegian politicians to get involved in these countries (Interview, 18 June 2012c). In that sense when analyzing Norway’s fundamental reasons for deciding to pursue niche diplomacy in peace efforts, it is important not to undervalue the organic way in which this engagement has developed. It can be even argued that the foreign policy choice reflects the expectations of Norway’s society and is in accordance with its character and traits. As stressed by one of the Norwegian MFA officials “Our work on behalf of peace in the world was not invented by anybody. It was more that we discovered that we had some qualities and that we can put them to good use” (Interview, 18 June 2012c).

As this section of the chapter has shown, the underlying motivations behind Norway’s “engagement politics” particularly in the peace area include merging interests and ideas, history tradition and societal traits. The engagement is also based on a number of dilemmas, not least of trying to ease tensions between realist and idealist internationalism present in Norwegian foreign policy. The abovementioned qualities, when used in an international context, result in the ability to form a more coherent foreign policy message. Combined they create a good humanitarian actor, which by definition needs to comply with the principles of humanity (such as equality and justice), impartiality and neutrality.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF NORWAY'S PEACE DIPLOMACY

The Norwegian peace engagement requires using a variety of policy instruments in many different fields. Although Norway is most renowned for its peace-broker activities, one should not dismiss the importance of Norway's development aid and its multilateral diplomacy within the UN, OECD and NATO, in forming an image of a peace nation. Today peace building, humanitarian aid and promoting human rights are three main pillars of the country's peace diplomacy.

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES

Since the end of the Cold War, which have kept many smaller world conflicts confined, Norway has shown much creative diplomacy in promoting peace. Its recognized role as a peace-broker has begun with the famous Oslo process which led to an Israel–Palestine peace accord in 1993.⁶ The Oslo I Accord was the first face-to-face agreement between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in an attempt to resolve the ongoing conflict. It has resulted in the recognition of Palestinian right to statehood and the establishment of Palestinian authority. What is less known however is the critical role of Norwegian NGOs in initiating the process, which was later taken on by and brokered by the Norwegian MFA (Egeland 1999, 530–31 & 541). During the 1990s, peace diplomacy emerged as a strand of Norwegian foreign policy and despite having been resisted by the traditional fractions within the Norwegian MFA, in time it has become a firm element of this policy. Since 1993, Norway was an active participant (both successfully and unsuccessfully) of many peace process, among others in the Philippines, Guatemala, the Balkans, Mali and most recently in Sri Lanka and Sudan (NORAD 2010). Today—according to the Norwegian MFA (2013)—Norway remains engaged in peace mediations in 20 different countries. As noted by one respondent, there are some processes where Norway mediates but because of the lack of agreement

⁶The Oslo I Accord was the first face-to-face agreement between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, in an attempt to resolve the ongoing conflict. It has resulted among other in the recognition of Palestinian right to statehood and the establishment of Palestinian authority. The Norwegian NGOs had played a role in initiating the process, while the Norwegian MFA has stood at its very heart. All the back channel negotiations concerning the agreement took place in secrecy in Norway, hosted by the FAFO Research Foundation. To learn more see: <http://www.faf.no/hist/>

such mediations continue to be secretive not to put unnecessary pressure on the parties concerned (Interview, 17 June 2012).

The peace and reconciliation efforts are seen by the Norwegian government as “an integrated part of a long-term, cohesive security policy... process-oriented in nature and ... often initiated at the direct request of the parties to a conflict” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway 2013). The mediation requests indeed come not only from governments and multilateral organizations, but also from Norwegian NGOs and local civil society. Because of the secrecy factor—so critical for the processes’ success—such niche diplomacy activities remain largely unknown to most of the world’s population. Despite this, mediation efforts still serve specific foreign policy goals, providing entry for Norway to its partners in the West and larger regional powers worldwide by making the country a knowledgeable and experienced interlocutor in the field (Interview, 17 June 2012).

Two decades after the completion of the Oslo Accords, Norwegian peace and reconciliation efforts are much more institutionalized, with a separate budget line and its own section within the MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway 2015a). The gradual institutionalization of these efforts has sparked criticism within the Norwegian policy circles. As explained by one of the Norwegian foreign policy experts “The pioneers of this process were strongly opposed to changing the format, arguing that Norwegian peace efforts should not be codified, bureaucratic and formal. The primary idea was that this needs to be a flexible tool” (Interview, 18 June 2012a). The formalization of Norway’s activities should be judged however against the backdrop of the ever-growing allocation of money for such processes, which requires some form of institutionalization and oversight.

Unlike in the early 1990s, today Norway is no longer the only actor in the niche of international peace mediations. With the growing efforts of the EU to enhance its efficiency in conflict prevention diplomacy, Norway faces a threat of being marginalized in a field where it has excellent capacity (Emerson et al. 2002, 90). Most respondents however remain optimistic about Norway’s future role as an international peace mediator. As argued, Norway continues to extensive experience, skills and finally characteristics of which the following make it an outlier in the field:

Firstly, Norway has the **ability to avoid publicity and facilitate processes “from the back.”** Norwegians have experience in assuring secrecy and avoiding publicity both during and after the process is completed. As one government official explained: “After years of work we know that as facilitators we need to stay in the background. To succeed it is important

to be less concerned about publicity and more on the results” (Interview, 21 June 2012a). In addition, the unique cooperative culture of Norway makes it a natural match for peace-brokering, while the size and location of the country guarantees that it does not pose any threat to the sides of the conflict. As noted by a representative of the Norwegian NGO community: “There is no logical reason why Norway should play a significant role in any conflict and peace process globally, apart from one precondition. This is that the parties want someone to mediate and that someone that mediates has not any strategic self-interest in that conflict. These are the criteria as to why Norway can play a role” (Interview, 22 June 2012b).

Secondly, Norway knows how to **find the right people for the job**. Within the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, time and effort has been devoted to creating an internal group of excellent mediators, as well as to developing the concept of international experience-sharing. The goal is to make Norway a knowledge-hub for mediators also from other countries. As explained by a senior Norwegian diplomat “When we have been firming this policy up in the beginning of the 2000s, we did not want to simply put the money into peace and reconciliation processes but actually built the knowledge and competences within the Ministry of these kinds of processes. This is why we have created a network of international mediators, which share their knowledge on special meeting organized annually near Oslo each year” (Interview, 17 June 2012). There is also a clear understanding that the mediating cannot be done by recognized politicians, but rather by low-profile diplomats. As noted by one Norwegian official “Politicians should prepare but should not be in the forefront of the peace and reconciliation processes. This should be left to experienced diplomats who know the local situation, the culture, tradition and most important the language. Without it any such process will not succeed” (Interview, 21 June 2012a). Indeed having indebt knowledge of the situation in a given conflict is critical for facilitating any kind of peace negotiations. As explained by one respondent “It is often embarrassing for local partners to expose to foreigners how do they act, interlink and network. If you are not able to understand the decision-making processes in different cultures then you will not succeed in the work you are doing” (Interview, 21 June 2012a). The years of experience in facilitating peace processes has surely taught Norwegians how to work in different cultural and societal contexts. They have also generated a body of know-how and inside knowledge for effective mediating.

Thirdly, in trying to attain mediation results Norway knows how to **interact with the big players**. The Norwegian cooperative culture extends

thus also to third parties of the conflict such as global or regional powers, which often can play a critical role in the peace-brokering process. This cooperation is necessary because—as argued by one of the NGO representatives—“Norway has never had the big sticks. We have only small carrots in financial assistance. Thus, we are completely dependent on networking with bigger players. I believe that we were successful in these processes where we were able to influence these bigger players, to implement strategies and make them aligned with processes started by Norway. Without them you do not have the necessary leverage” (Interview, 19 June 2012a). Only such cooperation can create a “peace dividend,” meaning a clear gain that both sides see coming from agreeing on a peace accord. This peace dividend cannot be offered only by Norway but also in conjunction with other actors like the UN, the USA and the EU.

Fourthly, Norway has been recognized for its **ability to provide the necessary financial resources for peace and reconciliation processes**. This includes funding *ad hoc* meetings, mediators, experts and even supporting families of the individuals that are critical for the peace process. Norway has not only a separate MFA budget line for such expenses but has easy access to additional budgeting if needed. As underlined by one of the Norwegian diplomats “Our engagement in peace and reconciliation processes is never a question of money. We have the funds. Rather we make the decision to engage based on the availability of manpower and expertise in a conflict” (Interview, 19 June 2012c).

Finally, Norway is able to assure direct access to local stakeholders. The Norwegian NGOs’ long-standing presence in many countries gives the Norwegian government access to a number of critical stakeholders on the ground. As described by one of the NGO representative “Thanks to our humanitarian approach, we have traditionally had partners who are well-respected on the ground and had contacts on both sides of the conflict. We have asked ourselves why not utilize that in a constructive way also engaging in peace issues? So there was a gradual move from working in conflict to working on conflict” (Interview, 19 June 2012a). This way the wide-ranging networks and contacts of Norwegian NGOs with local constituency-based organizations equip Norwegian diplomats with an additional instrument of generating influence in the mediation process (Hanssen-Bauer 2005).

The most problematic question which remains to be answered is how to actually define Norway’s success in peace and reconciliation processes? Even the most acknowledged of its achievements—the Oslo Process—despite

having changed the entire Middle East policy of major outside players, did not change the long-term policy on the ground. As one Norwegian scholar argues “There was a peak of Norwegian peace and reconciliation engagement with the Oslo Process in 1993 and then for years we have exploited this image. It gave us the world’s attention but came to little in terms of impact” (Interview, 22 June 2012a). Because of the lack of apparent “closed cases” the Norwegian mediating engagement tends to be looked upon by some respondents as disappointing. As described by a senior Norwegian diplomat directly engaged in some of the mediations “The same process that I consider our biggest success, can be seen as our biggest failure. This is because the stakes and hopes were so high and still there is no resolution to the conflict, after so many years” (Interview, 17 June 2012). Other respondents however strongly defend Norwegian engagement in peace processes by arguing that “Peace is not a commodity you pick of the shelf. It is an ongoing story. Building peace is a different mode than negotiating and mediating. It is not possible for any country or any actor to guarantee a lasting success of peace processes. This is the role of the sides of the conflict. Even if the statistics of successful peace processes are bleak, the consequence is that we do not give up, but learn from each lesson and continue our work” (Interview, 19 June 2012a).

Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid

Whereas peace and reconciliation processes have a secretive character and directly address a limited number of actors, Norway’s contribution to peace through development aid reaches out to millions of people around the globe. According to OECD (2014), when comparing percentages of Gross National Income (GNI) Norway remains the third largest official development assistance contributor in the world (after Sweden and Luxembourg). With a total annual appropriation of around \$5.2 billion, Norway continues to be among the few countries that exceeds the UN ODA target of 0.7 percent GNI. In that sense, Norway is challenging the worldwide trend of decreasing funding for development aid.

The goal of Norway’s development policy is to help combat poverty and promote social justice. Among the main priorities funded are environment and sustainable development; peace building, human rights and humanitarian assistance; oil and clean energy; women and gender equality; good governance and the fight against corruption; and efforts to reach the health-related (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway 2015b). Recently,

more and more attention is also paid to preventing global climate change through reducing deforestation, particularly in the Amazon region. As stressed by one of the NORAD officials “Brazil remains one of the most heavily funded country because of its significance for rain forest preservation. We give great amount of money and it is a risky project. If this project fails it would be a disaster for Norwegian development assistance” (Interview, 21 June 2012a). The focus on preventing global deforestation is explained by the fact that Norway is willing to take responsibility for the environmental impact caused by its oil and gas exports. As observed by one respondent to this study “90 per cent of Norwegian oil and gas is exported abroad and Norwegian environment activists often insist that also the emissions coming from these resources should be counted as Norwegian emissions. This would be of course difficult to do so the Norwegian government instead tries to get involved in protecting and planting forests which can balance these emissions” (Interview, 18 June 2012d). Among other important recipients of Norwegian aid are also Afghanistan, Tanzania and South Sudan. Norwegian continuous development assistance in these countries is a result of either decades of earlier presence (South Sudan, Tanzania) or Norwegian military involvement in the framework of the NATO mission as is the case of Afghanistan (NORAD 2015a).

Half of all official Norwegian development assistance is distributed through multilateral organizations, mainly the UN. The UN continues to be a preferred donor because receiving money through the organization seems to neutralize the typical donor–recipient commitment which Norway does not want to create with third countries (Interview, 21 June 2012a; Interview, 22 June 2012b). The other half of aid is channeled by the public sector (mainly Norwegian Embassies abroad) (16 percent), Norwegian NGOs (14 percent) and the public sector in recipient countries (8 percent). Only 8 percent goes directly to NGOs in the recipient country (NORAD 2015b). As argued by one of the NORAD officials: “We are in a middle of the discussion whether to shortcut Norwegian NGOs and give money directly to local NGOs in the South. Yet we have a lot of bad experience with corruption in the South and it is easier to evaluate the work of Norwegian NGOs. Also there is the Norwegian public’s wish to be part of the development work through Norwegian NGOs so cutting funding for them will raise a lot of concerns and questions. And our politicians will not want to go into a confrontation with people who might vote for them” (Interview, 21 June 2012a).

In the past, most of the development aid has been redistributed by the NORAD, which remains a directorate for the Norwegian MFA. Since 2004 however the redistribution role has been taken on by the Ministry itself, with NORAD responsible mainly for providing expertise, quality assurance, evaluations and statistics. A senior Norwegian diplomat has explained this structural change as follows: “The purpose to move aid into the Ministry was to assure more political control and alignment with political priorities and swift handling” (Interview, 17 June 2012). The Norwegian MFA remains thus at the heart of the decision-making process in both development assistance and peace and reconciliation processes (Interview, 19 June 2012c).

Multilateral Peace Diplomacy

As a country characterized by a clearly liberal institutional approach, Norway seeks peace and security through promoting universal respect of international law. Both the Norwegian political establishment and the society share a view that the less anarchy in IR and the more universally binding rules, the better for Norwegian long-term security. For this reason, Norway continues to be active in a number of multilateral forums, with the peace-building agenda at the forefront of its engagement. Among the most important multilateral forums for Norway are the UN, NATO and the EU.

From a Norwegian perspective, the UN remains the primarily international security organization. Since the establishment of the UN, Norway has provided the organization with its first Secretary-General (Trygve Lie 1946–1953) and a number of high-ranking UN officials. With both regular and voluntary donations, Norway remains one of the largest contributors to the UN system (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway 2014).⁷ As mentioned earlier, large parts of Norwegian development and humanitarian aid are channeled through the UN agencies. Within the system Norway has played a role of a norm-setter, strongly supporting new ideas such as “gender mainstreaming.” Also the public support for the UN is very high in Norway. As one of the respondents described it: “In Norway we are aware that only about 4.7 of all global ODA is channeled by the

⁷Norway Mission to the UN website informs that the state contributions to the UN system in 2012 consisted of \$610.5 million in core contributions, \$561.5 in non-core contributions and \$57.6 million in assessed, mandatory contribution, adding up to a total contribution of \$1.2 billion. This makes Norway the sixth largest contributor to the UN system.

UN, which is nothing for what we receive as an international community: a whole belief and value system. As Norway we are a large contributor to the United Nations because we believe in it" (Interview, 22 June 2012b). In the recent years, however, debates begun inside the country on UN system's efficiency and the decision-making framework. As one Norwegian foreign policy scholar stressed "This is a completely new phenomenon. Still a few years ago criticizing Kofi Annan would be unthinkable here. But this is changing rapidly. Norway is one of the countries within the UN system that can always be asked for money. So I think the change is that we look closer at what this money is being spent for" (Interview, 22 June 2012a). This change of perception may actually signal a broader shift in Norwegian foreign policy toward realism, discussed later in this chapter.

The second important multilateral partner for Norway is the EU. Although not an EU member, Norway is closely associated with the EU through a number of arrangements, which includes first and foremost the European Economic Area agreements. The extension of the Single Market to Norway in 1992 within the European Economic Area had allowed the country to benefit from the economic aspects of the European integration process (Tanil 2012). It has also assured free movement of people (and workers) between Norway and EU as part of the larger Schengen Area. Norway has been granted participation rights in several of the Union's initiatives which directly contribute to the promotion of peace and security on the continent. Among these bodies are the European Defence Agency, the Nordic Battle Group, Frontex and Europol (European Commission 2015).

The ongoing EU membership debate, which resulted in two failed referendums (1972, 1994) continues to be one of the most divisive issues in Norway. Despite the many negative consequences that come from a lack of EU membership (Eide 2015), respondents have argued that in the field of peace and reconciliation there are some positives sides of the status-quo. As observed by one senior Norwegian diplomat, in its mediator efforts around the globe "Norway is not obliged to report everything through the EU traffic and to inform 28 member states risking that at least one of them would undermined the work" (Interview, 17 June 2012). Some respondents have gone so far as to attributing Norway's active role on behalf of peace, to the fact it is not an EU member. As observed by one of the Norwegian NGO representatives "after Norway has decided not to join the EU, it could allow itself for a more independent role. We had the experience, the capital to invest and partners with whom we can cooperate. In this respect Norway could take some initiatives with no EU biases in a non-threatening way" (Interview, 19 June 2012a). What needs

to be acknowledged however is that in recent years, as the EU is gradually pooling its foreign policy, Norway's role in conflict-resolution diplomacy suffers from crowding out by EU envoys (Emerson et al. 2002, 89–90).

Finally, among the many instrument of Norway's policy of peace engagement is the **Noble Peace Prize**. The Prize is not granted directly by the Norwegian government, but with all the committee members being Norwegian, it still remains an important symbol of what Norway stands for in international affairs. As described by the Secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Committee Geir Lundestad (2001), "the values that underpinned the Nobel Peace Prize were concretely defined by Norwegians, but they were part of a wider Scandinavian and Western context. They represented the Norwegian version of Western liberal internationalism." The priorities of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee have however evolved over the years. As observed by one of the Norwegian foreign policy experts: "More recognition is given to those who fight against inequalities, social injustice and work for sustainable development. Norwegians believe that helping to build such societies is the best way to avoid conflict" (Interview, 18 June 2012d).

Some of the choices made by the Noble Peace Prize Committee are clearly problematic from the point of view of the Norwegian government. This is best illustrated by the 2010 nomination of the Chinese writer Liu Xiaobo. The award was granted for his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China and provoked a furious reaction of its authorities. China has even issued an official warning that the decision would hurt relations with Norway (The Guardian 2010). It did little good to explain that the Norwegian government has no influence on the choices made by the Noble Peace Prize Committee.

Overall, in the realization of its foreign policy agenda, Norway skillfully uses a variety of peace instruments. As we will examine in the next section of this chapter, all the instruments have one thing in common: they all include a non-governmental component and are implemented with the assistance (peace and reconciliation efforts) or directly by (development aid, Noble Peace Prize) the Norwegian civil society.

"NORWEGIAN MODEL" AND PEACE DIPLOMACY

The Characteristics of the "Norwegian Model"

The success of Norwegian international engagement does not depend merely on its society strongly identifying with a righteous cause or a vast number of policy instruments implemented by the state to pursue peace

diplomacy. It is also a result of the existence of the so-called Norwegian Model, which describes the ability to create interaction between government, civil society and research institutions in specific foreign policy efforts (Tvedt 2011).

Almost all respondents to this study have argued that, in the peace dimension of foreign policy, a critical role is played by NGOs. The Norwegian government has consistently treated NGOs as actors and contributors to Norwegian foreign policy and has attributed them with a **quasi-state representation role in third countries**. Norwegian NGOs are also strongly involved in consultation processes with the MFA regarding the different strands of Norwegian PD and can even influence the choice of policy priorities.

Such an approach has created what Iver Neumann (2011) calls “dual-track diplomacy,” where one track concerns traditional governmental actors and the second track concerns the NGO sector. As a result, many of the first Norwegian peace and reconciliation engagements, including the ground-breaking Oslo Peace Process, started at the initiative of Norwegian NGOs (Pruitt et al. 1997, 178). As stressed by a high-ranking Norwegian diplomat: “The Oslo Accords experience, which involved a Norwegian nongovernmental research center, set a standard for MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] peace processes cooperation with Norwegian NGOs working on the ground. This was then repeated in Guatemala (Norwegian Church Aid), Mali, Sudan (Norwegian People’s Aid) and even Sri Lanka” (Interview, 17 June 2012).

The relationship between the government and NGOs in foreign policy can be characterized by a number of features. First, there is strong, **ongoing dialogue and role-sharing**. Each of the party’s efforts is seen as complementary to the other. The NGOs are traditionally invited to contribute to new policies and offer expertise to the government. As described by one of the respondents representing the Norwegian government “The civil society has always been close to the system. There is not a lot of confrontation between civil society and the government. This is a consensus country. The NGOs are being used massively by the government to implement policy. The government is also conscious of their influence in the Norwegian society” (Interview, 21 June 2012a).

Indeed the NGOs also remain one of the main implementers of the policy in third countries and provide access to local civil society actors. The Norwegian government grants NGOs with funding for the implementation of such activities. By being heavily involved in peace processes, it also

enhances Norwegian NGOs' credibility on the ground. As described by one of the respondents representing Norwegian NGOs: "It is a good relationship, where there is mutual understanding of our roles. We like to refer to it as a strategic partnership where we are not only an implementing partner for the government but where we are also providing the government with our analysis and recommendations" (Interview, 22 June 2012b). The overall coordination of actions is also a fact. Another NGO representative explains each role in third countries as follows: "There are times when the government can sit quietly supporting us in what we do in third countries. There is an understanding that our work might prepare ground for something else. When the NGOs reach a stage which exceeds their competences, that is when the government steps in" (Interview, 19 June 2012a).

Second, the relationship between Norwegian government and the NGO sector in the area of foreign policy is characterized by **extensive public funding** channeled through the latter. According to a NORAD study, In 2010, approximately 2 billion NOK out of a total budget of 11.1 billion NOK of Norwegian government aid funds were allocated to Norwegian NGOs (Lervåg and Slenes 2010, 8). This represents approximately 18 percent of the total government aid budget. The NGOs supported by the Norwegian government range from small development associations to global humanitarian organizations with thousands of employees. It has to be acknowledged, however, that the funding has raised the visibility and role of only a few Norwegian NGOs, particularly those forming the "Great Five."⁸ Some of these larger organizations receive up to 90 percent of their budget from the Norwegian government, usually through four-year framework agreements covering not only project expenses, but also a large part of administrative expenses. Management of the funds is characterized by a high degree of flexibility. As one of the "Great Five" NGO representatives stressed: "This type of funding is unique and you do not find it anywhere else. It places us in a very favorable position and gives us the ability to build a long-term perspective" (Interview, 22 June 2012c). From the government's point of view, a surge in NGO funding, which began in the 1990s, has increased the state's administrative resources, allowing for more ambitious foreign policy (Toje 2011). By creating a shared agenda, the government has forged a national consensus

⁸The Big Five NGOs in Norway are Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People's Aid, Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children Norway.

on the legitimacy and political priority given to the development aid in general and to the specific policies decided on a political level in particular.

Finally, government–NGO relations are characterized by **extensive elite interpenetration**, including exchange of personnel (Tvedt 1994). Out of 18 respondents interviewed for this study, 10 had experience working in both the government and the NGO sectors in Norway. Such interpenetration results in easy access and a strong degree of mutual trust between the various branches of the foreign aid sector—government, civil society and research. One NGO representative describes the advantage of the rotation as follows: “We feel that we have access to politicians and have channels that we can use. We could raise issues and sometimes they would absolutely listen to what we are saying” (Interview, 18 June 2012e). Access is multidimensional and refers not just to cooperation on policy formation and the funding of implementation. Cooperation is also important on the ground in third countries. On the one hand, Norwegian embassies update domestic NGOs on what is happening on the political level and provide security information. On the other hand, working with Norwegian NGOs allows the state to access groups it would otherwise never be able to reach on its own (Egeland 1999; Strand 2005). As underlined by one senior Norwegian diplomat “Norwegian NGOs create channels for peace process engagement, conveying messages from one side to the other, sometimes to groups that the Norwegian government cannot admit to be contacting” (Interview, 17 June 2012).

Criticizing the Norwegian Model

There is, however, a number of serious challenges and threats related to the structure of the Norwegian Model. The criticism pertains mainly to the extensive public funding channeled through the Norwegian NGOs, potentially producing phenomena such as clientelism, agenda-chasing, or institutional capture and dependence (Toje 2011). One of the think tank community members interviewed for this study described the problem as follows: “From any power-analysis one needs to ask about the conflict of interest related to Norwegian NGOs being almost fully funded by the government. Yet this issue has been remarkably under-debated in Norway” (Interview, 22 June 2012a).

Indeed, most of the respondents did not seem to feel that there is a conflict of interest in the existing arrangement. Below is just a small selection of the general tone of responses coming from representative of the “Great Five”:

- “The NGO–government relations in Norway are sometimes difficult to explain to foreigners. I do not see strings attached to the funding. The government does not expect us to be loyal to their policies and does not refuse its grants to us because we are critical towards their activities” (Interview, 22 June 2012c).
- “There are ways to sustain a healthy relationship, even with such a high level of financial support from the government. The organization needs to present to the government its strategy, values and priorities and a program built around these priorities. In such a case, it is a sufficient level of independence for an organization to accept governmental funding” (Interview, 19 June 2012a).
- “When people talk about dependency they often measure it in terms of financial support. Yet financial dependence is not the whole picture. I believe that there are ways that you remain independent, despite receiving funds from the Norwegian government” (Interview, 22 June 2012b).
- “We are reliant on public funding, but independent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We identify and choose what we want to do according to needs. Then we apply for funding and find a lot of understanding for our choices” (Interview, 22 June 2012d).

These opinions match those expressed by government officials from NORAD: “I think that the government heavy funding of NGOs is part of our system. I always say that it is not a bad thing to be dependent from government financing because then you can concentrate on what is important. And I have never experienced our NGOs to refrain from criticizing NORAD just because we fund their activities. On the contrary, we hear and take seriously all words of criticism coming from NGOs because that improves our work” (Interview, 21 June 2012a).

Despite the overall positive approach of the respondents, some researchers (Toje 2011; Tvedt 1994, 1998, 2011) criticize the Norwegian Model for having created a fully state-funded civil society. Terje Tvedt (1998) went as so far as to call this model a “South System,” where everything is supply-driven, instead of demand-driven. According to one of the journalists interviewed for this study “the problem with development aid that it is set at the 1 per cent GDP and with the raise of Norwegian GNP there is always more money to be spent. In such a setting Norwegian NGOs are too often simply state-employees, receiving over 90 per cent of its funding from the Norwegian government. No one has really a critical attitude that a policy and strategy is needed for the use of the money” (Interview, 20 June 2012).

There are a number of consequences that can be observed as a result of the existing institutional dependence. First, with heavy funding from the government, **most other sources of funding have dwindled**. The balance between public and private sources of NGO funding in Norway fell from 50 percent in 1962 to 20 percent in 1972 to just 10 percent in 2001 (Toje 2011). Second, the **model sets a bad example for other states**—particularly for Norwegian development aid recipients. One of the NGO representatives described the problems as follows: “We often have to deal with authoritarian regimes which argue that by remaining the major source of funding for their NGOs they in fact are following the Norwegian Model. The difference is that Norwegian NGOs will still retain their own decision-making process, whereas in the case of non-democratic countries their NGOs are fully controlled by the government” (Interview, 18 June 2012e). Finally, the close cooperation between government and NGOs may be also at the root of a new phenomenon analyzed by researchers—the *Nordic Human Rights Paradox*—which describes Nordic ambivalence toward human rights. On the one hand, these states take pride in promoting human rights abroad, sponsoring new treaties and advancing a progressive global human rights agenda. On the other hand, Nordic policy-makers are increasingly opposed to the expansion of international human rights mechanisms (such as international and judicial oversight) if these mechanisms limit foreign policy leeway (Langford and Schaffer 2013). In Norway, this paradox is observed in areas where ideals clash with hard foreign policy objectives: “The current (Stoltenberg) government is too muted in the human rights agenda. It is not speaking about violations of human rights in the same way irrespectively of where they take place. Very seldom, Norway would be a leader in confronting Russia or Azerbaijan or even Kazakhstan. They would use the European Union as a shield” (Interview, 18 June 2012e). This issue has been raised publicly by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, which in a letter to the new Prime Minister Erna Solberg, stressed the need for Norway to increase its support for democracy and human rights organizations in Russia and the post-Soviet space (Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2013).

On a more positive note, today there is more public debate about the potential conflict of interest between NGOs and government than ever before. Two main factors contribute to this shift. First, with a stronger focus on transparency issues, questions about such conflicts of interest naturally arise. And second, with a realist shift in Norwegian foreign policy and defining of strategic interests, it becomes clearer that not all

foreign policy decisions are reconcilable with the values shared by NGOs. This is particularly true in the area of fighting climate change: Norway contributes to climate change through its immense oil and gas exports and yet wants to be perceived as a champion of the environmental battle (Interview, 22 June 2012b).

Despite the rising criticism, the existence of the Norwegian Model is probably one of the greatest assets in the realization of PD through peace diplomacy. It not only strengthens Norway's international credibility, but, most importantly, engages Norwegian society directly in the realization of foreign policy objectives.

THE FUTURE OF NORWEGIAN PEACE DIPLOMACY

The Ongoing Dilemmas of Norwegian Foreign Policy

The structure, history, tradition of Norwegian society and its interactions with the government provide strong foundations for effective peace engagement in the world. At the same time, however, they form the fundamentals of several foreign policy dilemmas that have been consistently brought up by the respondents in this study. The existence of and clashes between seemingly irreconcilable ideas have been at the very heart of Norwegian foreign policy identity and continue to determine the choices made in regard to the country's international engagement. The future outcome of these debates will strongly influence the level of public support for Norwegian PD in general and Peace Diplomacy in particular.

The first of these is the **Introvert versus Extrovert dilemma**. Over the last century, Norway has struggled between the ideal of pursuing blissful isolation, on the one hand, and realizing its "missionary impulse," on the other. This dichotomy can be explained by anthropological factors, such as the structure of society, which was traditionally one of farmers and peasants but also one of sailors and explorers (Houben 2005, 99). Despite being on the peripheries of the European continent, through its sea ventures Norwegian society has had direct contact with other countries, continents and societies. Having been strongly influenced by Lutheran Christianity, with its emphasis on hard work and duty, Norwegians also undertook many missionary activities in faraway lands. In the colonial period, Norway had the highest number of missionaries per inhabitant in the world (Norwegian Research Centre 2012). Instead of acquiring colonies, Norway established missions, which engaged in education, social

work and health care in third states. As describe by one of the respondents “The Norwegian missionary activities were not only a spiritual spreading of the Christian message. These were combined with a more holistic care of the whole society and other human beings. This more humanitarian approach of the missionaries is a tradition and legacy that we have brought with us over the years. This was incremental for our own understanding of how we relate to societies outside ourselves” (Interview, 19 June 2012a). The missionary movement remained a very strong popular political force in the country from as early as the mid-nineteenth century and still influences foreign policy discourse. At the same time, the “missionary drive” is constantly balanced by the need to preserve a special “outside” status, motivated by the self-perceive uniqueness of the country (Interview, 20 June 2012). Today, with the ongoing financial crisis, a growing number of new aid donors (India, China) and possible fatigue with peace efforts, Norwegians might easily resort to a more inner-looking foreign policy agenda. If this turns out to indeed be the case, then the effectiveness of Norwegian PD will sharply decline.

The second Norwegian foreign policy dilemma is the one between the **Idealist approach and the Realist approach**. Norwegians like to pride themselves on being a nation that has no self-interest in its international engagement, while some scholars even point out to the lack of strategic thinking tradition in Norway (Graeger and Leira 2005, 47). As argued by a representative of the Norwegian think tank community “In many ways Norwegian thinking about international engagement resembles the American belief that we are here to make the world a better place. Yet when there are 300 million of you it is easier to go crusading, and when there are only five million of you it’s better to go as missionaries” (Interview, 18 June 2012a). Norway’s weak “Realpolitik” culture is the result of the lack of nobility in the past, the distrust of diplomacy and the self-perception of being a rule-changer rather than a game-player in the international arena. This perception is strongly supported by the general public as well as Norwegian politicians. The idealist approach to international affairs is not only a strong liberal tradition, but it is also a combination of the social-democratic (solidarity across boundaries) and Christian (missionaries) traditions. The largest political parties in Norway have very strong attachment to these ideas and represent different strands of the same liberal tradition: right-wing parties emphasize the importance of free trade and human rights protection, while left-wing parties stress the need for more international relief aid and the strengthening of the UN. In the

years 2009–2013, however, the idealistic argumentation for Norway's foreign policy engagement seems to be under hard scrutiny (Interview, 22 June 2012a; Interview, 22 June 2012c). Under the second Stoltenberg government (2009–2013) Norwegian foreign policy has become more realistic and interest-based in two ways. On the one hand, there was a more down-to-earth judgment of what the country can and cannot do in helping to resolve the problems of the world. On the other hand, there was more focus on areas related to direct Norwegian strategic interest, such as the “High North.”⁹ As one foreign policy analyst observed: “In the past talking about ‘Norwegian interest’ would be unthinkable. Today we are heading toward a more balanced picture when it comes to Norwegian foreign policy. In some cases there will be still much talk about values, but in others the decisions will be made based on the real international economic and political interests of Norway” (Interview, 18 June 2012d). If this foreign policy shift proves to be permanent under the new conservative Solberg Cabinet (2013–), maintaining high public support and NGO involvement for an idealistic cause of PD will become a major challenge for the Norwegian government.

The third foreign policy debate revolves around the idea of **Norway as a Peace Nation versus its military engagement**. For many years, the Norwegian self-perception of being a Peace Nation was validated by international rankings placing it at the top of the list of most peaceful nations in the world (Global Peace Index 2015).¹⁰ The continuous emphasis on the peaceful nature of Norway and its people was accompanied by a strong attachment to the idea of only a defensive use of force. In the public debate, the armed forces were not perceived as a foreign policy tool, but rather as an instrument of defending Norwegian territory and its people. Norway's engagement in NATO expeditionary missions was portrayed as inherently

⁹Under the Stoltenberg government (2005–2009 and 2009–2013), the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs had devoted considerable amount of attention to protecting Norway's interest in the “High North,” meaning the Arctic areas made out of four geographically separated parts: Mainland Norway, Svalbard, Bjørnøya and Jan Mayen. These areas are rich in natural resources, in particular oil.

¹⁰The Global Peace Index prepared since 2007 by the Institute for Economics and Peace uses 24 different factors to assess a country's level of violence and danger. Apart from internal and external wars, it takes into consideration street violence, prison population and levels of organized crime, as well as national spending on the military and numbers of police per capita. To see the 2015 Report go to: http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Globa%20Peace%20Index%20Report%202015_0.pdf

humanitarian (Nustad and Thune 2003). The political establishment in Norway has traditionally avoided being associated too closely with military matters, and politicians have accented mainly non-military and humanitarian aspects of military activities abroad (Saxi 2010). Again, however, the situation today is transforming. The gradual drop of Norway's ratings in the Global Peace Index from first place in 2007 to 17th place in 2015 is the result of growing weapon imports, increased military capacity and the state's previous active engagement in Afghanistan and Libya. There is also a clear change in the nature of Norwegian military engagement as the traditional humanitarian profile of its foreign deployments has been replaced by a more distinctive military role (Haaland 2007, 2010). As remarked by one respondent "Norwegian defense forces are more prepared today to take part in different international conflicts than they are to defend Norway. This is because our governments came to realize, that being such a small country, Norway would not be able to hold back a real invasion and needs Allies. And Alliances demand engagement—in case of NATO out-of-area engagements" (Interview, 22 June 2012c). Indeed, with each passing year it becomes more difficult to argue that Norway is indeed a Peace Nation. So far the notion has been able to divert public opinion's attention from the less altruistic activities of Norway, its government and companies, such as oil drilling in Africa and the realities of its military operations. As one of the Norwegian diplomats observed: "There is a lack of consistency in our own self-perception. Public opinion in Norway has been able to maintain the image of us being always on the right side, protecting the weak and being a soft power. Our NATO engagement has not brought any damage to this public self-perception. I think it is a lack of proper understanding of what is going on" (Interview, 19 June 2012c). The dilemma becomes more evident with NATO playing a rising role in easing Norwegian security concerns over the northern regions and the Arctic.

To ease the "Peace Nation versus military engagement dilemma," the Norwegian government pays much attention to legitimacy issues, particularly when military intervention is under consideration. Additionally, all military interventions so far have been justified with reference to the importance of international norms for national security (Graeger and Leira 2005, 46). In the long run, however, a more realist approach to foreign policy might not be enough to prevent the general public from undermining the Peace Nation concept in its own eyes. The end of this general perception would of course mark the end of Norwegian PD at the forefront of foreign policy.

The fourth and final dilemma is one that can be called “**the *Annerledeslandet* versus Nordic Model dilemma.**” Although a strong sense of “being different” prevails in Norway, neither Norwegian political values nor the model of pursuing international policy is uniquely Norwegian. In almost all of its features, it resembles models undertaken by other Nordic countries as a consequence of the centuries-long polynation-building project called by scholars “Scandinavianism” (Neumann 2007, 54). Mary Hilson (2006) has indicated several characteristics of Scandinavian states’ foreign policy that perfectly describes Norwegian choices in foreign policy. First, the Nordic states prioritize engagement in international organizations such as the UN in their international activities. Second, Scandinavian countries perceive themselves to be the world’s peace makers, trying to achieve moral influence over international policy in three important areas: environmental policy, international security and global welfare. Third, the Nordic states consistently build an international reputation for generosity in their support of overseas aid programs. Fourth, the Scandinavian states are proud of their historic legacy of non-engagement in international conflicts and socialist internationalism, which heavily influences their foreign policy discourse. The similarities between other Scandinavia countries and Norway in the realization of foreign policy pose a more important dilemma than many realize. As noticed by Christine Smith-Simonsen (2011), “the concept of *Annerledeslandet* creates a sense of value; that being different makes it possible to make a difference.” Without the prevailing belief of Norwegian society in its unique characteristics that predispose it to being a Peace Nation, much of the country’s international engagement in distant countries (including impressive spending for the cause) might be put into question.

The Challenges to Norwegian Peace Diplomacy

With new, important trends emerging in world politics, Norwegian Peace Diplomacy is currently under growing pressures of reformulation. There are three main developments that might have profound consequences for the future of Norway’s policy of engagement.

First, in the last decade, **new types of humanitarian challenges have emerged.** This is because the world itself is changing in many aspects. In terms of statistics it is becoming wealthier, healthier and safer. Yet inequalities are increasing with the poor getting poorer and the rich getting richer. Inter-state conflicts are rarer than ever, yet the regional and intra-state

conflicts are becoming more protracted, thus long-lasting and with no immediate resolution perspective. The humanitarian challenges are changing and include problems such as climate change, migrations to cities and urban violence. These challenges require in-depth expertise. The task for Norwegian Peace Diplomacy will be thus to answer adequately to the new context by most likely specializing in smaller segments of development aid or focusing on particular countries or regions. As a representative of NORAD pointed out: “There is an internal debate in Norway on being too ambitious and too widespread. I agree with these arguments. There is so much good will to be everywhere, yet you need to sometimes focus, at least geographically” (Interview, 21 June 2012a).

Second, there is a **growing number of new donor states** and the “aid industry” becomes a competitive one. As the power of Europe and USA is declining around the world, new actors begin providing support for the developing world. The emerging economies, such as India, China and Brazil are for the first time in history becoming also donor countries. These states do not have a tradition in providing humanitarian and development assistance. They often do not respect the principles which have governed such aid in the past. As described by a Norwegian NGO representative “Western aid has been traditionally very conditional, based on values that we expect the receiving parties to adopt. With actors such as China or India offering foreign aid with no such conditions, the countries in need start to question the principle of conditionality. This also makes Western politicians more realistic and forces them to rethink their value-oriented approach” (Interview, 22 June 2012c). As a result, aid is becoming highly politicized, coupled with a chase for natural resources and influence. For Norwegian NGOs this new situation creates challenges in terms of humanitarian space in which they operate. As competition in the field of peace diplomacy and development assistance is becoming stiffer, with more actors working on the ground, it will be more difficult to cultivate a peace niche for Norway.

Third and final, the consequences of the **global financial crisis, falling oil prices and growing public scrutiny** are factors that will influence the future of Norwegian Peace Diplomacy. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the budgets of Western aid has been stagnant or decreasing which have widened the gap between humanitarian challenges and the funding available. Although Norway—largely thanks to its oil and gas reserves—has not experienced a fall in aid funding in the years 2008–2014 (NORAD 2015a), it still faces serious challenges in the years to come. The falling

oil prices (2014–2015) and decreased state revenue will surely strengthen public scrutiny over how peace diplomacy money is spend. Already today, the main axes of criticism are: the large size of the Norwegian “development industry,” and a general lack of financial oversight (Berglund 2012). As noted by one of the leading Norwegian security scholars “Questions arise regarding whom do we support and what are we achieving with all this money. Because 1 per cent of our GDP is a considerable amount of money all together. But the discussion is not around how much we spend but around how efficient we spent it. Processes for the sake of processes are not enough anymore” (Interview, 22 June 2012a).

The abovementioned trends surely affect Norway’s policy of engagement, strengthening a general shift toward a more realistic approach in Norwegian foreign policy. The former Stoltenberg government (2005–2013) has already been less outspoken about the “peace dimension,” transforming the foreign policy rhetoric into one that was more Norway-oriented, with themes of defense and territorial integrity dominating the debate. The new conservative government of Erna Solberg, faced with Russia’s annexation of Crimea (2014) and terror attacks in Europe (2015, 2016) has also placed security at the top of the foreign policy agenda (Brende 2015). Despite a visible shift toward realism, there is still however strong societal support for Norwegian engagement abroad. For this reason the funding for Peace Diplomacy will probably not fall sharply anytime soon. Yet the Norwegian governments might have to stress more often that Norwegian Peace Diplomacy is not charity but a cohesive foreign and security policy.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CASE-STUDY

By focusing on the internal conditions and rationale behind the development of Norwegian Peace Diplomacy (as seen by Norwegian diplomats and NGO representatives), this chapter has challenged the common assumption that this PD initiative is merely a pre-calculated foreign policy effort aimed at reinforcing a positive image of Norway among foreign publics. Instead, the study has shown that the peace engagement is strongly linked to the very identity of the Norwegian nation. The efficiency of Norwegian PD can be attributed to the ability of the government to capitalize on Norwegian society’s belief that the country is a Peace Nation with a missionary obligation; and the existence of the so-called Norwegian Model, which allows for interaction between government, civil society and research institutions in

specific foreign policy efforts. The attractiveness of the Norwegian foreign policy cause for its own society and Norwegian society's direct engagement in the implementation of the policy assures domestic constituencies' support and identifies with state actions abroad, thus strengthening the country's soft power outreach. From a more accidental involvement in conflict mediations, Norway has slowly gained a solid reputation in Peace Diplomacy. Such a reputation, based on strong solidarity and egalitarian traditions, cooperative culture, small country size and noble history, has created important political capital for the state's foreign policy.

These findings add to the more general debate on the importance of including a domestic dimension in state PD efforts (Riordan 2005; Cull 2009; Fitzpatrick 2012; Huijgh 2013). This Norwegian case-study provides evidence that domestic publics should be seen not just as an audience for foreign policy messaging and consultation, but more importantly as equal partners in PD's formulation and implementation.

REFERENCES

- Archer, C., & Joenniemi, P. (2003). *The Nordic peace*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Batora, J. (2005). *Public diplomacy in small and medium-sized state: Norway and Canada*. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
- Behringer, R. (2005). Middle power leadership on the Human Security Agenda. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40, 305–42.
- Berglund, N. (2012, March 4). Foreign aid doesn't meet peace goals. *News and Views from Norway*. Available online at: <http://www.newsinenglish.no/2012/03/04/foreign-aid-doesnt-meet-peace-goals/>
- Brende, B. (2015, March 5). Foreign policy address: 5 March 2015. *The Storting*. Available online at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/address_storting/id2398550/
- Cull, N. J. (2009). Public diplomacy: Lessons from the past. In *CDP Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*. Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School.
- Dörfer, I. (1997). *The Nordic nations in the New Western Security Regime*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Egeland, J. (1988). *Impotent superpower: Potent small state*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
- Egeland, J. (1999). The Oslo accord: Multiparty facilitation through the Norwegian Channel. In C. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, & A. Aal (Eds.), *Herdin cats: Multiparty mediation in a complex world*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

- Eide, E. B. (2015, October 27). We pay, but have no say: that's the reality of Norway's relationship with the EU. *The Guardian*. Available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/27/norway-eu-reality-uk-voters-seduced-by-norwegian-model>
- Emerson, M., Vahl, M., & Woolcock, S. (Eds.). (2002). *Navigating by the Stars. Norway, the European Economic Union and the European Union*. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies.
- Epland, J., & Kirkeberg, M. I. (2012). *Wealth distribution in Norway: Evidence from a New register-based data source*. Statistic Norway. Report 35/2012. Available online at: http://www.ssb.no/a/english/publikasjoner/pdf/rapp_201235_en/rapp_201235_en.pdf
- European Commission. (2015). *EU relations with Norway*. Accessed May 10, 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/norway/index_en.htm
- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2012). Defining strategic publics in a networked world: Public diplomacy's challenge at home and abroad. *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 421–40.
- Global Peace Index. (2015). *Annual report*. Available online at: http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Peace%20Index%20Report%202015_0.pdf
- Graeger, N., & Leira, H. (2005). Norwegian strategic culture after World War II: From a local to a global perspective. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40, 45–66.
- Greager, N. (2007). Norway between Europe and the US. In C. Archer (Ed.), *New security issues in Northern Europe, The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP*. New York: Routledge.
- Haaland, T. (2007). Participation in peace support operations for small countries: The case of Norway. *International Peacekeeping*, 14(4), 493–509.
- Haaland, T. (2010). Still Homeland defenders at heart? Norwegian military culture in international deployments. *International Peacekeeping*, 17(4), 539–53.
- Hanssen-Bauer, J. (2005). *The Norwegian model for conflict resolution*. Senior adviser at Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Speech, Lisbon, October 28.
- Helgesen, V. (2003). *Peace, mediation and reconciliation: The Norwegian experience*. Norwegian state secretary of foreign affairs presentation in Brussels on 21 May 2003. Available online at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Bondeviks-2nd-Government/ministry-of-foreignaffairs/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-individuelt/2003/peace,_mediation_and_reconciliation-the.html?id=267693
- Henrikson, A. (2005). Niche diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The global “Corners” of Canada and Norway. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.
- Hilson, M. (2006). *The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Houben, M. (2005). *International crisis management: The approach of European States*. London: Routledge.

- Huijgh, E. (2013). Changing tunes for public diplomacy: Exploring the domestic dimension. *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 2(1), 62–74.
- Ingebritsen, C. (2006). *Scandinavia in world politics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Jacobsen, P. V. (2009). *Nordic approaches to peace operations: A new model in the making?* London: Routledge.
- Jørgen Holst, J. (Ed.). (1985). *Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 1980s*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
- Langford, M., & Schaffer, J. K. (2013). *The Nordic human rights paradox* (Research Paper 2013–25). Faculty of Law, University of Oslo.
- Lee-Ohlsson, F. (2009). Sweden and development of the European security and defence policy: A bi-directional process of Europeanization. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 44(1), 123–42.
- Leira, H. (2010). *The politics of not having a Foreign Policy: The problem of Foreign Policy in Norwegian Discourse 1880–1905*. Paper presented at SGIR—Conference in Stockholm. Available online at: <http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Leirapercent20Stockholmper cent202010.pdf>
- Leiren, T. (2005). A century of Norwegian independence. *Scandinavian Review*, 92(3), 6–16.
- Leonard, M., & Small, A. (2003). *Norwegian public diplomacy*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Lervåg, A., & Slenes, T. (2010). *Norske organisasjoners egenandel og avhengighet av statlige midler*. Oslo: NORAD.
- Lie, T. (1969). Speech before the First Assembly as Norway's Representative 16th on November 1946. In A. W. Cordier, & W. Foote (Eds.), *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations. Volume 1: Trygve Lie (1946–1953)*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lundestad, G. (2001, March 15). *The Nobel Peace Prize 1901–2000*. Available online at: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/lundestad-review/index.html?print=1
- Mack, A. (2007). Trends in global violence and Norway's peace diplomacy. *Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Available online at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/campaign/refleks/inns spill/mack.html?id=478951>
- Melissen, J. (2005a). The New public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations* (pp. 3–27). Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Melissen, J. (Ed.). (2007). *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. (2013, January 8). *Norway's policy of engagement*. Available online at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norway_engagement.html?id=587985

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. (2014, December 18). *Norwegian contributions to the United Nations: Rank among Member States*. Available online at: <http://www.norway-un.org/NorwayandUN/Norwegian-UN-Policies/Norwegian-Contributions-to-the-UN/Rank-among-UN-donor-countries/#.VlhHuHarS01>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. (2015a). *The Ministry's Organizational Chart*. Accessed May 14, 2015, from https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/adm/orgchart_march2015.pdf
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. (2015b). *Development cooperation*. Accessed September 28, 2015, from <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/development-cooperation/id1159/>
- Morten Udgaard, N. (1973). *Great power politics and Norwegian Foreign Policy*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
- Neumann, I. (2007). When did Norway and Denmark get distinctively foreign policies? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 42(1), 53–72.
- Neumann, I. (2011). Peace and reconciliation efforts as systems-maintaining diplomacy: The case of Norway. *International Journal*, 66(3), 563–79.
- NORAD. (2010). *Pawns of peace. Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009*. Oslo: NORAD Evaluation Department.
- NORAD. (2015a, April 10). *A continuing high level of Aid*. Available online at: <http://www.norad.no/en/front/about-norad/news/2015/a-continuing-high-level-of-aid/>
- NORAD. (2015b). *Norwegian Aid Statistics 2014: Distribution by partner*. Accessed June 18, 2015, from <http://www.norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/> (homepage).
- Norwegian Helsinki Committee. (2013, October 22). *Human rights should be a central part of the Government's work*. Open letter to Minister Erna Solberg, Oslo. Available online at: <http://nhc.no/filestore/Brev/2013/LettertotheGovernmentOctober2013.pdf>
- Norwegian Research Centre. (2012). *Norwegian Missionaries: Practice and representation in the formation of "self" and "other", 1870–2005*. Accessed June 18, 2015, from <http://bergenmuseum.uib.no/nettutstilling/mission/index.htm> (homepage).
- Nustad, K. G., & Thune, H. (2003). Norway: Political consensus and the problem of accountability. In C. Ku & H. K. Jacobson (Eds.), *Democratic accountability and the use of force in international law* (pp. 154–75). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nye, J. S., Jr. (2004). *Soft power—The means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- OECD. (2014). *Official development assistance*. Accessed May 17, 2014, from <http://www.compareyourcountry.org/oda?page=0&cr=ocd&lg=en> (homepage).

- Petersen, J. (2000). *The Northern Region—developments and challenges*. In UN Parliamentary Assembly: Defense and Security for the 21st Century, Atalink.
- Pruitt, D., Bercovitch, J., & Zartman, W. (1997). A brief history of the Oslo Talks. *International Negotiation*, 2, 177–82.
- Riordan, S. (2005). Dialogue-based public diplomacy: A new foreign policy paradigm? In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations* (pp. 180–95). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Riste, O. (2001). *Norway's foreign relations: A history*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Rugh, W. A. (Ed.). (2011). *The practice of public diplomacy—Confronting challenges abroad*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Saxi, H. L. (2010). Norwegian and Danish defence policy: A comparative study of the Post- Cold War Era. *Defense and Security Studies 1-2010*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
- Simensen, J. (2000). National and transnational history: The National Determinant in Norwegian Historiography. In F. Meyer & J. E. Myhre (Eds.), *Nordic historiography in the 20th century*. Oslo: University of Oslo.
- Skånland, Ø. (2010). Norway is a Peace Nation: A Discourse Analytic Reading of the Norwegian Peace Engagement. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 45(1), 34–54.
- Smith-Simonsen, C. (2011). Mythbusting: Looking for Norwegians in the Colonies. *Revue d'Histoire Globale des Pays du Nord*, 5, 47–62.
- Støre, J. G. (2006). *Norway as Peace Nation—Myth or Fact*. Speech delivered at the Nobel Peace Centre on 24 April. Available online at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/archive/Stoltenbergs-2nd-Government/Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/taler-og-artikler/2006/norwaya-peace-nation-myth-or-fact-.html?id=420860>
- Store, J. G. (2010). *Norway's conflict resolution efforts—are they of any avail*. Speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, House of Literature, Oslo, June 11.
- Strand, T. (2005, January). *Norway's approach to democracy and development*. Paper presented at the Wang Symposium 'Pathways to Peace', Pacific Lutheran University.
- Tanil, G. (2012). *Why Norway outside of the European Union?: Norwegian national identity and the question of European integration*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Publishers.
- The Guardian. (2010, October 8). *Liu Xiaobo Nobel win prompts Chinese fury*. Available online at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/08/liu-xiaobo-nobel-chinese-fury>
- Toje, A. (2011). *Government funded Nongovernmental Organisations, Civil Society Aid Organisations and Donor Governments: The case of Norway*. Research report for NORAD. Available online at: http://asletoje.com/pdf_gallery/102.pdf

- Tvedt, T. (1992). *The "Civil Society", the State and the NGOs in Southern Sudan, Working Paper*. Bergen: University of Bergen.
- Tvedt, T. (1994). NGOs' role at 'the End of History': Norwegian policy and the new paradigm. *Forum for Development Studies*, 21(1–2), 139–66.
- Tvedt, T. (1998). *Angels of mercy or development diplomats? NGOs and Foreign Aid*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Tvedt, T. (2011). The Norwegian model. In S. Prakash & P. Selle (Eds.), *Civil society*. London: Routledge.

Australia's Ambivalent Engagement with Asia

INTRODUCTION

In stark contrast to Norway, Australia is a country one has little problems to locate on the map of the world. Occupying a separate continent which represents the sixth largest territory with just around 22 million citizens, Australia is also the world's 12th largest economy (International Monetary Fund 2015) and a “life-style superpower” (Interview, 31 March 2015a). In reputation rankings, where attributes such as physical beauty, appealing food, sports, entertainment and high-quality services and products are measured, Australia easily makes it to the top five (Reputation Institute 2015). At the same time, however, Australia continues to face major PD challenges in the region it considers today of utter importance for its economic and political future, namely Asia.¹ The PD challenges most often identified by the respondents of this study relate to a supposedly existing gap between how Asian nations perceive Australia culturally and socially (homogenous, white and culturally Western society) and the more complex reality (a multicultural society, with 46 percent of population comprised of first- or second-generation Australians). On the one hand, Australia is easily labeled as a racist country, an opinion which is reinforced by arguments from the past such as the White Australia Policy legacy

¹ In this chapter, the concept “Asia” will refer to the broader Indo-Pacific space, stretching from Central Asia, through India, China, Southeast Asia to the Pacific Islands.

(1901–1973), Hansonism (1997–1998) or the more recent Cronulla riots (2005) and Indian students bashing in Melbourne (2009).² On the other hand, Australia is perceived as a Western “Odd-man” and a subsidiary to the USA within Asia with little independent policy of its own. As recently noticed by the Secretary of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Peter Varghese (2013), “within our region, Australia is suffering from a soft power deficit... in too many cases, perceptions of Australia are caught in something of a time warp.” The Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence (2007) went even further in expressing its concern by stating that “some of the outdated images held about Australia may not only limit a broader appreciation of Australia and affect its reputation but act as an obstacle to the effective pursuit of its foreign policy.”

Although misperceptions about Australia are surely a major issue for the country’s PD, this chapter will argue that the problem lays deeper than that. The real issue for Australia might not actually be the outdated images contributing to Australia’s bad reputation in some Asian countries, but rather a lack of any reputation altogether. An external observer finds it challenging to define what does Australia actually stand for or what kind of contribution it offers to the world. As the Asiabarometer has consistently indicated in the years 2003–2007, an average person in Asia does not have a strong or meaningful opinion about Australia’s foreign policy or shows considerable indifference toward Australia. What is even more surprising, as stressed by Goldsmith and Linley (2012), is “views about U.S. or Chinese influence on (respondent’s) country are much better predictors of their views of Australia’s influence than (respondent’s) core values, identity, information or demographic.”

²In 2009, an isolated case of violence against Indian students in Melbourne in 2011 quickly snowballed into one of the largest public diplomacy crisis Australia had to face. Not only had it resulted in a tarnished reputation of Australia as an education destination, but it also generated a loss of \$2 billion in education exports because of the drop in Indian students. To counter the negative message transferred back to India, DFAT began cooperating closely with the Indian diaspora in Australia. This was because most Indian people considering sending their children to study abroad did get their information about the country not from official sources but from their relatives in Australia and local diasporas. Cooperating with these groups to convey the full, true picture of the situation in Australia was critical and contributed in the next years to come in a 20 percent growth in Indian students at Australian universities (Interview, 31 March 2015a).

These results would indicate that the efforts of previous Australian governments to convey to foreign publics the idea of Australia acting as a “good international citizen,” and a neighbor deeply engaged with Asia, only went so far. Indeed, despite a number of well-crafted instruments (such as the Australia Awards or New Colombo Plan) in the last decade, Australian PD has been criticized by a number of scholars and practitioners as one lacking strategic vision, coordination and funding (Byrne 2010, Oliver and Shearer 2011, Rimmer 2014). The poor state of this policy was exposed by the Australian Government’s Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia’s PD program. The final report famously stated that “perhaps the whole is not as great as the sum of its parts” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2007). As stressed by a number of respondents to this study (Interview, 7 May 2015; Interview 12 May 2015; Interview, 2 April 2015a; Interview, 14 April 2015a), PD still tends to be a second or third priority issue within Australian diplomatic service without any real alignment of efforts done by federal, state or non-governmental actors.

The following chapter moves beyond this criticism to explore the root causes that significantly limit Australia’s successful PD efforts in Asia. It is argued that there are two primary sins of Australian PD efforts—both requiring significant strengthening of the domestic dimension of Australia’s foreign policy. These are

- (a) the lack of clarity about the message Australia is sending to the outside world in general and to Asia in particular; and at times, a **clear ambivalence** in the messaging (searching for Australia’s national identity);
- (b) The inability to mobilize the country’s civic resources for the good of Australia’s reputation (working with Australian civil society).

The chapter will explore the links between the inconsistent PD messaging and the challenges of defining Australia’s identity both as a nation and as a part of Asia. It will also look at the state of relations between the Australian government and the NGOs in assuring successful PD performance. The author will argue that Australia’s PD effort has been severely hampered by a fickle and fluctuating engagement with Australia’s domestic society—on both the conceptual and implementation levels. The chapter continues thus investigating the link between the domestic dimension (its values, identity, actions) and framing and implementing of PD messaging

for foreign audiences. By doing so, the author once again argues that successful PD always starts at home.

THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF AUSTRALIA'S ENGAGEMENT WITH ASIA

Australia's Foreign Policy Culture

Australia is in a unique situation to most of the countries in the world. The modern origins of the nation are of European inheritance (dating back to 1788 and the establishing of the New South Wales as a British penal colony), yet its geographical location remains in intimate proximity to Asia. Throughout its modern history which formally begins with the 1901 referendum of colonies to unite in a federation, the country had just one strategic dilemma which derived directly from this unique geographical position. As described by Alan Gyngell (2008, 3), "from the beginning (...) the central dilemma for (Australia's) foreign policy has always been how best to protect the security and economic interests of a small population occupying a rich continent, located far from its key markets and major security partners."

Indeed, throughout the first century of Australia's federative existence, the major security and trading partner was one and the same country. In the first half of the century, this was Great Britain; in the second part, this was the USA. In both cases, Australia remained an inseparable part of the Anglo-American liberal world order, which assured the country both security guarantees and major market access. At the closing of the century, however, Australia, for the first time in its modern history, faced a situation in which the major economic partner and the major security partner was no longer the same country (White 2006). While in 1906, trade with UK accounted for 59 percent of imports and 49 percent of exports, 100 years later, it accounted to little more than 4 percent for both. With the UK joining the European Community, a rapidly growing Asian market and the natural proximity of this region to Australia, by early 2000s, trade has shifted almost entirely to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries. By mid-2000s, the Asian market accounted for 72 percent of Australia's trade (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007), with China and Japan constituting almost half of all 2014 exports.³ At the same time, however, Australia remained a staunch

³ By 2014, the main sources of Australia's imports were China (29 percent), Japan (20 percent), South Korea (8.4 percent), India (5.3 percent) and outside of the region—the USA with a mere 3.6 percent.

and reliable military ally of the USA, with security links to both NATO as a whole (mission in Afghanistan) and the UK in particular.

The major shift, which saw the security and trade aspects drift apart, has created a new dilemma which today lays at the heart of Australian foreign policy debate. This dilemma evolves around an ingrained fear that one day Australia would have to choose between its security and economic well-being, between its Western identity and its geographical positioning in Asia. Although as most of the respondents to this study (Interview, 2 April 2015; Interview, 9 April 2015a; Interview, 14 April 2015a; Interview, 14 April 2015b; Interview, 12 May 2015) have stressed this choice must not be made today, it is clear that already today its prospect causes inevitable trade-offs and shapes the foreign policy culture of the country.

In order to address the dilemma, the Australian foreign policy has continued to align to three guiding principles. Firstly, there is a firm belief among the elites, backed by significant public support (Lowy Institute 2015a), that **Australia must maintain its strong security alliance with the USA**. Dating back to the 1951 ANZUS Agreement, this alliance has been based on both assuring close defense and security cooperation (interoperability of forces, intelligence-sharing) and fostering political and economic ties (which included among others the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement of 2004). It has also been reflected by the fact that Australia, as the only US ally, committed forces to all major conflicts in which the USA was engaged since the end of World War II—whether it be Korea in 1950 or Iraq in 2003 (Higgot and Nossal 2008, 630). All this in hope that such staunch Australian commitment to the Alliance will create natural reciprocity from the USA in its management of affairs in South Pacific and Southeast Asia, ultimately assuring that no hostile power will establish a foothold in Australia's direct neighborhood.

Secondly, because of its economic dependency and its growing security imperatives in its immediate region, **Australia must establish and preserve an entrée into Asia**. As will be discussed later in the chapter, depending on the government currently in power, this should be done by either extended regionalism (as suggested by the Labor governments) or by bilateral arrangements (as preferred by the conservative governments).

Finally, Australia as a country which has benefited immensely from the current liberal order needs to **make genuine efforts to preserve this order, as well as Australia's current "middle-power" position within it**. As argued by Griffiths and Wesley (2010, 14), "Australia's isolation and its early identification with the British Empire have given rise to a foreign policy culture that takes it as read that changes to the global

distribution of power and global stability, however distant, will eventually affect Australia's security and prosperity" and, in that sense, any shift away from this order would be seen by Australia as a threat to its security. From an Australian point of view, the alternative for the current globalism (understood as a global set of institutions and rules) would be the raise of spheres of influences requiring some kind of accommodation between the USA and China (White 2011). Such a scenario would have immediate negative consequences for Australia, either isolating it from its current trading partners and markets or severely undermining its present security arrangements with the USA. In order to mitigate an outcome in which Australia would have to choose, the country thus continues to be a strong supporter of a rules-based liberal order, which includes the international trading system as well as regional order (Evans 1988).

In an attempt to align the three guiding principles to Australian foreign policy conduct, two broad concepts have seemed to dominate the general discourse. The first is the **principled pragmatism** concept. In its pure form, "pragmatism" evaluates policies based on whether they solve the problem, rather than on what is legally permissible, ethically required or even morally acceptable (Encyclopedia of the New American Nation 2015). The "principled pragmatism" is a distinctively Australian strand of realism defined as resorting to a practical approach to foreign policy decision, guided by certain principles which highlight the ethical and moral aspects of these decisions. The concept evolved from a sense of isolation and distance from cultures most similar to itself. As described by one of the respondents, "when you are depended on a region that is culturally different from you; and you are far from those who are similar, you need to make a lot of pragmatic choices" (Interview, 12 May 2015). In that sense, Australia's realism is not as much about power but about powerlessness and the need to compensate for its lack.

The concept raises criticism, as in reality the "pragmatism" seems to dominate the "principle." Firstly, it is not clear what "principles" are at its forefront. While the primacy of the alliance with the USA or the engagement Asia are nothing more than (potentially self-excluding) policies; the rules-based liberal order might be perceived as such. However, as noticed by one of the respondents, Australia has "elevated to the level of moral principle a conception of the international order which has served its pragmatic interests. Hence we have not had to make any choices between principles and pragmatism" (Interview, 2 April 2015). Secondly, the "principled pragmatism" concept has been an easy excuse for Australian

foreign policy-makers to remain at times very muted on international human rights issues (Kent 2001). When asked about Australia's stance on human rights violations in other countries, one of the former senior officials in DFAT said:

Our goal is not to impose our will on others: in any case, that is not a practical option for a country of Australia's size. We should be proud of our inheritance and talk about it but not expect that everyone should meet our standards or adopt our practices. At the end of the day, we hope that trading with countries like Australia will help lift more and more people out of poverty. Where we disagree—on human rights and other issues—we should raise those differences within a context of engagement except where those differences are so fundamental (eg with North Korea) that engagement is neither appropriate or productive. (Interview, 14 April 2015b).

Such a pragmatic approach does assure uninterrupted economic benefits to Australia. At the same time, however, it raises an obvious question of how far this "principled pragmatism" would stretch itself in order to defend the principles of the liberal world order which at the end of the day places human rights and liberties at its forefront.

The second concept, which tries to define Australia's foreign policy, is the more idealistic **good international citizen**. The idea was first introduced by Gareth Evans as Foreign Minister (1988–1996) who claimed that Australia had an interest "both from the point of view of our reputation and our national self-respect, in being—and being seen to be—a good international citizen" (Evans 1989, 12). The concept itself, embraced by consecutive Labor governments, refers to a more ethical foreign policy, which undertakes certain moral obligations beyond Australia's borders. It also refers to the spirit of internationalism, where the International System is seen as interdependent and requiring common solutions for global problems. Finally, it highlights the importance of an international legal framework and multilateral institutions (Evans 1989). Australia's realization of the good international citizen concept has historically fallen into three niche categories: peace diplomacy, development policy and environmental policy. Within only the peace dimension, Australia has committed efforts to conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations (Cambodia, East Timor), building the architecture for regional discussion about conflict management and resolution (Association of Southeast Asian Nations—ASEAN) and assuring greater arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. Particularly in the last case, Canberra's activities originated

from a sense of responsibility for a larger cause. As stressed by one of Australia's top foreign policy experts, "Australia felt that because we are such a major uranium supplier, we need to be more active in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. This might have been a rare example of a values-based diplomacy: we are trading in an area that could be seen as potentially dangerous for global security, so we have a responsibility to be very active there" (Interview, 12 May 2015). In the more distant past, a prominent place among the niche diplomacy was held by the human rights agenda. Australia gained a reputation as a country with a passionate devotion to the UN (1950s), supporting decolonization or the independence of such countries as Papua New Guinea and many smaller islands on the South Pacific Ocean (1970s) or having a leading role in the international campaign against apartheid in South Africa (1980s).

At first glance, the good international citizen idea resembles very closely the Norwegian tradition of liberal internationalism. The difference however is that while Norwegians see their commitment to a "global public good" through primarily idealistic lenses, Australians stress the pragmatic elements of such engagement. As noticed by Gareth Evans in an interview for this study, "Being a good international citizen has nothing to do with boys-scout good deeds. It is a vital component of national interests because of reputational and reciprocity returns you get from being seen to be a cooperative player on transnational problems. It squares the circle between idealism and realism. It's a way of being realistically idealistic" (Interview, 8 April 2015a). In that sense, the "good international citizen" concept is a mere extension of a "middle-power" state diplomacy, where states without enough international clout need to exploit niche opportunities to exercise their influence (Ungerer 2007, 540). As accentuated by a think tank community representative, "In order to protect the society we have created, we do not take on causes or fights that we do not have to take on externally. I would challenge people to find cases when Australia's behavior as a good international citizen damaged our interest. This has never happened" (Interview, 12 May 2015).

In sum, both concepts have strong grains of pragmatism embedded in them and it is thus pragmatism that dominates the foreign policy discourse of Canberra. There are historical and geographical factors which try to explain this phenomena. On the one hand, pragmatism might be the result of the historical struggle of Australians with their land (Interview, 10 April 2015). On the other hand, some experts argue that such approach is in fact a result of the ongoing engagement with Asia. As observed by one

respondent, “This engagement might have actually made us less prepared to stand up for our values. We might have become very Asian in that you do not criticize others” (Interview, 12 May 2015). Whichever factor prevails is, however, not as important as the fact that pragmatism—in contrast to Norwegian idealism—remains a defining characteristic of Australia’s foreign policy culture.

Australia’s Engagement and Perceptions of Asia

Australia’s longstanding engagement with its Asian counterparts is characterized by high levels of ambiguity, with policies reflecting both fear of an “Asian invasion” and hope that through cooperation, a better, more prosperous future awaits Australia (Johnson et al. 2010, 59).

In the first decades of its federative existence, Australia has perceived itself as an isolated European outpost—a bastion of Western civilization and its liberal democratic values. In such context, Asia was seen as a threat, which required security guarantees from a powerful friend engaged in the region (Jones and Benvenuti 2006, 111). The deepening of relations with Asian nations in the 1970s, the abandonment of the White Australia Policy and (as a result) the change of ethnic makeup of Australia, all have diminished perceptions of such threat within the Australian society. These developments have not however eased the tensions arising from two foreign policy imperatives: keeping Australia’s immediate areas free of hostile influence and remaining committed to fostering good relations with the Asian neighborhood. From an outside perspective, Canberra’s ambivalence in dealing with Asia is even more striking given that each change of Australian federal government provokes also a change of approach and substance of its policy toward Asia (Gorjao 2003). These approaches fall into two schools of thought, which dominated Australian foreign policy thinking in the last three decades:

- **The Conservative Tradition.** This approach to Australia’s relations with its Asian partners has been promoted strongly by the Howard government (1996–2007) and since 2013 has been undertaken again by the Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull governments. It rejects “grand constructs” or a strong role of multilateral institutions in Australia’s dealings with Asia. Instead, it promotes bilateral relations, with emphasis on trade and practical cooperation. Asia is a top priority but not the only one. Strong cultural and security links to

Europe and the USA also remain at the forefront of foreign policy thinking. The conservative tradition holds a belief that Australia does not face a choice between its history and its geography (Howard 2005) and that there is no need to start “disavowing our history, or disowning our values, or changing our institutions” (Howard 1995a, 15) in order to improve Australia’s relations with Asia. Such approach disregards the idea of middle-power activism and the concept of Australia as a “good international citizen,” which are both criticized as “fluffy products of globalism” without any serious benefit from the point of view of Australia’s national interest (Besson and Jayasuriya 2009).

- **The Labor Tradition.** This approach, initiated by the Hawke and Keating governments (1982–1996) and continued by the Rudd–Gillard–Rudd governments (2008–2013), can be characterized by extended regionalism and a belief that Australia retains, but also has to move beyond its traditional allies to engage with the Asian region (Keating 2000). Both Bob Hawke and Paul Keating believed that with the end of the Cold War, Australia needed to encourage the emergence (in both economic and security terms) of a strong regional organization (APEC) based on a commonality of interests. Creating new multilateral institutions in the region has become the trademark of consecutive Labor governments—the most recent being the unsuccessful initiative of Kevin Rudd’s (2008) to establish the Asian Pacific Community. The Labor tradition also brings to the forefront the “good international citizen” concept, with reputation being seen as hard currency in relations with Asia. Moreover, much of the focus on the engagement with Asia is brought back home. The task is to make Australians more “Asia-literate” (Dutton and Kessler 2009), more embracing its multiracial and multicultural fabric and more aware of the huge benefits that come from Australia living in an “Asian Century” (Australian Government 2012a).

The efficiency of each of the approaches to Australia’s engagement with Asia is hard to measure. Some scholars (Capling 2008, Robertson 2006) have argued that by the end of conservative Howard’s term in 2007, Australia was paradoxically more engaged in Asia than before 1996. The bilateral approach seemed to be better understood in Asia, lifting Australia’s regional profile and influence in areas of security and economy. Even the father of the “good international citizen” concept Gareth Evans acknowl-

edges that the more internationalist and multilateral activities of Canberra do not win too many affirmative votes for Australia in the region: “Being a good international citizen works more to our advantage in the broader Commonwealth context, in North America, Europe and non-francophone Africa, but unfortunately not so much in Asia” (Interview, 8 April 2015a) As he further argues, this is because Asian integration is not based as much on values, as on a self-interest community brought together by a common economic interest in removing barriers to trade. Having said that, it does not go unnoticed that even the Howard and Abbott government have skillfully used multilateral forums (APEC, UN) and Australia’s commitment to the resolution of global problems (nuclear non-proliferation, climate change advocacy) to win the hearts and minds of some Asian neighbors.

Naturally, neither of the political parties pursues a clear-cut type of engagement with Asia. What unites, however, both approaches is that this **engagement has been and remains largely elite-driven**. From the early 1970s, Australia’s regional diplomacy was constructed above the electorate and was a series of *fait accompli*. As underlined by Griffiths and Wesley (2010, 18), “Governments on both sides of politics believed that regional relations required changing social attitudes at home. Diplomacy was expected to lead public opinion.” What this meant was that the Australian government attempted to use the country’s geographic positioning and geopolitical interests to reframe its national identity and values for the Asian Pacific audience. As Keating (1992a, 190) stressed, Australia should make a point of presenting itself “‘as we are’. Not with the ghosts of Empire about us. Not as a vicar of Europe, or as a U.S. deputy.” By mid-1990s, this engagement became one of the most politicized issues, with large numbers of Australians expressing concerns over the “Asianisation of Australia” policy. The fracture between the political rhetoric and broad Australian sentiment on what was perceived as Australian identity and its associated values contributed to the raise of the far-right nationalistic party “One Nation” led by Pauline Hanson. Although the “Hansonism” phenomena was short-lived, it was the first episode to question years of Australian public relations and diplomatic work in the region. According to Anthony Milner (2000, 178), “it revived or confirmed the false image of Australia as a white society, opposed to immigration, clinging to Europe and the United States and generally at odds with the region in which it is located.”

Two decades on, some scholars claim that the debate over Australian identity and the country’s place in Asia has come to an end (Interview; 9 April 2015a; Interview, 27 March 2015). With exceptionally high levels

of public support for Australia's multicultural policy (84 percent) and an ever-changing makeup of Australian society (Markus 2014a, 12 and 34–35), it seems that there is a broad consensus that Australia might not be Asian, but remains an important part of the region. Studies show that there are growing cultural and economic ties with Asia particularly among the wealthier and better educated layers of Australian society (Pietsch and Aarons 2012). At the same time, however, despite huge efforts and significant gains in institutional engagement with Asia, neither the behavioral nor the attitudinal engagement in Australia's society have been fully consolidated (Gorjao 2003; Johnson, et al. 2010). As underlined by one of Australia's foreign policy experts: "Most Australians see the economic rationale of the engagement but do not understand the diplomatic and security logic behind it. They are still very culturally and security-wise orientated towards Europe and North America. Asia is seen as a place where we make our money, not a place where we have genuine friendships. The region still remains culturally very alien to most Australians" (Interview, 12 May 2015). A strong dichotomy of approach is particularly visible on the example of Australia's relations with China. As shown by the recent Lowy Institute Poll (2014), 60 percent of Australians have positive feelings toward the country, but almost half the population (48 percent) say it is likely that China will become a military threat to Australia in the next 20 years, and 56 percent think that the Australian Government allows too much investment from China. Concurrently, 78 percent of Australians believe that the alliance with the USA remains very or fairly important for Australia's security. This ambivalence is reflected in real-life politics contributing to fundamental contradictions in messaging. For instance, the governmental "Australia in the Asian Century" White Paper (Australian Government 2012a) indicated that the deepening of regional relations was the most important, pressing, overriding objective for Australia's foreign policy. At the same time, the 2013 Defence Department White Paper (Australian Government 2013a) implied that it was Asia (in particular an assertive China and potentially instable Indonesia) that might pose the major security challenge to Australia. As noticed by one of the respondents, "People in the region observe this contradiction and consequently we have a reputation problem. They see us saying one thing and doing another. There is thus an absence of trust and that can even become distaste" (Interview, 25 March 2015).

Overall, Australia seems to have only scratched the surface of its engagement with Asia. As underlined by a former senior diplomat "we need to go

beyond the utilitarian, commercial engagement and move into a deeper engagement: to actually understand these communities and feel comfortable with them" (Interview, 14 April 2015b).

Asian Perceptions of Australia

In the 1990s, Samuel Huntington (1996, 151–154) stressed that Australia's engagement with Asia would be as heavily influenced by the stance of the Australian public and elites as by the acceptance of this shift in policy by the Asian elites. He predicted that the engagement based solely on economic considerations would not last long. Unsurprisingly, most Asian nations were not enthusiastic to embrace Australia as part of its region. In fact, the issue of what precisely constitutes "Asia" and Australia's place in the region continues to be highly problematic for Canberra's neighbors in the North (Broinowski 2003). As hinted by Gareth Evans, "Australians feel more part of the Asia-Pacific, then Asians are willing to accept" (Interview, 8 April 2015a).

Naturally, how Australia is perceived in Asia largely depends on the country and the level of interest it has in its relations with Australia. In most of the Asian countries, Australia receives overall positive marks (Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2006; Hanson and Shearer 2009; Hanson 2012; Metcalf 2012). The affirmative arguments (made by those who have an opinion on the issue) focus on Australia's sophisticated economy, stable democratic system, excellent education and health system, high level of societal trust and tourism excellence. Many of these qualities resonate well especially among the Asian-educated middle class, which often sees Australia as an example to emulate. At the same time, other layers of Asian societies, especially those lacking the privilege to travel, would be more likely to structure their view of Australia around stereotypes that have arose in Asia over the years. In fact, several Australian foreign policy practitioners interviewed for this study have acknowledged that the major challenges for the country's PD in Asia today might be the outdated perceptions that still persist (Interview, 31 March 2015a; Interview, 7 May 2015; Interview, 12 May 2015; Interview 9 April 2015b). The respondents have mentioned three major stereotypes that Australia needs to counteract in the region:

- a) **Australia is a racist country.** The stereotype of Australian racism is one that continues to surface most often in Australia's relations with the region. Australians today strongly embrace their multicultural

identity and are proud of the fact that 50 percent of the populations is overseas born or a child of overseas born. Yet these numbers do not seem to be widely recognized outside Australia. Many Asians do not believe Australia can be genuinely multicultural. They refer to arguments from the past such as the racist “White Australia” immigration policy (1901–1973) or the rise of nationalistic political party “One Nation” (1997–1998). Although the image of Australia has profoundly changed over the last two decades, the legacy of that era is still affecting mutual perceptions. It is also reinforced by more recent anti-immigrant outbursts such as the Cronulla riots (2005), Indian students bashing in Melbourne (2009) and the “Reclaim Australia” marches (2015). Finally, as we will discuss later in the chapter, the way in which Australia deals with refugee and asylum seekers also does not strengthen its reputation of a tolerant and opened society (Morris-Suzuki 2004).

- b) **Australia is a client state of the USA.** In some Asian countries, the Australian strategic relationship with the USA receives much attention and criticism. Australia is seen as a state lacking independent foreign policy, serving simply as a Western outpost in the Pacific Ocean. As suggested by some respondents (Interview, 23 April 2015a; Interview, 24 April 2015a), this image might be reinforced by the fact that Australia continues to be a constitutional monarchy sharing its unelected, hereditary head of state, Queen Elizabeth II, with the UK and 14 other British colonies. As was put by one of the respondents: “we did not have a revolution, we did not claim our independence. That often irritates Australia’s neighbors who had to fight for their sovereignty and freedom. They feel we don’t understand that and don’t care about national sovereignty” (Interview, 25 March 2015). The Alliance with the USA is criticized by Australians themselves (particularly from the left side of the political spectrum) as a serious obstacle to Australia’s full engagement with Asia. One of the former senior diplomats in Canberra argued China will only want to go to war with Australia because of something that happens with the USA: “Australia is not threatened by the United States, but it is threatened by its foreign policy” (Interview, 24 April 2015a). Even more moderate voices underline that the way in which Australia enhances and advertises its military engagement with the USA might be seen by Asians as very disturbing. One of the respondents noticed that “many countries can have equally large engagement but they

don't go around and brag about it the way Australia does" (Interview, 27 March 2015). In opposition to this, other experts argue (Interview, 7 May 2015; Interview, 12 May 2015) that such views are outdated. The fact that America has so many Asian allies and partners, which seek American presence in the region and want Australia to be part of this partnership, is in their view something Australia can take advantage of. One of the senior foreign policy experts commented on the most recent improvements of Australia's standing in India: "when the U.S.-Indian relations changed fundamentally for the better, India's engagement with Australia rose. For India Australia has become a back-door partnership with the United States" (Interview, 7 May 2015).

- c) **Australians are people of bad character.** The final, most cited Asian stereotype about Australians concerns their national character. Some larger Asian nations such as China or India have shown a very condescending approach to Australia. Representing much older and mature civilizations, they would disapprove of Australia's derivative culture (as one "borrowed" from Britain and the USA), the societies' directness and desire for quick and practical solutions (seen as rudeness and lack of patience) and the balanced lifestyle (seen as laziness and lack of work devotion) (Fitzgerald 2004:30).

To the surprise of some in Canberra, the fact that Asian nations have become more prosperous and self-confident over the years has not diminished the easiness with which Asian elites bash Australia (Interview, 25 March 2015). Despite having thousands of Asians graduated from Australian universities, the criticism does not cease. This is because, as proven by Alison Broinowski in her book *About Face*, "representations of Australia (...) are constructed by opinion leaders' agendas of Occidentalism, racism, and regionalism in pursuit of their own domestic priorities and concerns." As described by one of the foreign policy experts, "Australia is a small and kickable part of the West and serves as a link to the colonial power resentment. We represent to them everything that Asians hated about colonialism and they can express these frustrations without fearing we would retaliate" (Interview, 9 April 2015a).

A more closer look at the policies of most Asian countries gives evidence to the fact that the criticism of Canberra policy is double standard. For example, the majority of the region (Japan, India) supports a continued US military presence, while racial discrimination is widespread within Asian societies (Pakistan, Cambodia, Japan) and between them

(e.g. Chinese in India or vice versa). Also hundreds of thousands of Asian do not mind sending their children to Australian universities, spending holidays or doing business with Australia, despite criticism of Australia's Western identity.

Although misperceptions about Australia are surely a major issue for the country's PD, as we will see in the next part of the chapter, the problem for Canberra is deeper than that. **The real issue for Australia might not actually be the outdated images contributing to Australia's bad reputation in some Asian countries, but rather a lack of any reputation altogether.** An external observer finds it challenging to define what does Australia actually stand for or what kind of contribution it offers to the world. As the Asiabarometer indicates (2012), an average person in Asia does not have a strong or meaningful opinion about Australia's foreign policy or shows considerable indifference toward Australia. What is even more surprising, as stressed by Goldsmith and Linley (2012, 525), is "views about U.S. or Chinese influence on (respondent's) country are much better predictors of their views of Australia's influence than (respondent's) core values, identity, information or demographic." Australia seems not to be very relevant to most Asian nations and public opinion about Australia nowhere is strong enough to actually affect the decisions of politicians from those countries.

AUSTRALIA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN ASIA

The Key Instruments of Australian Public Diplomacy in Asia

From the outset, Australian PD efforts, tracking back to 1939 and the establishment of the Radio Australia, have focused first and foremost on Asia. The first initiatives to reach out directly to Asian societies and connect them with Australia date back to the early post-world war period. It was in 1952 that the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific was conceived, bringing in the next four decades some 40,000 Asian students into Australian families (Australian Government 2015a). Around the same time, the short-term Overseas Visitors Program was established, with the aim to familiarize more Asian journalists and decision-makers with Australia and its policies. A few decades later, Australia's PD efforts in Asia continue to focus primarily on four areas: exchanges and visitors programs, cultural diplomacy, development aid and broadcasting.

The Success Stories: Educational and Cultural Diplomacy

Educational and development scholarships remain by far the most successful initiatives of Australian PD in Asia. Known as the **Australia Awards**, this whole-of-government initiative combines together scholarships and fellowships administered by three different governmental departments.⁴ The Awards are granted to current and future leaders from developing countries, creating an opportunity to undertake study, research and professional development in Australia. They also allow high-achieving Australians to do the same overseas. The DFAT PD Division coordinates 90 percent of all scholarships available (Interview, 31 March 2015a). Only in 2013–2014, it has spent \$362.2 million, enabling 4450 new recipients from 117 eligible developing countries to undertake a program in Australia. Fifty-four percent of all recipients came from the Indo-Pacific region (Australia Government 2015b).

The strength of the educational component of Australia's PD efforts comes not so much from the amount of money appropriated to the cause as from the fact that there seems to be understanding on the side of DFAT of what constitutes a successful international exchange. Through years of practice, the Australian government has internalized three core lessons: it treats exchanges as a two-way street, realizes them in close cooperation with domestic stakeholders and is working on building into the programs a strong Alumni component. First, there is an acknowledgment of the fact that the success of any international exchange has to be based on the flow of students and participants in both directions. Traditionally, as a much wealthier country, with a world-class education system, Australia has benefited from large numbers of Asian visitors interested in completing studies or other programs Down Under. It proved to be much more difficult to convince Australian students to pursue similar experiences in Asia. Language and cultural barriers, as well as practical considerations (finding a partner institution, accommodation, financing) have been at the top of the list of items limiting this flow. Already the Rudd government showed strong commitment to raising "Asian literacy" among the Australian population by introducing an Asian-language program in secondary schools. The new Coalition government, at the initiative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Julie Bishop, has taken a step further by introducing in 2012 the **New Colombo Plan** initiative (Australian

⁴The three departments administering the Australia Awards are DFAT, Department of Education and the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research.

Government 2012b).⁵ Unlike the initial Colombo Plan, its main aim is not to bring more Asians to Australia but instead to “reverse” the flow and expose more young Australians to Asia. The program offers grants and scholarships for short-term visits to a number of Asian countries with the goal of receiving professional experience in the region (via internships and mentorships). As one of DFAT diplomats said, the New Colombo Plan is about “transforming how young Australians look into the region and interact with the region” (Interview, 13 April 2015a). The pilot program, which started in 2014, included 1300 mobility students and 40 scholars awarded. By 2016 it supported more than 5450 mobility students and around 100 scholars to live, study and undertake work placements in the region. (Australian Government 2015c). As commented by one of the top Asian experts, the idea is “fantastic in diplomatic terms because what it says is that Australians have something to learn from the region. This is the type of exercise which really accumulates soft power” (Interview, 27 March 2015).

Second, both the Australian Awards and the New Colombo Plan, as PD initiatives, are primary **examples of public-private partnership**. In particular, the New Colombo Plan is one of the more successful international endeavors of the Australian government in working with Australian non-governmental actors. Having been developed with the help of both Australian universities (with 38 out of 41 involved directly) and with a significant input (both content-wise and financially) from Australian business, the program foresees only a facilitator role for the government. The idea is to create such a proposition for students, which enriches their university experience by obtaining market skills in an Asian environment (Interview, 13 April 2015a).

Third and final, the Australian Awards and the New Colombo Plan are soon to be supported by an extensive **Alumni program**, that will encompass all international students who have ever studied in Australia but will have a specific focus on current and emerging leaders and Alumni of Australian Government-funded award programs including the Australia Awards and New Colombo Plan. A senior DFAT representative explained that “the idea behind the strategy is to grow a global Alumni community that engages with Australia to build trade, investment, industry linkages, and partnerships in education, science, research and innovation” (Interview, 31 March 2015b). This new all-encompassing approach acknowledges the

⁵ Australian Government (2012b) New Colombo Plan, A report of the Steering Group, August 2013, delivered to the author by DFAT, 28 April 2015.

huge value of the Australian international education industry (third largest export sector) as a source of soft power in the region. With around three-fourth of international paying student enrollments coming from Asia (ECEC Monitor 2014), the ability to reach out to this group and enrich their Australian experience with additional network opportunities will surely enhance overall outcomes of the country's PD effort. At the same time, it might mitigate some of the negative effect felt recently by some international students, which result from the growing commercialization of international education in Australia (universities maximizing income by lowering language standards and student welfare) (Wesley 2009).

The second PD instrument which has been deemed by most respondents to the study as relatively successful with Asian partners is **cultural diplomacy**. Although receiving less attention and financing than educational diplomacy, promoting Australian arts and culture has a long history within DFAT's PD activities. Coordinated by the Australian International Cultural Council, cultural diplomacy is based on programs such as the International Cultural Visits (bringing arts and cultural leaders to Australia) or the Focus Country Program (deepening bilateral cultural ties with selected countries). It also has a strong media component implemented through the International Media Visits Program allowing foreign journalists to discover and increase understanding of contemporary Australia. When asked about the most far-reaching and audience-grabbing initiatives in the Asian context, respondents of this study would mention first and foremost these cultural events, which have contributed to the promotion of **Aboriginal culture abroad** (Interview, 31 March 2015a; Interview, 8 April 2015b; Interview, 9 April 2015b; Interview, 14 April 2015a). Cultural Ambassadors of Australia such as painter Emily Kame Kngwarreye, singer Geoffrey Gurrumul Yunupingu or the Bangarra Dance Company, with the financial support of DFAT, have had tremendous success in touring Asia (in particular Japan, Korea and China) with their art. Apart from the aboriginal heritage, the Australian Government (2013b) considers also sports as a "great cultural asset" of the country. As an element shaping Australian national identity, the love for sports became Australia's PD tool in Asia with 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, Cricket Games or the most recent 2015 Asian Football Cup hosted all Down Under. When talking about the Football Cup, one of the senior Australian diplomats stressed that the tournament has send a strong signal across the region that Australia is part of Asia and wants to be perceived as such (Interview, 31 March 2015a).

The PD Failures: International Broadcasting and Supporting the International Development Aid Sector

The most recent Australian PD success stories tend to fall into the more traditional categories of PD such as educational and cultural diplomacy. Admittedly, both areas have been heavily integrated into the workings of the DFAT and have seen consistent (though modest) flow of government funding. On the other side of the spectrum lie two other PD instruments—international broadcasting and development aid. Both, despite having had at times much bigger budgets than the exchange or cultural activities, have never become the core of DFAT's PD thinking. Run by external agencies or institutions, these two critical instruments have not only been underexploited by the Australian government, but with the severe 2014 cuts, their growth has been hampered.

Australia's International Broadcasting has a long history dating back to the beginning of the World War II and the establishment of **Radio Australia** for regional audiences in Asia and the Pacific Ocean (O'Keeffe and Oliver 2010). At first, a means of wartime propaganda, Radio Australia has transformed throughout the years into an independent source of news to many nations in the Asia-Pacific region, deprived from such access. It has also served as a medium of communicating with Australian expats and an instrument stimulating immigration to Australia (Duncan et al. 2005, 34). In time, Radio Australia had developed a reputation of a reliable, respected and diligence broadcaster, delivering an objective side of the stories taking place in the Asia-Pacific. It has been later supplemented by the television broadcasting arm, known since 2006 as the **Australian Network** television. By 2010, both agencies have been managed by the Australian Broadcast Corporation (ABC), retaining however two distinct brands and two different sources of funding. Radio Australia was financed from an annual allocation provided to the ABC from the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, while the Australia Network was subject of a five-year contract with the DFAT (O'Keeffe and Oliver 2010, 55). The Australia Network worked with a budget of \$223 million for ten years (2012–2022), which constituted a significant portion of the modest Australian PD allocations, yet remained minuscule in comparison to the budgets of other state international broadcasters such as the BBC or CCTV (Oliver 2014a). This ended in 2013 when the Australian Government announced it will terminate the Australian Network contract with the ABC (Australian Government 2014a), forcing the broadcasting corporation to scale down the network activities to digital and online

platforms. The cuts have also affected Radio Australia, which by 2014 saw slashes in the number of correspondents and offices across the Asia-Pacific region (Hayward-Jones 2014). These decisions have severely hampered both broadcasters, which in 2010 were said to be reaching monthly an audience of 10 million (2.7 million via radio, and seven million via the Australian Network) (O’Keeffe and Oliver 2010, 62).

The recent cuts have been seen by some respondents of the study as a political backlash against a public broadcaster. As pointed out by one of the foreign policy experts: “the conservative governments saw ABC as their critic, unable to understand that it is exactly this ability to criticize its own government that has made ABC so effective and respected as a broadcaster in the region” (Interview, 2 April 2015a). Regardless of the reason, these cuts have only added to a long history of Australian government negligence and volatile funding, dating back to the early 1990s. It is nevertheless surprising that at a time, when the number of international broadcasters is growing and competition for the attention of international public is tightening, a decision to scrap altogether an existing recognized brand is made. It seems to be the result of not only the ongoing political calculations (ABC’s conflict with the Coalition government, its inability to explain its core functions) but also a more general lack of strategic commitment to international broadcasting as a tool of PD. Telling is the fact that the Australian government had no objections to outsource over the years, something that other governments have perceived as a significant component of the IR infrastructure (O’Keeffe and Oliver 2010, 62). By doing so, it has limited its engagement and attention for the cause, failing in recent years to even openly acknowledge international broadcasting as a core of Australia’s PD efforts in documents such as DFAT Annual Report 2013–2014 (Australian Government 2014a), or the Senate Report on Public Diplomacy (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2007), even when it comprised anywhere from a third to more than a half of DFAT’s expenditure on PD.

A lack of strategic commitment on the side of the Australian government is also visible in the **international development aid** area. Although there is widespread understanding among the political elites in Canberra that Australia has a certain humanitarian responsibility toward the Asia and the Pacific (with 50 percent of Australian aid distributed in the region) and that instabilities in the neighborhood will directly affect Australia’s own security and prosperity, the commitment to development assistance over the last two decades has been dubious at best (O’Keeffe and Oliver 2010, 62).

The history of Australian foreign aid for Asia dates back to the Colombo Plan, which apart from the student exchange component discussed earlier, provided direct assistance to alleviate poverty in several countries in South and Southeast Asia—primarily Malaysia and India. In the 1960s, Australia became an official donor country through development agencies such as the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. The 1960s and 1970s saw a significant raise of Australia’s aid budget, as well as a growing involvement of NGOs in aid distribution. In response to these developments, by 1974, AusAID was established as an independent government agency created to manage Australia’s development aid (Kilby 2015). Until the end of the Cold War, Australian development aid policy has seen just one major review, with the Hawke government (1983–1991) undertaking a more pragmatic and self-serving approach by linking aid priorities to foreign policy and commercial objectives. It was not however until the 1990s that a significant weakening of foreign aid commitment began. Despite signing in 2000, the UN Millennium Development Goal (which required raising the foreign aid budgets to 0.7 percent of GNI by 2015), the Howard government (1996–2007) in fact decreased spending to only of 0.23 percent of GNI. The later promises of the Rudd government to lift the budget to 0.5 percent of GNI have brought only limited effect, and came to a halt as the financial crisis of 2007 grew (Phillips 2014). Still, in 2014, Australia ranked 14th out of 28 OECD countries in terms of its spending on aid as a percentage of GNI (OECD 2014).

The year 2014 will be probably the last in which Australia makes it to the top 20 international OECD donors. This is because in 2013 the new Abbott government, had made a decision to make staggering cuts of A\$11 billion from the foreign aid budget over four years (Financial Times 2015). Already the 2015–2016 Australian Government budget has foresee the fall of foreign aid expenditures to \$4 billion, down from a peak of \$5.6 billion in 2012–2013. As stressed in an overview prepared by the Lowy Institute for International Policy (2016), this constitutes “the largest ever multi-year aid cuts (33 per cent) and largest ever single year cut (20 per cent and \$1 billion in 2015–16).” With this, it is clear that Australian aid by 2017 will fall to 0.22 percent of GNI—again the lowest level in Australia’s history. In geographical terms, Asian countries will lose around 40 percent of Australian aid while North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa will face cuts up to 82 percent of funding. The Abbott government has been able to shield only the small Pacific islands, partly because of its heavy (sometimes complete) reliance on Australian aid and partly because of fear that China would be the first to step into the region, if Australia would signal its financial withdrawal (Financial Times 2015).

The Abbot government has neatly justified the aid budget cuts as one resulting from the slowing of Australia's economic growth and the widening budget deficit. But another of its decision—the dismantlement after 40 years of the sole Australian development agency—shows also a strong ideological component behind the approach toward development aid. The 2013 **absorption of AusAID** into the DFAT has come as a shock to much of the aid community (Australia Associated Press 2013). The decision has resulted in massive staff cuts, amounting to 500 people (Oliver 2015) and the loss of years of expertise in the field. It has also significantly hampered the cooperation between the Australian NGOs and government who ceased to be represented by an institutional partner with strong established practices (Interview, 8 April 2015b; Interview, 13 April 2015b). Finally, it raised questions within the aid community about the future priorities of Australian international assistance—whether aid would continue to reach out to the most marginalized groups in Asia, or rather become a tool of promoting Australia's national interests first and foremost (Phillips 2014).

Some of the respondents pointed out to the positive sides of the merger. One think tank expert stressed that it has indeed influenced positively the DFAT working culture, “AusAID by its nature was very outward focused, it was used to working with civil society organizations and it had a deep understanding of the benefit of the mutual relationship. I think that culture is now starting to have an effect on the wider DFAT culture” (Interview, 9 April 2015a). In that sense, the merger has brought with it a new breed of PD practitioners, with much more exposure to working with civil society (Interview, 2 April 2015a). It has also been used to introduce fresh concepts such as the **new aid paradigm**. Through actions such as “Innovationxchange Program,” it affirms the Government's push for DFAT to be more creative, entrepreneurial and innovative in its design and delivery of the Australian aid program (Australian Government 2015d).

Despite some positive elements, unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the Australian aid community remains critical of the current developments. As argued by numerous respondents to this study, both direct budget cuts and AusAID merger were purely ideological and politically driven decisions (Interview, 8 April 2015b; Interview, 13 April 2015b; Interview 23 April 2015c). On the one hand, it embodied a clash of two ideologies, where the previous Labor government believed that human development is good in itself, while the new government stressed that the development of Australia comes before the development of the rest of the world (Interview 23 April 2015c). On the other hand, it was an easy target for

budgetary savings, not as much in order to decrease the deficit, but rather to lift the planned Australian defense spending to the 2 percent within the decade to come (Oliver 2014b).

There is no doubt that the recent developments in the aid sector will leave a strong footprint on the non-governmental sector. The sector will survive despite severe budget cuts: the government has been only matching what the non-governmental sector was already gathering through private donations. The real damage comes from a general atmosphere around foreign aid. As noted by one of the NGO community representatives, “although the economic crisis did not affect Australia, the emotions related to this crisis did. There was a deep concern what will happen and consumer confidence dropped. Even today, eight years into the crisis the current Coalition government is talking down the economy, which again restrains people from giving to others” (Interview, 8 April 2015b). This mood has first and foremost contributed to an alarming drop in public support for the Australian foreign aid program. As shown by a recent Lowy Institute for International Policy (2015b) Poll, a majority of Australians (53 percent) were in favor of budget cuts to Australia’s overseas aid to developing countries, with only 35 percent opposing. As argued by some representatives of the NGO community, this is because the aid cuts were preceded by large domestic welfare cuts, abolishing of a range of national NGO Peak bodies, controversial policies on indigenous and labor rights which all created an environment of anxiety and a solely domestic focus (Kent 2001, 258).

Fortunately, despite the support for government aid cuts, individual donorship is not shrinking (Interview, 8 April 2015b; Interview, 13 April 2015b; Interview, 24 April 2015b; Interview, 22 April 2015b). The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID 2014), an umbrella organization for the majority of Australia’s non-government aid and international development organizations, assesses that the “sector raises and expends \$1.3 billion annually, with approximately \$875 million in 2011–2012 coming primarily from the public.” As suggested by some respondents, Australians are very generous on the individual basis, but do not like the picture of the government giving out their money to others. There seems to be a general lack of trust that the government can do a good job with money appropriated (Interview, 23 April 2015c). This logic however does not take into consideration the fact that much of the real work on the ground has been done by non-governmental actors. In that sense, the budget cuts and merger of AusAID is a large defeat for

Australia's non-government aid and international development organizations, which have not been able to raise public awareness on the issue. As noted by one scholar, "the big mistake made now in the way the NGOs are communicating with the public is that they talk about 'keeping the aid levels up'. People see this as a self-interested statement. What they should be talking about social justice issues, inequality, what is happening in the world" (Interview, 29 April 2015a).

Today, it is unclear what kind of a long-term impact the huge scaling back on international broadcasting and foreign aid will have on Australia's relations with Asia. As noticed by Financial Times (2015) with the decision, "Australia is now an outlier among developed countries, which in spite of a dip following the 2008 financial crash, have continued to grow overall aid spending, according to OECD data." These decisions will surely come as a PD blow, which will contribute to an image of Australia as a country that is "pulling-down the curtains" (Interview, 23 April 2015c). Such impressions are reinforced with the growing hostilities among the Australian population toward boat people and asylum seekers and the establishment of the notorious offshore refugee camps financed by Australia in Nauru, Cambodia and Papua New Guinea (BBC 2015a) discussed later in the chapter. As indicated by one of the respondents, "Today there is a growing sense of self-interest in Australia. The government has been part of that change—they have both reflected the general mood and they have added to that mood by cutting back hard on aid. As a result the general public has become more insular" (Interview, 22 April 2015b). The development of such societal mindset, if reinforced and blown out of proportion, will make it extremely difficult for any government, with even the best PD tools to defend Australia's positive image abroad.

Domestic Dimension of Australia's Public Diplomacy: The Difficult Journey to Getting It Right

Many harsh words have been written in the past about the overall state of Australia's PD. The poor condition of this policy was exposed in 2007 by the Australian Government's Joint Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence Inquiry into the nature and conduct of Australia's PD program. It underlined serious problems with a lack of political will and direction driving the policy, insufficient resources, weak coordination across departments and agencies and finally significant gaps

in engagement and consolidation of the Australian domestic public in shaping the PD program. The results of the inquiry have been confirmed also by independent research. Oliver and Shearer (2011, 17) argued that in the last decade, Australian government's commitment to PD "remained virtually non-existent." The ongoing activities seemed to be lacking strategy, the target audiences were vague at best and the programs were seriously underfunded. Also this study has revealed that most of the criticism still stands in 2015. A number of interviews confirmed that Australian PD in general and its messaging toward Asia in particular continue to have serious flaws. Among them are:

- **Lack of strategic intergovernmental coordination.** As we have seen in the previous section, responsibility for PD activities is scattered across a number of different governmental agencies such as DFAT (educational diplomacy, aid), Australia International Cultural Council (cultural diplomacy), Department of Education (Endeavour Fellowship), Tourism Australia (Brand Australia), Australian Trade Commission (economic diplomacy), Department of Industry and Science (science diplomacy), the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (Radio Australia) and even the Department of Health (sport diplomacy). Although there might be a good rational for having a multitude of institutions dealing with different parts of PD, it is not clear how these efforts are coordinated on the most practical level. For example, the most recent Australia's Public Diplomacy Strategy prepared by DFAT for the year 2014–2016 (Australian Government 2013b) completely omits questions of international broadcasting and in no way refers to the ongoing "Australia Unlimited" branding campaign sponsored by the Australian Trade Commission.⁶ The former is actually a good example of a failure to undertake a whole-of-government approach. Prepared with a significant amount of research and funding, with a very clear idea to show the human dimension of Australia, the 2012

⁶ Australia Unlimited was developed to provide an overarching theme for the Building Brand Australia Program sponsored by the Australian Trade Commission. At the heart of the Australia Unlimited concept is the idea that Australia's development has been forged through its enterprising spirit—the resilience, creativity and unquenchable desire of Australians to succeed, no matter what the challenge may be. To learn more, see <http://www.australiaunlimited.com/brand-australia/about-brand>

“Australia Unlimited” campaign has completely failed at the stage of implementation. The concept was never projected across other government agencies and the video on YouTube promoting the idea, in three years’ time (2012–2015), has been accessed only by 4000 viewers and received only two comments—one being a complaint that the organizers of the campaign are not replying to his emails (Australia Unlimited 2012).

- **Underfunding.** As highlighted earlier, with the exception of educational exchanges, all other areas of PD have seen a steep fall in funding. The dismantling of Australian Network, AusAID and severe foreign aid budget cuts, PD financing is practically down to DFAT expenditures. For the years 2015–2016, DFAT was in the possession of \$10 million for the New Colombo Plan and only around \$4.5 million on general Public Information Services and Public Diplomacy (Australian Government 2015e). The latter sum was to be spread across Australia’s network of 100 overseas embassies and consulates, as well as cover costs of cultural grants and media visitors programs (Oliver and Shearer 2011). As pointed out by one of senior DFAT diplomats “in the Australian system it is very difficult to win or preserve funding for PD, and it’s difficult to point to hard statistics of success—a common problem for practitioners. There is a sense in the Australian government that Australia’s PD takes care of itself” (Interview, 31 March 2015a).
- **Deprioritization of PD efforts.** Most respondents to this study (Interview, 2 April 2015a; Interview, 14 April 2015a; Interview, 7 May 2015; Interview, 12 May 2015) agreed that PD still tends to be a second or third priority issue within Australian diplomatic service. Only around 1 percent of DFAT A-based staff occupy positions dedicated to PD activities (Oliver and Shearer 2011). As ironically pointed out by one of the respondents: “There might be actually more people working on public diplomacy in the U.S. Embassy in Canberra than in our entire Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade. People in the Department believe that it is better to be a junior actor but in the space of hard power than to try to carve out space in the new and scary soft power area” (Interview, 14 April 2015a). This general mood can be encapsulated by the following quote made by one of the renowned foreign policy experts: “At the end the under-resourcing of PD efforts might have been a rational choice to have made. The rest of the world does not need to think

about Australia very much and I do not see why that is a bad thing” (Interview, 12 May 2015).

The abovementioned strategic weaknesses of Australian PD conduct, discussed usually by PD experts, omit, however, the two major **structural challenges** the policy is facing—both related to the involvement of the Australian “domestic dimension” in foreign policy. In stark contrast to the Norwegian examples presented in the previous chapter, Australian PD efforts are hampered first and foremost by

- (a) the lack of clarity about the message Australia is sending to the outside world in general and to Asia in particular; and at times a **clear ambivalence** in the messaging (searching for Australia’s national identity).
- (b) the inability to mobilize civic human resources for the good of Australia’s reputation (working with Australian civil society).

Both of these challenges, discussed in depth in the next sections, do not require more funding or even strategic coordination. What they do require, however, is a clear commitment to strengthening the domestic dimension of foreign policy. The first (clarifying the message) involves a soul-searching exercise with the general Australian public in defining Australia’s national and regional identity. The second (mobilizing national resources) demands coming into terms with the uneasy relationship the Australian government has fostered with its own civil society.

The PD Message and the Australian National and Regional Identity

In his 2013 Bruce Allen Memorial Lecture on Australia’s Soft Power, Peter Varghese, the Secretary of the DFAT acknowledged that Australia’s challenge with PD does not come from a bad international image, but rather from a “struggle to find symbols of uniqueness” (Varghese 2013). Indeed, out of the number of questions asked for this study, those concerning messaging and identity proved to be the most difficult for respondents to answer. When inquired about what **message Australia is sending to Asia** as part of its PD effort, PD practitioners would most likely mention narratives involving the physical characteristics (nature, wildlife, cuisine, lifestyle) (Interview, 31 March 2015a; Interview, 14 April 2015b) or the ethnic and cultural diversity of the country (Interview, 25 March 2015; Interview, 31 March 2015a;

Interview, 9 April 2015a). Some also argued that at a societal level, the most cohesive concept transferred from Australia to Asia was sport or education (Interview, 9 April 2015b). But even these straightforward answers quickly were acknowledged by respondents themselves to have serious shortcomings. For example, focusing on Australia's touristic or sport qualities has had very little foreign policy value (Interview, 2 April 2015a), overshadowing the human aspect of Australia's development—its political system, technological capacities and economic performance (Interview, 31 March 2015a). Meanwhile, the cultural diversity message has not made it through to wide Asian publics, overshadowed by historical memory of the White Australia Policy or current events such as the bashing of the Indian students in Melbourne (Interview, 9 April 2015b). In the most recent years, a new “Australia open for business” narrative was proposed by the Abbott government, prioritizing first and foremost the strengthening of economic ties with Asia. Again, however, respondents were very critical, dismissing this narrative as one lacking true PD value. As stressed by one of the respondents to this study, “the business aspects of soft power form a strategy, but they give a very mercantile idea of Australia. This message is also not unique. Today everyone is open to business” (Interview, 14 April 2015a).

On the other side of the spectrum was a large number of respondents, (particularly coming from outside the government), which openly admitted that they believed Australia had no clear PD message (Interview, 2 April 2015a; Interview, 9 April 2015b; Interview, 14 April 2015a; Interview, 12 May 2015). As noted by one of the foreign policy experts: “Australia is bad in public diplomacy partly because it has not the clarity about the message it wants to send to the outside world. Australia is not sure about its identity, it's not sure why others should be interested in it. It does not know what values it wants to convey through its public diplomacy. In consequence the PD efforts are half-hearted, unfocused, poorly resourced and largely ineffective” (Interview, 12 May 2015).

Indeed, the most critical shortcoming in Australia's effort to create a compelling story about itself is related to the **questions of national and regional (Asian) identity**. Largely influenced by the country's geography and history (Albrechtsen 2007), the ongoing identity debate has been part of a greater debate about Australia's place in Asia. Since the end of World War II, pursuing relations with Asian countries has served as an element of domestic policy discourse which helped define Australian identity—in opposition to the “Other.” Until 1973 and the end of the White Australia

Policy, Asians were effectively disenfranchised from the Australian society. The collective identity evolved around the notion of Britishness (Meaney 2013) or (as more immigrants came from different parts of Europe), a society of European decent. With the introduction of the multicultural policy in the mid-1970s, an elite-driven process started redefining Australia's both regional and national identities through its engagement with Asia. The Keating government (1991–1996), for example, urged for stronger Australian commitment to its relations with Asian countries to indicate a distancing from traditional Western allies and changing Australian national identity (Keating 2000). Keating, just as his later successor Kevin Rudd (2007–2013), supported the idea of a multiracial and multicultural Australia that moves outside from its colonial past. Yet such debates created discomfort among the more traditional strands of Australian society. The Howard Government (1996–2007) was persistently concerned about Asia changing the cultural foundations of Australia's European settlement tradition. Howard (1995a, b, 2005) also declared the end of the identity debate, stressing that newcomers to Australia, including Australian Asians should become “more like us” (Johnson et al. 2010, 61). And by “us” he meant a society being a projection of Western civilization, one inheriting the European values of liberal democracy. The identity debate has however by no means ceased in the years following the end of the Howard era. Today, it continues to evolve around **three core issues, which are the source of ambivalence in PD messaging**. These are dealing with historical legacies, Australia's approach to immigrants and Australian core values. The ambivalences which have arisen around these three issues need to be dealt with in a serious matter if Australia wants to clarify its message to the outside world in general and to Asia in particular. These are dealing with historical legacies, Australia's approach to immigration and asylum seekers and finally the uncomfortable debate on values.

First, the **identity of Australia** as a country is inevitably tied to a historical wrongdoing with which Australians are still coming to terms: the treatment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. In his famous Redfern Park speech, Prime Minister Keating (1992b) well captured the atrocities which indigenous people have experienced from the colonizers: “We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the diseases. The alcohol. We committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers. We practiced discrimination and exclusion. It was our ignorance and our prejudice. And our failure to imagine these things being done to us.” Despite the widespread condemnation of these wrongdoings,

the general societal recognition of the need to reverse them has been low. It was only in 1967 that Aboriginal people received voting right, in 1975 that they could start restoring traditional lands and in 2008 when they heard a national apology, made by the then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd for the “Stolen Generation.”⁷ Although the situation of the Aboriginal community has largely improved over the last decade, it still remains the poorest layer of Australian society. It is also one that generates a certain unease and even resentment among other groups of Australian society. For example, still, in 2015, over 20 percent of Australians understood and justified discrimination against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and a median of 40 percent claim that the community is given an unfair advantage by the government (Bagshaw 2015). Many Australians seem unaware of the fact that the structural problems the community faces today (alcohol abuse, mental health problems, family violence or criminal behavior) are symptomatic of unresolved past traumas, rather than the group inability to integrate into modern society. From a PD perspective, the Australian government has been largely unable to create a counter-narrative to the historical mistreatment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders by focusing, for example, on how today the richness and longevity of Aboriginal culture enriches Australian identity (Interview, 14 April 2015a).

The treatment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders is not the only historical legacy with which Australians have not come to terms. There are of course many not-so-noble elements of Australian history such as the “penal colony” references or the White Australia Policy which still seem to be haunting Australian collective memory. The largest challenge for identity-building lays however somewhere else. It is the inability to find positive unifying themes in history. Australia did not have, as the USA or most Asian nations, a war for independence. It did not have to fight for its sovereignty and freedom. In fact, despite the 1901 Proclamation of Constitution, Australia voluntarily continues to be part of the British monarchy. The largest national holiday, the ANZAC Day, was originally established to honor the members of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) who—under the command of the British Army—fought at Gallipoli against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Unsurprisingly, in recent years, there have been further attempts to create a common identity around the

⁷The “Stolen Generation” refers to the Aboriginal people forcibly removed from their families as children between the 1900s and the 1960s to be brought up by white foster families or in institutions.

ANZAC tradition, because as some argue the “strongest projection of national character is through the military tradition” (Interview, 14 April 2015a). This process has been viciously opposed by the Left who sees the idea of glorifying war (Manne 2015) and Australia’s role in trying to save the British Empire as inappropriate themes defining Australia as a nation. As underlined by a former Australian diplomat, “Australians respect the men who died during the First World War but we also need to see that they were deceived by their leaders—sent to an impossible situation. There is a lot of self-critical feeling about the ANZAC identity” (Interview, 24 April 2015a). Again, from a PD perspective, Australia’s attachment to its British identity or monarchy finds little understanding in Asia. It only strengthens the stereotypes of Australian being a European outpost, a former colonial state on the outskirts of Asia. As underlined by one of the Asian experts commenting on the short-lived 2015 revival of British Knighthoods by Tony Abbot, the Australian government “does not seem to understand that holding on to the British Monarchy is a sign to our Asian neighbors that our dreams and hopes remain on the other side of the world, not in our region. We are giving signals that are wrong signals” (Interview, 27 March 2015). In general, the ambivalence in dealing with historical legacies evolves around the inability to set aside both the positive and negative narratives of Australia’s colonial past and focus on the story Australia is creating today.

The second element which has had an enormous impact on the public debate about Australian identity are issues related to immigration, asylum seekers and Australia’s cultural composition as a nation. Here again, elements of ambivalence prevail. Australia has always seen itself as a country of immigration. With a slogan “populate or perish” and a strict (and at first discriminatory) selection system, since the end of World War II, Australia have seen the arrival of anywhere between 54,000 (1984–1985) to 190,000 (2012–2013) immigrants annually (Australian Government 2014b). The growing number and the relative easiness with which new immigrants integrated into the Australian society is surely a large success story of the state. Today, an astonishing 46 percent of population comprises first- or second-generation Australians (Markus 2013, 12). Historically, however, there have been tension between the Anglo-Australian identity that was constructed in the nineteenth century and immigrants coming first from other European countries and then from Asia and Africa. The postwar immigration policy was not intended to create a multicultural society, but in fact maintain homogeneity (Castles et al. 2014, 16).

With the abolishing of the White Australia Policy in 1971, immigration for all around the world became a fact. It was no longer possible to defend the idea of Australia having a single, homogenous identity. Immigrants formed clusters, but quickly gained a right to vote forcing politicians to take into account their interest. It was impossible to demand from these new voters to abandon their own identity, religion, culture, language and become part of the Anglo-Australian culture. Thus, the idea of **multiculturalism**, first introduced in 1974, gained importance stressing the elements of equality and the right of immigrants to pursue their own religion and languages.

Today, multiculturalism is a widely accepted phenomenon in Australia. Eighty-four percent of Australian population perceives the policy as good for Australia (Markus 2014b, 43) and 61 percent of Australians agree to the large numbers of newcomers each year (Lowy Poll 2014). The 2010, 2011 and 2012 Scanlon Foundation surveys on Social Cohesion (Markus 2010; Markus 2011; Markus 2012) also indicated a long-term change in Australian opinion, with a large measure of acceptance of groups once stigmatized. For example, the level of negative feeling toward immigrants from Italy and Greece was found to be less than 5 percent; it was 9 percent toward immigrants from Vietnam and China (Markus 2012, 3). The once-feared Asians are seen today as model immigrants and very much welcomed by most Australians. As noted by a former Australian diplomat, “still 50 years ago the problem was that anti-immigrant attitudes were deeply embedded in people. But that had changed very much in Australia and it is still there” (Interview, 24 April 2015a). Such opinions have been confirmed by the majority of respondents of this study. As noted by Gareth Evans, “there is not much instinctive prejudice in Australia. This is not part of the Australian psyche. Each new wave of immigrants brought within some uncertainty but then was completely absorbed. It is an instinctively tolerant society” (Interview, 8 April 2015a).

Behind the success story lies, however, also some self-doubt, resulting from uncomfortable facts. First, it is clear that there remain pockets of racism in Australian society, today directed toward the new waves of immigration. In the most recent Scanlon Survey (Markus 2014b), the core level of general intolerance in Australia was estimated between 10 percent and 25 percent, with heavily politicized issue such as asylum policy generating strong negative sentiment close to 30 percent. Around a quarter of Australians admit that they have negative feelings toward immigrants from the Middle East (Markus 2012, 3). Finally, studies show that anywhere

from 20 percent to 40 percent of immigrants (from non-English-speaking background) admit having experienced some kind of racial discrimination at work or in a public place (Dunn et al. 2015; Minear 2014). Sometimes, the incidents are blown out of proportions, and do not reflect the general attitudes, as was the case with the 2009 Indian Bashing incident in Melbourne. At the same time, a strong prejudice against two groups in particular—Muslims and asylum seekers—is a fact. In the first case, the security discourse has been constructed around the idea that radical Islam is a threat to Australian identity. In the second case, a political show-off to prove to voters that the Howard Government has reestablished border control and can be trusted to manage immigration has had a lasting impact on general opinion. In both cases, political leaders used the hostility toward smaller, even numerically insignificant groups (8000 asylum seekers) to channel public feelings which might otherwise turn against other parts of Australia's immigration policy. As underlined by one of the respondent, "the fact that Australia is experiencing an enormous increase in temporary immigrants, with entry numbers of almost one million in 2014, is practically unknown. Instead people focus on a few thousand people who come by boat to Australia fleeing oppression in their home-countries" (Interview, 29 April 2015b).

In particular, the handling of **asylum seekers** by Australia has provoked much international controversies including from bodies such as the UN. While denying "boat people" access to Australian territory, the government in Canberra has proposed a "Pacific solution"⁸ which meant creating in 2001 first offshore detention centers in Nauru, Manus Islands and Papua New Guinea (Hawksley 2009). There asylum seekers' applications are proceeded for up to two years. But even if the claims are proven, the refugees are never to be resettled in Australia, but instead sent back to other countries of the neighborhood. To add to the controversies, running of the centers is surrounded by a culture of secrecy with gag clauses imposed on doctors and all working staff. Media reports have exposed, however, cases of sexual assaults and abuses against detained refugees by both Australian and local guards (Independent 2015). They have also

⁸The policy was developed by the Howard government in response to the Tampa affair in August 2001, and was pursued until 2008 when the new Rudd government largely dismantled it. In August 2012, the succeeding Gillard Labor government introduced a similar policy, reopening Nauru detention center and Manus Island detention center for offshore processing.

revealed that the Australian government has been trying to hide other uncomfortable facts about the centers, such as the high rates of mental illness among children (BBC 2015b). From a PD point of view, the off-shore centers leave a disastrous image of Australia, undermining the very idea which the country would want to convey to the world: Australia as an open, democratic and diverse society. As commented by one of the respondents to this study, “the way Australia has been treating asylum seekers makes many question the democratic nature of the country” (Interview, 22 April 2015a).

The third and final element of ambivalence when talking about Australian identity is the question of **values**. The National Agenda on Multicultural Australia (1989) indicates a clear set of guiding principles for the Australian society. Among these are rule of law, tolerance and equality, Parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and religion. These values form the Australian civic identity, which in a diverse, immigrant society, substitutes the traditional ethnic identity of a nation (Castles and Davidson 2000, 127). Yet when asked about what constitutes Australian values, only one respondent to this study (Interview, 24 April 2015a) referred to the liberal–democratic principles in his response. Other respondents dismissed the question as one of little relevance to Australian identity in general and to PD in particular (Interview, 25 March 2015; Interview, 31 March 2015a; Interview, 8 April 2015a) or would indicate elements of Australian character such as “mateship” (solidarity) and a belief in “fair-go” (egalitarianism) (Interview, 7 May 2015; 8 April 2015b; Interview, 14 April 2015a; Interview, 24 April 2015a; Interview; Interview, 29 April 2015b). When asked about democracy, human rights or freedom of speech, the respondents would acknowledge these principles were uncontested but not widely discussed in public debate or foreign policy discourse. As stressed by an Australian diplomat, “democracy is a fact in Australia. At the same time we are not comfortable with pushing the concept down others countries throats, or go crusading for it. When it comes to human rights we tend to promote it more through building understanding than strident advocacy” (Interview, 31 March 2015a).

The clear unease of respondents in defining “Australian values” reveals an interesting phenomena. With no collective historical tradition of standing firmly for certain ideas (freedom, equality, democracy, peace, etc.), the society has turned to what describes its culture best: a pragmatic approach. Yet as shown by studies, in the recent two decades, this pragmatism has begun to underpin a materialistic approach (James 2007, 59). As described

by Stephen FitzGerald (2012), the second half of 1990s has seen the raise of an aspirational voter in Australia. This voter is a person who does not care about values or vision, but instead focuses on his personal narrow interest. His needs are being met by an aspirational politicians whose main concern are not grand projects and reforming Australian but rather a short-sited battle for votes and popularity. Unsurprisingly, the aspirational voter does not care about foreign aid cuts, governmental gag clauses on its own civil society or even national security legislature which severely hampers personal freedoms in Australia (Interview, 31 March 2015c). As long as his direct needs are met, all other issues important for the society in the future are played down. This increases incentives for the government to focus on more populist solutions and pay only lip service to the guiding principles enshrined in the Australian Constitution. As one foreign policy expert described the phenomena, “Australians do believe in values, but not if they are in direct conflict with pragmatic interests. We care about human rights, except when advocacy for human rights might damage our entrée into the Asia region. We care about environmental standards except when such advocacy might impinge on our ability to manage the South Pacific region” (Interview, 12 May 2015).

The consequences of such a mercantile approach are however dire. In 2014, only 42 percent of young Australians (18–29 years of age), believed that “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government,” with up to 33 percent perceiving non-democratic government as sometimes preferable (Lowy Institute 2014). This is not because young Australians are attracted to authoritarian regimes or do not believe in values enshrined in democracy. Instead, young people feel that democracy only serves the interests of a few and not the majority (Interview, 2 April 2015a). Unless a serious debate on improving the state of democracy takes place within the Australian society, one can expect a downward spiral leading to an increasingly self-serving approach among the older generation, and a disenchanting with democracy among the young generation. In such a setting, discussing values-based foreign policy approach or expecting a clearer values-based PD message is simply impractical if at all possible.

In all fairness, given Australia’s relatively short history, specific geographical location, growing ethnic diversity and acknowledging the fact that former Westminster colonies rarely make strong claims to identity (Dauvergne 2005, 2), it should not come as a great surprise that the debate on Australian national and regional identity is far from complete. On the

national level, it continues to focus largely on the “diversity” concept, despite it being unclear whether the majority of Australians would indicate diversity as really being at the core of their thinking. On the regional level, the debate had led to some mutual identity constructs with Asia (cooperative security concepts presented by the Labor governments). There is still, however, a sense of separation between cooperating with Asia and perceiving Australia as a country in Asia.

In sum, as stressed by Paulo Garjao (2003, 193), “the lack of a wide national consensus concerning Australia’s national identity creates additional difficulties to the establishment of a stable balance between geography and history in the near future.” It also makes crafting a single, convincing PD message for the outside world close to impossible. This is because, as noticed by one of the respondents “ambivalence in general is not a good basis from which to start successful PD. You have to be clear about who you are and what you believe in if you want other people to believe it” (Interview, 25 March 2015).

Cooperating with Domestic Civil Society Organizations

Apart from the need to engage Australia’s broader society in the process of crafting a PD message (through a deepened identity debate), the second most important step to strengthen Australia’s PD efforts is to mobilize the country’s civic resources for the good of Australia’s reputation. This in turn requires building a strong and strategic relationship with a number of domestic non-governmental actors, which would assure the alignment of efforts done by all stakeholders. The reason for this, as acknowledged by one foreign policy expert, is simple: “Australia’s best public diplomacy is not done by government or officials. In fact a lot of soft power comes regardless of what the Australian government does” (Interview, 7 May 2015).

Already in 2007, the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence in its inquiry on the state of Australia’s PD noted that there were significant gaps in engaging the Australian domestic public in shaping the PD program (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2007). The need to fill the gap has been partly acknowledged in the most recent “Australia’s public diplomacy strategy.” The document describes PD’s mission as being one that “strengthens Australia’s influence, reputation and relationships internationally by promoting a clear, creative and confident vision for Australia’s international policy agenda that reflects our core national interests and **improves domestic understanding of DFAT’s role**” (Australian Government 2013b). The document also recognizes the need to

build networks of influence and strengthen the engagement with domestic stakeholders—both to deepen their understanding of foreign policy challenges and to involve them in PD programing. Among the stakeholders mentioned in the document are think tanks, universities, private sector organizations, NGOs and diaspora communities. Unfortunately, as this study has discovered, the reality of cooperation with domestic actors on foreign policy issues is still very far from what is declared in the 2014–2016 what is declared in the 2014–2016 Public Diplomacy Strategy.

There are undeniably several positive examples of cooperation between DFAT—the main PD implementer—and domestic non-governmental stakeholders. Successful partnerships around specific PD programs include those with universities (Australia Awards, New Colombo Plan), national sport associations (sport diplomacy) and a number of bilateral Foundations, Councils and Institutes (FCIs) and NGOs such as Asia-Link (Second-Track diplomacy)⁹. More recent examples of positive cooperation involve also **diasporas** living in Australia, with the Indian diaspora actively participating in countering the negative image of Australia created by the 2009 Indian Melbourne bashing incident (Interview, 31 March 2015a). DFAT also reaches out to the general Australian public in an effort to explain its role as well as to present Australia's foreign policy priorities and challenges. It supports institutions such as the Australian Institute for International Affairs (AIIA) which through its branches in Australia organizes conferences, meetings, as well as sustains an impressive digital presence (20,000 viewers blog, podcasts, Facebook page).¹⁰ It also tries to involve former Australian Ambassadors to participate in speaking engagements with larger Australian communities. This is a challenging task, because in the Australian political system, Ministers are the official spokespersons for the government and have leadership of engaging publicly with a domestic audience. But as stressed by one DFAT representative, “it is important too that officials broaden knowledge and build understanding within the Australian community, as well as globally, of the Australian Government's international policies and DFAT's role. Sometimes striking this balance can be difficult, but it is important for the Department to do

⁹Track II diplomacy refers to dialogues that promote a cooperative and regional approach to security. Track II diplomacy engages leaders from universities, business, civil society and governments in order to identify new perspectives, develop innovative solutions and achieve mutual understanding. For more, see Asia-Link website http://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/asialink_diplomacy/track_ii_diplomacy

¹⁰To learn more, see the website of the AIIA <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/>

this ‘domestic diplomacy’ and complement advocacy role of the Minister” (Interview, 31 March 2015a).

Overall, within DFAT, there is a basic understanding of the importance of cooperating with Australian non-state actors in the conduct of PD (Interview, 31 March 2015a; Interview, 31 March 2015b; Interview, 13 April 2015a; Interview, 14 April 2015b; Interview, 12 May 2015). As underlined by a senior Australian diplomat, “with the small budget we have, the way we work is to form connections with Australian organizations or communities to tell Australia’s story. We have to work with them, otherwise we would not be able to do anything. But our message is more authentic for it” (Interview, 31 March 2015a). Some respondents (Interview, 9 April 2015a) stressed that the process of opening to the “domestic dimension” actually accelerated with the integration of AusAID into DFAT and the transfer of staff with years of experience in working with Australian domestic stakeholders. It was after all AusAID that had established the Australian Volunteers for International Development¹¹ or the Australian Civilian Corps,¹² successfully engaging Australian domestic public in supporting the development of the foreign aid program. However, the opposing view to this argument has it that because of general staff reductions in DFAT and the relatively small programs NGOs run, the officials feel they cannot afford the time to deal with non-governmental stakeholders directly. As an NGO aid sector representative underlined, “today DFAT prefers to talk to the larger contractors. In consequence our contracts are managed by them rather than DFAT. This in turn is very inefficient” (Interview, 8 April 2015b). At this stage, it is probably too early to judge how and if AusAID merger with DFAT will in fact influence DFAT’s culture or DFAT culture will dominate over what is left from an organization with a significant public outreach.

¹¹Through the Australian Volunteers for International Development 2000, dedicated and skilled Australians work as volunteers in more than 1300 host organizations across 43 countries, promoting a positive perception of Australia in the region and of the aid program domestically. To learn more about the Australian Volunteers for International Development, see <http://www.australianvolunteers.com/programs/volunteer-programs/australian-volunteers-for-international-development-avid/about-avid/>

¹²The Australian Civilian (ACC) Corps register is comprised of over 500 experienced civilian specialists with expertise in fields including aid coordination, disaster risk reduction, electoral assistance, health administration, engineering, and law and justice. Since its establishment in 2011, the ACC has undertaken over 100 deployments in over 15 countries, the majority in Asia and the Pacific.

Beyond the positives of the necessary cooperation, two structural challenges stand in the way of creating a real domestic dimension of Australia's PD. First, at the bureaucracy level (DFAT), there is an inability to involve stakeholders already at the priority-setting and programs design. The fact that civil society actors are often seen more as contractors for implementation purposes rather than partners co-owning a program severely hampers the PD outcomes. As explained by a senior DFAT official, the low level of engagement of non-state actors comes from the fact "the domestic constituency for PD is not easy to identify" (Interview, 31 March 2015a). It seems, however, that the real problems lie more in DFAT's general "culture of doing things" than in the inability to find the right partners to take co-ownership of PD programs.

The second challenge can be traced back to the Australian government's general attitude toward working with domestic civil society. As illustrated on the example of Australian government's relations with international development organizations (discussed in detail below), there are serious issues of trust that need to be addressed before Australia can launch efforts to create a domestic dimension of its PD.

Relations Between the Australian Government and Its International Development Sector

As we have argued in the previous sections, aid and international development is probably the largest underused area for Australian PD. As reported by the ACFID, the sector is made up of a few hundred of Australian domestic organizations doing work overseas, which together receive over \$949 million in individual donations and \$95 million from overseas grants. This is additionally matched by \$293 million in Australian government grants coming from the foreign aid budget. The industry receives the support of some 50,000 volunteers and disperses its presence and funding across 71 countries, of which 61 percent goes to the Asia-Pacific region (ACFID 2014:22–30).

As illustrated by the numbers above, unlike the Norwegian aid and development sector (overwhelmingly dependent on Norwegian government grants), the Australian NGOs receive on an average only 20 percent of funding from the government. Traditionally, much of the financing has been channeled through the **Australian NGO Cooperation Program (ANCP)**, which engages 49 highest performing organizations and their in-country partners in the bilateral aid program of the Australian government. Most respondents to the study, who represented the international aid and development sector, have praised the program as generous and one with

a high degree of latitude (Interview, 8 April 2015b; Interview, 13 April 2015b; Interview 23 April 2015c). The original idea behind the ANCP was that the Australian government augments the funding that NGOs fundraise domestically and in addition contributes to better practice by supporting the most professional NGOs (Interview, 24 April 2015b). The matching of funds was thought to create an environment of trust where NGOs are treated as partners to government, not as contractors (Interview, 13 April 2015b; Interview, 22 April 2015a; Interview, 24 April 2015b). Such cooperation can indeed create a win-win situation. For the NGOs, it helps augment their funding, as well as opens new cooperation opportunities within the government. As underlined by one of the NGO representatives, “the accreditation with DFAT is a big plus for the NGOs giving them additional credibility. It makes leveraging other government funding much easier” (Interview, 13 April 2015b). Meanwhile, for the government, the ANCP scheme increases spending efficiency. As described on DFAT’s website “the ANCP extends the reach of Australia’s aid program by leveraging NGO’s public and private support—every dollar invested by the Government translates into \$1.50 on the ground” (Australian Government 2016). There is also an important image benefits for the government. As observed by one Australian senior diplomat, “to say that we are pursuing a policy that has the full support of a group of highly reputable Australian NGOs, adds value to the public debate. These organizations are professional, well-funded and the government values the on-the-ground information they can provide and the overall policy perspectives they can offer” (Interview, 14 April 2015b).

This seemingly symbiotic relation of political and technical overlap—where NGOs realize their mission to alleviate poverty overseas and government can effectively implement its official aid program—has, however, serious deficiencies. These result from two features that well characterize the relations between Australian NGOs and the Australian government in general: a fluctuating engagement on the side of the government (Huijgh and Byrne 2012) and a surprisingly repressive environment in which NGOs have to operate in Australia.

As discussed earlier on, a change of government in Australia often brings a disruptive change to the working environment of Australia’s aid and international development sector. As described by one of the NGO representatives, “our relationship with the government has been a varying one, depending on the perceptions of the value of that relations among politicians. This is to say that in some periods the federal government,

no matter which political party was in power, wanted to have a strong partnership; and in other periods it has been less interested in that partnership” (Interview, 24 April 2015b). In the years 2007–2013, for example, the Rudd and Gillard governments made great efforts to improve their relations with the NGO sector, which was seen as a critical partner of the expanding aid program. There was a strong desire on the side of officials to gain more knowledge from the sector, as well as promote more permanent managing funding arrangements (Interview, 24 April 2015b). The new Abbott government not only reversed some of those gains but also added to the uncertainty by abolishing the only dedicated government aid agency (AusAID), making significant foreign aid cuts and shifting policy away from aid to a focus on economic growth.

The consensus view among respondents to this study was that the atmosphere of uncertainty is a result of a very limited understanding in Australian government of the role of civil society in providing solutions for societal problems. Strong misperceptions on the governmental side include the belief that there is no added value of working with civil society, that NGOs cannot compete with the private sector in bringing innovative solutions or that they contribute only minimally to Australia’s economic growth and well-being. Because of these views prevailing within the government, the NGOs have to retreat to arguments which help proving the sector’s political usefulness. As underlined by one of the NGO representatives, “The public support for our actions matters a lot in relations with government because it shows we have the power to mobilize constituencies. When meeting with officials we always make a point that we have over 75,000 Australians who support our work through regular or irregular financial contributions and that 80 per cent of our revenue comes from the Australian public. We make clear to the decision-makers that we can reach those people very quickly (Interview, 22 April 2015b). Apart from showing muscles, in an uncertain environment, the Australian NGOs also seek untraditional ways of reaching out to government, mainly through informal contacts. To provide an example, the good working relation of ACFID with Julie Bishop (while she was still in the opposition) later helped reverse bureaucracy decisions to cut funding for NGOs programs, as the foreign aid budget was shrinking (Interview, 13 April 2015b; Interview, 29 April 2015a). As described by one of the NGO representatives involved in the campaign against foreign aid cuts, “we asked the government to prioritize NGO funding four times and we were successful four times.

Nevertheless the gains of the last decade have been reversed. We have won some battles but we have lost the war” (Interview, 13 April 2015b).

The Australian NGOs community faces not only a fluctuating engagement on the side of the government but at times also a **strongly repressive environment**. This environment has been traditionally harsh on advocacy NGOs working for domestic purposes, yet—as we will illustrate on a few examples—has started to have an impact also on Australian organizations delivering international aid. The situation of many Australian NGOs, particularly those engaged in advocacy work, has gravely eroded during the Howard decade (1996–2007). Legitimizing its actions by the public choice theory (Staples 2006), the conservative government of the time has treated all policy advocacy, participation and consultation as deceptive strategies for self-interested minorities (Sawer and Jupp 1998, 84). The Howard years have resulted in serious cuts in domestic organization funding, dismantling of domestic Peak Bodies, changing in taxation system and introduction of “gag clauses” in all government contracts with NGO service providers (Maddison and Dennis 2005). Although the financial cuts of that decade, as well as the gag clauses had not directly affected the aid and international development organizations, indirect attempts were made to crack down also on this sector. In 1996, for example, Andrew Thomson, the first parliamentary secretary for development cooperation, made publically a point that giving money to NGOs who are criticizing government is “biting the hand that feeds” (Philips 2014). Later, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Alexander Downer was reported to have repeatedly bullied ACFID and other NGOs, forcing them to refrain from public advocacy if they wanted to see continuous government funding of the aid program (Interview, 29 April 2015a).

Two decades later, the consequences of the “lost decade” for NGO–government relations are still very much visible in Australia. Although officially abolished on the federal level in 2013 with the Not-for-profit Sector Freedom to Advocate Act (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2013), **gag clauses** have spread effectively on the state level, taking on different forms and sizes. Such clauses can oblige an NGO to give up advocacy work altogether or order NGOs to refrain only in their criticism of the specific contract they are implementing. In reality, however, the explicit gag clause written in the contract results in as implicit gag clause or self-censorship on the side of the NGOs which fear that the government could simply not renew a contract with an NGO they disapprove (Hirsch 2013).

Gag-clauses directly affect also the aid and international development organizations. This is well illustrated by the recent case around Save the Children's¹³ contract with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection to provide services at the Nauru regional processing center for asylum seekers. Faced with the horrific reality of the center, Save the Children disregarded the contract's gag clause and alerted anonymously the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) to child sexual abuse, violence and self-harm which was happening inside of the center. The Australian government retaliated first by sacking ten Save the Children workers on false allegations of coaching self-harm among asylum seekers and then by launching an investigation concerning a "disclosure of information by commonwealth officers" (The Guardian 2015a). Despite the fact that a governmental and Senate inquiries found that there was in fact physical and sexual abuse of children on Nauru, clearing Save the Children from allegations of wrongdoings (The Guardian 2015b), the contract was taken away from the organization (Save the Children 2015).

Gag-clauses are not the only instrument the government uses to suppress Australian civil society. Another effective tool is **tax deductibility**. In Australia, NGOs are eligible for tax exemptions or tax reductions if they work in the area of health, education, general relief of poverty or in other matters of the public good (Australian Government 2015f). For a number of years, however, the Australian conservatives, inspired by a debate commenced in the USA (Gray 2013, 461–464), have argued that not-for-profits conducting advocacy in these fields should not be granted tax exemptions. From this perspective, supporting advocacy from public money is a misuse of the tax deductibility idea which traditionally was offered to charitable foundations alleviating the suffering of the poor (English and Australian Common Law definition). As notified by respondents of this study, such a narrow definition excluded the contemporary understanding of the role of NGOs in society, which is also to hold governments to account (Interview, 13 April 2015b). The recent years have seen some changes in the legal NGO environment. The turning point was the High Court of Australia decision made in the *AidWatch Incorporated versus Commissioner of Taxation* case in 2010. The High Court overruled Australian Taxation Office's (ATO) 2006 decision to revoke AidWatch's charitable status, because it was based

¹³Save the Children Australia is one of the largest Australian foreign aid recipients, which in the years 2002–2013 has received 13.4 percent of the total budget appropriated to NGOs by the Australian government (ACFID 2014, 27).

on the argument that AidWatch has done advocacy work (O'Connel and Emerson 2014). As the Court stated, there was no general doctrine in Australia to exclude political objects from charitable purposes. On the contrary, advising the government, if it was doing something wrong is for the public good, thus it is eligible for tax deductibility (High Court of Australia 2010). The AidWatch case is particularly interesting because it involved an organization generating public debate about the effectiveness of foreign aid. The tax deductibility battle continues, however, and currently involves environmental organizations campaigning for the Great Barrier Reefs (The Guardian 2015c; The Sydney Morning Herald 2015). As described by one of the respondents to this study, the environmental organizations inquiry is "part of a push-back by the current government both in principle—conservatives who feel offended by this new legal definition—and practical—environmentalist annoyed some politicians by campaigns against fossils fuels" (Interview, 13 April 2015b).

In sum, it is very difficult for most aid and international development organizations to escape the reality that the non-governmental sector in Australia faces. These few opinions from respondents representing the Australian foreign aid sector show that there is a widespread understanding of the need to limit the criticism in order to preserve a good working relationship with the Australian government:

- "The Australian NGOs have to be very strategic when deciding to criticize the government. Often the problem is that the Australian media do not pick up this criticism because you need to be saying outrageous things to be heard. NGOs are reluctant to do that, so they prefer to keep quiet" (Interview, 29 April 2015a).
- "If you are entirely independent from government funding of course that you can be far more critical as an NGO. However if you have 20–50 per cent of your money coming from the state budget you need to that into account what the government is saying, thinking and doing" (Interview, 13 April 2015b).
- "This government has demonstrated that they would close government funding to NGOs that criticize them in public. So it's a difficult environment to have a friendly discussion" (Interview, 8 April 2015b).

The relations of Australian foreign aid NGOs show the general complexities around creating a strong domestic dimension of PD. The Norwegian example has stressed the necessity to treat domestic stakeholders, particularly NGOs,

as partners and co-owners of specific PD initiatives. It has also underlined the need to synergize efforts with what the domestic public has already been doing. Such approach is characterized first and foremost by a high degree of societal trust, which for the time being seems to be missing in the Australian government relations with its non-governmental counterparts.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CASE-STUDY

This case-study shows that creating a domestic dimension of PD will not come naturally for Australia. Apart from the general deprioritization of PD in Australian foreign policy, the country has two other structural problems, which severely hamper the efficiency of public diplomacy efforts Down Under. In stark contrast to the Norwegian examples presented in the previous chapter, Australian PD efforts are impeded first and foremost by

- (a) the lack of clarity about the message Australia is sending to the outside world in general and to Asia in particular; and at times a **clear ambivalence** in the messaging.
- (b) The inability to mobilize civic human resources for the good of Australia's reputation (working with Australian civil society).

Both of these challenges, discussed in depth in this chapter, do not require more funding or even strategic coordination. What they do require, however, is a clear commitment to strengthen the domestic dimension of foreign policy. The first (clarifying the message) involves a soul-searching exercise with the general Australian public in defining Australia's national and regional identity. The second (mobilizing national resources) demands coming into terms with the uneasy relationship the Australian government has fostered with its own civil society.

REFERENCES

- ACFID. (2014). *ACFID Annual Report: Financial statements*. Available online at: https://acfid.asn.au/sites/site.acfid/files/resource_document/ACFID-annual-report-2014.pdf
- Albrechtsen, J. (2007). News from the trenches down under: National Identity after a decade of the Culture Wars. In C. E. Klafter, J. Albrechtsen, et al. (Eds.), *The future of National Identity* (pp. 37–65). Vancouver: The University of British Columbia.

- Australia Associated Press. (2013, September 18). *AUSAID to be absorbed into Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*. Available online at: <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/09/18/ausaid-be-absorbed-department-foreign-affairs-and-trade>
- Australia Unlimited. (2012). *Building brand Australia One Story at a Time.mov*. Published 1st November 2012 on YouTube. Available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJtRCxSj4Bo>
- Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2007). *Feature Article: 100 Years of International Trade Statistics*. Available online at: <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/0/618AFF5416C64078CA2573E9001016FE?OpenDocument>
- Australian Government. (1989). Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*. Available online at: <https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multicultural-affairs/programs-policy/a-multicultural-australia/national-agenda-for-a-multicultural-australia>
- Australian Government. (2012a). *Australia in the Asian Century*. Available online at: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/australia-in-the-asian-century-white-paper.pdf>
- Australian Government. (2012b). Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *New Colombo plan. A report of the Steering Group*. Delivered to the author by the New Colombo Plan Secretariat at DFAT, via email on April 28, 2015.
- Australian Government. (2013a). Department of defence. *Defence White Paper 2013*. Available online at: http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf
- Australian Government. (2013b). Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Public Diplomacy Strategy 2014–2016*. Available online at: <http://dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/public-diplomacy/Documents/public-diplomacy-strategy-2014-16.pdf>
- Australian Government. (2014a). Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Annual Report 2013–2014*. Available online at: <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/corporate/annual-reports/annual-report-2013-2014/dfat-annual-report-2013-14.pdf>
- Australian Government. (2014b). Department of Immigration and Citizenship. *2012–13 Migration Program Report*. Available online at: <https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/report-on-migration-program-2012-13.pdf>
- Australian Government. (2015a, April 28). Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade, e-mail correspondence with the author.
- Australian Government. (2015b). *Australia Awards*. Accessed September 25, 2015, from <http://www.australiaawards.gov.au/Pages/about.aspx> (homepage).
- Australian Government. (2015c). Department of foreign affairs and trade. *New Colombo plan Fact Sheet*. Accessed October 10, 2015, from <http://dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/new-colombo-plan/resources/Pages/new-colombo-plan-fact-sheet.aspx>

- Australian Government. (2015d). *InnovationXchange—Australia's new aid paradigm*. Media Release by Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hon. Julie Bishop, MP on 23 March 2015. Available online at: http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2015/jb_mr_150323.aspx
- Australian Government. (2015e). Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Entity resources and planned performance*. Accessed July 30, 2015, from <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/corporate/portfolio-budget-statements/Documents/2015-16-foreign-affairs-and-trade-pbs-dfat.pdf>
- Australian Government. (2015f). Australian Taxation Office. *Tax Concessions*. Accessed September 10, 2015, from <https://www.ato.gov.au/Non-profit/Getting-started/Tax-concessions/>
- Australian Government. (2016, January). Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *The Australian NGO Cooperation Program—Fact Sheet*. Available online at: <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/aid/Documents/the-australian-ngo-cooperation-program-fact-sheet.pdf>
- Bagshaw, E. (2015, March 19). *Twenty per cent still think it's OK to discriminate against Indigenous Australians*. Available online at: <http://www.smh.com.au/national/twenty-per-cent-still-think-its-ok-to-discriminate-against-indigenous-australians-20150318-1m2ly8.html>
- BBC. (2015a, March 11). *The secrecy surrounding Australia's asylum camps*. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-31827074>
- BBC. (2015b, August 16). *Australia refugees: Detention centre 'gag' angers medics*. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-33923485>
- Beeson, M., & Jayasuriya, K. (2009). The politics of Asian engagement: Ideas, institutions, and academics. *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 55(3), 360–74.
- Broinowski, A. (2003). *About face: Asian accounts of Australia*. Melbourne: Scribe Publications.
- Byrne, C. (2010, Fall). 'Not quite the sum of its parts: Public diplomacy from an Australian perspective. *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 41–53.
- Capling, A. (2008). Twenty years of Australia's Engagement with Asia. *The Pacific Review*, 21(5), 601–22.
- Castles, S., & Davidson, A. (2000). *Citizenship and migration: Globalization and the politics of belonging*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Castles, S., Vasta, E., & Ozkul, D. (2014). Australia: A classical immigration country in transition. In J. Hollifield, P. Martin, & P. Orrenius (Eds.), *Controlling immigration: A global perspective* (3rd ed.). Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (2006). *The United States and the rise of China and India: Results of a 2006 multinational survey of public opinion*. Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs AND.

- Dauvergne, C. (2005). *Humanitarianism, identity and nation: Migration laws of Australia and Canada*. Vancouver: UBC.
- Duncan, M., Leigh, A. and Madden, D. (2005). Changing the channel in Asia, *The Diplomat*, 34–6.
- Dunn, K., Forrest, J., & Paradies, Y. (2015). *Challenging racism: The anti-racism research project, Attitudes to racism, cultural diversity and the recognition of racism, Australia (2001–2008)*. University of Western Sydney. Accessed September 18, 2015, from http://www.uws.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/173635/NationalLevelFindingsV1.pdf
- Dutton, M., & Kessler, D. (2009, September). Australia's Asia: Illiterate future. *China Heritage Quarterly*, (19). Available online at: http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/articles.php?searchterm=019_australia_asia.inc&issue=019
- Encyclopedia of the New American Nation. (2015). *International Law—Pragmatism*. Accessed May 14, 2015, from <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/International-Law-Pragmatism.html#ixzz3gcS5Iivs>
- Evans, G. (1988). *Australia's place in the world: The dynamics of foreign policy decision-making*. Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade to ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Bicentennial Conference, Australia and the World: Prologue and Prospects, December 6, 1988.
- Evans, G. (1989). Australian foreign policy: Priorities in a changing world. *Australian Outlook*, 43(2), 1–15.
- Financial Times. (2015, June 10). *Australia cuts foreign aid in favor of budget repairs*. Available online at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/30ce8218-0e7b-11e5-8aca-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3jomAcuwi>
- Fitzgerald, J. (2004). Who cares what they think? John Howard, William Morris Hughes and the Pragmatic Vision of Australian National Sovereignty. In A. Broinowski (Ed.), *Double vision*. Canberra: ANU ePress.
- FitzGerald, S. (2012). *Australia and China at forty: Stretch of the imagination*. A lecture presented on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University Marking the Fortieth Anniversary of Australia-China Diplomatic Ties. Delivered 12 November 2012. Available online at: <http://www.thechinastory.org/2012/11/australia-and-china-at-forty-stretch-of-the-imagination/>
- Goldsmith, B., & Linley, M. (2012). Engaged or not? Perceptions of Australian influence among Asian publics. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 13(4), 525–51.
- Gorjao, P. (2003). Australia's dilemma between geography and history: How consolidated is engagement with Asia. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 3(1), 79–196.
- Gray, A. (2013). 'Government funding of non-governmental organisations and the implied freedom of political communication: the constitutionality of gag-clauses. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 48(4), 456–69.

- Griffiths, M., & Wesley, M. (2010). Taking Asia seriously. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 45(1), 13–28.
- Gyngell, A. (2008). *Ambition: The emerging Foreign Policy of the Rudd Government*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Hanson, F. (2012). *Shattering stereotypes: Public opinion and Foreign Policy, Lowy Institute Indonesia Poll 2012*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Hanson, F., & Shearer, A. (2009). *China and the World. Public opinion and Foreign Policy, Lowy Institute China Poll 2009*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Hawksley, G. (2009). Australia's aid diplomacy and the Pacific Island: Change and continuity in middle power foreign policy. *Global Change, Peace and Security*, 21(1), 115–30.
- Hayward Jones, J. (2014, July 25). Radio Australia cuts hurt the Pacific and Australia. *The Interpreter*, Lowy Institute for International Policy. Accessed July 27, 2015, from <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/07/25/Radio-Australia-cuts-hurt-Pacific-Australia.aspx>
- Higgott, R. A., & Nossal, K. R. (2008). Odd man in, odd man out: Australia's liminal position in Asia revised—A reply to Ann Capling. *The Pacific Review*, 21(5), 623–34.
- High Court of Australia. (2010). *AID/WATCH incorporated v Commissioner of Taxation* (Case Number HCA 42). Canberra.
- Hirsch, A. (2014). NGOs, Government Censorship and You. Published by the Right Now Blog on 14 December 2013. Available online at: <http://rightnow.org.au/writing-cat/article/ngos-government-censorship-and-philanthropy/>
- Howard, J. (1995a, April 12). *Australia's links with Asia: Realising opportunities in our region*. Speech at the Fifth Asialink Lecture and Asialink Birthday Celebrations, Melbourne. Available online at: http://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/853546/The_Fifth_Asialink_Lecture_and_Asialink_Birthday_Celebrations.pdf
- Howard, J. (1995b). *The role of government: A modern liberal approach*. The Menzies Research Centre, 1995 National Lecture Series: Parliament House, Canberra.
- Howard, J. (2005, March 31). *Australia in the World*. Lowy Institute for International Policy, Pandora National Library of Australia John Howard Archive.
- Huijgh, E., & Byrne, C. (2012). Opening the Windows on diplomacy: A comparison of the domestic dimension of diplomacy in Canada and Australia. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 395–420.
- Huntington, S. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- ICEF Monitor. (2014, July 16). *Australian enrolment surging in 2014*. Available online at: <http://monitor.icef.com/2014/07/australian-enrolment-surging-in-2014/>

- Independent. (2015, June 20). *Nauru: Guards at Australian-run detention camp 'filmed themselves getting sexual favours from refugees*. Tom Brooks-Pollock. Available online at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/nauru-detention-camp-guards-filmed-themselves-getting-sexual-favours-from-refugees-10333733.html>
- International Monetary Fund. (2015). *World economic outlook database*. Accessed July 20, 2015, from <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx>
- James, O. (2007). *Affluenza: How to be successful and stay Sane*. London: Vermilion.
- Johnson, C., Ahluwalia, P., & McCarthy, G. (2010). Australia's ambivalent re-imagining of Asia. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 45(1), 59–74.
- Jones, D. M., & Benvenuti, A. (2006). Tradition, myth and the dilemma of Australian foreign policy. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 60(1), 103–24.
- Keating, P. (1992a). Asia-Australia Institute Address of 7 April 1992. In M. Ryan (Ed.), *Advancing Australia: The speeches of Paul Keating, Prime Minister*. Cremorne Point, NSW: Big Picture Publications.
- Keating, P. (1992b). *Speech at Redfern Park*. Delivered on December 10, 1992 in Sydney. Available on YouTube at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mKhmTLN3Ddo>
- Keating, P. (2000). *Engagement: Australia faces the Asia-Pacific*. Sydney: Macmillan.
- Kent, A. (2001). Australia and the International Human Rights Regime', in: J. Cotton and J. Ravenhill (eds.) *The National Interest in a Global Era: Australia in World Affairs 1996–2000*. South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 256–78.
- Kilby, P. (2015). *NGOs and political change: A history of the Australian Council for International development*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Lowy Institute for International Policy. (2014). *The Lowy Institute Poll 2014*. Available online at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/2014_lowy_institute_poll.pdf
- Lowy Institute for International Policy. (2015a). *The Lowy Institute Poll 2015*. Available online at: <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2015>
- Lowy Institute for International Policy. (2015b). *2015 Lowy Institute Polling: Attitudes to Australia's Aid Program, Report*. Available online at: <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/2015-lowy-institute-polling-attitudes-australia-aid-program.pdf>
- Lowy Institute for International Policy. (2016). *Australian Foreign Aid. Overview*. Accessed January 25, 2016, from <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/australian-foreign-aid>

- Maddison, S., & Dennis, R. (2005). Democratic constraint and embrace: Implications for progressive non-government advocacy organisations in Australia. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 40(3), 373–89.
- Manne, R. (2015). *A Turkish tale. Gallipoli and the Armenian genocide*. *The Monthly Essays*. Accessed May 17, 2015, from <https://www.themonthly.com.au/monthly-essays-robert-manne-turkish-tale-gallipoli-and-armenian-genocide-459>
- Markus, A. (2010). *Mapping Social Cohesion 2010: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys Summary Report*. Melbourne, VIC: Institute for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University.
- Markus, A. (2011). *Mapping Social Cohesion 2011: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys Summary Report*. Melbourne, VIC: Institute for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University.
- Markus, A. (2012). *Mapping Social Cohesion 2012: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys Summary Report*. Melbourne, VIC: Institute for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University.
- Markus, A. (2013). *Mapping Social Cohesion 2013: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys Summary Report*. Melbourne, VIC: Institute for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University.
- Markus, A. (2014a). Attitudes to immigration and cultural diversity in Australia. *Journal of Sociology*, 50(1), 10–22.
- Markus, A. (2014b). *Mapping Social Cohesion 2014: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys Summary Report*. Melbourne, VIC: Institute for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University.
- Meaney, N. (2013). Britishness and Australian identity: The problem of nationalism in Australian history and historiography. In J. Curran & S. Ward (Eds.), *Australia and the wider world: Selected essays of Neville Meaney* (pp. 23–36). Sydney: Sydney University Press.
- Metcalf, R. (2012). *Facing the future. Indian views of the world ahead, The Lowy Institute India Poll 2013*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Milner, A. (2000). What is left of engagement with Asia. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 54(2), 177–84.
- Miner, T. (2014, March 25). Australians are racist and unfriendly, say migrants. *Herald Sun*. Available online at: <http://www.news.com.au/national/australians-are-racist-and-unfriendly-say-migrants/story-fncynjr2-1226862883355>
- Morris-Suzuki, T. (2004). Tampa in Japan. East Asian responses to Australia's refugee policy. In A. Broinowski (Ed.), *Double vision: Asian accounts of Australia* (pp. 105–122). Canberra: Pandanus Books.
- O'Connell, A., & Emerson, J. (2014). 'Non-for-profit tax reform in Australia: Opportunities and challenges. In M. Harding, A. O'Connell, & M. Stewart (Eds.), *Theoretical and comparative perspectives* (pp. 276–96). University Cambridge Press: Not-for-Profit Law.

- O'Keeffe, A., & Oliver, A. (2010). *International broadcasting and its contribution to public diplomacy*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- OECD. (2014). *Official development assistance*. Accessed May 17, 2014, from <http://www.compareyourcountry.org/oda?page=0&cr=ocd&lg=en> (homepage).
- Oliver, A. (2014a, January 30). Last call for the Australian Network. *The Interpreter*, Lowy Institute for International Policy. Available online at: <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/01/30/Last-call-for-the-Australia-Network.aspx>
- Oliver, A. (2014b, May 13). First look at the budget: DFAT, aid and defence. *The Interpreter*, Lowy Institute for International Policy. Available online at: <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/05/13/First-look-at-the-Budget-DFAT-aid-and-defence.aspx>
- Oliver, A. (2015, May 13). DFAT's Dickensian budget. *The Interpreter*, Lowy Institute for International Policy. Available online at: <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/05/13/Foreign-affairs-budget.aspx>
- Oliver, A., & Shearer, A. (2011). *Diplomatic disrepair: Rebuilding Australia's international policy infrastructure*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. (2007). *Australia's Public Diplomacy: Building our image*. Canberra: Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.
- Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. (2013). *The Senate* (Not-for-profit Sector Freedom to Advocate Bill 2013 No. 56). Canberra.
- Philips, K. (2014, March 24). *Game of giving: Australia's history of foreign aid*. ABC Radio National. Available online at: <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/5340938>
- Pietsch, J., & Aarons, H. (2012). Australian engagement with Asia: Towards closer political, economic and cultural ties. In J. Pietsch & H. Aarons (Eds.), *Australia identity, fear and governance in the 21st Century* (pp. 33–46). Canberra: ANU ePress.
- Reputation Institute. (2015). *Top countries RepTrak*. Accessed July 20, 2015, from <http://www.reputationinstitute.com/research/Country-RepTrak>
- Rimmer, S. H. (2014, February 2). Lost in transmission: the Australia Network, soft power and diplomacy. *The Conversation*. Available online at: <http://theconversation.com/lost-in-transmission-the-australia-network-soft-power-and-diplomacy-22580>
- Robertson, A. (2006). Australia's position in Asia: Closer than ever. *Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas*, 22(2), 26–32.
- Rudd, K. (2008). It's time to build an Asia Pacific Community. Speech to the Asia Society Australasia Centre on 4 June 2008. *The Australian*. Available online at: <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/politics/full-text-of-kevin-ruddspeech/story-e6frgczf-1111116541962>

- Save the Children. (2015, August 31). *Statement on Nauru tender outcome*. Available online at: <https://www.savethechildren.org.au/about-us/media-and-publications/media-releases/media-release-archive/years/2015/save-the-children-statement-on-nauru-tender-outcome>
- Sawer, M., & Jupp, J. (1998). The two-way street: Government shaping of community-based advocacy. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 5(54), 82–99.
- Staples, J. (2006). *NGOs out in the cold: Te Howards Government policy towards NGOs* (Discussion Paper 19/06). Canberra: Democratic Audit of Australia.
- The Guardian. (2015a, March 4). *Police investigate Save the Children whistleblowers over Nauru abuse report*. Available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/mar/04/police-investigate-save-the-children-whistleblowers-over-nauru-abuse-report>
- The Guardian. (2015b, August 31). *All children should be removed from Nauru detention, Senate inquiry finds*. Available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/31/all-children-should-be-removed-from-nauru-detention-senate-inquiry-finds>
- The Guardian. (2015c, March 31). *Tax-deductible status of green groups including Greenpeace under spotlight*. Available online at: <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/mar/31/tax-deductible-status-of-green-groups-including-greenpeace-under-spotlight>
- The Sydney Morning Herald. (2015, July 22). *Government-dominated tax deductibility inquiry out to get green groups, says Bob Brown*. Available online at: <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/governmentdominated-tax-deductibility-inquiry-out-to-get-green-groups-says-bob-brown-20150721-gigynd.html#ixzz3LL7tgiiN>
- Unger, C. (2007). The middle-power concept in Australian foreign policy. *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 53(4), 538–51.
- Varghese, P. (2013). *Bruce Allen Memorial Lecture: Building Australia's soft power*. Speech made on 17th October 2013. Available online at: <http://dfat.gov.au/news/speeches/Pages/bruce-allen-memorial-lecture-building-australia-s-soft-power.aspx>
- Wesley, M. (2009). *Australia's poisoned Alumni: International education and the costs to Australia*. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
- White, H. (2006). 'Old, New or Both? Australia's Security Agendas at the Start of the New Century', in Derek McDougall & Peter Shearman (ed.), *Australian security after 9/11: new and old agendas*, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Hampshire, UK, 13–27.
- White, H. (2011). Power shift: Rethinking Australia's place in the Asian Century. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 65(1), 81–93.

US Government-Sponsored Educational Exchange Programs

INTRODUCTION

Educational exchange programs have a long-standing and key role in US PD efforts. Despite a decrease in funding after the end of the Cold War, exchanges still constitute the second (after international broadcasting) largest PD expense approved annually by the US Congress (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2014, 2) and continue to be rated by American diplomats as one of the most useful PD tools available (Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy 2005; Fitzpatrick 2008; Rugh 2011). The underlying assumption of the US Government in funding such programs—on a student, academic or professional level—is that educational exchanges contribute to mutual understanding and have a positive impact on the image of the USA abroad. They naturally complement other tools in the state’s attempt to communicate its values and foreign policy objectives to foreign publics. Finally and most importantly, exchange programs constitute the only PD instrument that reaches out directly to the “human factor” engaging individuals in a life-changing experience potentially resulting in a shift of self-conception and dislodging previously fixed notions (Scott-Smith 2009, 50–55).

Empirical studies offer enough examples to see educational exchange programs as serious channels of foreign policy influence (Espinosa 1976;

Parts of this chapter have been published in *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* (2015) 11, 5–17. doi:10.1057/pb.2014.11; published online 2 July 2014.

Kellermann 1978; Duggan 1998; Schmidt 1999; Richmond 2003; Scott-Smith 2003; Atkinson 2010). In measuring the success of these programs, most of the available research either focuses on anecdotal evidence or relies heavily on short-term process evaluations (Sunal and Sunal 1991). However, measuring long-term impact still poses a major challenge (Banks 2011). In general, evaluations of international exchange programs focus on the direct participants and their impressions; yet there are some new studies that attempt to assess the degree to which these programs have an impact on individuals beyond the direct participants (Olberding and Olberding 2010).

Despite a number of publications analyzing international exchange programs as tools of PD, one facet of the discussion has in the past failed to attract significant public or scholarly attention: the question of domestic public engagement in the formulation and realization of these programs. Although scholars do focus on how domestic NGOs can directly influence foreign policy outcomes (Nye and Keohane 1971; Clarke 1998; Edwards 1999; Reimann 2006), only a few direct their attention to the increasing role of domestic civil society in the field of PD (Riordan 2005; Cull 2009; Fitzpatrick 2012; Huijgh and Byrne 2012). Even less consideration is given to the practical deliberations of agenda-setting or forming partnerships between government and NGOs necessary to successfully implement such a key PD tool as educational exchange programs. The aim of this chapter is thus to fill this gap by providing empirical evidence for one of the book's hypothesis, which states that engagement of domestic civil society actors, on both the formulation and implementation levels, is a precondition for running successful PD.

Against the backdrop of the NPD paradigm, discussed in detail in Chap. 2, educational exchange programs seem to be ahead of their time. They fulfill two important criteria, which should be defining for contemporary tools of PD: they engage the domestic public directly with their foreign counterparts and include it in the policy-making process. When analyzing the literature on US government-sponsored educational exchange programs, one finds extensive research on the positive interaction between developing direct social relationships with Americans and enhancing favorability toward the USA (Kelman and Lotte 1962; Selltitz and Cook 1962; Stangor et al. 1996). As Bellamy and Weinberg (2008, 59) have stressed, "at the core of the research on exchange is a simple but powerful finding: the American public is the greatest asset the United States has to promote its noblest values to the world." Concurrently, little research is available on the

role of domestic public in the exchange programs' policy-making process. The purpose of this chapter is thus to analyze **whether there is a direct association between best practices in the formulation and implementation of US government-sponsored educational exchange programs and the engagement of American civil society in the process.** In order to respond to this research question, the study provides insights from 21 US Government and non-governmental representatives directly involved in the creation of educational exchange programs.¹ The reason for choosing this research population is that US diplomats as well as their non-governmental partners through their day-to-day work are the best-equipped observers of the practical formulation and implementation of exchange programs. They also have direct access to US foreign policy proposals and are able to influence some of their outcomes. The empirical evidence is reinforced by author's firsthand experience with US state-funded exchanges.²

By asking American diplomats and NGO representatives about their opinions on what works in formulating and implementing such programs, this case-study makes two specific contributions to proving the book's hypothesis:

- First, it shows evidence that the efficiency of program implementation relies heavily on the level of engagement of the domestic civil society in the policy process.
- Second, it reveals that with time the NGO/civil society engagement can move from playing an implementing role to influencing the program design and policy formulation.

¹The interviews have been conducted from July to September 2011 in Washington, DC, and Warsaw. Eight were conducted with DS officials based in Washington, DC, as well as with representatives of the Public Affairs Section in the US Embassy in Warsaw. Thirteen interviews were conducted with representatives of nine non-governmental institutions serving as operators to the US Government-funded programs, or experts in international exchange programs. These institutions included International Institute of Education, American Council on Education (ACE), American Councils on International Education, Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange, American Council of Young Political Leaders, Council on Standards for International Educational Travel, ILearn. The interviews have focused on Government and NGOs activities during a specified period of time: from 9/11 to the first three years of the Obama Administration (2008–2011).

²The author has experienced firsthand the diversity of exchange programs firstly as a high school exchange student in Louisiana (1997–1998), then a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Harvard University (2007) and finally as the Head of a Polish NGO working as a local operator of the US Department of State sponsored US–Poland Leadership Youth Exchange Program (2009–2012) and partner to the extended FLEX program (2015–2016).

In sum, the chapter attempts to reveal the overall philosophy and the main characteristics, which define the creation of government-sponsored exchanges in the USA. It also examines the major challenges that need to be addressed when working on these programs. Finally, by analyzing the procedures, partnerships and outreach of the exchange programs, it tries to retrieve the elements that together allow government-sponsored international exchange to be one of the most efficient PD tools.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: AN OVERVIEW

US Public Diplomacy, Exchange Programs and the Domestic Dimension

American PD has a long-standing and rich tradition. Having been established principally as “an ad hoc instrument of American foreign policy to meet wartime exigencies” (Wang 2006, 1), it has since expanded to encompass different modes of engagement. As pledged in the founding legislation of US PD, the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (known also as the Smith–Mundt Act), two of these modes were considered as predominant: messaging through media and cultural/educational exchanges (Bellamy and Weinberg 2008). Major landmarks in the evolution of America’s PD include the launching of the Voice of America in 1942, the establishment of the Office of War Information during World War II and the beginning of the Fulbright Exchange Program in 1946. In 1953, the newly established US Information Agency (USIA) took over responsibility for overseas information programs from the State Department, while in 1977, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) was merged with USIA, to be reintegrated with the State Department in 1999 (Department of State 2015a). Seventy years on, the institutions might have changed but the goal of US PD remains the same. It is to engage foreign publics for the purpose of achieving foreign policy objectives.

Throughout much of its history, US PD relied on cooperation with the American domestic public. Although it is true that until 2013,³ the

³The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 amended the Smith–Mundt Act and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1987, allowing for materials produced by the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors to be released within US borders and striking down the ban on the dissemination of such material in the USA.

Smith–Mundt Act had limited domestic access to information intended for foreign audiences (Metzgar 2012), on the cultural/educational exchanges front, public engagement was fully fledged from the early postwar years. Several different non-state actors played a key role in assuring the success of these PD efforts, particularly in one area: international cultural and educational exchanges. The private sector, an initiator of the pre-World War II exchanges, helped to co-finance the first government exchange programs in the 1940s and 1950s (Dudden and Dynes 1987, 2).⁴ The American academic community actively participated in recruiting and hosting exchange students, and offered large-scale donated services on many university campuses.⁵ Finally, private agencies, such as the Institute for International Education, gave the impetus for cooperation and provided channels for its expression (Berman 1983, 126–140). The Cold War experiences of public–private cooperation fostered a symbiotic relationship, which continued in the post-9/11 era of PD.

In the new millennium, with an urgent need to find more effective ways of communicating with foreign publics in a digitalized and globalized world, the American administration has begun to search for new tools and channels for its PD efforts. The most recent studies have made a strong case in arguing that effective PD increasingly engages both international and domestic audiences as its targets, and favors not only two-way dialogue (Riordan 2005; Cull 2009; Obama Administration 2011; Fitzpatrick 2012) but also collaboration (between societies and between government and its domestic public). As observed by Ellen Huijgh (2013, 70), “a relationship approach of public diplomacy [...] must transcend the inclusion of more exchange programs, more listening and more dialogue. Implementing the principles of reciprocity and mutuality implies the integration of the domestic component.” Indeed, recent reviews of US PD under the Obama Administration show an increased focus on collaboration and partnership-building with public and private partners, including domestic ones. As stressed by Kathy Fitzpatrick (2011, 32), “expanding and strengthening people-to-people relationships is identified

⁴ Among the most involved institutions were the Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation, which in 1947, for example, agreed to defray the costs of the cooperating agencies for the first six months so that the first Fulbright Program could get underway (Dudden and Dynes 1987, 2).

⁵ Such services would include appointing faculty members as “Fulbright Program Advisers.”

as a ‘strategic imperative’ of U.S. public diplomacy,” and the importance of the domestic publics in this policy is fully recognized.

The deepening investment in the domestic dimension of US PD is first and foremost visible in the implementation of these programs, which have already in the past demanded a strong involvement from the American public. This is particularly the case of educational exchange programs, where not only execution but also conception falls more and more into the responsibilities of domestic civil society partners. US PD has placed a high priority on conducting cultural and educational exchanges starting as early as the 1940s (Schneider 2007). The use of these programs as foreign policy tools experienced its “Golden Age” in the 1950s, triggered by the Cold War and the need to “win hearts and minds” in the fight against communism (Parmar 2010). In this period, the Fulbright–Hays Act of 1961 was passed, which enabled the US Government to strengthen its ties with other nations through the use of educational and cultural exchanges.⁶ A new wave revamping interest and underlying the importance of international exchanges came with the events of 9/11 (Sablosky 2003). The attacks on New York and Washington, DC, have revealed a new challenge for US PD: a challenge to effectively communicate US cultural values abroad in an ever more complex international setting. As stated in 2005 by the US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, the main priorities of the American Government shifted to accommodate the need “to foster a sense of common interest and values between American people and people of other countries, to isolate, marginalize and discredit violent extremism and to foster a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in our values.”

The recognition of the urgent need to better explain American values to foreign nations of different cultures changed for good the regularity of the government-sponsored exchange programs. From 2001 on, the funds available only to the Department of State (DS) for programs such as Fulbright, the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) or youth exchanges have increased almost sixfold, growing from 100 million dollars in 2000 to 623 million dollars requested for the 2016 budget (Department of State 2015b, 31). The shift of policy has been reflected also by the extension of exchange programs to more than 160

⁶The Fulbright–Hays Act of 1961 is officially known as the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.

states, with money moving away from the European and post-Soviet states into Asia and the Muslim world. For example, already in 2003, 25 percent of governmental funding for cultural exchange programs was targeted at Arab and Muslim countries (Djerejian 2007, 46–49) with countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq receiving the largest appropriations (United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2014).

Today, the significance of cultural and educational exchange programs in US foreign policy is reflected also in the scope of governmental activities that reach far beyond the DS. According to the FY-2010 Annual Report of the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on US Government-Sponsored International Exchange and Training Programs,⁷ there are 14 Cabinet-level Departments and 49 Independent Federal Agencies, that administer or participate in international exchange and training programs. In the framework of 243 programs, more than 2,744,000 foreign citizens participate worldwide, which represents a federal investment of more than \$1.8 billion. Interestingly to the 1.8 billion dollars coming from the US budget on international exchanges and training, an additional \$708,284,06 was appropriated in 2009 by foreign governments, private sector (both US and foreign) and international organizations. This constitutes more than 1/4 of the funding available for US Government-run programs and shows how effectively the Federal Government is able to leverage non-US Government funds in achieving substantial international exchange and training programming yield with limited financial outlay.

The Rationale Behind Establishing Government-Funded Exchange Programs

Year after year, the USA continues to host the largest numbers of exchange students, visiting scholars and professionals in the world. According to the Institute of International Education (2015a) in the academic year of 2014–2015, there was an estimated 977,926 international students studying at US colleges and universities. More than 66,889 international secondary school students participated the same year in youth exchanges

⁷The IAWG was created by the President of the USA in 1997 to improve the coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of US Government-sponsored international exchanges and training.

(U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2015). The USA remains the destination of choice for a vast majority of international students worldwide, with reports showing that even 75 percent of them select American universities as their first choice (Chow 2011). The inflow of students is assured by many different factors. They range from a continuously popular appeal of “living an American Dream” to the willingness of experiencing academic excellence of US universities or learning the English language. Despite the growing number of foreign students which are now able to pay or individually find sponsors for their stay in the USA, the American Government continues to be a critical partner in promoting and funding international exchanges. Only in the last decade, the funds available to the DS have increased sixfold (Department of State 2015b, 31). Moreover, the outreach of these programs to different foreign public audience has broadened, with many of them directed toward the most disadvantaged groups: from women in Afghanistan to youth in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro. What is then the underlying motivation for the US Government to spend taxpayers money on international exchanges, if such programs are already very popular, even on commercial terms?

Although quantifying the impact of international exchanges poses a significant challenge (Wilson and Bonilla 1955; Watson and Lippitt 1963; Richmond 2003), in the opinion of the majority of the respondents interviewed for this book, such programs are one of the most effective PD tools the USA has in its toolbox (Interview, 6 September 2011a; Interview, 7 September 2011a; Interview, 7 September 2011b; Interview, 8 September 2011a). “Effectiveness” is perceived here in a very comprehensive manner. From the point of view of the US Government, there are at least five rationales behind supporting international exchange programs.

First, studies show a positive correlation between time spent abroad and **strengthening mutual understanding**. In a survey conducted by the DS (2006), 98 percent of Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program respondents reported that their Fulbright experiences gave them a deeper understanding of the USA and its culture, while 93 percent believed their experiences heightened their awareness of social and cultural diversity among different nations. Moreover, as indicated by one of the State Department officials, “studies done over the years show that a person living in a country develops an affinity to that country, which they could not develop in any other way” (Interview, 7 September 2011a). A similar opinion was shared by a representative of the NGO running state-sponsored exchange programs, who stressed that it is “rare that a student will come for an exchange and not leave with a sense of appreciation, even affection” (Interview, 6 September 2011a).

Second, by exposing individuals to America and its citizens, exchange programs **allow dispersing myths** about the country. As the first political, economic and military power in the world, the USA produces many, often contradicting sentiments among international publics. A sometimes distorted image of the USA transmitted by mass media can result in either blind admiration or blunt hatred—depending on the source of information a person has access to. As sources of knowledge about America range from Hollywood movies to international press coverage of CCTV or Russia Today, it is hard to expect a viewer to have a balanced picture of the USA and its citizens. The goal of exchange programs is thus to allow participants to understand the USA in a more nuance way, permitting them to make the final judgment through their own experience. Many of the respondents stressed that it is harder to buy into xenophobic ideologies when the program participants see the world as a place that they fit into. As stressed by the head of one of the largest non-governmental operators of these programs: “Most of our senior Alumni, as a result of their exchange experience, have a more balanced and textured way of looking at the world. They see their country much more objectively and perceive the United States as a valuable partner—a place to travel and work. It is not ideological for them. The exchange programs give them resources but also the liberty to make their own opinions” (Interview, 8 September 2011a). Because of the importance of exposure, the US DS promotes distance-learning or branches of US educational institutions abroad only to a limited extent. The priority is to convince foreign students to come to the USA because without the physical contact with the country the impact on their understanding of US values and culture is always limited.

Third, the experience acquired during an exchange does not only impact the participants but also, because of the **multiplier effect**, its community back home. Each foreign student not only comes back from the USA with a deeper understanding of America but also later serves as a facilitator in explaining to its family and peers the complexities of a different culture. As underlined by one US diplomat, “When talking about the United States among its countrymen a former foreign exchange student to the U.S. has the level of credibility that no American representative will ever have, because he or she is not perceived as a foreigner and understands the local context of what he or she is saying” (Interview, 7 September 2011b).

Fourth, international exchanges are seen as a unique opportunity to **share subject area expertise and exchange grand ideas** among professionals from all around the world. With an ever-growing need to develop international links and strengthen the comfort level among citizens of different nationalities

and religions, these programs serve as tools of connecting people through sharing knowledge and know-how. Professional and academic exchanges bring to the USA the best and the brightest in a given field of studies and allow them to meet people with similar interests, thus improving a worldwide network of like-minded individuals. Not infrequently, during these programs, professionals develop ideas on how to reform existing practices back home. This happens both as a result of being exposed to a life in a democratic and developed country (Atkinson 2010) and by having contact with participants from other parts of the world. As noticed by one of the American diplomats: “The professional experience that the participants receive when talking and sharing knowledge with other participants of our programs from all around the world can often be as powerful as being exposed to U.S. professionals or our solutions to particular problems” (Interview, 7 September 2011b).

Fifth and final, international exchange programs allow exposing **Americans themselves to other cultures**. Throughout the interviews, most respondents showed a deep understanding of the intrinsic value of exchanges seen as a “two-way street.” As pointed out by one of the diplomats working in the State Department ECA: “We understand that most Americans will not have the opportunity to live abroad. However if foreigners live amongst them they can get some kind of international experience, which may shape their way of thinking about the world” (Interview, 7 September 2011a). In that sense, international exchanges are part of a comprehensive approach to PD, which looks at the impact of such programs from all angles: a foreign student’s perspective, US host community’s perspective and the value the student will bring to the community back home. This requires a strategic, long-term commitment to exchange programs as PD tools. As observed by one State Department official, “our programs are not quick turn-arounds. We do them for the long-term. You see the results through our Alumni Associations gathering individuals who become Heads of States or Noble Prize Winners and they can speak about the United States from the authority of having been here, of understanding who we are” (Interview, 7 September 2011c).

The Role of the Department of State in Initiating Educational and Cultural Exchanges

Aside from the substantial financial commitment and a comprehensive understanding of the value of international exchanges for US PD, the American Government has also an institutionalized system of organizing such programs, which relies heavily on both intra-governmental and (as we will see in the following parts of the chapter) non-governmental cooperation.

The bulk of the activities on educational, academic or professional international exchanges are managed by the US DS, responsible for the overall conduct of foreign policy. Its activity is coordinated both externally (e.g. with the US Department of Homeland Security and US Department of Education) and internally. Within the DS, three units deal with exchanges. Primarily, it is the ECA, with a supportive role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs and Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour. This creates a very multifaceted setting with a synergy of activities of a number of actors. The locus of authority in the DS lays with the Secretary of State, who as an appointee of the President carries out his foreign policy (Foley, 2008). Until the year 2001, the amount of attention paid to PD tools in general and to international exchange programs in particular largely depended on the direction undertaken by each presidential administration. Traditionally, under US Presidents coming from the Democratic Party, there was less funding for international exchanges, as the agenda was prone to be more internally oriented. The most palpable budget and staff cuts of more than 30 percent took place under the Clinton administration in 1993 (Sablosky, 2003). This trend ceased, however, after the events of 9/11. The DS budget's increase after 2001 was not as much a result of a new Republican President, George W. Bush (2000–2008) being elected, but was a consequence of terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This national tragedy has changed for good the regularity of funding exchange programs, with a continuously raising budget throughout the years to come. With the new Obama Administration (2008–2012 and 2012–2016) in power, the cultural and educational exchanges have gained even more significance as foreign policy tool. The new President and the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton (2009–2013) made it a priority to promote international dialogue through exchanges.⁸ They have also shown a larger recognition for a more balanced foreign and security policy, with a stronger diplomatic component. This shift of policy has been reflected not only by a further increase of budget for existing exchange programs but also by an increase of the number of presidentially led initiatives. Among such initiatives were governmental summits on education convened jointly by the US Secretary of State and US Secretary of Education with their counterparts from other

⁸Throughout the interviews, it has been reported by several respondents within the DS that the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton is a staunch advocate of exchanges. This is supposedly because still as the wife of the Governor of Arkansas in the early 1990s, she regularly hosted many of the DS program visitors. This fact today helps to raise the visibility of this branch within the Department.

countries, and the “100 000 Strong Initiatives” with China (Belyavina 2013) and with the Americas (Obama 2011). All these initiatives stress the need to see international exchanges as a “two-way street,” where both Americans and their counterparts travel, learn and in the process amplify their understanding of each other. They also heavily rely on cooperation with both the private and non-governmental sectors. The “100,000 Strong” initiative with China—crafted to increase the number and diversify the composition of American students studying in China—is a good example of this public–private partnership. The US Government simply provided a forum for corporations and other private organizations to talk on how they themselves can establish programs promoting US study and work in China and set scholarships for Americans to go abroad.⁹

Within the DS, the main entity responsible for educational and cultural exchanges is the ECA. Established as early as in the 1930s, its most notable era of growth was experienced in the post-World War II period. Under the leadership of Senator J. William Fulbright, the “Fulbright–Hays Act” of 1961 was passed, which still today serves as the legal basis for the major part of all US Government-funded exchanges (United States Congress 1961). In parallel to the ECA activities, the USIA was founded, as the federal institution responsible for the US PD effort, handling messaging, press and radio. In an attempt to synergize their activities, both institutions have been merged under President Jimmy Carter in late 1970s. Initially, the ECA moved outside of the DS to the USIA, to again remerge with the Department in 1999, when the USIA was dissolved. The merger of the 1990s was a result of a growing disconnection between foreign policy-making and PD messaging. Although this step has been criticized and called “short-sighted” by some independent experts (Taylor 2009, 12), the DS has seemed to have benefited from the merger. As one of the DS officials underlined, “the fusion of these two institutions was a great victory for a cohesive messaging and strategy in public diplomacy policy. Today,

⁹Citing the strategic importance of the US–China relationship, in November 2009, President Barack Obama announced the “100,000 Strong” initiative, a national effort designed to increase dramatically the number and diversify the composition of American students studying in China, to reach 100,000 by 2014. As there was no public funding appropriated to this cause, the effort was based on a public–private partnership. The initiative is run today by a not-for-profit foundation, enjoying strong political endorsement from both the US and Chinese governments. To learn more, see the 100,000 Strong Foundation website at: <http://100kstrong.org/about-us/supporters/>

we are really using public diplomacy as a tool of foreign diplomacy and often it is the strongest tool we have” (Interview, 7 September 2011d).

Today, the ECA realizes its mission of fostering mutual understanding between Americans and other nations through a variety of programs reaching out to a truly diverse group of people: from youth, students, educators, artists to athletes and rising leaders in many fields (Department of State 2015c). As described by one of the representatives of the US not-for-profit, which closely cooperates with the ECA,

The Department of State programs reach out to those who would otherwise never receive an opportunity to travel and learn abroad. It invests money in non-traditional partners: nations in transition, in crisis etc. Despite often a lot of good will without the Department of State the NGOs would never be able to realize some of these strategic priorities, which increase the capacity of other countries in certain areas

(Interview, 8 September 2011a)

The long-term goal of the US DS in realizing exchange programs is always the same: to show an open democratic society and government and the advantages of moving world economies toward a dynamic free market model. This in turn is to contribute to the increase in access to basic human rights globally which will benefit both foreign societies and US foreign policy.

The Flagship Programs

The ECA accomplishes its mission of promoting mutual understanding through hundreds of exchange programs realized in over 160 countries of the world. The range of these programs is truly impressive: from country-specific ones to those with a limited life span. They cover academic, cultural, sports and professional exchanges, often placing focus on the underrepresented sector of foreign societies. The best-known programs realized by the ECA are **Fulbright**, the **IVLP**, the **Youth Exchange and Study Program**.

The Fulbright Program

The Fulbright Program, established under the Fulbright–Hays Act of 1961, is the largest and probably the best-known federally funded exchange program in the USA. Since its founding, it has provided over 310,000 participants from USA and around the world access to world’s best universities

and a chance to conduct research, study and work abroad (Department of State 2015d). Although traditionally associated with academic exchanges for scholars and students, Fulbright today offers grants also for teachers and professional, who do not necessarily plan to undertake an academic career in the future (Institute of International Education 2011, 40).¹⁰

The Fulbright Program's success may be attributed to two main factors. Firstly, the grants are awarded on a merit-based, open competition, which requires usually a preparation of a well-thought-through research project. Secondly, the program's formation and design is done on a cooperative basis between the US Government and the partner-state. Joint priority-setting is proposed to all 150+ states participating in the program. The locus of authority is a presidentially appointed board—The Fulbright Board of Foreign Scholarships, which promulgates the directions, regulations and parameters of the program. At the same time, however, priorities of the program as well as the numbers and categories of grants are developed by 49 binational Fulbright Commissions around the world. For a country to be able to establish a Fulbright Commission cost-sharing in the program is obligatory (Interview, 7 September 2011b). Often these shares are not equal, but some amount of financial contribution is required. In 2013, the Congressional appropriation for the Fulbright Program was \$242.8 million, while in the previous fiscal year, foreign governments contributed approximately \$91.2 million (Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board 2014, 10, 56). This co-ownership approach assures that a strong commitment to the program comes from both parties. As rightly noticed by one of the respondents who have previously sat on the Fulbright Board, “Bilateral commissions assure not only mutual commitment but allow for both voices to be heard” (Interview, 6 September 2011a). Where Fulbright Commissions do not exist, the program is administered by US embassies in cooperation with host country governments (Department of State 2015e). This has certain disadvantages, as partnership is limited and the program can only attempt to engage the higher education system of that country in academic exchange.

Throughout the interviews, respondents underlined the importance of those components of the Fulbright Program, which serve the exchange of experienced professionals: be it scholars, school teachers or future political

¹⁰For example, the Hubert H. Humphrey Program—one of the many Fulbright initiatives—brings outstanding mid-career professionals from societies in transition to the USA for non-degree academic study and gaining professional experience.

leaders on mid-career programs. This is because of the multiplier effect that this group can generate. As stressed by one respondent: “when we bring teachers to the U.S. they go back home and teach hundreds of students through the experience they received during their stay here” (Interview, 6 September 2011a). Indeed, studies have shown that professional programs allow for a more sustained engagement with the USA in the future. It is estimated that over 80 percent of Fulbright professionals who participated in exchange programs maintained active friendships and professional relationships with their US counterparts and cooperate on other programs (Department of State 2006). The effect of a Fulbright exchange on a scholar might include co-publishing articles, revising their teaching curricula or inviting US students to their countries. It is important to stress that the sustainable outcomes from this type of Fulbright experience tends to work both ways: many US scholars become involved in research programs of the host country and after coming back to the USA can make a strong case for increased academic and professional bilateral cooperation.

International Visitor Leadership Program

The significance of professional exchanges for the DS is more visible when analyzing another ECA program with long-standing traditions: the IVLP. Established in 1940, the IVLP offers tailor-made short-term visits to the USA. These visits are designed for non-US mid-career professionals between 25 and 45 years old, who are current or potential leaders in government, politics, media, education, NGOs and other fields. Each year, nearly 5000 exchange participants come to the USA in the framework of 838 tailor-made IVLP projects. Among the 200,000 Alumni of the program, more than 335 are current or former Chiefs of State or Heads of Government (Department of State 2015f). The success of the program can be thus evaluated not only by the number of participants but also, more importantly, by the position that these visitors already have or might obtain in the future within their own societies. To assure the right pool of leaders, the selection and nomination processes take place at the local US Embassy level. This makes IVLP one of the few US Government-sponsored programs with no direct application available and assures a rather elite character of the exchange.

The IVLP is unique also for other reasons. In comparison to the majority of US Government-sponsored international exchanges (academic, youth, etc.), it offers a rather limited exposure to the USA, as most projects take no more than three weeks. At the same time,

however, the experience is very intense, providing the participants with an opportunity to meet with professionals from their field, as well as to gain an appreciation of the ethnic, cultural and political diversity of the USA. Although each IVLP project is tailor-made for a selected group, the general elements of all visits include exposure to the idea of federalism (through meetings in government institutions) and to the American civil society (through Civic Education workshops or meeting with US NGOs working locally in different states). Unlike other exchanges, which require at least some knowledge of the English language, the IVLP projects often provide participants with translators competent to offer the cultural guidance and interpretation. As explained by one US diplomat, “sometimes the non-English speakers are the people you need to reach out to most. They are more likely not to have had exposure to the United States or opportunity to travel here” (Interview, 7 September 2011e).

The theme of each IVLP visit is selected according to the needs of the nominated candidates. Much depends on the type of outreach a given project has. In projects which are aimed at particular countries, issues from the bilateral agenda are explored. For regional and multiregional projects, the topics of visits are decided at the office of the Secretary of State. In the last few years, these included women empowerment, health issues, food security and climate change. Throughout the interviews, many respondents stressed that in contrast to individual and country-focused visits, the multinational programs have an added value: they allow participants to compare professional experience in a truly international environment. As underlined by a State Department representative,

In many cases the real impact of the IVLP does not come from the Americans but from other international participants that have been with them on a program. Sometimes when selecting participants to these programs we match nationalities, which may have a hard history of cooperation. Instead of animosity you see great friendships being formed on such programs. You find the bounding between opposing parties that comes of being together in a foreign country

(Interview, 7 September 2011b)

Indeed, several respondents emphasized that the program has seen participants being reinforced by each other's desires to change things in their countries. It has also seen many of its Alumni duplicating in their home countries' solutions, which they learned from their peers or saw being

implemented in the USA (Interview, 7 September 2011a; Interview, 7 September 2011c; Interview, 7 September 2011e).

Last but not least, the IVLP is realized in close cooperation with seven private, not-for-profit program agencies in Washington, DC, and a network of over 100 community-based organizations across 45 states and 13 countries (Global Ties U.S. 2015). These organizations are the main actors responsible for arranging the professional meetings and all the logistics. As stressed by one US diplomat, “The Department of State relies heavily on NGOs for contacts on the ground. Our local partners know their local resources, the local business and community leaders. They are the ones making the connections with our guests” (Interview, 7 September 2011e). The voluntary engagement of NGOs significantly contributes to the level of participants’ appreciation of the program, minimizing at the same time the impact of the government in programming and adding credibility to the experience.

Youth Programs

Youth programs are currently the fastest growing component of the DS programming of international exchanges. In the last decade, the federal Government’s investment in these programs has been steady and unwavering (Interview, 8 September 2011a). Born in the wake of World War II, secondary school student exchanges have long helped showcase the American people to nations with which the USA was trying to build a better relationship. In principle, they offered a chance for young people to live with an American host family and attend a US high school from one to two semesters. At the same time, however, until the 1980s, these exchanges were primarily organized by private foundations or companies and were not a key part of the official PD effort of the DS. As recalled by one US diplomat interviewed for this study, “Having been in the Department of State for 18 years I can remember I had to justify the need of working with secondary students in some of our programs. 20 years ago reaching to people at the undergraduate level was fairly uncommon. Today youth programs are at the heart of our programming” (Interview, 7 September 2011b). The first large government-initiated youth program was the **Congress–Bundestag Youth Exchange** created in 1983 to strengthen ties between Germany and the USA through citizen diplomacy. After the end of the Cold War, it was followed by the **Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX)**, a program directed at youth from the former post-Soviet republics. With the events of 11 September 2001, it was only natural that the

youth exchange programs be extended to Muslim countries, including South Asia. As highlighted by one of the representatives of the ECA

After 9/11 we realized we have whole populations, particularly youth, which had mistaken views of the U.S. and which had not been the focus of our programs. Our task was then to change the distorted image of the United States that they might get from media. We wanted to give young people an opportunity to come here and see for themselves what America is and what it is not

(Interview, 7 September 2011c)

As a result, the **Kennedy-Lugar Youth Exchange and Study Program** was introduced in 2003, providing scholarships to high school students from countries with significant Muslim populations to spend up to one academic year in the USA. Like most US-Government youth exchanges, the program also offers American secondary student the opportunity to live and study in Muslim countries. Today, the US DS has over a dozen of bilateral and multilateral secondary school exchange programs (Department of State 2015g), establishing new ones in regions of strategic US national interest or with countries with which it wants to strengthen ties.¹¹

The growing significance of youth exchanges for US PD is a result of three factors. First, secondary school programs, like no other, create an opportunity for a life-changing experience. By immersing young people into an authentic, American family and school environment, such programs promote a lifelong attachment to the USA. They allow students to form their opinions and perceptions about the USA at an early stage of life. As highlighted by one of the not-for-profit operators: “The benefit of these types of exchanges may be less tangible but the experience is more profound” (Interview, 8 September 2011a). Second, the success rate, as perceived by the participants themselves, is remarkably high. In a survey conducted in 2007 on a random selection of exchange secondary students from different US Government and private sponsored exchange programs, 98.6 percent of respondents assessed positively their experience in the USA, with 96.7 percent saying so about the relationship with their American host families (Lee 2007). Third, thanks to the voluntary nature of partnership to these programs, youth exchanges are more easily

¹¹ As a recent example, the FLEX program, after having had to shut down its operations in the Russian Federation in 2014, was a year later enlarged to encompass seven new countries to its portfolio: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Romania and Serbia.

available to a larger number of foreign students. It is important to understand that neither the US high schools nor the host families receive any type of financial benefits for hosting an exchange student. This changes the nature of the motivation to take on an international student. It also significantly lowers the costs of the program allowing the US Government funding to be available in countries where the lack of transparency usually privileges only certain groups of people. As stressed by one US diplomat, “Our priority is to reach out to those who would otherwise never receive an opportunity to go abroad. If you implement a university exchange you can go only to cities where there are universities. When you implement a high school exchange you can go literally anywhere in the partner country, reaching deep down into the society” (Interview, 7 September 2011c). Fourth and final, youth exchanges are a long-term investment in future leaders and opinion-makers. As underlined by a US NGO representative, “There is a certain profile of risk-taking that is a part of every exchange student. These are people who in a long-run will be changing their societies, sometimes not through Government but through non-traditional means such as, venture capital investments or working in the nongovernmental sector” (Interview, 8 September 2011a).

EducationUSA

The PD efforts of the State Department ECA are much more complex than only offering exchange programs funded from the US federal budget. The ECA also tries to leverage the many educational resources that the USA possesses in order to bring an even larger number of international visitors. As the bulk of international students come for full degrees and are not part of any official exchange (Macready and Tucker 2011), it is only natural that the DS seeks partnerships with American universities in its effort to promote US higher education abroad. After all, it is estimated that annually the 977,000 foreign students on American campuses contribute almost \$30.5 billion to the US economy through tuition and living expenses (National Association of Foreign Student Advisers 2015).

As an acknowledgment of the importance of promoting studying in the USA, especially in times of increased international mobility and raising global competition, the DS has created the EducationUSA network of over 400 international student advising centers in more than 170 countries. Its aim is to promote US higher education among international students, through both US Embassies abroad and other (local) institutions. In this sense, EducationUSA serves as a liaison between American universities and

international students who wish to learn more about the possibility of studying in the USA. The DS effort is particularly important having in mind the full decentralization of the American higher education system (which is in majority private owned) and a lack of a coherent promotion strategy of the system as a whole. As observed by one of the representatives of the Institute for International Education, a not-for-profit supporting the US DS with this program: “The EducationUSA is a multi-facet effort, not only benefiting U.S. higher education but also showing that U.S. door are opened to students from all around the world” (Interview, 9 September 2011a).

The DS (2010) estimates that one out of two international students who study in the USA has at some point contacted an EducationUSA advising center in their respective country. The key to the program’s success is a large variety of partnerships created by the US Government in its realization. As one US diplomat responsible for EducationUSA stressed,

if the State Department were to pay for what we are doing, it would have never afford it. So we have partners all over the world that offer to work with us because they have the same goals as we do. They want to see more opportunities to exchange in both ways. So anywhere we can find partners who want to be part of that effort, we can expand the very small budget we receive from Congress to make it go a lot further

(Interview, 7 September 2011a)

The budget for Educational Advising and Student Service of \$12,241,000 is indeed only a small fraction (2 percent) of the \$589,000,000 appropriated by Congress in 2015 for Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (Department of State 2015b, 32–33). At the same time, its effectiveness is impressive. Every week, US universities send to the DS information on the scholarships they offer. These in turn are forwarded as feeds to local partners in 170 countries, which then pass them on directly to interested students. Depending on the part of the world, such partners may include universities, libraries, NGOs or national Fulbright Commissions. The type of institutional partnership varies from region to region. The most developed network is currently in Latin America. Still in the 1960s, the US Government had set up in the region dozens of binational Cultural Centers, which offered English-language courses, access to library and teaching advice for Latin American societies. After the 1990s, PD budget cuts, these Centers (along with the buildings co-owned by the federal government) were divested to local, private partners, with an expectation that

they will continue to cooperate with the DS on student advising activities. This cooperation has provided US foreign policy with a broad outreach to local Latin American populations. For the Centers, on the other hand, working with the US Government is lending prestige to their activities and differentiates them from other English-language institutes in the country (Interview, 7 September 2011a). In Europe, the situation is again different with Fulbright Commissions or American Corners serving as the main institutions offering educational advice. In Africa, educational advising falls within the responsibility of US Embassies, with advisers being usually DS employees. EducationUSA is opened to adding any institution interested in joining the network of educational advising, as long as it agrees to abide with the State Department rules. These rules are very strict as the program is non-commercial and most information and services have to be offered for free. Moreover, the partners are expected to pay the salary of their educational advisers, whereas all other costs (materials, promotion, etc.) are paid from the US federal budget. The partnerships work as long as both sides see benefits and are committed to common rules and values. It is worth mentioning that there is no uniformity in ways of working with partners. The flexibility of EducationUSA to leverage these partnerships is unique within the ECA framework and is part of its success in reaching a large audience of 25 million prospective international students each year (Department of State 2010).

The EducationUSA program has undergone significant developments over the years. In the 1960s, educational advising was done through a number of local advisers sitting in the libraries and waiting for interested students to come and get the necessary information. Today, the activities are much more proactive and include organizing conferences, seminars, meetings with local Alumni of US universities and visiting local schools. More effort is made to explain to students what are the advantages of studying in the USA. This is particularly important in Europe, where students have many options to choose from, which are less expensive than studying at American universities. With this in mind, the DS has commissioned one of its US non-governmental partners, the Institute for International Education (IIE), to professionalize the training of advisers of the “EducationUSA” program. This is done by setting benchmark criteria for different levels of **Regional Education Advising Coordinators**—from beginner to advanced adviser. The IIE then organizes training in the framework of a weeklong program in Washington, DC, as well as study visit to US university campuses, so that the local advisers get a sense of what it is like to study at an American university (Institute of International Education 2015b).

This is a crucial element of the training, especially as most advisers are usually nationals of the host country and often have little empirical experience with the American higher education system.

Finally, the ECA, through a variety of activities, strongly encourages and supports the **process of internationalization** of American universities (Green et al. 2008). As underlined by one of the US diplomats, “It is not enough for the students to come to the United States. There has to be an exchange experience, a positive exchange experience. This cannot happen if the school does not know how to internationalize or to provide such an exchange to international students” (Interview, 7 September 2011a). The lack of comprehensive internationalization of campuses results in the isolation of international students and limits the opportunities to integrate with American students. This in turn might leave among international students a distorted image of the USA and in fact serve to the disadvantage of the US PD efforts. With this in mind, the DS takes a proactive stance and encourages American colleges and universities to internationalize. This is done by state officials participating in higher education conferences and fairs, working on ideas for comprehensive internationalization with higher education institutions and their voluntary membership associations,¹² as well as organizing an annual meeting for US DS partner associations and schools (Interview, 6 September 2011a). The ECA also supports research on international integration including the Institute of International Education (2015a) “Open Doors” report, which provides comprehensive information about the country of origin of foreign students studying in the USA. As summarized by one of the IIE representatives responsible for contacts with the DS:

Before the focus of EducationUSA was to reach out to international students, through a network we have created for the Department of State. Not many U.S. universities knew about this effort as it was happening abroad. Since a few years however the Government has been really focused on bringing the U.S. university community as a partner to this program. You cannot be successful without each other

(Interview, 9 September 2011b)

¹²These associations include the American Association of Community Colleges, the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, the ACE, the IIE, the Association for International Education Administrators and others. Many of the NGOs collaborate to promote or advocate internationalization at the national level through the Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchanges.

Other ECA Programs

In an effort to leverage the shrinking resources, at the same time remaining successful in reaching out to foreign publics and communicating its values, the US DS is undertaking more cost-effective initiatives. These include supporting English-language teaching abroad as well as market-driven programs.

Among the most recent initiatives, which have proven to be the fastest developing worldwide, is the **English Access Microscholarship Program (ACCESS)**. Through after-school classes and intensive summer teaching, the program provides socially disadvantaged high school students with foundation of English-language skills. The curriculum allows gaining an appreciation for American culture and democratic values, but also offers students the leadership skills necessary to succeed in their future professional life. The program is realized by US Embassies abroad and since its inception in 2004, approximately 95,000 students in more than 85 countries have taken part in it (Department of State 2015h). First and foremost, ACCESS enables and empowers young marginalized populations. As observed by one US diplomat responsible within the ECA for program evaluations, “The participants of this program are individuals, to whom we have never reached out before. In some countries the governments even ask us what interest we have in reaching out to these marginalized groups. The program is so popular that we have cases of people actually moving to poorer communities to become eligible to the ACCESS program” (Interview, 7 September 2011c). This opinion is widely supported within the ECA: “We have Ambassadors saying that if they could have they would direct all their funding for public diplomacy to this particular program. We could never afford to bring so many young people to the United States, but at least we can bring a little bit of our values and culture to them. This is also extremely cost-efficient” (Interview, 7 September 2011e). In the future, the DS hopes to do a follow-up for the participants of this program, through organizing internships in US companies or American Chambers of Commerce in the partner countries.

Another way of leveraging resources is promoting programs that are market-driven. An interesting example of a public–private partnership in organizing such exchanges is the **Work & Travel Program**. It is directed to students attending university-level studies, who want to travel to the USA for up to four months and earn money by working in a wide variety of fields. The program is operated by local travel agencies accredited with the US DS, who offer this opportunity for a fee. The fees may vary significantly depending of the region or country. Generally, the more operators on a market, the more competitive the price of such program is. Although it has been sometimes argued that this type of *gastarbaiter*

opportunities cannot be considered as real cultural exchange programs, not-for-profits representing the exchange community strongly disagree. As noted by a representative of the Alliance for International Exchange¹³: “We bring to the U.S. entrepreneur individuals, who thanks to the program can support the cost of coming here. This is both a work experience and a cultural experience, because the participants have to figure out how to live a day-to-day life in a foreign country and culture. This is cultural learning, which is empowering and brings confidence to the learner” (Interview, 8 September 2011b).

BEST PRACTICES IN FORMULATING US GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED EXCHANGES AND US DOMESTIC ENGAGEMENT

The many decades of running educational and cultural exchanges with countries from all around the world have contributed to a number of best practices, which have been consistently used by the DS in the formulation and implementation of the programs. The following section of the chapter discusses the most important of these practices, as indicated by the majority of the respondents of the study—both governmental and non-governmental actors. By analyzing such practices, the chapter unveils the practical dimension of domestic engagement in government-sponsored educational and cultural exchanges.

Practice 1: Establishing Partnerships with Domestic NGOs

The first key best practice contributing to the US DS’ success in implementing exchange programs worldwide—which was most often mentioned by respondents of the study—is the richness of partnerships formed between the government and domestic NGOs. The US DS (2013) defines a partnership as “a collaborative working relationship with nongovernmental partners in which the goals, structure, and governance, as well as roles and responsibilities, are mutually determined and **decision-making is shared.**” This definition as well as cooperating with NGOs is strongly supported by American PD practitioners. As noted in survey commissioned by the USIA Alumni Association, 82 percent of former diplomats

¹³The Alliance for International Exchange (formerly Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange) is an association of 90 NGOs comprising the international educational and cultural exchange community in the USA. Founded in 1993, the Alliance serves as the only collective public policy voice of the exchange community.

indicated that such partnerships with NGOs enhance the effectiveness of US PD (Fitzpatrick 2008, 13).

Indeed, US-based NGOs (such as World Learning, American Councils for International Education, Institute for International Education or the Global Ties US, known formerly as the National Council for International Visitors) continue to be the primary collaborators in fulfilling the mission of the ECA. They not only routinely administer the programs on the ground but also work closely with the DS in forming the objectives and themes of the exchanges. Most of these institutions have several decades of experience in cooperating with the American administration on a wide variety of educational exchange programs. They provide a network of community-based entities across the USA that work to develop and strengthen globally competent and engaged communities and citizens. This network supports programs such as the IVLP or FLEX by involving thousands of American volunteers. Global Ties US (2014), for example, estimated to have over 38,000 Americans contributing annually 600,000 hours of their time to work as professional resources, home hospitality hosts and drivers for program participants.

The mutual relation is often described as a **partnership process** in which each side plays a different role. The DS' role is to set the policy objectives and oversee the balance of the program, whereas the NGOs manage the implementation, administration and the logistics. Already, however, at the stage of developing a program, much dialogue and sometimes negotiations between the DS and its potential future operators take place. As one of the NGO operator has described:

From our perspective it is better to receive an unstructured program, because then we can move the way we need to in order to attain the program's goals. The more details you put into a government document on how exactly the program should look like, the harder it is to then go around the impediments that may appear in the process. This is why we advise the Department of State already at the program formation stage

(Interview, 8 September 2011a)

The work at this phase is very creative and the opinions of NGOs, as future implementers of the program, are taken into consideration. Although there is much flexibility at the initial stage of creating a program, the **contracting process** is well specified and transparent. A description of a grant is generated with the DS and posted on the Federal Register as a request

for proposal. The incoming applications are considered by a review panel within the DS and grants are awarded. Once selected, the awarded institution continues to work closely with the DS in Washington, DC, as well as the US missions abroad, which can sometimes assist the American NGOs in soliciting partnerships overseas and in recruiting participants for the program.

The role of domestic NGOs in the realization of government-sponsored programs goes naturally beyond programming and focuses mainly on implementation of the programs on the ground. Overall, the advantages of having NGOs operating educational and cultural exchanges are numerous. Firstly, NGOs demonstrate an ability to reach out more effectively to different groups of people, work in remote areas, innovate and respond to participants' needs, which is difficult, if sometimes not impossible, for official agencies to do (Elliott 1987). They have a much larger flexibility to address obstacles on the ground, which increases the effectiveness of program implementation. As stressed by one of the NGO operators: "When you look at programs administered by the Department of State itself, they do not have the richness of pools and do not grow in time. The ones developed by operators are often better structured. We can focus more on benchmarking and accountability so that people actually achieve something during the programs. The Department of State alone would not be able to assure all this" (Interview, 8 September 2011a). Secondly, as non-state agents, NGOs have a larger credibility among foreign publics and stand a greater chance than Government to encourage the changes in attitudes and practices. As described by another NGO sector representative:

Part of the success of the exchange programs realized in the U.S. is that Government does not control them. The animating principle of all exchange programs, as set in the Fulbright-Hayes Act of 1961 is the public-private partnership. You may never meet a State Department official through the whole program. You never feel controlled or manipulated. No one will tell you what to think, which adds to the program's credibility

(Interview, 8 September 2011b)

Thirdly, contracting operational activities to not-for-profits has proven to reduce the overall costs of the program (Boris 2006). This is because NGOs often have a network of well-established voluntary staff and partners on the ground, which are more willing to devote their time for a not-for-profit than they would for a state-run agency. They are also more

efficient in leveraging resources and forming partnerships with NGOs from other countries.

Just like the non-governmental sector has strongly influenced the way in which government-sponsored exchange programs are formed and implemented in the USA, the DS has shaped the major policies and good practices related to operating exchange programs. Firstly, throughout the years, the DS has been successful in creating program **principles and regulations**, which affect both government- and market-driven exchanges. The partner NGOs, being constrained by certain guidelines and the necessity to regularly report and evaluate their activities, often in time begin to implement the same guidelines for programs, which are financed from other sources. Secondly, the DS funding drives activities in regions, which do not attract private funding or where one needs additional supplemental initiatives (Interview, 9 September 2011b). It thus sets new trends and generates more interest in regions, which otherwise would not be on the international exchange radar (Smith 2006). Finally, the US Government, through programs such as Fulbright, can encourage internationalization of American universities (Interview, 6 September 2011a), as well as help rally the private sector support for the process, as is the case of the “100,000 Strong Initiative.”

Government–NGO partnerships naturally pose many challenges for both sides. In the course of the interviews, the respondents were asked to indicate areas, which create the largest difficulties in working with each other on international exchanges. Four major challenges were repeatedly brought up. Firstly, it is the **changes in funding priorities**. When choosing regions in which programs are implemented, the DS is guided by political considerations such as national security or investing in relations with key allies. From an NGO perspective, the selection of countries in which the US Government decides to invest often does not reflect the needs on the ground and is not sufficiently balanced. Depending on the foreign policy agenda, some regions experience a decrease of funding for exchanges (e.g. post-Soviet space) and other experience the opposite (e.g. the Arab world). In the opinion of NGOs, shifting priorities causes damage to ongoing education programs that need a longer time to develop (Interview, 8 September 2011a). Moreover, for American NGOs, it is always a challenge to explain such shifts to local partners, without leaving an impression of abandonment. Secondly, American NGOs constantly struggle with **timelines and budget constraints** imposed by the DS. Many respondents acknowledged the existence of a structural problem with budgeting

within the US Government (Interview, 8 September 2011a; Interview, 8 September 2011b; Interview, 9 September 2011a; Interview, 9 September 2011b). As admitted by an American diplomat working at the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs: “Having the ECA budget ready on time is extremely rare. The tendency of having have to operate on the so-called ‘continuing resolution’, with no clear idea what the level of funding will be, has meant that even when in theory we should start our programs in October, in practice we do not know until April of next year what the real funding is” (Interview, 7 September 2011b). The structural budget deficiencies are even more challenging for the NGO operators, which are sometimes asked to freeze their own assets to begin running a program, before the actual grant is wired by the government. The third challenge for the NGO–government partnership is the changing nature of numerous **regulations** imposed on the exchanges by the administration. These include visa and student safety requirements, which are subject to change because of political considerations or as a result of malfunctions of certain programs. An NGO advocacy representative noticed during the interview: “The government is susceptible and aversive to any negative publicity, which may arise around exchange programs. Its response is regulating a concrete problem without looking at the overall impact of that particular regulation. Our view, as nongovernmental institutions is that government should regulate less and enforce more the regulations that already exist” (Interview, 8 September 2011b). The fourth and final challenge in contracting the implementation of state-sponsored exchanges to NGOs is that in the process, the programs lose the US Government branding. As admitted by an American diplomat: “we constantly have to deal with the problem that international visitors associate the scholarships they receive with the operating partner and not with the U.S. Government. We need to do a better job in conveying the message that these scholarships are paid from the U.S. taxpayer’s money” (Interview, 7 September 2011c). Surprisingly enough, just as was the case with Norway, the potential conflict of interest resulting from NGOs being too closely attached to US foreign policy has not been highlighted by most respondents as a challenge of cooperation. Yet from a power analysis, it is clear that the substantial financial US Government contribution channeled through private agencies and NGOs may produce phenomena such as clientelism, agenda-chasing or institutional capture. Most respondents felt, however, that the independence of the American NGO sector has not been put in jeopardy due to the impact non-governmental actors have on the program design

and implementation. Such argument misses, however, the point that the general objectives of each US-sponsored exchange, its target audience and geographical outreach are still determined by the DS.

Despite the many challenges (outspoken, or not), the partnerships formed between the US Government and American NGOs continue to be the bedrock of US PD efforts in the area of educational and cultural exchanges. This comprehensive relation anticipates the engagement of NGOs in the most important stages of the programs' formation and implementation, contributing enormously to the overall success of US Government-sponsored exchanges.

Practice 2: Program Design Responding to Needs of Stakeholders

The second best practice in forming government-sponsored exchange programs, most often cited by US diplomats and NGO representatives, is preparing a **design of the program that responds to the needs of all stakeholders**. As stressed by some scholars (Egner 2009), framing (understood as arguments that emphasize individual aspects of a particular policy) works best when it is done on a country-specific basis and when it relies on local advocates rather than when it is centrally devised by US officials. Moreover, the program design needs to strike a balance between the content and the opportunities of socializing with American society. As we will see in this section, such a design can be assured only if the DS works closely with domestic actors—both NGOs and the American society.

When establishing the topic of an exchange and defining the target audience of a given program, the DS undertakes an eclectic approach. Everything starts with developing a “clear sense of what one is trying to accomplished and participants one is seeking for (Interview, 7 September 2011a), taking at the same time into consideration the interest within the top U.S. foreign policy leadership” (Interview, 7 September 2011b). The program design drafting is supported by survey research to indicate any gaps that might appear. The composition of each program needs to reflect US foreign policy priorities as well as to be tailor-made to meet the interest of the individuals or the group involved. As an example, one of the respondents from the DS recalled a recent initiative designed for bloggers from non-democratic states interested in social and political change. The elements of the educational exchange program to the USA were introducing young bloggers to their counterpart in the USA, taking them to a major international conference on the subject, meeting with officials and discussing how the US Government

uses new media in its work. All this made the visit to the USA not only professionally enriching but also provided participants with a sense of appreciation for their work (Interview, 7 September 2011d).

Some programs, such as the **International Visitors Leadership Program (IVLP)** go as far as offering individual agendas for their participants. In projects which are aimed at a particular country, themes from the bilateral agenda are explored. For regional and multiregional projects, the topics of visits are decided at the office of the Secretary of State. Throughout the interviews, respondents stressed that in contrast to individual and country-focused visits, the multinational programs have an added value: they allow participants to compare professional experience in a truly international environment (Interview, 6 September 2011a; Interview, 7 September 2011a; Interview, 7 September 2011b; Interview, 7 September 2011d).

For long-term programs, such as youth exchanges or Fulbright, a balance is sought between allowing international visitors to learn and explore the USA on their own and assuring that they do not feel left alone in a foreign country. Special predeparture and on-the-spot orientations organized by the operators help incoming participants acculturate and overcome any anxieties they might relate to living in a different culture. This is important particularly for high school exchanges, where—because of the age—participants might be unaccustomed to dealing with a new environment or prejudices they might encounter during their stay in the USA (Interview, 8 September 2011a).

American civil society actors play a key role in all stages of program design and program realization. Firstly, with each year of cooperation, **the role of the NGO operator in programming increases** and in time the operator can even influence the way in which new exchanges are formed. As observed by one of the NGOs' respondents: "The framework of our flagship initiative has been created by us almost 20 years ago at the request of the Department of State. In the years much of the language and content has been implemented into official government documents, although the administration might not be even aware of it" (Interview, 8 September 2011a). Secondly, a good program design requires striking equilibrium between the substantive content and the **exposure to the USA and its society**. Establishing contacts between visitors and local society is an indispensable element necessary to increase intercultural understanding. As research shows, foreign students who develop stronger social relationships with Americans are more likely to see the

country more positively (Selltiz and Cook 1962; Flack 1976 Atkinson 2010). For this reason, even in the framework of short-term government-funded exchanges (such as IVLP), international visitors are exposed to smaller cities and communities, and in the case of youth programs, even rural areas of the USA. There is a certain conviction that in such places essential features of the American society, such as openness, voluntarism and diversity, can be better experienced. As one US diplomat claimed: “Exposure to American people has never let us down. It always improves visitors’ opinion about the United States and almost never disappoints them” (Interview, 7 September 2011e). As noted by another US diplomat: “It is surprising particularly for visitors from more restricted societies, that we allow unlimited access to our society. We do not control whom they meet and we do not ask the host families about their political views. We trust Americans” (Interview, 7 September 2011c). Finally, it should not go without notice that many US DS programs, particularly those addressed to youth and professionals, envisage additional **hands-on components** such as **community service opportunities**, provided by NGO operators and their local branches. This allows the participants to go beyond the host family environment and explore different aspects of American life. As described by one of the NGO operators: “Community service helps youth to understand how U.S. society works, as it is fundamental for our culture. It also gets them involved with different layers of society, outside school, outside family, outside their peers. Sometimes these are the most successful interactions students have with American society” (Interview, 8 September 2011a).

Practice 3: Careful Selection of Participants

The third most often referred to element contributing to the success of US Government-sponsored exchanges is the **careful selection of participants**. This variable has been in the past repeatedly cited by researchers who point to the importance of selecting individuals who can play a role of change agents or information multipliers (Scott-Smith 2008). There are a number of criteria that the DS follows when looking for candidates for the programs, yet also at this stage, the role of the NGO operator (responsible for selection methods) is substantial.

The first criterion of selection is **transparency**. As one of the US diplomats has put it: “When examining a bid we look for a selection of participants which is transparent. There is always a temptation to

bestow the opportunity of exchanges as a gift for future influence. What we do not want is for programs to be limited to a group of people” (Interview, 7 September 2011b). Attention is thus paid to assuring the competitiveness of programs and a selection based on merit. The majority of the study respondents agreed that high-quality participants guarantee the future success of the program because of the model role they will play later in their society. As stressed by one of the NGO operators:

Choosing the right kids for a youth exchange is important for three reasons. Firstly it ensures a successful experience for the participants. Secondly it guarantees that American families will be willing to host students in the future. Thirdly, it forms role-models for next year students that decide to participate in an exchange. When I sometimes ask the students why they came to the U.S., I hear that they want to be like the Alumni: active, engaged, progressive

(Interview, 8 September 2011a)

The second criterion is the **diversity of environments** the participants represent. As pointed out by respondents, the recent tendency within the DS is to reach out with the programs to underrepresented sectors of foreign societies, in particular to women, youth and people with disabilities (Interview, 7 September 2011d). Last but not least, in all government-sponsored exchanges, the priority groups continue to be current and prospective opinion-makers and opinion-shakers. This is because, as studies show, changes in the home institutions/settings are more likely to be influenced by participants of higher rank or those who attained a “politically influential position” upon return home (Sunal and Sunal 1991, Atkinson 2010).

Once again, a large part of responsibility for the selection process is bestowed on the non-governmental partner or operator of the program. With the exception of the IVLP program (where recruitment is conducted by US Embassies, putting the transparency principle at stake), American NGOs as well as universities have often the final say on who is recruited to participate in the programs. Through partnerships with foreign NGOs and academic institutions, they are able to assure a better pool of participants. Finally, as non-state actors, they are better equipped to assure a transparent recruitment process, which is not subject to political considerations.

Practice 4: Keeping Track of Alumni

Finally, a key element contributing to the success of government-sponsored exchanges is the ability of the DS to keep track of its Alumni. Having from 20,000 to 40,000 participants of the DS-funded programs per year, the USA has the biggest and fastest growing network of “State-Alumni”: over 1 million worldwide (Department of State 2015i). With such a great number, it is the more challenging to provide proper resources to sustain Alumni engagement with the USA. As one of the State Department officials responsible for the Alumni programs pointed out: “Having invested a considerable amount of our tax-payers money into the exchanges, it is the more important to maintain contact with our Alumni, to continue the dialogue we have started during the program. If you do not, it is simply not capitalizing on your investment” (Interview, 7 September 2011f).

When working with its Alumni, the ECA undertakes two types of activities. On the one hand, it seeks to support the individual Alumni back in their home country, building on the experience gained during the exchange program in the USA. As noticed by one of the US diplomats: “We begin to treat the Alumni network is a more comprehensive way. We try to enable and assist Alumni to do what they planned to do back home: either by supporting their research, activities or promoting their cause through our local or global network” (Interview, 7 September 2011b). On the other hand, the DS offers tools, such as the Alumni. state.gov online community, that serve as a platform for communication, but also a place to access grants, publications, implement projects and learn about new opportunities available for Alumni.

In tracking Alumni, the US DS works closely with US missions abroad. The US Embassies have access to a full database of Alumni of exchanges which they use to maintain contact. As underlined by one US diplomat: “the Department of State has started to involve its Alumni in different forms of dialogue through our U.S. missions. We ask them for opinions on our policies or ask for advice needed to better understand the country we work with” (Interview, 7 September 2011c). Although much of the work on keeping track of Alumni lies within the DS and its foreign missions, the American NGOs still play an important role in the process. By maintaining contact with their program, Alumni and conducting post-program activities, the operators create a web of like-minded leaders who can help each other to reengage in the society and find places where their skills will be appreciated. As one of the NGO representative has described it: “Most

of our Alumni have been able to show that when you go back home, you can have a much better life. We also work hard with our Alumni to build networks on the ground, because it is networks that make things done” (Interview, 8 September 2011a).

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CASE-STUDY

Due to the number and scope of exchanges, their geographical outreach and years of experience of the DS in running these programs, the US lessons learned are surely of value to other countries striving to form a collaborative, synergy-driven PD strategy. The chapter allows formulating the following recommendations for the conduct of international education exchange programs:

- **Prioritize countries but not participants.** Government-exchange programs need to be aligned with the strategic priorities of each state. With limited resources, states must choose strategic priority countries or regions with which, however, engagement has to be as broad as possible. Exchanges should have a relatively large spectrum of participants, reaching out to diverse groups of individuals (from youth to professionals). Only such engagement brings tangible PD results, as it avoids the dispersing of resources and shows genuine interest in one partner country or a particular region.
- **Define your message and source of appeal.** The use of exchange programs as a PD tool has to be embedded in a larger PD strategy, which defines the goals of a country as well as resources in its possession, which make it compelling to foreigners. All programs need to be sending similar messages and pushing forward the same objectives and goals. The power of attracting exchange visitors depends on the ability to recognize the country’s strengths (such as strong higher education system, an opened society) as well as the ability to tell a compelling story.
- **Form partnerships and consult partners.** In order to compose and implement successful exchange programs, the government needs to form numerous comprehensive partnerships in the country and abroad, making the process of formulating and implementing exchanges as inclusive as possible. At the national level, such collaboration should include primarily NGOs and universities, serving as implementing partners. At the international level, partnerships

include global civil society organizations, higher education and public institutions, which have a common mission of promoting international dialogue through exchanges. It is crucial for all partners to share common objectives and values and for them to be involved in the programs creation, as part of a consultative process. Only then a co-ownership approach is assured, which strengthens the commitment to the program from all sides.

- **Share costs.** The government's financial effort to promote more international exchanges needs to be strengthened by sharing costs with other partners. These include universities, which are attracted by having foreign students, private foundations with a mission of supporting international dialogue or even foreign governments interested in strengthening mutual ties. The MFAs must also recognize the role and increased importance of the private sector actors in PD activities. Only cost-sharing allows achieving substantial international exchange yield with limited financial outlay on the side of the taxpayer.
- **Get your society involved.** International exchanges are about connecting citizens to citizens. They are based on building relationships between ordinary individuals from hosting and sending states. This is why implementation of exchanges requires a strong involvement of the host society. The voluntary aspect of receiving foreigners by local communities is crucial for the success of the program. The government needs to trust its NGO partners and resist the temptation to control the implementation of programs by selecting whom the participants will meet. Only having contact with diverse groups of the society contributes to the process of sharing its distinctive experience and bolsters positive views about a country.
- **Encourage the internationalization of higher education.** By engaging with foreign students, universities serve as the best diplomatic centers of the hosting country, build a global image of that country abroad. For this reason, the government needs to encourage comprehensive internationalization of its higher education system. While doing that, it needs to recognize that the attraction and retention of foreign students at the campuses is just one part of the internationalization process. The other is assuring that the inflow of foreign students also influences the academic environment of the host country by enhancing its curriculum and study-abroad opportunities for its own students.

- **Think win-win.** PD exchange programs of one state cannot be realized to the detriment another state. On the contrary, they must be seen as beneficial for the bilateral relationship. For this reason, the exchange programs must avoid funding brain drain in the sending country, but rather serve as a tool of enhancing the competitiveness of the workforce of that country and in the future contributing to the growth of its economy. Moreover, exchange programs should promote building collaborative models in education, bringing together best resources and ideas from both countries. Last but not least, whenever possible, the design of exchange programs should be done on a cooperative basis with third-state. This creates real commitment and cooperation in realization of programs, which are mutually beneficial.
- **Place transparency and integrity issues first.** In the realization of the programs abroad, the government needs to avoid any possible controversies such as fraud allegations or non-transparent criteria of selection of participants for a program. Such allegations can be counterproductive to the PD efforts and severely hamper the image of the country abroad. It goes without saying that in order to assure transparency overseas, the same principle needs to be implemented when working with partners at home.
- **Invest in the Alumni Network.** Following up on the relationship, which has been established in the course of an exchange program, is as important as a successful implementation of such an exchange. Communication platforms and other tools of engaging Alumni should be assured in order to foster the relationship over time. The government can also choose to engage with particular Alumni through its missions overseas. As sustained engagement with all Alumni is not possible, the government needs to be selective about whom and how to engage.
- **Invest in content, not in the package.** Last but not least, the success of using exchange programs as PD tools depends on the product offered. The choice of the topic of an exchange and its target audience should be a result of complex planning and the ability to respond to the needs of the third-country. The “one-size-fits-all” strategy does never work in composing exchange programs.

The chapter has revealed that all best practices in the formulation and implementation of government-sponsored exchange programs—as

indicated by the respondents—heavily involve the domestic component of American society. Not only are the NGO operators consulted on the content of these programs and the American public involved in key elements of the agenda, but in time non-governmental actors can move from playing an implementing role into influencing the program design and policy formulation process. This makes exchange programs ideal tools of “New Public Diplomacy,” where the development of relations between civil society actors abroad and at home comes to the forefront of the policy, with the state playing only a facilitative role in the process.

REFERENCES

- Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy. (2005). *Cultural diplomacy: The Linchpin of public diplomacy*. Washington, DC: US Department of State.
- Atkinson, C. (2010). Does soft power matter? A comparative analysis of student exchange programs 1980–2006. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6, 1–22.
- Banks, R. (2011). A resource guide to public diplomacy evaluation. In *CDP perspectives on public diplomacy*. Los Angeles, CA: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School.
- Bellamy, C., & Weinberg, A. (2008). Educational and cultural exchanges to restore America’s image. *The Washington Quarterly*, 31(3), 55–68.
- Belyavina, R. (2013). *U.S. Students in China: Meeting the goals of the 100,000 Strong Initiative. A pilot study on U.S. student participation in education abroad activities in China*. New York: Institute of International Education. Available online at: <http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Publications-and-Reports/IIE-Bookstore/US-Students-in-China>
- Berman, E. (1983). *The influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The ideology of philanthropy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Boris, E. T. (2006). Nonprofit organizations in a Democracy: Varied roles and responsibilities. In: E. Boris, & E. Steuerle (Eds.), *Nonprofits and government: Collaboration and conflict* (pp. 18–27).
- Chow, P. (2011). *What international students think about U.S. higher education: Attitudes and perceptions of prospective students in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America* (Institute of International Education Report). New York: IIE.
- Clarke, G. (1998). Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and politics in the developing world. *Political Studies*, 46, 36–52.
- Cull, N. J. (2009). Public diplomacy: Lessons from the past. In *CDP Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*. Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School.

- Department of State. (2006, January 18). Bureau of educational and cultural affairs. *Visiting Fulbright Student Program Outcome Assessment*. Available online at: http://eca.state.gov/files/admin/fulbright-visiting-student-one-pager_jan-2006.pdf
- Department of State. (2010). Bureau of cultural and educational affairs. *Promoting U.S. Education Abroad*. Accessed October 9, 2011, from http://photos.state.gov/libraries/jordan/444376/pdf/Promoting-U_S_-Education-Abroad.pdf
- Department of State. (2013). *Global partnership initiative*. Accessed March 20, 2013, from <http://www.state.gov/s/partnerships>
- Department of State. (2015a). Bureau of cultural and educational affairs. *History and Mission of ECA*. Accessed June 10 June, 2015, from <http://eca.state.gov/about-bureau/history-and-mission-eca> (homepage)
- Department of State. (2015b, February 2). Congressional budget justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. *Fiscal Year 2016*. Available online at: <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/9276/FY16CBJStateFORP.pdf>
- Department of State. (2015c). Bureau of educational and cultural affairs. *About ECA*. Accessed June 10, 2015, from <http://eca.state.gov/about-bureau>
- Department of State. (2015d). Bureau of cultural and educational affairs. *The Fulbright Programs*. Accessed June 17, 2015, from <http://eca.state.gov/fulbright/fulbright-programs> (homepage).
- Department of State. (2015e). Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs. *Fulbright Commissions*. Accessed June 10, 2015, from <http://eca.state.gov/fulbright/about-fulbright/funding-and-administration/fulbright-commissions>
- Department of State. (2015f). Bureau of cultural and educational affairs. *IVLP Experience*. Accessed June 17, 2015, from <http://eca.state.gov/ivlp/about-ivlp>
- Department of State. (2015g). Bureau of cultural and educational affairs. *Exchange Programs*. Accessed June 11, 2015, from <http://exchanges.state.gov/non-us> (homepage).
- Department of State. (2015h). Bureau of cultural and educational affairs. *English Access Microscholarship Program: At a Glance*. Accessed September 26, 2015, from <http://exchanges.state.gov/non-us/EnglishAccess>
- Department of State. (2015i). Bureau of cultural and educational affairs. *Impact: Facts and Figures*. Accessed September 6, 2015, from <http://eca.state.gov/impact/facts-and-figures>
- Djerejian, E. P. (2007). *Changing minds, winning peace*. West Bethesda, MD: Crossbow Press.
- Dudden, A. P., & Dynes, R. R. (Eds.). (1987, January 1). *The Fulbright experience, 1946–1986: Encounters and transformations*. Transaction Publishers.
- Duggan, S. J. (1998). *The politics of US-German educational exchange: Perspectives of German decision-makers* (PhD thesis, Stanford University).

- Edwards, M. (1999). International development NGOs: Agents of foreign aid or vehicles for international cooperation? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 28, 25–37.
- Egner, M. (2009). *Between slogans and solutions: A frame-based assessment methodology for public diplomacy*. PhD thesis, The Pardee, RAND Graduate School.
- Elliott, Charles. (1987). Some Aspects of Relations Between North and South in the NGO Sector. *World Development* 15(Supplement): 57–68.
- Espinosa, J. M. (1976). *Inter-American beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy 1936–1948*. Washington, DC: Department of State.
- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2008). *The collapse of American Public Diplomacy—What diplomatic experts say about rebuilding America's image in the world. A view from the trenches*, United States Information Agency Alumni Association Survey. Hamden: Quinnipiac University School of Communication.
- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2012). Defining strategic publics in a networked world: Public diplomacy's challenge at home and abroad. *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 421–40.
- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2011). U.S. public diplomacy in a post-9/11 world: From messaging to mutuality. In *CDP perspectives on public diplomacy*. Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School.
- Flack, M. (1976). Results and effects of study abroad. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 424(1), 107–77.
- Foley, M. (2008). The foreign policy process: Executive, congress, intelligence. In M. Cox & D. Stokes (Eds.), *US foreign policy* (pp. 107–28). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board. (2014). *Annual report*, Washington, DC. Available online at: http://eca.state.gov/files/bureau/ffsb-annual-report_final_printready_12-18.pdf
- Global Ties U.S. (2014). *Volunteer engagement and multi-generational collaboration: An analysis*. Co-authored by R. Callender, S. García, S. Okogo and K. Whitson. Available online at: <https://www.american.edu/sis/practica/upload/Mueller-Global-Ties-U-S-Final-Report.pdf>
- Global Ties U.S. (2015). *Community-based members*. Accessed May 10, 2015, from <http://www.globaltiesus.org/our-members/community-based-members>
- Green, M., Luu, D. T., & Burris, B. (2008). *Mapping internationalization on US campuses* (2008th ed.). Washington, DC: American Councils on Education.
- Hughes, K. (2005). *U.S. State Department undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs*. Speech to 42nd ISNA Convention in Chicago, Illinois, September 2.
- Huijgh, E. (2013). Changing tunes for public diplomacy: Exploring the domestic dimension. *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 2(1), 62–74.

- Huijgh, E., & Byrne, C. (2012). Opening the Windows on diplomacy: A comparison of the domestic dimension of diplomacy in Canada and Australia. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 395–420.
- Institute for International Education. (2015a). *Open doors data: International students*. Accessed March 7, 2015, from <http://www.iie.org/en/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students>
- Institute of International Education. (2011). *Student mobility and the internationalization of higher education: National policies and strategies from six world regions*, Project Atlas Report. New York: IIE.
- Institute of International Education. (2015b). *Education USA: Your source on U.S. Higher Education*. Accessed March 7, 2015, from <http://www.iie.org/Students/Tabs/International/Education-USA> (homepage).
- Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchange and Training Programs. (2010). *FY-2010 Annual report*. Available online at: <http://www.iawg.gov/reports/annual/>
- Kellermann, H. (1978). *Cultural Relations as an instrument of US Foreign Policy: The educational exchange program between the United States and Germany, 1945–1954*. Washington, DC: Department of State.
- Kelman, H. C., & Lotte, B. (1962). Effects of cross-cultural experience on national images: A study of Scandinavian students in America. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 6(4), 319–34.
- Lee, J. (2007). *Hosting motivation and satisfaction survey—2006–07. Feedback from 2006–07 long-term exchange students, host families, and host schools*. Available online at: http://www.csiet.org/uploaded_files/410/files/Publications/Hosting_Motivation_and_Satisfaction_Study_-_Final.pdf
- Macready, C., & Tucker, C. (2011). Who goes where and why? *An overview and analysis of global educational mobility* (Global Education Research Reports, Report 5). New York: Institute of International Education.
- Metzgar, E. T. (2012). Public diplomacy, Smith-Mundt and the American Public. *Communication Law and Policy*, 17(1), 67–101.
- National Association of Foreign Student Advisers. (2015). *Data and statistics: NAFSA International Student Economic value tool*. Available online at: http://www.nafsa.org/Explore_International_Education/Impact/Data_And_Statistics/NAFSA_International_Student_Economic_Value_Tool/
- Nye, J. S., Jr., & Keohane, R. (1971). Transnational relations and world politics: An introduction. *International Organization*, 25(3), 329–49.
- Obama, B. (2011). *100,000 strong in the Americas*. Speech at La Moneda, Santiago, Chile, March 21.
- Olberding, J. C., & Olberding, D. (2010). Ripple effects' in youth peacebuilding and exchange programs: Measuring impacts beyond direct participants. *International Studies Perspectives*, 11(1), 75–91.

- Parmar, I. (2010). Challenging elite Anti-Americanism in the Cold War: American Foundations, Kissinger's Harvard seminar and the Salzburg seminar in American studies. In I. Parmar & M. Cox (Eds.), *Soft power and US foreign policy. Theoretical, historical and contemporary perspectives* (pp. 108–120). London: Routledge.
- Reimann, K. (2006). A view from the top: International politics, norms, and the worldwide growth of NGOs. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50, 45–57.
- Richmond, Y. (2003). *Cultural exchanges and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Riordan, S. (2005). Dialogue-based public diplomacy: A new foreign policy paradigm? In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations* (pp. 180–95). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rugh, W.A. (ed.) (2011). *The Practice of Public Diplomacy – Confronting Challenges Abroad*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sablosky, J. A. (2003). *Recent trends in Department of State support for cultural diplomacy: 1993–2002*. Washington DC: Center for Arts and Culture.
- Schmidt, O. (1999). *Small Atlantic world: US philanthropy and expanding international exchange of scholars after 1945*. PhD thesis, Harvard University.
- Schneider, C. (2007). Culture communicates: US diplomacy that works. In J. Melissen (Ed.), *The new public diplomacy. Soft power in international relations* (pp. 147–68). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Scott-Smith, G. (2003). Her rather ambitious Washington program: Margaret Thatcher's international visitor program visit to the United States in 1967. *Contemporary British Politics*, 17(4), 65–86.
- Scott-Smith, G. (2008). Mapping the undefinable: Some thoughts on the relevance of exchange programs within international relations theory. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 180.
- Scott-Smith, G. (2009). Exchange programs and public diplomacy. In N. Snow & P. Taylor (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy* (pp. 50–7). London and New York: Routledge.
- Selltiz, C., & Cook, S. W. (1962). Factors influencing attitudes of foreign students toward the host country. *Journal of Social Issues*, 18(1), 7–23.
- Smith, S. R. (2006). Government financing of nonprofit activity. In E. Boris & E. Steuerle (Eds.), *Nonprofits and government: Collaboration and conflict* (pp. 219–25). Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.
- Stangor, C., Jonas, C., Stroebe, W., & Hewstone, M. (1996). Influence of student exchanges on national stereotypes, attitudes & perceived group variability. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 26(4), 663–75.
- Sunal, D. W., & Sunal, C. C. (1991). Professional and personal effects of the American fulbright experience in Africa. *African Studies Review*, 34(2), 97–123.

- Taylor, P. (2009). Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. In N. Snow & P. Taylor (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy* (pp. 12–16). London and New York: Routledge.
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2015, November). Student and Exchange Visitor Information System: SEVIS by the numbers. *General Summary Quarterly Review*. Available online at: <https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2015/sevis-bythenumbers-dec15.pdf>
- United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. (2014, December 11). *Comprehensive Annual Report on Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting. Focus on FY13 Budget Data*. Available on-line at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/235159.pdf>
- United States Congress. (1961). The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (MECEA) of 1961. *Public Law* 87-256, 75 Stat. 527.
- Wang, J. (2006). Managing national reputation and international relations in the global era: Public diplomacy revisited. *Public Relations Review*, 32(2), 91–6.
- Watson, J., & Lippitt, R. (1963). Cross-cultural experience as a source of attitude change. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2(1), 61–6.
- Wilson, N., & Bonilla, F. (1955). Evaluating exchange of person programs. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 19(1), 20–30.

Summary of Findings

The book has presented empirical data derived from case-studies that analyze PD efforts of three liberal democracies: Norway, Australia and the USA. It has specifically looked at the relationship between PD and the increasingly important role played in foreign policy by domestic publics. The case-studies have highlighted two major challenges in developing a genuine domestic dimension of PD. First, as shown in the Norwegian and Australian examples, the broad PD messaging needs to enjoy domestic legitimacy and self-identification with the cause. Second, foreign policy-makers need to learn to involve the domestic public in both formulation and implementation of PD initiatives (*Case-study 3: U.S. Government-sponsored educational exchange programs*), but also increasingly acknowledge and support PD activities that are undertaken independently by domestic civil society (*Case-study 1: Norway as a Peace Nation*). Finally, state PD practitioners need to see domestic publics as “strategic publics” with which communication is as important as it is with foreign publics. Comparing these three case-studies allows us to draw preliminary conclusions about the variables that impact PD practice.

The openness to PD innovations, including NPD and selecting collaborative solutions, seems to depend on foreign policy tradition, domestic democratic culture and the relationships between government and its civil society. While exploring these variables, the following chapter will summarize Norwegian, Australian and American performance in implementing

the three platforms of PD domestic outreach (informative, cooperative and identity-building). It will also discuss whether the study findings about PD's domestic dimension are applicable to countries of a non-democratic nature.

DETERMINANTS OF COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY

This comparative analysis suggests that the choice whether to favor more traditional PD approaches (monologue, dialogue) or to innovate in the collaborative space depends on a state's foreign policy tradition, its democratic culture and the relationships between government and its civil society. All three variables are interlinked and influence each other. Foreign policy tradition and domestic democratic culture (including stocks of social capital), both determine the way in which PD practitioners will approach domestic civil society (Norway, Australia). On the other hand, a long history of developed working relations between the government and non-governmental sector can influence the foreign policy culture and make it more predisposed to innovations in PD (USA).

Table 6.1 Foreign policy tradition and PD practice in Norway, Australia and USA

	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Australia</i>	<i>USA</i>
Predominant foreign policy tradition	Liberal internationalism	Principled pragmatism	Realistic idealism
IR theory best explaining foreign policy behavior	Constructivism	Liberalism/Realism	Liberalism/Realism
PD paradigm	Collaboration	Dialogue	Dialogue/Monologue
Main goal of PD	Negotiating understanding/ Contributing to global public good	Creating a positive image/Building relations	Creating a positive image (information)/ Building relations (engagement)
Preferred PD instruments	Humanitarian and development aid	Educational Exchanges and Cultural diplomacy	Cultural and Educational Exchanges/ Broadcasting

Foreign Policy Tradition

As illustrated in Table 6.1, each of the country under study has a different type of a predominant foreign policy culture. Norway, with its tradition of liberal internationalism and attachment to ideas of justice and equality, has benefited from Norwegian society's receptiveness to new concepts of international order (Leiren 2005). Its foreign policy is characterized by a commitment to ever-increasing international funding for humanitarian and development purposes. It also promotes the idea of "liberal institutionalism," which describes a general orientation toward multilateralism and the belief that nations should cooperate because their long-term mutual interests are of greater value than their individual short-term needs. Such a foreign policy tradition naturally favors collaboration also in the practice of PD. PD's aims are less about creating a positive image of Norway abroad and more about negotiating understanding between nations as well as building social capital among partners. In that sense, Norwegian approach to PD can be best explained by the theory of constructivism, which places among PD's main objectives the changing of the nature of relationship between the practitioner and host country.

Australia's foreign policy tradition is best described as "principled pragmatism." This concept is a distinctively Australian strand of realism defined as resorting to a practical approach to foreign policy decision, guided by certain principles which highlight the ethical and moral aspects of these decisions. At times, "principled pragmatism" has been complemented by the more liberal in nature notion of a "good international citizen." The latter concept (which has been in and out of vogue in Australia) refers to an ethical foreign policy characterized by certain moral obligations beyond Australia's borders. It also professes the spirit of internationalism, where the International System is seen as interdependent and requiring common solutions for global problems. At first glance, the "good international citizen" resembles very closely to the Norwegian tradition of liberal internationalism. The difference, however, is that while Norwegians see their commitment to a "global public good" through primarily idealistic lenses, Australians stress the pragmatic elements of such engagement. Pragmatism is reflected also in Australian PD practice, which focuses predominantly on creating a positive image abroad, among others through relationship building. Dialogue is then the preferred mode of PD communication and educational exchanges, as well as cultural diplomacy remain the main tool of the policy.

The USA is the most complex of the three case-studies. On the one hand, it has a long-standing liberal tradition, which has facilitated the creation of strong links with civil society at home and abroad and for decades strengthened the image of America as a “shining city upon a hill.” On the other hand, the predominant foreign policy culture, which I would brand as “idealistic realism,” has seemed to have worked to the detriment of American PD. In its idealistic drive to promote democracy around the world, the USA has too often favored monologue and unilateral actions. By stressing the supremacy of its values and norms, it has disregarded the fact that “it is what one hears and understands, not what one says, that is important in PD” (Proedrou and Frangonikolopoulos 2012, 734). Moreover, as pointed out by Rhonda Zaharna (2010, 160), “The U.S. preference for unilateral actions suggests a view of itself as an autonomous entity capable and willing to act independently of its environment.” Exceptionalism (understood as America’s unique mission to transform the world) might serve as a strong, identity-building PD notion. Yet when coupled with unilateralism, it contributes to growing international distrust of US motives, hampering international cooperation on issues that matter most for American foreign policy. Such combination also opposes the very idea of a collaborative PD, where states are judged on the basis of their contribution of global public goods, such as peace, security, sustainable development, respect for human rights and international law. The irony here is that the USA has the potential to be an outlier in providing all these global public goods. The inability, however, to recognize in a broader foreign policy context (beyond PD and exchange programs) the principles of mutuality and collaboration rips the dividend of many of its diplomatic activities.

Domestic Democratic Culture and Government–Civil Society Relations

In addition to the foreign policy tradition, also two other factors play a major role in a state’s ability to undertake collaborative PD. These are the general democratic culture and the quality of relationships between government and its civil society. As pointed out by Geoffrey Wiseman (2010, 47), democracies are generally more likely to innovate “polylaterally”—that is, cooperate with non-state actors—than semi-democracies and non-democracies. This is because in open societies, the innovations are strengthened by a free flow of ideas, transparency and the ability to learn

from one's mistakes. Yet as can be concluded when comparing Norway and Australia, pluralism is only a point of departure for true collaborative PD. There also needs to be a high level of social capital within a society in general and between government and civil society in particular. As we have argued in Chap. 2, genuine networks and partnerships, both within and between communities, breed social trust, foster norms and create stocks of goodwill, which can be invaluable in times of crisis (Fidrmuc and Gerxhani 2008, 26). This is clearly the case in Norway, where cooperative culture and high level of social trust remains one of the fundamental characteristics of Norwegian society. The general attitude of co-ownership and efficient democratic control (Archer and Joenniemi 2003) leads to a more vibrant civil society, measured in terms of membership affiliation and active civic engagement. When put to use in the foreign policy context, cooperative culture can operate in a twofold manner. On the one hand, it allows all Norwegian actors—both governmental and non-governmental—to work together to attain concrete foreign policy goals (Norwegian model). On the other hand, it makes Norway an attractive honest broker in multilateral settings. As illustrated in Table 6.2, the collaborative culture has a large impact on the practicalities of government–domestic society cooperation in PD. In Norway, this cooperation can be characterized by high

Table 6.2 Government–domestic civil society cooperation in PD in Norway, Australia and USA

	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Australia</i>	<i>USA</i>
Level of PD cooperation between government and civil society	Very high	Intermediate	High
Role of NGOs in PD efforts	Quasi-state representation role in third countries.	Service provider/contractors to state PD initiatives	Partners to state PD initiatives Independent actors
Type of relationship	Ongoing dialogue and role-sharing	Fluctuating governmental engagement	Mutual partnership
State funding in the budget of domestic development aid NGOs	Extensive (up to 90 percent)	Small (median of 20 percent)	Data not available
Intra-sector elite interpenetration	Extensive	Weak	Medium

levels of mutual engagement, a representative role NGOs play in state PD activities, role-sharing and dialogue, extensive public funding for NGO activities and finally deep elite interpenetration (changing career positions) between the government and civil society.

Such cooperative domestic culture is much less visible in Australia. It can be best illustrated by the example of the Australian Government's attitude toward NGOs. Most state officials think that the value of working with Australian civil society is limited and perceive NGOs as much less efficient partners in comparison to the private sector. Moreover, Australia's decision-makers have a history of treating domestic NGOs (particularly advocacy ones) as organizations endangering their political interest. As seen during the Howard years, the Australian Government had little problems to introduce gag clauses or selectively use tax deductibility laws in an effort to curtail NGOs' ability to influence general publics. As such practices prevail (*Save the Children in Nauru case*), trust and collaboration between Australian civil society and its government is further weakened. The consequences of this are visible also in the practice of PD (Table 6.2). Here, civil society partners are too often treated as mere contractors to state PD initiatives. The government's engagement with NGOs working internationally largely depends on the ruling party's priorities and as such is subject to constant fluctuations. In the development aid sector, public funding for NGOs amounts usually to no more than 20 percent of not-for-profits' annual budget. Finally, it is rare to see civil servants or politicians joining the ranks of NGOs, or those employed in the NGO sector moving into government. Australian Government and Australian civil society form two distinctive and—at times—hostile to each other worlds. Until this is the case, it will be very hard for Australia to introduce a collaborative approach to PD.

The USA has been praised for having one of the most vibrant civil societies in the world, with around 1.8 million registered NGOs, employing 9 percent of the American workforce (Boris 2004). It has also been proud of its pluralistic democracy and strong constitutional protection for freedom of expression. Finally, the US Government has shown continuous engagement to work with civil society not only on the domestic issues but also on the foreign policy front. As we have discussed in Chap. 5, the decades devoted to cooperating with NGOs on the realization of educational and cultural exchanges has resulted in strong partnership relations, where at least a portion of US PD is co-formed by non-state actors. NGOs are thus not only mere contractors or operators but also true partners in

the realization of US foreign policy. American PD practitioners, probably more than their Norwegian and Australian counterparts, acknowledge also the potential of NGO “actorness” in PD and the value of projects that do not fall under traditional state PD and are run independently (and sometimes even in competition) to state efforts. As far as democratic culture and NGO–government relations are concerned, the USA has good grounds to conduct a truly collaborative PD. What is, however, inhibiting the process is first and foremost the foreign policy culture, which in PD still prioritizes image and an effort to explain America to the world, over a strong commitment to public global good.

ASSESSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PD’S DOMESTIC DIMENSION

Against the backdrop of foreign policy traditions, domestic democratic culture as well as government–civil society relations, how far advanced are Norway, Australia and the USA in introducing a full spectrum of PD domestic outreach? When we analyze this question using the three DD platforms introduced in this book (informative, cooperative and identity-defining), Norway is yet again an outlier (Table 6.3). In Chap. 5, we have argued that the efficiency of Norwegian PD can be attributed to exactly the way in which it is handling its domestic outreach. First, when dealing with PD messaging, Norway is using the identity-defining platform and capitalizing on Norwegian society’s belief that the country is a Peace Nation with a missionary obligation. Second, thanks to the “Norwegian Model” of cooperation with civil society around foreign policy goals, as

Table 6.3 Implementation of PD domestic dimension platforms in Norway, Australia and USA

	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Australia</i>	<i>USA</i>
Informative Platform (Explaining foreign policy to domestic publics)	Advanced	Intermediate	Poor
Cooperative Platform (Engaging in and supporting of civil society PD efforts)	Very advanced	Intermediate	Very advanced
Identity-Defining Platform (Defining and strengthening national identity)	Very advanced	Poor	Advanced

well as the country's openness to INGOs, Norway is able to make the most of the cooperative platform of PD. Finally, through continuous dialogue with its own society (within the informative platform), Norway is assuring domestic constituencies' support and identification with state actions abroad, thus strengthening the country's soft power outreach.

Meanwhile, Australia is only at a preliminary stage of implementing a domestic dimension of PD. The platform on which it has performed relatively well is the informative one. In the recent years, there have been enhanced efforts on the side of DFAT to reach out to the general Australian public. In cooperation with think tanks and universities, Canberra has opened a number of channels for dialogue on different foreign policy issues (Australian Diplomacy Today Forum, cooperative initiatives with think tanks and universities, etc.). DFAT has also actively encouraged young Australians to travel abroad and expose themselves to the world, in particular to Asia (New Colombo Plan). The cooperative platform, however, proves to be much more challenging for Australian foreign policy. Although there is a number of successful partnerships with non-governmental stakeholders around specific PD programs (Australia Awards, New Colombo Plan, sport diplomacy), the uneasy relationship between the Australian Government and its domestic civil society casts a shadow on many collaborative efforts. Australian diplomacy also finds it difficult to treat domestic stakeholders, particularly NGOs, as co-owners of specific PD initiatives and even less so independent-from-government initiatives as part of Australia's PD. Finally, Australia underperforms within the identity-defining platform. National branding campaigns either lack whole-of-government approach ("Australia Unlimited") or add up to pure tourism advertising ("There is Nothing Like Australia"). These public endeavors also do not serve defining or strengthening national identity and are not perceived as part of Australia's PD effort. In consequence, PD messaging lacks clarity or is characterized by clear ambivalence.

In its domestic outreach, the USA is most advanced in the identity-defining and cooperative platforms. In the area of external identity-projecting, the US PD has been able to capitalize on the notion of freedom and America as "the land of the free." The message has survived untarnished, despite the many setbacks in US foreign policy, particularly during George W. Bush's presidency. This is because it genuinely reflects the self-perception of the majority of Americans, and echoes a universal appreciation of freedom shared by many people and nations. The USA has also performed very well on the cooperative platform. As discussed

earlier, American diplomacy sees civil society as partners and multipliers of its PD effort and American citizens as Ambassadors of American values. The US Department of State (2013) defines a partnership as “a collaborative working relationship with nongovernmental partners in which the goals, structure, and governance, as well as roles and responsibilities, are mutually determined and **decision-making is shared.**” The US PD is thus a multi-stakeholder instrument, which involves the whole-of-government, NGOs and American society. However, as observed by Kathy Fitzpatrick (2010, 9–10), “while U.S officials may view domestic publics as important to public diplomacy’s success, they do not view domestic public—i.e., American citizens, American institutions and American policy makers—as strategic ‘publics’ of public diplomacy.” This means that while the cooperative platform of domestic outreach is used efficiently, the informative platform is lagging behind. American diplomacy does not see its role in explaining international affairs to American citizens or in actively exposing the domestic society to global challenges. The US Government’s unwillingness to open a domestic debate on climate change or the country’s lack of leadership in fostering multilateral initiative (particularly those promoting stronger global public engagement) are just some examples of such approach (Birdsall and Sowa 2013). This is particularly troubling in times when there is a growing disinterest among Americans of global affairs (Fitzpatrick 2010, 10). Initiatives such as the Obama Administration’s “100,000 Strong” project might be the first signs of changes in governmental policy. Yet there is still a lot work to be done in order to bridge the gap between the cooperative and informative platform of US PD’s domestic outreach.

THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN NON-DEMOCRATIC STATES

As acknowledged in the introduction to this book, all three countries’ case-studies represent liberal democracies with a long-standing tradition of independent and vibrant civil society. The openness of these societies, a high level of social capital and developed trust between governmental institutions and non-governmental actors stimulate collaborative practices and constructivist PD innovations. The case-studies demonstrate the participatory-democratic potential of PD programs, but this should not exclude other models or avoid questioning such models. After all, the general practice of PD has been enthusiastically pursued also by semi-democracies and

authoritarian regimes. The last decades have in fact seen an outburst of PD and nation-branding activities among a number of countries with dubious democratic standards such as China, Russia or Saudi Arabia. Given, however, the lack of a vibrant civil society, the question remains whether non-democratic systems can also use with success the domestic dimension to strengthen their PD efforts.

It is hard to question that in some aspects of foreign policy and PD conduct, non-democratic countries possess clear advantages over democracies. With strong, centralized control over the political system and media, “illiberal democracies” can set up and pursue foreign affairs objectives with few domestic constraints (Dosch 2006, 47). They also have a better control over the image they want to project as well as the message that is transmitted to foreign publics (Melissen 2011, 5). In such context, undertaking the more traditional forms of PD, grounded in one-way messaging (broadcasting) and promotional campaigns (branding), seems to come most naturally for non-democracies. In the globalized open network reality, however, monological PD becomes more and more outdated and ineffective. At the same time, non-democracies find it particularly difficult to move from the PD realist paradigm (monologue) to liberal (dialogue) or constructivist (collaboration) paradigms. These states have of course used instruments of dialogical PD such as exchange and cultural diplomacy. Efforts of this kind are, however, usually heavily controlled by the government and leave little space for partnership with independent non-state actors. More importantly, the goal of these activities is rarely to build mutual understanding but rather to project a certain positive image of the country abroad.

The structural limitations of semi- and non-democratic systems inhibit their ability to efficiently develop collaborative practice such as the domestic dimension of PD. A closer look at the three platforms described in Chap. 2 shows the scale of the problem. Having assumed centralized control and an insulated position within the state, decision-makers can largely ignore the opinions and interest of different segments of society (Dosch 2006, 46–47). Explaining foreign policy to domestic publics (informative platform) becomes an instrument of state propaganda, where genuine feedback from and dialogue with society is unwelcomed. In addition, the fundamental distrust of the very concept of “civil society” impedes illiberal democracies from engaging also in the domestic outreach’s cooperative platform activities. The widespread perception in countries such as Russia and China is that the idea of fostering such a society is merely a subversive

policy of liberal states to undermine regime existence. Non-democracies dismiss any genuine grassroots movements as potentially threatening to the state itself, and those few non-state actors which are tolerated (local governments, private enterprises) undergo a process of close scrutiny and control when acting abroad. In many authoritarian regimes, the crackdown on independent NGOs is coupled with a scaling up of Governmental–Non-Governmental Organizations. These institutions might lack the credibility abroad but their real goal is not PD, but to employ practices of democracy to subtly undermine other democracies through propaganda, subversion and defamation (Walker 2016, 56). Such actions are deeply rooted in the realist paradigm, where information is just an extension of war, but with different means. Although distrustful of domestic civil society actors, in recent years, non-democracies have shown interest in working with INGOs. Such cooperation is however perceived only as a way of gaining access to important networks and positioning oneself as a valued partner (Yang and Taylor 2014) rather than working for the global public good. Finally, although non-democracies engage in nation branding and activate their societies in the process (identity-defining platform), they find it extremely hard to compete with soft power messages generated by democracies. As underlined by Joseph Nye (2002, 69–73), vaster soft power is available to those who are the closest to the predominant global culture, which today relies heavily on the notions of pluralism and liberalism. Judging from globally positive perceptions of strong democratic nations such as Canada, Australia, Sweden or Switzerland, indeed, “no other set of norms rivals the democratic one as a medium of international discourse and justification” (Mor 2006, 161).

Although non-democracies have shaky foundations for an efficient long-term collaborative PD effort, it does not mean that some have not professed PD’s domestic outreach. China is an interesting case-study. As noted by Nicolas Cull (2011, 120), “in Chinese doctrine, the phrase ‘public diplomacy’ was initially used exclusively to refer to the task of explaining foreign policy at home.” With the rapidly intensifying government-led PD and its effort to explain China to the world, focus is placed also on ensuring that the Chinese population gains a better understanding of global affairs (d’Hooghe 2013). Initiatives such as the project “Meet the Diplomats Online” are developed for the domestic audience to better understand China’s growing diplomatic effort (Conley Tyler et al. 2012). The Chinese central government is also allocating more responsibility to local governments (although not NGOs) in the area of PD. Scholars such

as Yiwei Wang (2012) acknowledge, however, that China's impressive PD offensive has produced inadequate results, with international perceptions about China actually worsening in the last few years. The explanation for this has been sought in structural domestic inadequacies. Among factors weakening Chinese PD effort is the lack of an independent and mature civil society to communicate in parallel with international society, as well as China's multiple identities, which the government finds impossible to explain to foreign publics (Wang 2012, 467). With no doubt, as Joseph Nye notes, for China to succeed, it will need to unleash the talents of its civil society and begin to recognize the value of civil engagement also in PD. This might not be, however, possible within the existing political system, which is structurally hostile to foreign policy democratization processes.

In sum, undertaking a collaborative diplomacy approach requires strengthening the domestic civil society and opening the political system to independent non-state actors. This of course is unlikely to happen in non-democratic states, which see pluralism as a treat to regime stability. Such governments will continue to work with certain non-governmental actors, but only in the realist paradigm of Strategic PD which is "nothing more than the practice of propaganda in the earliest sense of the term, but enlightened by half a century of empirical research into human motivation and behavior" (Manheim 1994, 7).

Conclusion

The domestic dimension of PD describes the government's ability to engage its own society in foreign policy practices through information, collaboration and identity-defining. It exemplifies a shift toward a collaborative paradigm of PD where "instead of spreading the ideologies and norms, states should focus on developing functioning societies in the world and intergroup connections between social groups which is crucial for a society to prosper" (Merickova 2014, 363). The strength of collaborative PD comes from its authenticity, legitimacy and moral authority which is a result of the synergies produced between different actors. This book has argued that government's attitude toward domestic civil society actors and civil engagement matters immensely in assessing a country's readiness to move from the monological to dialogical to collaborative PD. As a multi-channel, multi-stockholder exercise, efficient PD domestic outreach requires not only a pluralist environment but also high level of social trust. NGOs are

no longer only partners to state PD activities but become independent actors forming such policy. At the same time, general domestic publics become strategic audiences for the government. Countries such as Norway have proven that such paradigm shift is already a reality, bridging the gap between traditional PD and alternative approached. It is very likely that in order to meet the challenges of the global network society, other countries will soon follow. This means that governments will see a decrease of its implementation role in PD and an increase of its part in coordinating the activities of a multitude of domestic stakeholders. By outlining the criteria for the domestic dimension of PD, the book has provided a framework which may serve as an inspiration in the state's effort to adjust to the ongoing internal democratization of foreign policy.

REFERENCES

- Archer, C., & Joenniemi, P. (2003). *The Nordic peace*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Birdsall, N., & Sowa, A. (2013, August). *The United States. From multilateral champion to handicapped donor and back again?* (CGD Policy Paper 029). Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
- Boris, E.T. (2006). Nonprofit organizations in a Democracy: Varied Roles and Responsibilities. In: E. Boris & E. Steuerle (Eds.) *Nonprofits & Government: Collaboration & Conflict*, pp. 18–27.
- Conley Tyler, M., Abbasov, A., Gibson, N., & Teo, F. (2012, April 30). *Domestic public diplomacy*. Discussion Paper: International Experience. Australian Institute of International Affairs. Available online at: <http://apo.org.au/resource/domestic-public-diplomacy-discussion-paper-international-experience>
- Cull, N. J. (2011). 'Karen Hughes and the Brezhnev Syndrome: The trial of public diplomacy as domestic performance. In A. Fischer, & S. Lucas (Eds.), *Trials of engagement: The future of U.S. public* (pp. 111–133).
- D'Hooghe, I. (2013, October 24). *China's public diplomacy shifts focus: From building hardware to improving software*. China Policy Institute Blog, Nottingham University.
- Department of State. (2013). *Global partnership initiative*. Accessed March 20, 2013, from <http://www.state.gov/s/partnerships>
- Dosch, J. (2006). The impact of democratization on the making of foreign policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. *Südostasien aktuell: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 25(5), 42–70.
- Fidrmuc, J., & Gerxhani, K. (2008). Mind the gap! Social capital, East and West. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 36, 264–86.

- Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2010). *The US public diplomacy's neglected domestic mandate* (USC Center on Public Diplomacy Perspectives, Paper 3).
- Leiren, T. (2005). A century of Norwegian independence. *Scandinavian Review*, 92(3), 6–16.
- Manheim, J. B. (1994). *Strategic public diplomacy and American foreign policy: The evolution of influence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Melissen, J. (2011). *Beyond the new public diplomacy* (pp. 1–30) (Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 3).
- Merickova, L. (2014). Alternative approaches to public diplomacy. *Polish Sociological Review*, 3(187), 351–65.
- Mor, B. D. (2006). Public diplomacy in grand strategy. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2(2), 157–76.
- Nye, J. S., Jr. (2002). *The Paradox of American Power—Why the world's only super-power can't go it alone*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Proedrou, F., & Frangonikolopoulos, C. (2012). Refocusing Public Diplomacy: The Need for Strategic Discursive Public Diplomacy. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 23(4), 728–45.
- Walker, C. (2016). The Authoritarian Threat. The Hijacking of ‘Soft Power’. *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 49–63.
- Wang, J. (2012). Domestic constraints on the rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(4), 459–72.
- Wiseman, G. (2010). Polyilateralism: Diplomacy's third dimension. *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, 4(1), 24–39.
- Yang, A., & Taylor, M. (2014). Public diplomacy in a networked society: The Chinese government—NGO coalition network on acquired immune deficiency syndrome prevention. *International Communication Gazette*, 76(7), 575–93.
- Zaharna, R. S. (2010). *Battles to bridges: U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy after 9/11*. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

REFERENCES

- Adams, C. M., Koehs, J., Mason, S., & Wolf, S. (1999, March). Domestic and social economic impacts of the International Visitors Program. In *Applied Research SSC 353*. Alverno: College.
- Charles, E. (1987). Some aspects of relations between north and south in the NGO sector. *World Development*, 15(Suppl), 57–68.
- Clinton, H. (2012, February 28). National security and foreign policy priorities in the FY 2013 International Affairs Budget. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC.
- D’Hooghe, I. (2008). Into high gear: China’s public diplomacy. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 3, 37–61.
- Drysdale, P. (2015, June 15). Keeping Australia open for business. *East Asia Forum*. Available online at: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/15/keeping-australia-open-for-business/>
- Duncan, M., Leigh, A., & Madden, D. (2005). Changing the channel in Asia. *The Diplomat*, 34–36.
- Frankel, C. (1966). *The neglected aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Hirsch, A. (2014). NGOs, Government censorship and you. *Right Now Blog*. December 14, 2013. Available online at: <http://rightnow.org.au/writing-cat/article/ngos-government-censorship-and-philanthropy/>
- Hixson, W. L. (1997). *Parting the curtain: Propaganda, culture, and the cold war 1954–1961*. New York: St. Martins Griffin.
- Joenniemi, P. (2003). *The Nordic peace*. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate.

- Kent, A. (2001). Australia and the international human rights regime. In J. Cotton & J. Ravenhill (Eds.), *The national interest in a global era: Australia in World Affairs 1996–2000* (pp. 256–278). South Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Lord, C. (1998). The past and future of public diplomacy. *Orbis*, 42(1), 49–72.
- Maddison, S., Dennis, R., & Hamilton, C. (2004). *Silencing dissent: Non-government organisations and Australian democracy*. Canberra: The Australia Institute.
- Milner, A. (2001). Balancing ‘Asia’ against Australian values. In J. Cotton & J. Ravenhill (Eds.), *The national interest in a Global Era: Australia in the world affairs* (pp. 1996–2000). Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Neumann, I. (1999). Norsk sørpolitikk: Den disaggregerte stats diplomati. *Internasjonal Politikk*, 57(2), 181–197.
- Nye Jr., J. S. (2012, January 17). Why China is weak on soft power. *International Herald Tribune*.
- Nye Jr., J. S., & Owens, W. (1996). America’s information edge. *Foreign Affairs*, 75, 20–30.
- Osgood, K. (2006). *Total cold war: America’s global battle for hearts and minds in the 1950s*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Snow, N. (2009). Rethinking public diplomacy. In N. Snow & P. Taylor (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy* (pp. 3–11). London and New York: Routledge.
- Wendt, A. (2007). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- White, H. (2005). The limits of optimism: Australia and the rise of China. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 59(4), 469–480.
- Zaharna, R. S. (2009). Mapping out a spectrum of Public Diplomacy initiatives, information and relational communication frameworks. In N. Snow & P. Taylor (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy* (pp. 86–100). New York: Routledge.

INDEX

A

Abbott government, 99, 101, 112, 119, 132
 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders
 culture, 109, 121
 treatment by Australian government, 120, 121
 ACFID. *See* Australian Council for International Development (ACFID)
 Afghanistan, 68, 80, 95, 151, 152
 AidWatch, 134, 135
 AIIA. *See* Australian Institute for International Affairs (AIIA)
 American Exceptionalism, 190
 Amnesty International, 38, 40
 ANCP. *See* Australian NGO Cooperation Program (ANCP)
 Anholt, Simon, 27
Annerledeslandet, 56, 56n4, 81
 ANZAC. *See* Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC)
 ANZUS Agreement, 95
 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 94, 100, 101

asylum seekers. *See* Australia, asylum policy
 AusAid, 112, 113, 115, 117, 129, 132
 Australia
 asylum policy, 123
 multicultural policy, 102, 120
 national identity, 41, 93, 101, 109, 118, 120, 127
 perceptions in Asia, 136
 racism, 103, 105, 123
 relations with Asia, 100, 115
 relations with Great Britain, 94, 105
 relations with the United States, 4, 101, 105, 146
 values, 40, 92, 93, 98–101, 106, 119, 120, 125, 126, 131
 Australia Awards, 93, 107, 107n4, 108, 128, 194
 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), 121, 122
 Australian broadcasting corporation, 110
 Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 114, 130, 132, 133, 134n14

Australian Institute for International Affairs (AIIA), 128
 Australian NGO Cooperation Program (ANCP), 130, 131

B

Bishop, Julie, 107, 132
 Brazil, 68, 82
 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 148

C

Cambodia, 97, 105, 115
 Canada, 23, 35, 41, 197
 Carter, Jimmy, 156
 China
 Noble Peace Prize, 71
 perceptions in Australia, 104, 197
 public diplomacy, 42, 43, 156, 197
 Tibet & Olympic games, 42–3
 citizen diplomacy, 36, 161
 civil society, 2–6, 8–10, 14, 21, 24, 28, 31, 33–7, 39–41, 44, 45, 52, 53, 58, 59, 64, 71, 72, 74, 75, 83, 93, 113, 118, 126–30, 132, 134, 136, 146, 147, 150, 160, 174, 178, 180, 187, 188, 190–3, 194–8
 Clinton administration, 155
 Clinton, Hilary, 155, 155n8
 collaboration, 2, 4, 5, 8, 14, 16, 17, 19, 23–5, 28, 30, 34, 37, 39, 43, 44, 149, 178, 189, 190, 192, 196, 198
 Collaborative Public Diplomacy. *See* public diplomacy
 Colombo Plan
 New, 93, 107, 108, 108n5, 117, 128, 194
 original, 106, 108, 112
 Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange, 161

constructivism, 5, 8, 14, 22–9, 43, 44, 189
 contact hypothesis, 25
 cooperative culture, 5, 58, 59, 65, 84, 191
 Cronulla riots, 92, 104
 cultural diplomacy. *See* diplomacy
 cultural relations, 20, 21

D

democracy
 in Australia, 120, 125, 126, 192, 197
 illiberal, 6, 196
 democratization of foreign policy, 10, 27, 32, 199
 development assistance
 Australian, 6, 111, 112
 Norwegian, 6, 58, 60, 67–9, 82
 dialogical public diplomacy. *See* public diplomacy
 diaspora. *See* diplomacy
 diplomacy
 cultural, 13, 21, 36, 106–10, 116, 145, 189, 196
 diaspora, 128
 niche, 45n3, 51, 52, 56–8, 60, 62, 64, 98
 Domestic Dimension of Public Diplomacy
 implementation, 3, 4, 8, 10, 37, 84, 93, 130, 146, 150, 180, 187, 193–5, 199
 Non-democratic states, 195–8
 platforms, 3, 10, 34–42, 44, 188, 193, 196

E

East Timor, 97
 educational exchanges, 21, 117, 145, 148–50, 155, 189
 EducationUSA, 163–6

elite interpenetration, 74, 192
 elite interviewing, 5
 English Access Microscholarship
 Program, 166
 Evans, Gareth, 96–8, 100, 103, 123

F

Finland, 35
 FLEX. *See* Future Leaders Exchange
 (FLEX)
 Fulbright Exchange Program, 148
 Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX),
 147n2, 161, 162n11, 169

G

Gag-clauses, 134
 globalization, 1, 13, 27, 36, 40
 Global Peace Index, 79, 79n10, 80
 global public goods, 2, 23, 190
 “good international citizen” concept,
 97, 98, 100
 Greenpeace, 38, 40
 Groupism, 16
 Gullion, Edmund, 13

H

Hambro, Carl Joachim, 54, 54n1
 Hansonism, 92, 101
 High North, 61, 79, 79n9
 Howard government, 99, 112, 120,
 124, 124n9
 Hughes, Karen, 150
 humanitarian assistance. *See*
 development assistance

I

identity
 Australian, 101, 119, 121, 122,
 124, 125

competitive, 27
 defining, 2–4, 9, 34, 40–2, 44, 193,
 194, 197, 198
 definition, 2, 16, 19, 27
 group, 40
 Norwegian, 56–9
 illiberal democracy. *See* democracy
 internationalization of universities,
 165, 166, 166n12, 170, 179
 International Visitor Leadership
 Program (IVLP), 150, 159–61,
 169, 173, 174, 176
 Iraq, 17, 95, 151
 IVLP. *See* International Visitor
 Leadership Program (IVLP)

K

Keating, Paul, 100, 101, 120
 Kennedy-Lugar Youth Exchange and
 Study (YES), 162

L

liberal internationalism, 57, 58, 71,
 98, 189
 liberalism, 8, 14, 17–22, 197
 Lie, Trygve, 54, 54n3, 69

M

Manheim, Jarol, 16, 17, 198
 Manus Islands, 124
 middle-power concept, 56, 98, 100
 Multiculturalism. *See* Australia,
 multicultural policy
 multiplier effect, 153, 158

N

Nansen, Fridtjof, 54, 54n1, 54n2
 national branding, 7, 8, 25–7,
 40, 194

NATO. *See* North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO)
 Nauru, 115, 124, 124n9, 134, 192
 new public diplomacy. *See* public diplomacy
 NGO. *See* non-governmental organizations (NGO)
 Noble Peace Prize, 71
 non-governmental organizations (NGO)
 cooperation with government; In
 Australia, 3, 9, 197; In Norway, 3, 9; In USA, 3
 International (INGOs), 9, 197
 noosphere, 39
 NORAD. *See* Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)
Nordic Human Rights Paradox, 76
 North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), 55, 56, 58, 61, 63, 68, 69, 79, 80, 95
 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), 57, 61, 63, 68, 69, 73, 75, 82
 Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 76
 Norwegian model
 characteristics, 71–4, 191
 criticism, 74–7
 Norwegian Peace Diplomacy
 concept, 9–10
 European Union, 55, 76
 history, 57, 77
 institutionalization, 64
 instruments, 9, 63
 peace and reconciliation processes, 59, 62, 65, 66, 69
 security, 52, 80, 83
 in Sri Lanka, 51, 72
 in Sudan, 51, 72
 Nye, Joseph S., 4, 18–21, 27, 32, 39, 40, 55, 146, 197, 198

O

Obama administration, 147n1, 149, 155, 195
 Olympic games, 42
 Oslo Accords, 51, 64, 72

P

Pakistan, 105, 151
 Papua-New Guinea, 98, 115, 124
 PD. *See* public diplomacy (PD)
 peace and reconciliation processes.
 See Norwegian Peace Diplomacy
 Poland, 35, 147n2, 162n11
 Polyilateralism, 37
 PR. *See* public relations (PR)
 principled pragmatism, 96, 97, 189
 propaganda, 2, 8, 15, 16, 19–21, 29, 44, 110, 196–8
 public affairs, 8, 16, 31, 32, 34, 44, 147n1, 150
 public diplomacy (PD)
 collaborative, 1–10, 25, 26, 28, 29, 33, 36, 37, 39, 42, 44, 168, 177, 179, 188–98
 definition, 2, 13, 16, 19, 27, 34, 137, 168
 dialogical, 2, 25, 196, 198
 new, 2, 3, 14, 23, 28, 34, 180
 strategic, 14, 16, 17, 28, 198
 public relations (PR), 8, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 30, 31, 101
 Putnam, Robert, 24, 32

R

Radio Australia, 106, 110, 111, 116
 realism, 8, 14–17, 70, 83, 96, 98, 189, 190
 refugee treatment. *See* Australia, asylum policy
 Rudd government, 107, 112, 124n9
 Russian Federation, 17, 162n11

S

Saudi Arabia, 17, 196
 Save the Children, 39, 73n8, 134,
 134n14, 192
 Scandinavianism, 81
 Smith-Mundt Act, 31, 148, 148n3, 149
 social capital, 4, 8, 23–5, 38, 39, 44,
 188, 189, 191, 195
 socialization, 8, 23, 24, 44
 soft power, 9, 14, 16–19, 22, 26, 39,
 40, 43, 80, 84, 92, 108, 109,
 117–19, 127, 194, 197
 Solberg, Erna, 76, 79, 83
 South Africa, 98
 strategic public diplomacy. *See* public
 diplomacy

T

theory of change, 7

U

Ukraine, 17
 United Nations (UN), 52, 54n1,
 54n3, 55, 56, 59, 63, 66–9,
 69n7, 70, 78, 81, 98, 101,
 112, 124
 United States Agency for
 International Development
 (USAID), 151
 U.S. Information Agency (USIA),
 148, 156, 168

W

White Australia Policy, 91, 99, 119,
 121, 123
 Work&Travel Program, 167