



THE NEW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SERIES



# **CRITICAL SECURITY METHODS**

New frameworks for analysis

Edited by Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans,  
Andrew Neal and Nadine Voelkner

# CRITICAL SECURITY METHODS

*Critical Security Methods* offers a new approach to research methods in critical security studies.

It argues that methods are not simply tools to bridge the gap between security theory and security practice. Rather, to practise methods critically means engaging in a more free and experimental interplay between theory, methods and practice. This recognizes that the security practices we research are often methods in their own right, as forms of surveillance, data mining, visualization, and so on, and that our own research methods are themselves practices that intervene and interfere in those sites of security and insecurity.

Against the familiar methodological language of rigour, detachment and procedural consistency, *Critical Security Methods* reclaims the idea of method as experiment. The chapters offer a series of methodological experimentations that assemble concepts, theory and empirical cases into new frameworks for critical security research. They show how critical engagement and methodological innovation can be practised as interventions into diverse instances of insecurity and securitization, including airports, drug trafficking, peasant struggles, biometrics and police kettling.

The book will be a valuable resource for students and researchers in critical security studies, politics and international relations.

**Claudia Aradau** is Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and is author of *Rethinking Trafficking in Women* (2008) and co-author, with Rens van Munster, of *Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown* (2011).

**Jef Huysmans** is Professor of Security Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) and Director of the Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance at the Open University (UK). He is author of *Security Unbound* (2014), *The Politics of Insecurity* (2006) and *What is Politics?* (2005), and editor of several other volumes.

**Andrew Neal** is Senior Lecturer in Politics & International Relations at the University of Edinburgh, and author of *Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism* (Routledge 2010) and co-editor, with Michael Dillon, of *Foucault on Politics, Security and War* (2008).

**Nadine Voelkner** is Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations and International Organization (IRIO), University of Groningen.

## **The New International Relations**

Edited by Richard Little, *University of Bristol*, Iver B. Neumann, *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway* and Jutta Weldes, *University of Bristol*.

The field of international relations has changed dramatically in recent years. This new series will cover the major issues that have emerged and reflect the latest academic thinking in this particular dynamic area.

### **International Law, Rights and Politics**

Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS  
*Rein Mullerson*

### **The Logic of Internationalism**

Coercion and accommodation  
*Kjell Goldmann*

### **Russia and the Idea of Europe**

A study in identity and international relations  
*Iver B. Neumann*

### **The Future of International Relations**

Masters in the making?  
*Edited by Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver*

### **Constructing the World Polity**

Essays on international institutionalization  
*John Gerard Ruggie*

### **Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy**

The continuing story of a death foretold  
*Stefano Guzzini*

### **International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order**

Beyond international relations theory?  
*N.J. Rengger*

**War, Peace and World Orders in European History**

*Edited by Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser*

**European Integration and National Identity**

The challenge of the Nordic states

*Edited by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver*

**Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars**

A political economy of intra-state war

*Dietrich Jung*

**Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research**

*Edited by Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung*

**Observing International Relations**

Niklas Luhmann and world politics

*Edited by Mathias Albert and Lena Hilkermeier*

**Does China Matter? A Reassessment**

Essays in memory of Gerald Segal

*Edited by Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot*

**European Approaches to International Relations Theory**

A house with many mansions

*Jörg Friedrichs*

**The Post-Cold War International System**

Strategies, institutions and reflexivity

*Ewan Harrison*

**States of Political Discourse**

Words, regimes, seditions

*Costas M. Constantinou*

**The Politics of Regional Identity**

Meddling with the Mediterranean

*Michelle Pace*

**The Power of International Theory**

Reforging the link to foreign policy-making through scientific enquiry

*Fred Chernoff*

**Africa and the North**

Between globalization and marginalization

*Edited by Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen*

**Communitarian International Relations**

The epistemic foundations of international relations

*Emanuel Adler*

**Human Rights and World Trade**

Hunger in international society

*Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez*

**Liberalism and War**

The victors and the vanquished

*Andrew Williams*

**Constructivism and International Relations**

Alexander Wendt and his critics

*Edited by Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander*

**Security as Practice**

Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War

*Lene Hansen*

**The Politics of Insecurity**

Fear, migration and asylum in the EU

*Jef Huysmans*

**State Sovereignty and Intervention**

A discourse analysis of interventionary and non-interventionary practices in Kosovo and Algeria

*Helle Malmvig*

**Culture and Security**

Symbolic power and the politics of international security

*Michael Williams*

**Hegemony & History**

*Adam Watson*

**Territorial Conflicts in World Society**

Modern systems theory, international relations and conflict studies

*Edited by Stephan Stetter*

**Ontological Security in International Relations**

Self-Identity and the IR State

*Brent J. Steele*

**The International Politics of Judicial Intervention**

Creating a more *just* order

*Andrea Birdsall*

**Pragmatism in International Relations**

*Edited by Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi*

**Civilization and Empire**

China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society

*Shogo Suzuki*

**Transforming World Politics**

From Empire to Multiple Worlds

*Anna M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling*

**The Politics of Becoming European**

A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries

*Maria Mälksoo*

**Social Power in International Politics**

*Peter Van Ham*

**International Relations and Identity**

A Dialogical Approach

*Xavier Guillaume*

**The Puzzle of Politics**

Inquiries into the Genesis and Transformation of International Relations

*Friedrich Kratochwil*

**The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations**

Philosophy of Science and its implications for the study of World Politics

*Patrick Thaddeus Jackson*

**Arguing Global Governance**

Agency, Lifeworld and Shared Reasoning

*Edited by Corneliu Bjola and Markus Komprobst*

**Constructing Global Enemies**

Hegemony and Identity in International Discourses on Terrorism and Drug Prohibition

*Eva Herschinger*

**Alker and IR**

Global Studies in an Interconnected World

*Edited by Renée Marlin-Bennett*

**Sovereignty between Politics and Law**

*Tanja Aalberts*

**International Relations and the First Great Debate**

*Edited by Brian Schmidt*

**China in the UN Security Council Decision-making on Iraq**

Conflicting Understandings, Competing Preferences

*Suzanne Xiao Yang*

**NATO's Security Discourse after the Cold War**

Representing the West

*Andreas Behnke*

**The Scandinavian International Society**

From Norden to the Northern Dimension?

*Laust Schouenborg*

**Bourdieu in International Relations**

Rethinking Key Concepts in IR

*Edited by Rebecca Adler-Nissen*

**Making Sense, Making Worlds**

Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations

*Nicholas Greenwood Onuf*

**World of Our Making**

Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations

*Nicholas Greenwood Onuf*

**Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global Governance**

*Edited by Michael J. Struett, Jon D. Carlson and Mark T. Nance*

**European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games**

The EU overseas countries and territories

*Edited by Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ulrik Pram Gad*

**Power, Realism and Constructivism**

*Stefano Guzzini*

**Justice, Order and Anarchy**

The international political theory of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon

*Alex Prichard*

**War in International Society**

*Lacy Pejcinovic*

**The United States and Great Power Responsibility in International Society**

Drones, Rendition and Invasion

*Wali Aslam*

**The Dao of World Politics**

Towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations

*L.H.M. Ling*

**International Orders in the Early Modern World**

Before the Rise of the West

*Shogo Suzuki, Yongjin Zhang, and Joel Quirk*

**Emancipatory International Relations**

Critical Thinking in International Relations

*Roger D. Spegele*

**Africa in the Expansion of International Society**

Surrendering the Savannah

*John Anthony Pella, Jr*

**Small States and Status Seeking**

*Iver B. Neumann and Benjamin de Carvalho*

**Critical Security Methods**

New frameworks for analysis

*Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal and Nadine Voelkner*

# CRITICAL SECURITY METHODS

New frameworks for analysis

*Edited by Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans,  
Andrew Neal and Nadine Voelkner*

First published 2015  
by Routledge  
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge  
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

© 2015 selection and editorial material, Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans,  
Andrew Neal and Nadine Voelkner; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial  
material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted  
in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and  
Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or  
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now  
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in  
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing  
from the publishers.

*Trademark notice:* Product or corporate names may be trademarks or  
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation  
without intent to infringe.

*British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

*Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data*

A catalog record for this book has been requested.

ISBN: 978-0-415-71294-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-415-71295-8 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-88154-6 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo

by Saxon Graphics Ltd, Derby

# CONTENTS

|                                                                                           |           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <i>List of contributors</i>                                                               | <i>xi</i> |
| <i>Acknowledgements</i>                                                                   | <i>xv</i> |
| 1 Introducing critical security methods                                                   | 1         |
| <i>Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal and Nadine Voelkner</i>                      |           |
| 2 Mapping                                                                                 | 23        |
| <i>Victoria Loughlan, Christian Olsson and Peer Schouten</i>                              |           |
| 3 Discourse/materiality                                                                   | 57        |
| <i>Claudia Aradau, Martin Coward, Eva Herschinger, Owen D. Thomas and Nadine Voelkner</i> |           |
| 4 Visuality                                                                               | 85        |
| <i>Rune Saugmann Andersen, Juha A. Vuori and Can E. Mutlu</i>                             |           |
| 5 Proximity                                                                               | 118       |
| <i>Christian Bueger and Manuel Mireanu</i>                                                |           |
| 6 Distance                                                                                | 142       |
| <i>Lara Montesinos Coleman and Hannah Hughes</i>                                          |           |
| 7 Genealogy                                                                               | 159       |
| <i>Philippe Bonditti, Andrew Neal, Sven Opitz and Chris Zebrowski</i>                     |           |

**x** Contents

|   |                                                                |     |
|---|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 8 | Collaboration                                                  | 189 |
|   | <i>Xavier Guillaume</i>                                        |     |
|   | with an intervention by <i>Philippe Bonditti, Andrew Neal,</i> |     |
|   | <i>Sven Opitz, Chris Zebrowski</i>                             |     |
|   | <i>Index</i>                                                   | 208 |

# CONTRIBUTORS

**Claudia Aradau** is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. Her work explores the political effects of practices of (in)security and violence. She is the author of *Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of security* (2008) and co-author, with Rens van Munster, of *Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the unknown* (2011). Her current research focuses on styles of reasoning and the epistemic politics of governing the future.

**Philippe Bonditti** is Assistant Professor at the Instituto de Relações Internacionais at PUC-Rio (IRI/PUC-Rio), Brazil. His research explores the reconfiguration of modern states' security apparatuses and of the figure of the enemy when security discourses and technologies take 'terrorism' as their main target and mobility as their referent object. His articles have appeared in *Alternatives*, *Cultures & Conflits* (fr.) and *Critique internationale* (fr.).

**Christian Bueger** is Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Cardiff University. He obtained his PhD from the European University Institute and was a visiting fellow at the Centre for Advanced Security Theory, a Leverhulme Fellow at the Greenwich Maritime Institute, and a research fellow at the Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg. His research interests include international organizations, international practice theory sociology of science, the United Nations and maritime security. He is currently working on an ESRC funded project titled "Counter-Piracy Governance – A Praxiographic Analysis". Further information is available at <http://bueger.info>.

**Martin Coward** is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. His research focuses on war, violence and security, particularly in an urban, networked context. His monograph *Urbicide* outlines an understanding

## **xii** Contributors

of the politics of urban destruction, especially in the context of ethno-nationalist conflict. His recent work has focused on the way in which the trope of the network is performative of military space/doctrine and is constitutive of a temptation to interdiction. Further information is available at his blog, [www.martincoward.net](http://www.martincoward.net) and on Twitter @martincoward.

**Xavier Guillaume** is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of *International Relations and Identity* and co-editor, with Jef Huysmans, of *Citizenship and Security: The constitution of political being*.

**Eva Herschinger** is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Bundeswehr University Munich, Germany. She gained her PhD in Political Science at Jacobs University Bremen in Germany after studies of political science and German literature at the Universities of Mannheim and Heidelberg, Germany, and the Institute d'Etudes Politiques in Paris, France. Her research interests include critical security studies, international (Political) theory, discourse theories and discourse analytical methods as well as questions of international terrorism, global drug prohibition and global migration.

**Hannah Hughes** recently completed her PhD in the International Politics Department at Aberystwyth University. Her thesis provides a sociological analysis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the actors, activities and forms of authority constituting its assessment practice and the knowledge of climate change this generates. She is currently working on publishing key contributions from the thesis.

**Jef Huysmans** is Professor of Security Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) and Director of the Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance at the Open University. He co-edits the journal *International Political Sociology*.

**Victoria Loughlan** is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. She is interested in the technology/politics nexus, particularly the application of new information technologies in post-conflict spaces and their management in organizational contexts, such as the United Nations. Her PhD thesis analyses the role of Geographic Information Systems in UN Peace Operations from a practice perspective.

**Manuel Mireanu** is currently a PhD student at the School of Political Science, in the Department of International Relations, Central European University, Budapest. He studies the security practices of vigilante groups in Milan, Budapest and Athens.

**Lara Montesinos Coleman** is Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of Sussex. Her research focuses on social and political theories of

dissent and resistance, and the politics of knowledge and the political sociology of development and violence. She is co-author of *Por Dentro E'Soga: Un análisis de los impactos de la BP en Casanare* (Ediciones Desde Abajo 2010), co-editor of *Situating Global Resistance: Between discipline and dissent* (Routledge 2012) and author of several academic articles. She was previously a Lecturer at Durham University.

**Can E. Mutlu** is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. He is the co-editor of *Critical Methods in Security Studies: An Introduction*. His recent research appears in *Comparative European Politics*, *European Journal of Social Theory*, *Eurasia Border Review*, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* and the *Review of International Studies*.

**Andrew Neal** is a Senior Lecturer in politics and international relations at the University of Edinburgh. He is principal convener of the ESRC seminar series *Security in Scotland, with or without constitutional change* and is working on a monograph on parliamentary security politics in the UK. His most recent book is *Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-terrorism: Liberty, security and the war on terror* (Routledge 2010). Further information is available at his blog, [securitypolitics.wordpress.com](http://securitypolitics.wordpress.com) and on Twitter: @AndrewWNeal.

**Christian Olsson** is Lecturer in IR at Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), affiliated to its REPI research unit. He is associate editor of French journal of international political sociology *Cultures & Conflits*. His current research approaches the colonial genealogies of contemporary military doctrine, the historical sociology of security practices and the role of private military companies in recent overseas military interventions, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq where he has carried out field-research. His latest publications include: “‘Legitimate Violence’ in the Prose of Counterinsurgency: An Impossible Necessity?” (*Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, May 2013).

**Sven Opitz** is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Hamburg. His research addresses the temporal, spatial and material aspects of security and law. He is currently working on modes of global contagion and control. Publications include *An der Grenze des Rechts* (Velbrück 2012) and ‘Future Emergencies: Temporal Politics in Law and Economy’ (*Theory, Culture & Society* 2014). Since 2008 he is co-editor of *Foucault Studies*.

**Rune Saugmann Andersen** is a PhD candidate at the Center for Advanced Security Theory (CAST) at the University of Copenhagen and is an external Lecturer at University of Helsinki. His research is concerned with how images and new media are changing security politics and how this is reflected in scholarship on security. His articles have appeared in *Security Dialogue*, *Journalism Practice* and *JOMEC* journals. As part of his research he is exploring visual methodology, has led multiple workshops on video as a method, and published a research video in *Audiovisual Thinking*.

**Peer Schouten** is a PhD candidate at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, and editor-in-chief of *Theory Talks*. His research focuses on the relation between transformations in global governance and postcolonial state formation, with a particular emphasis on the intersections of mineral resource extraction and corporate security governance in 'volatile environments'.

**Owen D. Thomas** is a PhD candidate at the University of Exeter. Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, his thesis examines the relationship between publicity, security and war. He is the author of 'Foucaultian Dispositifs as Methodology: The Case of Anonymous Exclusions by Unique Identification (UID) in India' (forthcoming).

**Nadine Voelkner** is Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Groningen and Associate Researcher at the Centre for Global Health Policy at the University of Sussex. Her research and publications concern the global politics of human and, more specifically, health security.

**Juha A. Vuori** is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Contemporary History at the University of Turku in Finland, and an Adjunct Professor (Docent) of International Politics at the University of Tampere School of Management. His main research focus has been on the critical development of securitization theory through illocutionary logic, semiotics, and the application of the approach to the People's Republic of China. He is co-author of *A Contemporary History of the People's Republic of China* (written in Finnish, published by Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press) and the author of *Critical Security and Chinese Politics: The Anti-Falungong Campaign* (Routledge). He has edited a number of books and published in journals such as *European Journal of International Relations*, *Security Dialogue*, and *Asian Journal of Political Science*.

**Chris Zebrowski** is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Loughborough University. His research has been concerned with tracing a genealogy of resilience as a security value in the field of emergency governance. His current research investigates how resilience discourses are being adopted and adapted to guide governmental practices in different empirical fields including emergency exercises, international financial governance, and the resilience training programmes of Western militaries.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In developing this book over several years of collaboration, we have acquired many intellectual debts, found inspiration and shared conversations with many people. The book is the outcome of the work done in the International Collaboratory on Critical Methods in Security Studies (ICCM), an ESRC-funded International Networking and Training Opportunities project (ESRC RES-810-21-0072) and we would like to thank all of you who have been involved at some stage of the project.

The idea for the book emerged from the need for students and scholars experienced in critical security studies to consider critical research and critical methodology in conjunction, as mutually dependent rather than as isolated entities. The project formally ran from November 2009 to October 2011 but lives on as a network.

We are grateful for the generous comments and encouragement we received from a number of discussants in ICCM-themed conference panels and workshops, including Michael Williams and Karen Lund Petersen at the International Studies Association annual convention in Montreal 2011, Kyle Grayson at the International Studies Association annual convention in San Diego 2012, Rens van Munster at the ICCM workshop in Edinburgh 2012, and Stefan Elbe at the Standing Group on International Relations conference in Warsaw 2013. The ideas developed in this book were aired to audiences at the Standing Group in International Relations Conference in Stockholm in 2010 and the International Political Sociology Doctoral Workshop, Cumberland Lodge 2011.

We would like to thank the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Edinburgh for providing funds for an additional workshop on the draft chapters in May 2012.

*This page intentionally left blank*

# 1

## INTRODUCING CRITICAL SECURITY METHODS

*Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal and Nadine Voelkner*

### Theory and method in critical security studies

Critical security studies (CSS) is now an established field of scholarship. Central to CSS is the shared assumption that security threats and insecurities are not simply objects to be studied or problems to be solved, but the product of social and political practices. CSS aims to understand how those practices work and their social and political implications.

Critical security scholars have challenged the theoretical and normative assumptions of traditional security scholarship and have analysed security practices in a variety of transnational sites. They have created an intellectual space in which research on diverse theoretical and empirical aspects of security and insecurity has flourished. CSS research now covers practices as diverse as the constitution of fear in popular culture and advertising (Weldes 1999), environmental degradation (Dalby 2002), the securitization of global health and disease (Elbe 2010; Voelkner 2011), the securitization of migration (Huysmans 2006) and asylum (Lavenex 2001), the commodification of security (Leander 2005; Abrahamsen and Williams 2006), the proliferation of risk calculation and management (Lobo-Guerrero 2007; Salter 2008; Aradau and van Munster 2007; van Munster 2009; Neal 2009), or practices of surveillance (Lyon 2002), to name just a few.

The proliferation of sites of interest for CSS scholars has entailed important questions of method, of how to deploy concepts in these empirical sites. How should an analysis of securitization be completed? How does one locate and analyse particular practices as 'security'? How does a security field relate to a field of surveillance? How can we analyse the relation between security and risk? These and many other questions require not just theoretical sophistication, but also methodological development. The debates over the conceptualization of security – as speech act, discourse, field of professionals, *dispositif*, or practice – have been

supplemented by methodological questions. Over the past few years, a series of books have tackled the challenge of methodology, of how to analyse security practices. After having been associated with the positivism of much of traditional security studies, method is back on the agenda of CSS. This book intervenes in this new arena of debate by proposing a different understanding of method and developing new frameworks for analysis for CSS scholars.

Lene Hansen's *Security as Practice* (Hansen 2006), for many years the only sustained treatise on methodology in CSS, has now been joined by Laura Shepherd's *Critical Approaches to Security: An Introduction to Theories and Methods* (Shepherd 2013), and Mark Salter and Can Mutlu's collection *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies* (Salter and Mutlu 2012). At the same time, an increasing number of books have tackled method and methodology in international relations (IR) more generally (for a discussion, see Aradau and Huysmans 2013).

Hansen's methodology of discourse analysis aims to 'take methodology back' for poststructuralist analyses of identity and foreign policy (Hansen 2006: xix). In her view, methodology is a 'way of communicating choices and strategies that all writing, deconstructivist and poststructuralist, must make' (Hansen 2006: xix). *Critical Security Methods* similarly engages in taking back method and methodology for critical security analyses. However, it reformulates the rather rationalist approach to methodology that informs most other books on methodology, even those written from a critical perspective. 'Rationalist' refers here not to rational choice social science but rather to the conception of methods as a rational choice that aligns a technical instrument of analysis to a theory for the application of a coherent set of procedures and techniques. We depart from this in three ways.

First, we move away from the 'cascading path' approach that starts with theory and moves down to methodology and then to methods. In this widespread and generally unquestioned approach, theory is the starting point where the epistemological, ontological and normative questions and perspectives are established. The stakes for critical research remain thus at the theoretical level. Subsequently, these authors discuss methodology as the set of ideas that informs, justifies and validates the aims and methods of research. And finally, they introduce methods as the tools that critical security researchers can use to conduct their inquiry on the empirical world.

The problem with the cascading approach to theory, methodology and methods is that it addresses the meaning, purpose and practice of scholarship *in advance* of the scholar's use of methods in their encounter with the empirical world, separating the two. True, theoretical concerns about epistemology, ontology, and normativity *inform* the methods and the aims of research. And critical theoretical concerns will almost certainly influence the interpretations, conclusions and even self-reflections drawn from the research. This awareness has often moved methodology 'up' to meta-theoretical debates, while still relegating methods to the bottom of the hierarchy (Jackson 2011; Wight 2006). However, in existing works on methodology in CSS, theory and method are kept apart in a hierarchy linked by methodology. To question this hierarchy, we aim to reconnect method and methodology in ways

that render methods significant in the research process. We do so by reconceptualizing method as *practice*.

Second, we move beyond the assumption of coherence that frames this cascading approach to methodology and method. Here, methods and methodology are about rational choices and selection of appropriate tools that are coherent with a particular theory and epistemology. The structure of Shepherd's textbook epitomizes this approach: theoretical chapters are presented first, in order to inform choices about methods that follow as forms of data collection. Only then is the student properly equipped, 'with knowledge of the theoretical foundations and techniques necessary for the conduct of independent critical research in the field of security studies' (Shepherd 2013: 1). Instead, our book approaches methods as experimentation through the concept of methodological *bricolage*.

Third, we extend the critical sensibility of security analysis in CSS to methods as well. To do so, we expand the question of reflexivity to include an analysis of the effects that methods as practices have. In the third section below, we discuss the relevance of criticality for our approach and the politics of method.

This introduction addresses each of these three moves in turn, and then discusses the frameworks for security analysis that emerge out of a critical engagement with method and methodology.

## Method as practice: The security life of methods

The first move we make away from the approach to treat methods as a bridge between a theory and a technical instrument of analysis is to reconceptualize method as *practice*. Rather than treating security as a given object or value, critical security studies has understood security as a practice through which the 'security-ness' of situations is created. For something to become a security concern, institutional, political, technological, and various other work is performed that makes it a matter of insecurity. This process can take many forms. It can take the form of a speech act in which security is called into existence by speaking it, just like a promise. It can also take the form of professionals of security enacting security routines in areas of social and political life. Social movements can mobilize needs for security in relation to vulnerabilities created by dominant powers as a political tactic. Thus, critical security research is about understanding security as practice in the broadest sense. As well as the literal sense of practice as 'what people do', this includes discourses, ideas, power relationships, bodies of knowledge, techniques of government, technologies, and the linkages between them.

Method, we argue, can be understood as practice in this broad sense of 'doing'. Method can also be understood in the more specific definition of practice as 'embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding' (Schatzki 2001: 2). For example, in the European Union the scope of identification with Europe is measured in regular surveys of public knowledge, sentiments and opinions about the European Union. A methodological practice – a survey – enacts 'identity' as a sum of individual feelings

towards the EU and knowledge about it. Although a shared and instituted practice, it is not the only method through which European identity is enacted and evaluated. Identity is also enacted in the circulation of institutional discourses about Europe, for example. The methodological practice of identification then draws on rhetorical devices and use of discursive registers rather than surveys of public opinion. European identity is further enacted in deploying European repertoires of action in disputes such as European rights frameworks and institutional mechanisms. Instead of surveys or discourse analysis, identity is then constituted and evaluated through sociological registering of repertoires of action and their use.

In this understanding, methods entail a particular embodied 'practical sense' or *habitus* developed in a professional field. In recent discussions of method in CSS, methodology often also works as a form of 'hygiene' (Law 2004). Methodology comes to affirm 'the moralist idea that if only you do your methods properly you will lead a healthy research life' (Law 2004: 9). For example, in the words of Salter, the aim is for 'good, clean...clear research design' (Salter and Mutlu 2012: 15). There are understandable reasons for the hygienic approach. Students and researchers need ways to justify their methods to others. They are called on to affirm the rigour, credibility, seriousness and scientificity of their work. This is all the more difficult when they are trying to make practical use of a fairly new and challenging body of theory that is relatively unfamiliar and potentially disruptive to others. As a heterodox approach, they often need to negotiate their access in terms of orthodox expectations institutionalized in grant awarding bodies, supervision committees, obligatory methods classes, and peer reviewers from other methodological persuasions. Focus on and demands for clear methods have a gate-keeping function in these negotiations. In the scholarly field of security studies and IR the 'hygiene' of method is a *habitus*. It is therefore not surprising that expanding the legitimacy of critical security approaches in this scholarly field at some stage runs into the need to demonstrate methodological credentials. Although method issues have been raised from time to time, in the last couple of years the methodological question has gained a distinct momentum for both developing CSS and increasing its legitimacy within the research field. However, demanding a focus on methods is a powerful tool to neutralize the more disruptive aspects of heterodox approaches – to make them more like the existing orthodox knowledge and its ways of doing research. Therefore, the methodological stake for CSS is to import its heterodox elements into its practice of method, thus messing up the hygienizing effects by doing methods differently. An important first step is to conceptualize methods as practice rather than simply a technique that consists in applying a proper and internally coherent way of doing surveys, discourse analysis, regression analysis, and so on.

Recasting methods as practice draws attention to the fact that methods are not limited to the academic field of security studies. Methods circulate through other social spaces, can be formulated in different fields, acquire legitimacy elsewhere, or travel from the academic field to other social fields and vice versa. Transferring the analysis of security as practice to methodological thought displaces methods from a

tool of representing reality to a securitizing practice. In other words, methods are not simply tools of analysis but are developed and deployed as part of security practices themselves: e.g., analysis, precaution, horizon scanning, mapping, visual representation, all make possible the multiplicity and dispersion of security practices. Social network analysis is an oft-cited example, used by security experts for the purposes of risk profiling as well as by social scientists. According to Marieke de Goede, security experts in the ‘war on terror’ redeploy methods of social network analysis that have been developed by critical social scientists (De Goede 2012). To paraphrase Law, Ruppert and Savage, methods are in and of security worlds (Law, Ruppert, and Savage 2011). We refer to these processes of circulation of practice as the ‘security life of methods’. Our coinage is inspired by the language of ‘*social life of methods*’ developed in sociology to ‘focus on the affordances and capacities which are mobilized in and through methods themselves’ (Savage 2013: 4; Ruppert, Law, and Savage 2013).

Our insight is that security practices themselves entail methods. For example, to return to social network analysis, security agencies have adopted and developed methods to *map* relationships between individuals they deem suspicious. So what does it mean to use mapping as a critical methodology (Chapter 2)? How can we research materiality when objects have been propelled to the heart of counterterrorism: critical infrastructures, ‘dirty bombs’ or ‘dangerous liquids’ (Chapter 3)? Similarly, in the UK, the Ministry of Defence has built an image database and made it available to the public. What does it mean to use visual methods in research when visual methods are widespread in the world of security experts (Chapter 4)? If methods are practices through which security agencies intervene in social life, then what do they mean for our own research?

The security life of methods means that the security practices we study in CSS are often methods themselves. These methods are found in the situated rationalities and knowledge systems that CSS researchers have always aimed to study. For example, when we study how visibility relates to security, we are not simply adding new ‘visual’ research objects to our security research programmes, but trying to understand the security implications of visualizing practices and representational methods. Data visualizations, for example, are important methods in social network analysis, which are used by security agencies to make sense of large quantities of communication data. Similarly, to study cartography and forms of mapping through CSS is not simply to study maps as artefacts, but to study mapping *practices*. To map is to practise a method. Furthermore, this practice is not only something that happens ‘out there’, on which we can turn our critical gaze. As our chapter on mapping shows, mapping is also a *method* to be practised in CSS. So if we want to understand the implications of mapping as a practice, then it makes little analytical sense to make a strong distinction between academic methods removed from the world and non-academic methods in the world. There is neither a real methodological distinction nor a practical one, since there is extensive circulation between the practitioners and methodologies of ‘academic’ methods and those of ‘security’ methods. If we are to study methods as practices, what is important is not

the type of actor, their objects of concern or even their political aims, but the workings, effects and implications of the practices themselves.

Scholarly *habitus* and the circulation of methods emphasize the role of regularity, reproduction and continuity in the concept of practice. Methods are often taught as a set of procedures and operations that need to be followed. Moreover, method training is part of creating particular research *habitus* such as quantitative training that reproduces a positivist enactment of knowledge and qualitative discourse analysis that instils a post-positivist research disposition. Methods also reproduce particular arrangements of political practice. For example, political geographical mapping techniques reproduce a flat world of states or geopolitical renditions of *Lebensraum* – and not a world of exchange relations between mobile people.

Yet practices are also about change. It is the problem of change that captures the critical sensibility of CSS. Critical security studies is not about identifying and analysing security *problems*, but rather security *problematizations* as the ways in which things come to be treated as security problems. It does not seek to *solve* security problems, but to understand how they came to be constituted as problems in the first place. Indeed, going back to the Frankfurt School and the early days of critical international relations, critical theory has always been a critique of ‘problem-solving theory’ (see also [Chapter 8](#) in this volume). We return to the problem of change, criticality of method and politics later in this introductory chapter.

For the moment, suffice to say that our aim is not to solve the problem of methods in CSS. It seems that once the question of methodology is resolved and validated, the critical scholar can go out to conduct their research into security practices. Methods then become solutions to research problems, a form of ‘problem-solving theory’. We argue that the concern of CSS with practices and problematizations should be extended to the practice and problematization of method itself. We ask not only what it means to treat *security as practice* but also what it means to treat *method as practice*.

This means not *solving* the problem of method through methodological elaboration at the ‘meta’ level or by defining methods and templates of research design suitable for CSS in advance of conducting research, but by deepening the *problematization* of method throughout the practice of research. Method should be questioned as practice; as *part of* the empirical world of practices that we already study in CSS. This means continuing to ask what method *does* as a practice. For example, how does the practice of method affect actors in the world? How does method *constitute* worlds by constructing them as intelligible? How does the practice of method affect its practitioners? How does the practice of method *constitute* us as researchers, when we think about methods, learn methods, discuss methods, and most importantly, use methods?

Our conception of methods emerges from this trend of letting research be driven more intensely and directly by what actors in security and politics actually do, the ways that they do it, and the effects of their actions. But as mostly happens when positioning or naming something new, this idea that security studies is turning from philosophy to practice *tout court* is exaggerated. Our questions are

about the different ways that ideas, theory, methods and empirical objects are assembled in the course of the problematization of security and insecurity. Critical methods then start from the forms that insecurities take, and from the question of how insecurities are constituted as objects of knowledge and action. For instance, methods for analysing the role of dangerous objects are entwined with the production of an array of objects of insecurity: from bombs to drones and liquids (Chapter 3). They are also connected to visual techniques producing iconic images of insecurity objects that are diffused in society via news media, advertising, movies, and so on (Chapter 4). Understanding method as practice has the effect of making methodological assemblages visible in concrete sites of (in)security.

### Method as experimentation: *Bricolage*

If methods are understood as practices, we can adopt a more relaxed attitude towards methodological experimentation and *bricolage*. By treating methodology experimentally, we reject the role of methodology as a bridge between theory and method that provides justification for the use of particular methods. In social science, methodology and method are often differentiated in similar terms to theory and practice, with ‘methodology’ being meta-theoretical reflection (Ackerly, Stern, and True 2006; Jackson 2011) and ‘method’ standing for the more lowly work of putting theory into practice, of selecting the appropriate tools. However, we suggest that the two are more closely entangled than is generally understood. The analytical move, then, should not always be top-down (from theory to methodology to method, or from abstract to concrete) but often a more experimental move of to and fro, of improvisation and *bricolage*. In this sense, we turn methodology into a way of experimenting with an assemblage of concepts, methods and empirical objects. ‘Assemblage’ refers to a mode of bringing together that allows for heterogeneity – spatial, logical, temporal, ideational – within apparently ordered social realms (Marcus and Saka 2006: 2). It works on the basis that possibilities for disruption, innovation and creative change take place in experimentation, by relating what is usually kept apart. Assemblage also refers to rhizomic knowledge practice, which emphasizes momentary interference in various sites, trying things out for a while, moving on to other sites, inflecting other combinations and which contrasts with understanding knowledge practice as growing a solid tree from ontological and epistemological roots. Assembling is a messy way of knowing that contrasts sharply with the architectural idea of building a coherent and stable knowledge mansion.

Our view of *bricolage* is thus different from simply combining different methods in some kind of new multi-method approach more adequate to the complexity of the world. Multi-method approaches combine different methods for the purpose of gathering more data that can be added up for a better understanding of the issue as a whole. *Bricolage*, on the other hand, takes complexity not as a challenge to knowledge that needs to be overcome by multiplying methods but as the recognition that the world consists of things that ‘relate but don’t add up’ (Mol and Law 2002: 1). While

multi-method approaches emphasize multiplying data about a phenomenon, *bricolage* focuses on experimenting with combining theories, concepts, methods, and data in unfamiliar ways to bring out relations that otherwise remain largely invisible. However, *bricolage* remains a situated interference rather than the formulation of a piece of knowledge that aims at completing the jigsaw of universal knowledge about the world. In our understanding, methods are thus active and particular rather than passive and universally applicable (Kincheloe 2005).

In IR, Hayward Alker's (1996) critique of the relatively rigid differentiation in research on international relations between epistemological and ontological choices on the one hand and methodological ones on the other, provided an important starting point for our approach to method. For Alker, methods are an integral part of the analytical, normative and political constitution of knowledge. Methods are not detached from meta-theoretical, theoretical and analytical concerns, but neither are they necessarily fixed to certain theoretical positions. The connections between the various components of knowledge formation are what matters, constituting an experimental site of knowledge production where methods are developed, combined, applied, or modified. There is no need to deal with the detail of Alker's methodological work here but his argument for a more relaxed stance towards methodological experimentation and *bricolage* informs our own critique (Alker 1996).

The critique, in fact, can be raised against much of the research in social science and in methods training courses, where methods 'appear to be free-floating tools unmoored in conceptual space' (Yanow 2006: 8). Methods are generally taken to be of a limited number and transferable from one field to another and, to a certain extent, from one theory to another. A recent book on qualitative methods lists the following set of methods: in-depth interview, oral history, focus group interview, ethnography, content analysis, case study, and mixed methods (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011). Nonetheless, the authors also set limits to this transferability inasmuch as some methods are seen to be more in line with certain approaches. For example, critical approaches to security have so far tended to emphasize qualitative forms of discourse analysis as particularly suited for engaging with the social construction of security (Hansen 2006; Campbell 1992; Weldes 1999; Fierke 2007; Milliken 1999). Quantitative methods, on the other hand, have often been associated with rational choice approaches (e.g., King 1989; King and Zeng 2001; Goldstein 1992).

These separations are not always strict or discrete, however. Methodological pluralism, triangulation, mixing methods and using both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the same research are quite common (see e.g., Della Porta and Keating 2008). Yet, although not completely dismissing the meaning or usefulness of these distinctions, our approach does not follow them, and does more than bring them together or mix them. Ann Tickner (2006: 20) has also noted the multiplicity of methods that feminists have mobilized in their research, from statistical research to ethnography and discourse analysis. However, Tickner places the feminist sensibility at the level of methodology rather than methods themselves, challenging 'the often unseen androcentric or masculine biases in the way that knowledge has traditionally been constructed in all the disciplines' (2006: 36). Being open towards

combining various methods that some deem incompatible does not, however, imply a reduction of methods to theory-neutral tools.

Understanding methodology as experimental, as *bricolage*, as we are suggesting, means rethinking the notion of experiment along the lines offered by science and technology studies (STS). Rather than being associated with hypothesis testing, experiments create novelty, produce phenomena and make something invisible visible (Latour 1999; Shapin 1988; Shapin and Schaffer 1985). Experimentation is also associated with innovative art and other creative work, thus challenging boundaries between scientific and artistic life. Interestingly, in the nineteenth century, experiments in art and science were seen as similar (Basu and Macdonald 2007). Understanding methodology as experimentation entails a rethinking of critical security research. Rather than adjusting methods to critical theoretical commitments, critical research becomes a *bricolage*, experimentally bringing together concepts, questions, and controversies distinct to empirical sites. The purpose of critical research is not grand theorizing or devising an overarching theory of security, but creating innovative and distinct assemblages by experimenting with methods, concepts, and empirics. Experiments challenge that which is taken for granted and attend to the complexity of the world.

The emphasis on practice and experimentation does not disconnect methods from meta-theoretical, theoretical, analytical and case-selection choices. Instead, it draws attention, through experimenting and analytical assemblage, to the ways in which methods and methodology are interrelated. The principle of experimentation draws attention away from the distinction itself by treating method and methodology as practices of experimenting, connecting and assembling.

Conducting research on or in an archive, field, or institutional practice, as the chapters here demonstrate, raises the question of how to assemble concepts, empirical data, and epistemological and ontological perspectives into an analytical story. Here, method does not refer to a tool that will bridge theory and empirical processes – representation and reality – sustaining the credibility, scientificity, objectivity, and seriousness of knowledge. Instead it questions how to problematize security practices and processes, how to interfere and intervene in security knowledge by analysing the processes and conditions through which insecurities are made politically significant. An experimental research approach means that creativity is manifest through method work as well. Methods can be assembled in new ways beyond existing distinctions. Thus, an experimental approach can question the distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods. Pierre Bourdieu's work has shown that quantitative and qualitative methods can be productively assembled with concepts and empirical sites (Bigo 2011; [Chapter 2](#) in this volume). Experiments can also productively assemble authorship collectives through collaborative practice ([Chapter 8](#) on the method of collaboration).

While an experimental approach relaxes the strictures of traditional approaches to method, it does not mean that it loses any coherence or that it offers an 'anything goes' view of methodology. Just as an assemblage holds together while remaining heterogeneous (Allen 2011), *bricolage* presupposes the staging of an analytical story.

It also works within fields of practice, where the scientific *habitus* creates constraints, while being itself amenable to change. Methods of research have gained and lost legitimacy over time. Yet, our understanding has implications for methods of teaching and training. Although teaching particular techniques – such as content analysis, regression analysis, focus groups, life story techniques, and so on – is important, it needs to be embedded in training practices of experimenting with the assembling of concepts, theories, data, and methods to bring out relations that otherwise remain largely invisible. To realize such training, critical security methods teaching needs to be organized in terms of ‘methodological problematizations’ of insecurity rather than a list of methods. Arranging methods training in this way would embed methodological techniques in a wider set of practices, including the practice of methods in security fields. The notion of problematization also instils an understanding that knowledge does not arise from applying a method correctly but is a practice of assembling concepts, theories, methods, and data. This book proposes a selection of six methodological assemblages, each organized around problematizations that are pertinent in contemporary security and scholarly practice and through which the teaching of critical security methods could be organized.

### **Method as critical: The political life of methods**

Our third methodological intervention is to develop the CSS critical sensibility in the direction of the politics of method. Understanding method as practice and as experimentation is the first step in this critical engagement. As the previous two sections have shown, treating method critically means questioning and problematizing method in the course of research. It means challenging any rigid separation between different methods, the different users of methods, and the different uses of methods.

The ‘security life of methods’ draws attention to how security methods help to bring forth worlds of (in)security. They help to fix the limits of what is to be considered secure and what are socially acceptable norms, conduct, knowledge, research and political practice in these worlds. In turn, security methods also help to fix what is considered insecure, abnormal, dangerous and to be excluded. Security methods help to constitute securitized subjects such as ‘the terrorist’ or ‘vulnerable humans’ and securitized objects such as ‘dangerous liquids’ or viruses against which security practices can be/are mobilized. On the back of the move from security as research object to security as practice, CSS has shown that security knowledge is not simply knowledge about worlds but also always a particular re-iteration of these worlds. The production of knowledge is therefore never normatively and politically neutral. In the late 1970s Ken Booth (1979), for example, unpacked in great detail how strategic studies were inherently conservative. The analysis of insecurity implied a preference for re-instating status quo. Similarly, but from a different theoretical angle, Bradley Klein (1994) has shown how strategic studies reproduced certain political and analytical discursive schemas as truths hiding the inherently unstable nature of knowledge claims.

Translating these debates to the problem of method implies that methods are not just about useful knowledge (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009), they are also about the reproduction of particular *habitus* and social fields. This helps explain why CSS has shied away from using statistical methods for analysing discourse. In so far as quantitative methods in IR were a device that strengthened positivist knowledge positions and produced a disposition towards the production of order rather than disruption, it made sense for CSS to focus on non-quantitative methods. There is nothing inherent in statistical techniques that prevents them from being used in critical knowledge – with its focus on disruptive practices and the politicality of knowledge itself – but there are field effects. The way such techniques operated and were positioned in the academic field of international relations in the 1980s and 1990s made it challenging to draw on quantitative methods for the purpose of critical knowledge.

Critical methodology thus does not simply unpack the methods at work in securitizing processes, but includes an analytics of the controversies and problematizations in which these methods are ‘enacted’ and contested. Methods do not come from nowhere. What are the political dynamics, strategic imperatives and institutional facilitators that allow methods to be mobilized around security problematizations? Is there a political decision, a marketplace for methods and technologies, or an ineluctable technologization that potentially builds security into everyday life, our architectures, social networks, and tools of work? Methods are therefore essentially situated in political life, both in the security field and in the academic field. Their circulation and institutionalization take place in fields of contestation and domination. Methods are a practice of and within power relations; they exercise power and are inscribed by power relations. For example, statistical methods have been a practice of statecraft through creating populations as a category upon which states could act. Ethnographic methods are inscribed with and partake in shaping a history of colonization and war. Similarly, methods have been used to contest policies, such as research that finds statistically significant relations between health and economic inequality, which has been used to challenge neoliberal economic policies. Critical security methods raise questions about the power relations that are simultaneously shaped by and shape methodological practice.

We cannot simply take methods as we find them. We need to understand their descent, their formation, and the perceived needs to which they respond. For example, how and why were forms of profiling supplemented by social network analysis as a security method? Understanding particular objects of (in)security is entwined with understanding the emergence of particular methods that enact social worlds. For instance, the research on human trafficking has been framed by the methodological question of categorization and quantification (see e.g., Tyldum and Brunovskis 2005). Gathering data has, however, been imagined as an objective way of grasping human trafficking at the expense of questions of how ‘sexual exploitation’ or ‘slavery’ need to be conceptualized for its analysis. This needs to be understood within the market of NGO expertise as well as academic expertise relevant for NGOs and international organizations.

This sensitivity to the political life of methods is not limited to the field of security practice. It also extends to the methodological production of knowledge in the field of scholarship. The conditions of the production, circulation and dominance of methods in the academic field raise questions about the power relations at play, struggles over what counts as relevant and what is sufficiently important to be studied, as well as questions about what research topics may be left aside because methods are deemed inadequate or inadapted for its study.

One example of this political life of methods in the academic field is the ‘disciplining’ effect of academic disciplines. Critical scholars know well the debate in IR about ‘science’ and the demand placed by neopositivist gatekeepers on new approaches to forward their claims in the form of testable hypotheses (Jackson 2011).<sup>1</sup> But we also need to consider the political effects of the genealogy of security studies itself as a subdiscipline of IR. This genealogy has path-dependent effects on what we are expected to study, where we are expected to locate those studies, and where we are to publish (see [Chapters 6 and 7](#) for discussions of these limitations). International relations remains one of the advanced forums for the discussion of security, but many of its journals police the boundaries of what they consider to be ‘international’ and what they do not. Given that many of the early scholars of CSS have now risen to positions of power, this raises the question of disciplinary path breakers becoming positioned in the field of security studies. Are there inevitable disciplinary practices that come with taking a position in this field and negotiating the place of critical knowledge and methods within it? Whatever the ‘disciplining’ power of disciplines, we consider that, empirically, security practices have long since sprung the territorial and disciplinary trap of the ‘international’ (Shah 2012). This is evidenced when militaries turn to anthropologists for help, when security services turn to sociologists to understand problematized social phenomena, and when the market for security technologies is global. Critical security studies has played a considerable role, though not exclusively of course, in reconstructing the security studies field so as to include multiple security practices and to limit the hold that national security approaches and a territorialized conception of the international have on security studies. The chapters in this book work on the back of these developments. They examine methodological issues in and for security studies that in important ways has moved beyond the international to security practices operating in a great diversity of scales and sites. Among the issues looked at are kettling in the UK, resistance in Colombia, international negotiations of environmental issues, the global war on terror, biometric identification in India and urban crime.

Placing disciplinary *habitus*, power relations and regimes of knowledge at the heart of contemporary demands for a stronger focus on methods in critical security studies is central to what we call the ‘political life of methods’. Critical methods require reflexivity and self-interrogation about these elements.<sup>2</sup> The chapters in this book share a strongly reflexive disposition towards the disciplinary effects of security studies. For example, [Chapter 6](#) discusses the consequences and limits of using security as an analytical lens in two different research projects. [Chapter 8](#) raises

questions about the limits of individualized reward systems in research. [Chapter 3](#) explores the interstices of materiality and discourse as a way of moving beyond the stark and disciplining opposition that is currently used within critical approaches. In doing so, it challenges the linguistic turn that took up a particular understanding of language as performative and constituting reality, which has informed a considerable part of critical security approaches in the past three decades.

This reflexive disposition transfigures into a political act when it supports researchers in seeking to produce knowledge that works away from and disrupts not only given truths but more specifically the methodological regimes that define what makes truthful knowledge. Our earlier endorsement of methodological experimentation disrupts disciplinary methodological regimes by pushing the limits of strong methodological coherence between meta-theory, theory, methods and data. Similarly, in an attempt to challenge the emphasis on methods as technique and research design, we have organized the chapters in terms of frameworks of methodological practices that have become central to both securitizing practices and their scholarly analysis, such as visibility, ethnographic proximity, and the materiality of security objects.

The ‘political life of methods’ draws attention to the role that methods can play in challenging and changing dominant productions of (in)security. Methods do not just carry substantive assumptions about the world; they also have effects for social and political life. This demands that critical security methods consider not only the ‘situated-ness’ and limits of knowledge and the contestations surrounding methods, but also include a sensitivity to potentially subjugated, silenced or marginalized practices and knowledges. Unease with scientificity and the dominance it entails upon other forms of knowledge has often surfaced in critical approaches. For example, feminist scholars have rightly pointed out that scientific knowledge entails its own forms of masculine domination (Tickner 2006; Sylvester 1994). They have led a call for a methodological privileging of subordinated positions, in which knowledge about the world can be formulated from the position of those who are politically as well as epistemologically marginalized. As such, feminism has been most outspoken about developing knowledge that is grounded in the lifeworld of women who are often absent from security knowledge (Enloe 2007; Haraway 1988). Poststructuralist approaches similarly experimented with methods of intertextuality and the breaking down of disciplinary distinctions between genres of text and knowledge to demonstrate how worlds are not simply created by political and security systems and elites but are also brought into being in mundane practices that are often seen as insignificant in the security studies field, such as sports, travel writing, diaries, popular TV series and so on (see e.g., Lisle 2013; Rowley and Weldes 2012; Kiersey and Neumann 2013; Derian and Shapiro 1989). Their methods also made visible how instituted scholarly methods tend to reproduce dominant power relations and the legitimating frameworks that sustain them. Disrupting the latter by introducing genre-crossing methods aimed at creating the possibility for subjugated knowledge and practice to gain presence in the scholarly field of security knowledge.

The political life of methods thus refers to reflexivity about the power relations and *habitus* that methods produce and sustain. This means proactively positioning oneself through the development of methods so as to challenge familiar and instituted processes of validation of what matters for security practice and studies. A key question for critical scholars, in spite of their IR/security studies heritage, is what it means to start not here in ‘the international’ but elsewhere. Feminist, Marxist, and postcolonial approaches share this mobilizing of a distinct positioning, as does the use of popular culture and the recent experimenting with auto-ethnographic methods to understand international politics. For critical security scholars this can mean starting with situated practices of struggle rather than security (see [Chapter 6](#)). For example, developing critical mapping methods when analysing geopolitical security practice or the reification of territoriality through border control regimes often work by making visible the victims and injustices produced by security practices ([Chapter 2](#)). Or, it can require that critical security scholars undo security as an object and experiment with methods that analyse security practices as more dispersed and possibly not primarily intelligible as ‘security’ (see [Chapter 6](#)). Another way of taking a critical position through method is to experiment with collaboration in order to challenge the limits of individualizing forms of knowledge production in scholarly fields organized through new management practices ([Chapter 8](#)).

Critical security methods are thus also political because of their rupturing effects (see Aradau and Huysmans 2013). This may not mean ‘changing the world’ in the way that Marx (1994) called on philosophers to do (although it might); more often, critical methods mean changing worlds in local and immediate terms. When we practise methods, we talk to selected people, we go to distinct places, we interact, we are hired, we employ assistants, we buy, we consume, we introduce ideas, we collaborate, we argue, we produce and we publish. As security researchers, we interact with those affected by security practices and those responsible for security practices, and we interact with other researchers, creating new forms of knowledge and new social arrangements. In so doing, these practices can introduce turbulence into existing routines, *habitus* and practices. Sometimes they might resolve issues and questions, but they might also make them messier. Sometimes they also create entirely new issues and questions.

In making the political life of methods central to critical methodology, we must thus add two elements to our understanding of method as practice and method as experimentation. First, we draw attention to methods, including critical security methods, as being practices that bear upon and are enmeshed in power relations and struggles over strategic imperatives and institutional facilitators of particular security and scholarly practices. Methods do not only live in social but also in political dynamics about what counts as relevant, valuable and right. The aim of incorporating methods of reflecting on these politics within critical security methods is not to declare and transcend ‘biases’ but to recognize the political responsibilities and effects of methodological practice. Second, critical security methods can also be understood as taking position in these dynamics in favour of

rupturing not simply existing truths but habitual and institutionalized uses of methods that reproduce dominant political practices. This latter understanding of the politicality of methods is important for linking the methods discussion to the broader critical project that comes with a concern for challenging limits, transgressing boundaries and privileging the agency of the marginalized.

## Methods as frameworks of critical security analysis

Before giving an overview of the chapters in the book, let's go over the main elements that make methods frameworks of critical security analysis. The aim of this book is to translate the central characteristics of critical security studies into critical security methods. It is a reply to calls for developing methods and methodological frameworks in critical security studies – and critical IR more generally – by proposing a performative and experimental approach to methods. Our approach partly emerges from observing parallel developments in methods of security practice and methodological interests in critical security studies. For example, there is a growing interest in ethnography and anthropology in both critical security studies and security operations. The intensified calls for visual methods in critical security studies go hand in hand with developments in visual securitization, both in the current old and new media practices and the security institutions. The outspoken use of network analysis in security practices runs parallel with methodological interest in network analysis in critical security studies. A research interest in new materialist methods is gaining momentum while forensic methods are taking a more outspoken front seat in security practices. At issue here is not that these parallel developments in the scholarly field of critical security studies and the field of security practice are directly and causally related or that they are inherently problematic. Rather, observing these parallel developments draws attention to the performative rather than representative nature of methods, and thus to the need to include what we call 'the security life of methods' in methodological frameworks. It translates the performative understanding of security as a securitizing practice – rather than as a given object or value – into the conception of methods as practice that we propose. Methods are not simply instruments of representation that extract data according to fixed procedures so as to bridge a gap between knowledge and reality; they act in and upon security worlds. 'Critical security methods' imply a performative understanding of methods as practice.

Our approach recognizes the uneasy relation between methods and critical approaches, not in the sense that the latter do not 'do' methods, but rather in the sense that a focus on methods often erases the inherently social, normative and political content of social scientific knowledge. Making the political life of methods a central component of frameworks of security analysis allows critical approaches to engage with method-focused developments in ways that sustain a reflexive disposition. Such a disposition makes it imperative to include in the practising of methods an understanding of how methods are inscribed by and bear upon power

relations, struggles and habitual dispositions in the fields of both security and scholarship. Rather than being erased from methodological debate, the normative and political work that methods do then becomes a key issue in these debates. One of the key interferences made by critical security studies in the study of security has been to draw attention to how security practices sustain and create exclusions and dominations. Conceptualizing methods as having not only a security but also a political life translates this interference into the development of methods.

This understanding of methods has consequences for how we conduct methods development, training and debate. Methods are not simply a technical matter of proper research design and teaching a set of procedures of data extraction. Methods teaching and discussion requires the training of modes of data extraction to be mixed with sociologies of their history, presence and struggles in contemporary security practice and fields of knowledge production. The question is never simply 'how to apply a particular method properly' but always also 'what do methods do in and to the security and security studies fields where they are practised'. At stake in methods debates is thus never only the production of scientificity or useful knowledge through proper use of methods, but also the production of political knowledge – knowledge that reiterates, questions or disrupts existing power relations.

In this book we have added to this approach an argument for a more experimental understanding of methods. 'Experimental' does not mean setting up controlled labs where one can do quasi-clinical experiments on objects and subjects. Rather, experimental refers to a more freely combinatory approach to methods. Research methods are a matter of assembling various concepts, methodological techniques and data without being shoehorned into prescribed requirements of coherent alignments of methods, meta-theory, theory and research problem. Instead it values *bricolage* and trial and error. In doing so, it prioritizes the creative use of methods, concepts and data to deliver new insights above rigour, coherence and the sufficiency of data. The purpose is to make methods a site of highly creative and experimental knowledge construction rather than an almost technological site defined by the proper application of prescribed sets of analytical techniques.

Given this approach to methods, the chapters in this book and the wider project of critical security methods are not organized around lists of particular methods of research. Instead, the chapters deploy the analytical framework advanced here to develop critical methods in six different methodological assemblages: mapping, visibility, materiality and discourse, proximity and distance, genealogy, and collaboration. The chapters offer different methodological experimentations that combine a set of concepts, orientations, empirical sites and modes of organizing methodological practice that carry the critical sensibilities of critical security studies into methodological discussion. Taking methodological questions as key drivers in this assembling means formulating frameworks of analysis with specific attention to connecting critical theory and empirical sites of security problems. Yet, forging such connections is not a technical issue of the most effective and efficient way of extracting data to link the worlds of empirics to the worlds of theory. New frameworks emerge from critical methodological assembling that traverses distinctions

between theoretical development, methodological practice in security and scholarly fields, and concrete problems of insecurity, vulnerability, conflict and risk. These methodological experimentations thus respond to scholarly calls for methods and a recognition that methods play a key role in shaping processes of securitizing.

The chapters in this book were developed through a collaborative work of several years, and they are not always univocal but often evince tensions and different takes on the analytical frameworks or methodological experimentations. They also pay heed to the difficulties that researchers encounter in developing methodological analyses in critical security studies, and in particular, the challenges experienced in connecting theoretical development and empirical practices.

**Chapter 2** on ‘Mapping’ explores distinct critical methodological mapping tools and vocabularies for studying the spatiality of security practices. In the ‘practice turn’ in social science, we find a surge in spatial language and metaphors, for example, topography, topology, geography, boundaries, mapping and maps, networks, fields, and lines of sight. The study of mapping forces us to re-think the spatialities of security, which in turn translates into an emerging interest in the methodology of mapping. The chapter discusses the security and political life of maps by contextualizing the renewed fascination with mapping that has developed over the last decade in security studies and among security practitioners. It articulates the politics inherent in the map as artefact and in mapping as a practice, arguing that maps are not simply mirrors of reality, but rather ‘mobile engines’ that distort and co-constitute the outside world, assembling it and rendering it mobile. With all this in mind, the chapter explores in detail what mapping means as a critical security method and security practice by investigating ‘mapping’ in the work of two different and increasingly important authors: Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu.

**Chapter 3** on ‘Discourse and Materiality’ starts from the proliferation of dangerous objects in security discourses – from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to the more mundane liquids at airports, and from viruses to luggage – to explore methods of analysis that do not reproduce the separation of discourse and materiality or their hierarchy. To this purpose, the chapter proposes to start with relationality in analysing discourses and materialities of security. While relationality is often referred to in international relations and social sciences more generally, the chapter operationalizes relationality in three ways: through *dispositifs*, performativity and agency, in order to experiment with different conceptual–empirical assemblages. Drawing on concepts inspired by Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Karen Barad, Bruno Latour and Jane Bennett, the chapter deploys them in a series of empirical sites in order to devise a framework for critical analysis of discourses and materialities of (in)security. From the deployment of biometric technology, the performativity of drug classifications, to critical infrastructure protection, the chapter recasts the relation between discourse and materiality through methodological experimentation. Finally, the chapter unpacks the political effects of critical method assemblages it has explored.

**Chapter 4** on ‘Visuality’ develops methodological insights in analysing visuality in the form of still or moving images, signs, symbols, charts, and graphs, among others

that play a central role in security practice. Whereas we have come to associate visibility with various representations of security, the vast majority of works in critical approaches to security have focused on the discursive rather than the visual as their medium of analysis. Visual aspects of meaning making and discourse have properties that discourse analysis of written or spoken artefacts cannot reach. Starting from an overview of how images have been dealt with in the critical study of security so far, the chapter develops an argument for a broader methodological focus on regimes of visibility and the polysemous and ambivalent nature of visual strategies. Although visual artefacts remain important, the chapter explores in particular methodological implications of studying pictorial power constituting truth, the power of affect in visibility, and the political significance of banal visual spectacles.

Chapter 5 on 'Proximity' and Chapter 6 on 'Distance' consider the growing interest in ethnographic work and evaluate the strengths and limits of mediating proximity and distance in research and practice. These chapters start from the observation that security studies are often too far from actual practice and, as such, frequently end up understanding security practice through representations rather than through experience or engagement. The chapters foreground the importance of engaging with situated practices through fieldwork in order to understand and to situate prevailing orders of security. Doing fieldwork is a way of performing research and part of the critical process of constructing research problematics. In this vein, Chapter 5 explores the methodology of proximity by drawing particularly on pragmatist thinkers John Dewey and Bruno Latour and elaborating on participatory observation. The chapter draws on fieldwork carried out both in conflict and violent situations such as in Israel and in urban Brazil as well as in intergovernmental headquarters where problems are framed in terms of security.

These chapters also bring to our attention that fieldwork and the knowledge practices of the ethnographer can recreate or substantiate existing security orders. Chapter 6 thus explores fieldwork as a means to address the demand for distance in research, particularly as it relates to the categories through which researchers frame the object of study. The chapter mobilizes the scholarly ethics of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault to reflect upon the authors' ethnographic fieldwork into the securitization of the environment in intergovernmental processes of climate change knowledge production and peasant and worker struggles against dispossession and armed repression in Colombia. The chapter argues that mediating proximity and distance is a defining issue of critical research.

Chapter 7 on 'Genealogy' asks what it means to research 'security' through historical raw material. The chapter explores genealogy as a method of analysing past and present security problematizations, their conditions of emergence, the strategic needs they respond to, the political and epistemological struggles they involve, and the reorganizations of power relations they entail. It offers a framework for analysing the historical emergence of security problematizations and the heterogeneous assemblages of techniques, knowledges, subjectivities and objects that get constituted around them. Mirroring the way that security practices link disparate things, the chapter presents genealogy as a way to conceptualize, interfere

with and further problematize those linkages. The chapter situates genealogy in the work of Michel Foucault and explains its relationship with other Foucauldian methodological concepts such as archaeology, problematization and *dispositif*. It also contextualizes genealogy in critical international relations theory, and explains what a genealogical approach means for security studies.

Chapter 8 on ‘Collaboration’ explores collaboration as a critical method of knowledge production for security studies. In opposition to the romantic model of the individual researcher, collaboration as method opens different possibilities for knowledge creation in CSS and IR. This does not necessarily imply that collaboration is a critical method by definition, as funders and academic institutions, for instance, expect collaboration. Collaboration as a critical method depends on a series of ‘felicity conditions’ – the forms of knowledge it aims to produce (critical or problem-solving), the aims of knowledge (heuristic or entrepreneurial) and the institutional conditions of knowledge production (hierarchical or redistributive). The chapter shows how, despite its difficulties and enrolment in strategies of neoliberal academic management, collaboration can result in a transformative process for how knowledge is produced, circulated and valued.

## Notes

- 1 See, for example, Keohane’s definition of reflective approaches in IR and critical scholars questioning of it (Keohane 1988), (Ashley and Walker 1990), (George and Campbell 1990).
- 2 For a discussion of the importance of reflexivity for feminist methodology, see J. Ann Tickner (2006).

## References

- Abrahamsen, R., and M.C. Williams (2006). ‘Security Sector Reform: Bringing the Private In’. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 6(1): 1–23.
- Ackerly, B.A., M. Stern, and J. True (2006). ‘Feminist Methodologies for International Relations’. In *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3–18.
- Alker, H. (1996). *Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic methodologies for international studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Allen, J. (2011). ‘Powerful Assemblages?’ *Area*, 43(2): 154–157. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4762.2011.01005.x.
- Aradau, C., and J. Huysmans (2013). ‘Critical Methods in International Relations: The Politics of Techniques, Devices and Acts’. *European Journal of International Relations*. May. doi: 10.1177/1354066112474479.
- Aradau, C., and R. van Munster (2007). ‘Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future’. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(1): 89–115.
- Ashley, R.K., and R.B.J. Walker (1990). ‘Introduction: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies’. *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(3): 259–268. doi: 10.2307/2600569.

- Basu, P., and S. Macdonald (2007). 'Introduction: Experiments in Exhibition, Ethnography, Art, and Science'. In *Exhibition Experiments*, edited by Sharon Macdonald and Paul Basu. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 1–24.
- Bigo, D. (2011). 'Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power'. *International Political Sociology*, 5(3): 225–258.
- Booth, K. (1979). *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. London: Croom Helm.
- Campbell, D. (1992). *Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Dalby, S. (2002). *Environmental Security, Borderlines*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- De Goede, M. (2012). *Speculative Security: The politics of pursuing terrorist monies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Della Porta, D., and M. Keating (2008). *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences. A pluralist perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Der Derian, J., and M.J. Shapiro (1989). *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern readings of world politics*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Publishers.
- Elbe, S. (2010). *Security and Global Health*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Enloe, C. (2007). *Globalization and Militarism: Feminists make the link*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Fierke, K.M. (2007). *Critical Approaches to International Security*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Friedrichs, J., and F. Kratochwil (2009). 'On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology'. *International Organization*, 63(04): 701–731. doi: 10.1017/S0020818309990142.
- George, J., and D. Campbell (1990). 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations'. *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(3): 269–293. doi: 10.2307/2600570.
- Goldstein, J.S. (1992). 'A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events Data'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(2): 369–385. doi: 10.1177/0022002792036002007.
- Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War*. London: Routledge.
- Haraway, D. (1988). 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective'. *Feminist Studies*, 14(3): 575–599.
- Hesse-Biber, S.N., and P. Leavy (2011). *The Practice of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Huysmans, J. (2006). *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. London: Routledge.
- Jackson, P.T. (2011). *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*. London: Routledge.
- Keohane, R.O. (1988). 'International Institutions: Two Approaches'. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4): 379–396. doi: 10.2307/2600589.
- Kiersey, N.J., and I.B. Neumann (2013). *Battlestar Galactica and International Relations*. London: Routledge.
- Kincheloe, J.L. (2005). 'On to the Next Level: Continuing the Conceptualization of the Bricolage'. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 11(3): 323–350.
- King, G. (1989). 'Event Count Models for International Relations: Generalizations and Applications'. *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(2): 123–147.
- King, G., and L. Zeng (2001). 'Explaining Rare Events in International Relations'. *International Organization*, 55(03): 693–715. doi: 10.1162/00208180152507597.
- Klein, B. (1994). *Strategic Studies and World Order: The global politics of deterrence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Latour, B. (1999). *Pandora's Hope: An essay on the reality of science studies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

- Lavenex, S. (2001). 'The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional Legacies'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(5): 851–874.
- Law, J. (2004). *After Method: Mess in social science research*. Abingdon: Oxford.
- Law, J., E. Ruppert, and M. Savage (2011). 'The Double Social Life of Methods'. In *CRESC Working Papers*. Milton Keynes: Open University.
- Leander, A. (2005). 'The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33(3): 803.
- Lisle, D. (2013). 'Frontline Leisure: Securitizing Tourism in the War on Terror'. *Security Dialogue*, 44(2): 127–146.
- Lobo-Guerrero, L. (2007). 'Biopolitics of Specialist Risk: Kidnap and Ransom Insurance'. *Security Dialogue*, 38(3).
- Lyon, D. (2002). *Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, risk, and automated discrimination*. London: Routledge.
- Marcus, G.E., and E. Saka (2006). 'Assemblage'. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23(2–3): 101–106. doi: 10.1177/0263276406062573.
- Marx, K. (1994). 'Theses on Feuerbach'. In *Selected Writings*, edited by L. H. Simon. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. pp. 98–101.
- Milliken, J. (1999). 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2): 225–254.
- Mol, A., and J. Law (2002). 'Complexities: An Introduction'. In *Complexities*, edited by John Law and Annemarie Mol. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. pp. 1–22.
- Neal, A.W. (2009). 'Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47(2): 333–356. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.00807.x.
- Rowley, C., and J. Weldes (2012). 'The Evolution of International Security Studies and the Everyday: Suggestions from the Buffyverse'. *Security Dialogue*, 43(6): 513–530.
- Ruppert, E., J. Law, and M. Savage (2013). 'Reassembling Social Science Methods: The Challenge of Digital Devices'. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 30(4): 22–46. doi: 10.1177/0263276413484941.
- Salter, M. (2008). *Politics at the Airport*. Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press.
- Salter, M., and C. Mutlu (2012). *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Savage, M. (2013). 'The "Social Life of Methods": A Critical Introduction'. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 30(4): 3–21. doi: 10.1177/0263276413486160.
- Schatzki, T.R. (2001). 'Introduction. Practice Theory'. In *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, edited by Karin Knorr Cetina, Theodore R. Schatzki and Eike Von Savigny. London: Routledge. pp. 10–23.
- Shah, Nisha (2012). 'The Territorial Trap of the Territorial Trap: Global Transformation and the Problem of the State's Two Territories'. *International Political Sociology*, 6(1): 57–76. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00144.x.
- Shapin, S. (1988). 'The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England'. *Isis*, 79(3): 373–404.
- Shapin, S., and S. Schaffer (1985). *Leviathan and the Air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Shepherd, L.J. (2013). *Critical Approaches to Security: An introduction to theories and methods*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Sylvester, C. (1994). *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tickner, A.J. (2006). 'Feminism meets International Relations: Some Methodological Issues'. In *Feminist Methodologies*, edited by B. A. Ackerly and Maria Stern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 19–41.

- Tyldum, G., and A. Brunovskis (2005). 'Describing the Unobserved: Methodological Challenges in Empirical Studies on Human Trafficking'. *International Migration*, 43(1–2): 17–34. doi: 10.1111/j.0020-7985.2005.00310.x.
- van Munster, R. (2009). *Securitizing Immigration. The politics of risk in the EU*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Voelkner, N. (2011). 'Managing Pathogenic Circulation'. *Security Dialogue*, 42(3): 239–259. doi: 10.1177/0967010611405393.
- Weldes, J. (1999). *Cultures of Insecurity: States, communities, and the production of danger*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wight, C. (2006). *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as ontology*. Vol. 101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yanow, D. (2006). 'Neither Rigorous Nor Objective? Interrogating Criteria for Knowledge Claims in Interpretive Science'. In *Interpretation and Method. Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, edited by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea. New York: M.E. Sharpe. pp. 67–88.

# 2

## MAPPING<sup>1</sup>

*Victoria Loughlan, Christian Olsson and Peer Schouten*

### Introduction

After a decade of developments in discursive approaches to security, critical scholarship is increasingly shifting away from security-as-discourse towards understanding security *practices*.<sup>2</sup> The starting point of this more recent research is to ask how security is practised, by whom, and to what effect, starting with a fixed conception of ‘security’ (as a speech act, policy-given or normative, such as ‘human security’). With this shift in perspective, the practices themselves, the moving bodies, artefacts and technologies come to the foreground of analysis; the researcher must leave the comfortable ground consisting of analytical frames of reference and enter the empirical muddy waters where discourse, institutions, and materialities form complex, dynamic entanglements.

So how *does* one study security practices? It is hoped that the chapter will answer this question by offering distinct critical methodological mapping tools and vocabularies to those interested in studying the spatiality of politics and security practices. The chapter proceeds in two sections. First, it discusses the political life of maps. It does so by contextualizing the renewed fascination with mapping that has developed over the last decade, both in security studies and among security practitioners. We begin with the observation that concomitant with the ‘practice turn’, we find a surge in spatial language and metaphors. With topography, topology, geography, boundaries, mapping and maps, networks, fields, and lines of sight all around,<sup>3</sup> it is apparent that studying security in practice forces us to re-think the spatialities of security, which in turn translates into an emerging interest in the methodology of mapping. This first section discusses the politics inherent in the map as artefact and in mapping as a process. This section also argues that maps are not mirrors of reality, but rather ‘mobile engines’ that distort and co-constitute the outside world.

The second section explores both the contribution mapping can make to security studies as a methodology and mapping as a practice by those we study. It does so by offering an in-depth overview of two specific approaches to mapping as methodology. The chapter aims at unpacking the mapping methodologies in security studies that find inspiration in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Bruno Latour to articulate how they render visible different constituent elements of security practices.

Yet, while Bourdieuan and Latourian mapping approaches provide an entrance point in the topographical extension of security arrangements throughout space ('structure'), in order to grasp the purchase of their respective methodologies for critical security studies it is also necessary to engage with how each relates to the unfolding over time of mapping practices ('process'). The chapter engages with both Bourdieu and Latour by comparing how mapping, first, relates to the *context* with 'The chapter engages with both Bourdieu and Latour by comparing how their approaches to mapping, first, relate to the *context of production* or the mapping process; second, what the relative weight is that they give to *inscription* or the role of the artefact 'map'; and, finally, how their methodology deals with the *context of appropriation* or the subsequent life of the map as it circulates through different contexts. Their work has supported the development of two divergent understandings of mapping, which this second section will introduce and articulate.

Bourdieu's approach to mapping is often translated into a topographical understanding of the spatiality of security practices. In other words, via this approach a relief can be mapped depicting actors, their relative positions, and their attributes. This chapter argues that a topological understanding of Bourdieu's work – developed, principally, by Didier Bigo – provides a more nuanced understanding of the workings of security, as it engages more thoroughly with the way security practices shift across contexts. In order to go beyond the depiction of composite parts of security practices, we highlight the relational aspects of these actors and their attributes, how they hang together in order to assemble security arrangements.

The chapter then moves to Latour and inquires how his methodological approach, actor-network theory, speaks to security practices. In this increasingly popular body of work, the to-be-mapped is different again: rather than topology, Latourians aim to map heterogeneous entanglements that constitute security assemblages. Latour's approach, as we will see, abandons the focus on fixed structures altogether in favour of a singular focus on the transformations that a concern – whether it be a map, an object or an understanding of, for instance, 'security' – undergoes in processes of (dis)assembling and circulation. Both sections of the chapter are illustrated with examples of security scholars that have used the respective approaches as a method to map security practices. A final discussion gives a critical appraisal of both methodologies.

The first part of this chapter 'From state maps to mapping security' contextualizes the subsequent in-depth discussion of Bourdieu and Latour's methodologies, and then the general movement of the chapter is one from an ontological understanding of political mappings as static artefacts enclosing a frozen representation that corresponds to an equally static reality 'out there', to an increasingly fluid and unstable

performative understanding of mappings as partially actors, partially circulating objects, entangled with equally unstable and heterogeneous notions of security.

## **From state maps to mapping security**

The immediate post-Cold War period was one of intense criticism towards the scientific approach to space, security, and mapping that had hitherto dominated in international relations (IR). In the early 1990s, critical IR scholarship started to challenge these territorial underpinnings of IR, linking its territorial assumptions to the reproduction of insecurity (Walker 1993) – leading John Agnew to argue that the discipline was caught in a ‘territorial trap’ (1994). Critical geography has worked to produce a counterweight to this scientific and non-reflexive discourse on maps as mirrors. For instance, J.B. Harley, drawing on Foucault and Derrida, developed a deconstructivist approach to maps, highlighting what is absent in the map, what is silenced and how maps may contradict themselves. He excavates their cultural situatedness, their power-knowledge constellations, textuality and rhetorical dimensions (Harley 1989). What is represented in a map follows from a process of exclusion, prioritizing some and silencing others.

The re-appraisal of the relations between space, politics and security accelerated further after 9/11. Facing a host of both tangible and intangible threats, it became a core challenge for governments to map risks and insecurities – both in terms of such things as the spread of diseases, illegal immigration, and illicit financial flows that could fund terrorism; and of crime hotspots. Mapping techniques were discovered as security technologies to locate insecurity in geographically circumscribed spaces, tangible objects, or demonizable subjects (Boin and Ekengren 2009). For instance, prefiguring an example that will be explored more in-depth below, private security companies in Johannesburg use municipal maps that advertise safe commercial areas to tourists to sell security services within those areas and reinforce a racialized topography of (in)security. The practice of post-9/11 security governance has led to at least a partial abandonment of state borders, couching security instead in terms of protecting globalization against its discontents such as ‘terrorist networks’ and ‘pockets of insecurity’; through equally respatialized security efforts such as ‘networked warfare’ and ‘nodal governance of crime’ or the protection of ‘critical’ or ‘vital’ infrastructures (Hameiri 2011; Collier and Lakoff 2009). Concomitantly, practices of mapping insecurity started involving a wide range of mapping technologies to apprehend an expanding ‘space of security’ (Foucault 2007) and subjectivities, that is, the spheres of life under scrutiny (Amoore and de Goede 2005). Mapping itself became a practice in the search for ontological security: it ‘domesticates the unknown and the invisible, making them known and visible, making them available for use’ (Pickles 2004: 7).

## ***The political life of maps***

Mapping increasingly became a central term and a central technology not just for security practitioners but also in critical security studies (CSS). While the increased

circulation of ‘mapping’ appears to be a collective scholarly response to the increasing perception that state-centric analysis of security would be attempting to grasp a bygone reality, no definitive new map of security has emerged. Rather, with a new abundance of non-territorial mappings of (in)security and the proliferation of mapping technologies, the questions become: What in this post-9/11 world counts as a map? What methods count as mapping methods? This chapter proceeds to explore the answers Bourdieuan and Latourian approaches would give. We will do so through a tripartite discussion of their methodological contribution to security studies composed of an overview of their body of work; a discussion of their approach to mapping, with specific attention to the distinct conceptions of order and power that flow from their respective understandings; and finally, an overview of how their methodology can be applied to security practices. First, however, we will point out some commonalities that mapping processes involve. As we investigate what work modes of mapping do, three main points are of importance.

First, mapping is a process of *inscription*, which means the translation of a given phenomenon through mediation by technical tools (typically metrics, GIS software, or theodolites in surveying), into something else. The inscription tools chosen determine, in part, the shape of the representation, which may be an analogue output – like a text or drawn map – or a digital one like geocoded data or statistical models. The availability of mapping tools and techniques changes the kind of (political) representations we can craft (Latour 2011a). It also means mapping comes about through a range of methods and does not necessarily entail a specific research design: mapping can be both quantitative (as social network analysis), qualitative (as when a discourse is mapped out), or both, as in Latour’s MACOSPOL, which is an effort at mapping controversies online.<sup>4</sup>

Second, the *context of production* of mappings extends beyond material inscription. Understanding mapping entails a broader focus on the processes through which security mappings get assembled as, respectively, representing violent borders, powerful threats, or security solutions. This assembling process entails not only material inscription of ‘outside’ elements ‘onto’ the map, but also, if a mapping is to be felicitously performative, the rearrangement of human bodies, border posts, infrastructures, and other entities in line with the map. For a map to be representative, substantial intervention in the outside world is often required; work, that should be considered as part of the context of production of mapping.

Third, and finally, the ‘social life of maps’ doesn’t end when the artefact ‘map’ has been produced and all elements have been rearranged to correspond to the map. The material inscription of maps – as mentioned above – makes that which is mapped mobile, travelling via email as attachment, being accessed through a website, brought into offices across the globe, or being printed out and handed around. The map thus made mobile can be used in practices in disparate settings (Czarniawska and Sevón 2005: 8–9). In this way, maps are devices enabling navigation, transport, communication – in short rendering possible ‘governance at a distance’ (Latour 1987). Maps gain significance in the context of use – a map can,

for instance, become politically meaningful when embedded in military security practices to conquer contested terrain. However, that mappings can be circulated also implies the opening of a space of contestation and confusion: control over mappings is destabilized and as other people use mappings for their own, possibly divergent, purposes, the map starts to transform. In this *context of appropriation*, the aggregate significance of a mapping can thus undergo substantial shifts. All mapping processes involve this other translation, in which distinct gazes of order are imposed on the inscribed materials. The questions asked of a map in circulation are important to such an extent that its readings are underdetermined by the materialities involved. For example, a British geography student might view a territorial map of Africa as a nuisance, since she will have to memorize each of its countries and its respective capital, while a South Sudanese citizen looking at the same map might see an outdated, contested, and highly political expression of a conflicted colonial legacy. Beyond inscription and the context of production, the context of appropriation then forms the third part of the political life of maps.

In sum, then, the politics of mapping is therefore not just about the practice of mapping (the context of production) or inscription, it is also about its circulation and how others use the map in their own strategies and alternative interpretations (context of appropriation). For this reason we must ask not only ‘what does the map *show* or *how* it does show something, but *what does the map do?* *What does it accomplish?*’ (Wood 1993: 56, original emphasis). Looking critically at mapping in this way situates it firmly within practice.

The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to mapping approaches by, or inspired on, Bourdieu and Latour, two contemporary French theorists. Each in their own way they engage thoroughly with mapping in practice, conceptualized here as comprising context of production, inscription and context of appropriation.

## **Bourdieu: A theory of fields**

While mainstream security studies have, since its inception, drawn on the more general geographical assumptions of geopolitics and IR theory, it is only by delving into the work of Pierre Bourdieu – a French sociologist who elaborated a unique approach to power in practice by bringing together elements from Marxian, Weberian and Durkeimian sociologies – that the reference to ‘mapping’ has made its way into critical approaches to security and the so-called ‘Paris School’. In order to understand the ensuing modes of spatialization, it is necessary to clarify a few points pertaining to Bourdieu’s theory of fields. Field theory can, for practical purposes, be brought down to a few very simple principles. The positions of social agents, and the relations between these positions, can be represented as forming a ‘social space’. The positions of the actors in this space cannot be conceived of in absolute terms. Every position can only be located in relation to other positions in this social space. For example, to say a social agent is powerful – whatever species of power one is looking at – only makes sense relative to agents holding less power and vice versa. The corollary of this simple fact is that if the level of power–

resources held by one agent changes considerably, the positions of all the agents defining themselves in relation to the latter, change as well, even if marginally. Just as a variation in electric charge changes the magnetic force field of a charged object, dominant agents within a given field 'deform' their space of relations each time their relative position changes: this spatial deformation is called a 'field-effect'.

A second corollary of this relational approach to the nature of power – of what are called 'capitals' in the theory of fields, the most important of which are economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital – is that the agents defining their positions relationally within the field are likely to enter into struggles with another over their relative positions and, thus, over capitals. The notion of a field can then be said to refer to a specific social space of objective positions structured by struggles between social agents over a specific capital, determining part of what is at stake in these struggles. The field is a bordered network of relations in which some positions are central (and hence dominant) and others are peripheral or marginal. All positions, however, are definable in relation to one another – that is, they are knowable and measurable in objective terms. 'Society', a vacuous concept according to Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 16), is composed of as many fields as there are species of power, hierarchies of positions, and stakes over which agents struggle.

As it pertains to data selection, data gathering and data analyses, an approach in terms of social fields implies not looking at individuals but at relations and at relative positions. Knowing the economic capital of an agent is, as such, irrelevant. What is of interest is its relative level compared to the economic capital of others with which this agent enters into struggles. Relevant data for a fields approach is hence data that allows highlighting distinctive gaps (between, for example, rich/poor, professionals/amateurs), significant cleavages and unequal distributions of different kinds of power. This is very different from methodological individualism. Indeed, one can analyse the structure of a field independently from individual persons. What is important is not as much the person but the position he or she occupies in the relational figuration constituted by the field. Hence, Bourdieu is a staunch opponent to rational choice theories although he uses some of their mathematical methods. Indeed, for Bourdieu the practical strategies deployed within the field are generally not calculated nor are they rational in the universalistic sense of the term. Rather, they are embedded in the socialization of agents, what he calls the *habitus* of the agents. *Habitus* represents the socialized subjectivity through which they develop a 'feel for the game' and invest the field with meaning, thus preventing them from questioning the arbitrariness of the way in which the field operates (Bourdieu 1998).

The *habitus*, and the dispositions, practices and bodily attitudes (*hexis*) that are linked to it, are related to the agent's position in the field, but also to his or her 'family-history' and genealogy, his or her social trajectory and relations. The methods of prosopography (the description of collective biography, both synchronic and diachronic), interviews and participant observation are some of the methods allowing access to the *habitus*. The interaction between the field and the *habitus* of

its social agents produces and reproduces the structure of the field. Indeed, the correspondence between *habitus* and position in the field is both linked to the fact that a particular *habitus* allows for a social agent to occupy the corresponding position and to the fact that the occupation of the latter induces the corresponding *habitus*. However, this interaction also leaves spaces for agency and transformation: the *habitus* of an agent being the effect of multiple fields and a function of his or her social trajectory, there is place for leeway in the interplay between position and *habitus* over time. Bourdieu can therefore not be considered a pure structuralist.

### ***From the field to the map***

For Bourdieu, the concepts of social space and of fields are both metaphors and methodological tools. In his language, power relations are often spatialized (centre/periphery, upper-class/under-class, central/marginal). One could argue that this is in line with the spatial power-metaphors used in everyday language. While reproducing this spatial and vertical imaginary of power, Bourdieu's analyses of power are not, however, uni-directional. Through the concept of symbolic violence and symbolic power, the violence/power that 'operates only inasmuch as those who undergo it recognize those who wield it' becomes relational: it is exerted upon social agents with the complicity of the latter (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 148).

The methodological tools of *inscription* developed by Bourdieu rely heavily on two-dimensional spatial representations such as graphs with 'clouds of points' (*nuages de points*) – spaces of positions, spaces of dispositions, spaces of discourses – in order to reveal structural homologues, cleavages, distinctive gaps etc. As such, there is a certain level of mathematical sophistication to Bourdieu's research methodology, including multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), for example (Bourdieu 1984). Indeed, Bourdieu correlates spaces of positions and spaces of standpoints. In other words, he tries to show how, in a particular field, the discourses and standpoints of different actors are in fact linked to their position in the field rather than floating freely in a Platonic world of ideas (Bourdieu 1984).

Bourdieu's generic view on methodology is simple: it is only worth exploring in relation to a research object, in the research-practice and as scientific practice. Methodological discourse in the abstract is seen as utterly unproductive. The way in which methodology has traditionally been approached in mainstream political sciences and international relations, as a field of specialization with its experts and manuals, as requiring a separate section at the beginning of each article, as flowing from theoretical assumptions and determining research practice (rather than being elaborated and refined, along with theory, in close interaction with one's concrete research) is contrary to the Bourdieuan understanding (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

When considering the spatiality of the field, three elements are of particular relevance in Bourdieuan mapping. First, no matter from which perspective one looks at the relations between positions in the field, they remain objectively

definable, and thus 'mappable'. To map a field is therefore not to give one's own perspective, to follow one's intuition or representation, but to 'measure'. This is probably one of the central tenets that frames the *context of production* of Bourdieuan maps. This social measurement of species of power, and of their holders, however, becomes incredibly complex when considering the relation between the numerous fields structuring social relations: species of power accumulated in one field by an agent can be reinvested in another by the same social agent and ultimately all fields have to be analysed in relation to other fields. This complexity has only partially been solved by the postulate of an overarching field of power, a field of fields, that would determine the relative value of the different capitals and the 'exchange-rate' between them (Bourdieu 1998). Indeed, it is to some extent the State, or rather the specific capital linked to state-power and its monopoly on legitimate symbolic violence, that unifies the field of power. It is hence arguably difficult to analyse transnational practices independently of the State, independently from 'national societies', if one takes this postulate of a unifying 'field of fields' at face value. Revealingly, many of the Bourdieuan sociologists interested in transnational practices (Yves Dezalay, Bryant Garth, Antoine Vauchez, Antonin Cohen) tend to analyse them as a way to 'boost' subsequent national careers by reinvesting the capital accumulated abroad (the 'transnational capital') in the national field of power (Dezalay and Garth 2002). Second, the borders of a field can, according to Bourdieu, be seen as being drawn by the actors of the field themselves. By setting entry costs and maintaining exclusionary practices, fields are differentiated one from the other. To a certain extent, fields can then be said to be bordered independently of the gaze of the social researcher: the field ends where its field-effects subside (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 100–101). Third, in spite of the author's methodological rigidity or rigour, depending on one's epistemological premises, there is some leeway for indeterminacy, agency and ultimately for 'malleability' of the space, or even 'distant proximities' without this necessarily being seen as a mere 'statistical aberration'. For example, Bourdieu never claims that the field as a space of positions absolutely 'determines' position-taking, dispositions or strategies on the part of the agents. The rules of Euclidean geometry, the homogeneity of the mapped space, are not absolutely determining. Bourdieu here prefers to speak of a 'structural homology' (Bourdieu 1984; Coulangeon and Lemel 2009). There is 'homology' rather than determination. While the exact meaning and implication of this claim is subject to debate, it is usually compared to what Max Weber called 'elective affinity' when describing the relation between protestant ethics and capitalism (Weber 2002): one does not 'determine' or 'cause' the other, but there is a close relation. Homology implies both a relation of difference and of essential similarity or compatibility. To 'map' a field can hence also be seen as the activity of producing an artefact, to inscribe it into a two-dimensional graph that will be 'structurally' homologous to this field. Bourdieuan mapping can itself be said to have an elective affinity with 'generative structuralism': it is closely related to a structural reading of social

reality. However, the structure is neither fixed nor a given to the author, rather it is constantly produced and reproduced and any 'reproduction' is always slightly different from a previous production (Bigo 2011). The map is hence always, at least in principle, historically situated.

One could make the point that for Bourdieu, the spatial notion of field has a threefold status: metaphorical, analytical-methodological and ontological. It is a metaphor for describing the place where a competitive 'game' is being 'played' (just as 'the market' is a common metaphor in economy). It is an analytical-methodological device for making the world intelligible but is to a certain extent also understood to exist independently of the researcher, as a bordered network of objective and relational positions. From Bourdieu's perspective, the field could be seen to model a pre-existing reality, a structure that exists independently of the agents that just so happen to occupy its different positions. This is the ontological dimension of the field. However, drawing on the critical geographic literature introduced in the beginning of this chapter, we can ask: what kind of new space is brought into being through his methods? In other words, what is the purchase? By fixating positions on maps, by classifying (in the sense of ascribing social classes to 'people') by and through maps, by showing how relations of domination are reproduced by structures even when the dominated try to resist to their domination, is Bourdieu not in fact discouraging social mobility? This issue of reflexivity in sociology, the necessity to account for the performativity of one's social analyses has, in fact, been dealt with by Bourdieu (1999, 2004). Arguably, the (foreseen or expected) context of appropriation of Bourdieuan mapping has hence to be a central concern in the very production and inscription of these maps.

## Order

As noted above, Bourdieu is concerned with the production and reproduction of the relations of domination that structure social life. How social structures emerge and are reproduced, both through practices of power and of resistance, is the governing problem. Bourdieu's work has therefore been criticized for depicting an order that is relatively static (Butler 2008). That being said, for Bourdieu, the production and reproduction of social structures are not distinct moments but rather simultaneous processes (Bigo 2011). Relations of domination tend to be reproduced, but not exactly identical: gradual change is hence possible. Even rapid transformations are possible, for example, when fields merge, when one field incorporates another or when discrepancies appear between social structures and the agents' *habitus* following a social crisis. By mapping the same field at different time periods, one can highlight such change. By highlighting the struggles structuring the field and the social trajectories of the players in the field, one can identify the mechanisms of change. Nevertheless, at best, one will only have maps of different time periods, the process of change being lost by the stasis (referring to time) and fixation (referring to space) entailed by the maps.

## Power

Power and domination linked to other concepts such as ‘inequality’, symbolic violence, or ‘social stratification’ are central for a Bourdieuan understanding of social reality. For example, while Derrida focuses on the illocutionary act when approaching Austinian speech-acts, Bourdieu, on the contrary, emphasizes the role of the social position and hence symbolic power of the locutor in producing perlocutionary effects (Bourdieu 1991; Butler 2008). As a result, he has sometimes been accused of having a too vertical and top-down approach to the legitimate ‘principles of vision and division’ of the social world. In other words, the legitimate readings of social reality are to a great extent imposed by the powerful (Bourdieu and Fritsch 2000: 19). Still, Bourdieu’s sociology is very different from the so-called ‘elite theory’ of Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca or Robert Michels. Power is not equated with a clear-cut distinction between the dominant/dominated. Since one can be engaged in multiple fields at the same time, one can be simultaneously dominant in one, and dominated in another. The positions in the field shape the *habitus* of the social agents occupying these positions. Thus, the marginal or dominated actors will have different strategies and different ‘principles of vision and division’ depending on their positions in the field (Bourdieu and Fritsch 2000: 63). Power is not a monolith producing homogeneous effects throughout the field; rather, it is an unequal and yet permanent struggle between relational positions. The *doxa*, the ‘common sense’ of the field, is then never a consensus, nor a homogeneous ideology, rather it is an agreement on legitimate disagreements within the field. Resistance to the dominant order is both possible and desirable (Bourdieu 2003). What remains for Bourdieu, however, is that social space, while complicated, is objective and definable once the relevant capitals have been identified. What is appealing for Bourdieu-inspired research, then, is that social relations can, quite literally, be mapped in ways which are comparable to the fixing activity of topographical representations – we can see and record position with a degree of certainty that can be tested by others. With regards to the question of the (foreseen or expected) context of appropriation of Bourdieuan mapping and analyses, the question is, however, to what extent the ‘visual revelation’ (by means of maps) of previously unseen power relations can make practices of resistance more likely or efficient. The answer to this question is in Bourdieu’s own writing somewhat complex. On the one hand, the mere knowledge of the mechanisms of symbolic power, and the structural inequalities that underpin them, is not likely to neutralize them. In this sense, knowledge of the social world is not emancipating by itself, automatically. On the other hand, knowledge (both produced and conveyed by the mapping of fields) of objective power relations, and even more so of the margins of manoeuvre they allow for, can potentialize strategies of resistance by highlighting the limited yet existing leeway left for dominated agents. Bourdieu was however tragically aware that, given its most likely context of appropriation, his ‘mapping of social fields’ could also be (and is also) put at the service of academic (and other) power strategies (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

## **BOURDIEU-INSPIRED SECURITY-STUDIES AND THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL**

The Bourdieuan analysis of security practices raises specific methodological problems. First, security professionals often do not want to disclose the kind of detailed and 'personal' data that indicates economic, social and cultural capital: salary, wealth, social relations, address, diplomas, profession of parents and so on. Second, when assembling files on the security professionals one is observing, there always is a risk of reproducing the practices the security professionals themselves use when analysing 'terrorist networks' and identifying suspects. The 2006 joint US Army/US Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 'Counter-insurgency' even contains a section on the sociology-inspired methodology of social network analysis (SNA). It must be admitted that the Bourdieuan analysis of social relations (as most sociological approaches), share a common vocabulary with SNA: 'networks', 'relations', 'relationality', 'social capital', the focus on 'metrics' and 'measurements' as well as on 'mapping social spaces'. Moreover, contrary to a common assumption, SNA is not necessarily characterized by methodological individualism, nor can it be reduced to the 'address book' of the nodal actors of a given network. For SNA, the unit of analysis is not necessarily the individual or its attributes. Rather, the focus is on the relationality between actors, so called 'dyad attributes'. In other words, there is a risk for researchers to lose their sense of critical distance by appropriating the way of thinking of his research object.

There are, however, significant differences between the standard SNA-approach and Bourdieu's approach to the mapping of social relations. First, the Bourdieuan research starts with a scientific problematization that has to be autonomous from preoccupations framed by other fields (especially from the field of power): scientific problems have to be constructed from within the fields of science and not be imposed or even influenced by external concerns that would risk submitting truth to power. The relative autonomy of the scientific field creates an interest on the part of scientists to attempt not to submit their truth-claims to any other preoccupations than the ones arising from this field. Any pre-constructed objects must accordingly be uncovered and submitted to radical doubt. In other words, to start with a category of people deemed 'suspect' would be totally unacceptable for Bourdieu: instead, the relevant questions are: how this category is constructed? Who has the power to produce the authorized knowledge on it? What are the capitals that confer this power? The question of 'data-selection' is hence seen as secondary to the one of problematization and of construction of the scientific object.

Second, there are also sharp contrasts regarding 'data-analysis' in SNA-mapping and Bourdieuan field-mapping. For both, analysis of the 'social

capital' held by social agents requires knowledge of the agents' durable and more or less institutionalized social relations. However, for Bourdieu, unlike standard SNA, social capital has to be analysed in a wider structural context and in order to account for the latter, one has to identify the other species of power held by the agents of the group (Bourdieu 1980). 'Social capital' for Bourdieu is then slightly more 'structural' than for most SNA-inspired approaches. It is not about tracing and assessing the links and nodes that tie one individual to another in order to assess their proximity or distance. It is about group-belonging, collective trajectories and the exchange of different forms of capital within the group.

Third, the respective ontologies of Bourdieu and standard SNA are ultimately very dissimilar. While SNA focuses on relations understood as interactions, Bourdieu centres the analysis on the underlying structural conditions that frame these interactions. Bourdieu focuses on the structural relation 'which operates in a permanent and invisible fashion' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 113), rather than on the effective interaction or actualized exchange. For Bourdieu, 'the structure of a field understood as a space of objective relations between positions defined by their rank in the distribution of competing powers or species of capital, is different from the more or less lasting networks through which it manifests itself'; on the contrary:

in network analysis, the study of these underlying structures has been sacrificed to the analysis of the particular linkages (between agents or institutions) and flow (of information, resources, services, etc) through which they become visible – no doubt because uncovering the structure requires that one put to work a relational mode of thinking that is more difficult to translate into quantitative and formalized data, save by way of correspondence analysis.

*(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 113–114)*

### ***Using field-mapping in IR and CSS***

References to Bourdieu seem to be on the rise in IR literature, notably through the 'practice turn' in IR theory (Pouliot 2008; Mérand and Pouliot 2008; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Mérand and Forget 2012; Adler-Nissen 2012; Hopf 2010). Some of these authors also use the specific field-mapping techniques associated with Bourdieu's work. In CSS, Bourdieu has mainly been used by the 'Paris School' around Didier Bigo (Bigo 1996; Wæver 2004; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006), and also by Anna Leander in Copenhagen (Leander 2005 and 2010). Here, Bourdieu is used as a way of reframing academic IR and promoting the research agenda of an International Political Sociology (Bigo and Walker 2007) where his thinking is combined with Foucaultian notions and concepts (Balzacq,

Basaran, Bigo, Guittet and Olsson 2010; Bigo 2005a), a move that relativizes some of the tenets of Bourdieu's epistemology and methodology. Indeed, to a certain extent, Foucault's idea of relationality and relational power questions Bourdieu's methodology of localizing power through the measurement of capitals 'held' by positions/actors (Cronin 1996). Most of the latter literature tries to explore, in line with what we have called tracing, how securitization occurs and what actors, agencies and bureaucracies are involved in the process (Bonelli 2008). Indeed, the underlying assumption is that, as opposed to the Copenhagen School, securitization is not foremost a discursive process. Rejecting a too narrowly defined linguistic constructivism, they consider securitization to be fuelled by routinized practices as much as by discourses (Bigo 1996; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). Most of this literature also tends to focus on the role of security professionals (police, intelligence services, military, customs, insurance and private security companies and so on) sharing a common *doxa* and *habitus*, rather than on professionals of politics as the Copenhagen School would tend to do. This provides a fundamentally different understanding and constitution of security. Here it is foremost seen as a field of practice and, therefore, a central aim of these scholars is to understand how this field works: what kinds of capitals structure the struggles in this field; over what security professionals compete; what is at stake in the game played; what practices are involved; what are the dominant and marginal actors, how do the field of security and the field of politics interact or relate to one another? Didier Bigo and his team accordingly have tried to integrate some mapping, in the restrictive sense of the word, into their research practice in order to highlight relational dynamics between security-agencies as well as correlations between spaces of positions and spaces of position-taking.

### ***From topography to topology: abandoning the map, not the space?***

A major point in the critical endeavour of Didier Bigo has been the introduction of the concept of topology into the cartographic and 'topographic' world of mainstream security studies and of Bourdieuan sociology (Bigo 2001; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). Topography refers to the study and representation of the shape and features of a surface (of a planet, a landscape etc.). The geographical map can be one of its potential outcomes. Topology is a branch of mathematics interested in the continuous deformation of objects that involves stretching, but not tearing or gluing. It draws on geometrical concepts (space, dimension) but focuses on transformations and cannot take notions of border, inside/outside or of left/right for granted. Frequently, the latter cannot any longer be consistently defined. Classical examples studied in topology include the Möbius strip or the Klein bottle. Positions become not only relative to one another but also relative to the positionality of the mapper him- or herself. If you want to see the inside of a Möbius strip you can represent it, but it will be a partial view, a contestable view and hence ultimately a very unstable and contextual view.

The advantage of topology as a metaphor in security studies is that it allows thinking of practices that not only straddle boundaries, for example, police forces of an EU member state working in another country, but also that might also be taking place 'outside' and 'inside', depending on who is talking. For example, if these police forces working abroad are in the EU, then is it still abroad? And if they claim to provide for domestic security in a third state then is it outside or inside? As a heuristic device topology then is far more reflexive than the traditional graph with its abscissae and ordinate. It forces the researcher to relativize and to realize that in order to locate a point one has to first locate oneself and thus introduce perspective. However, it is also about the recognition that things are changing, transforming, and complex. It leads the viewer of the 'map' to realize how problematic it is to think in terms of inside/outside, as usually is done in traditional IR and security studies, but that at the same time our inclination to do so is permanently there. The topology metaphor deconstructs our cartographic imagination based on clear borders, and immutable positioning systems, while still allowing for a spatialized, albeit moving, representation of social reality. Ultimately, the context of production of topological analyses will be very different from the ones of bi-dimensional graphs.

It is then not a coincidence that Bigo's nuancing of Bourdieuan sociology, and his appropriation of the latter's mapping, has in particular targeted (and nuanced) the geographic/topographic assumptions of Bourdieuan fields-theory: the question of the role of social proximity in the expansion of networks of power (Bigo 1996); the idea that homology of positions and 'topologies of the neighbourhood' (Bigo 2005b) play a central role in structuring alliances of contiguous positions against remote ones; the idea that borders between fields are foremost 'fences' rather than junctures; the idea of a field of power that would be centrally linked to a specific state-linked (and hence a territorially bound) species of power capital (Bigo 2011). On this last point, Bigo has argued that the transversality of the field of (in)security professionals and the 'transnationality' of bureaucratic guilds questions the idea of a 'field of fields' fixing exchange rates between capitals at 'national' or 'global' levels. It is not only the central role of the State as a bureaucratic field that is here questioned, but with it also the idea of a 'force' capable of creating an unambiguously mappable meta-field.

However, the question that Bigo's work inevitably raises is how you can possibly have it both ways? The mathematics of topology is not amenable to graphic and 'parsimonious' representation through abscissae and ordinates. Is one not running the risk of inconsistency if one opposes topology to the topographic world of security-professionals while simultaneously trying to map the latter's relative positions on a bi-dimensional graph? The central point in Bigo's work is certainly that topology is mainly a metaphor to encourage reflexivity and to account for complexity, while the cartography of fields is seen as a methodology.<sup>5</sup> The tension between both is, however, seemingly irreducible. Bourdieuan maps have to be parsimonious if they are to show anything (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 218–260). Topology is fundamentally complex and messy and in this sense visualizes the limits of visualization.

## Latour: A theory of actor-networks

With a growing interest within IR and security studies to map security practices through the prism of ‘security assemblages’, the work of Bruno Latour increasingly appears in its bibliographies. Interest in Latour – and other scholars working under the broad umbrella of actor-network theory – can be linked to increasing attention to materiality in IR.<sup>6</sup>

This section argues that if the goal is to methodologically apprehend security practices, then actor-network theory (ANT) opens up a whole new terrain to be mapped. ANT expands the terrain because of its distinctive ontology that first, pays equal attention to the context of production and appropriation of maps/meanings/artefacts/security arrangements, and second, incorporates the materials assembled in security arrangements as equally relevant as ‘social’ constructions. In his classic essay ‘Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: the Sociology of a Door-Closer’, Latour playfully but poignantly points out that ‘what defines our social relations is, for the most part, prescribed back to us by nonhumans. Knowledge, morality, craft, force, sociability are not properties of humans but of humans accompanied by their retinue of delegated characters’, that is, the nonhuman entities that have been pre-inscribed with certain attributes that humans are later forced to deal with (1988: 310). Interaction, for Latour, should always be considered in the broader context of both the humans and nonhumans that are present and forceful. In other words, Latour’s idea of practice concerns ‘the mutual constitution of materiality and society in terms of networks of heterogeneous relations in which human and non-human combine’ (Bourne 2012: 153).

This translates into the purchase of Latour’s approach for mapping as a method, which can be summarized in the dual imperatives of *inclusiveness* and *symmetry*. The former relates to the question of how many diverse elements mapping as method allows us to assemble – do we really take into account all the discursive, practical, and material elements that are relevant in constituting a given actor-network? The latter asks whether mapping treats social/discursive and material/natural elements on the same ontological footing (Mayer and Schouten 2011: 20). Whereas, for instance, European integration is dominantly hailed as evidence for social constructivism (how *else* could European states integrate but by *thinking* differently about themselves and each other?), an ANT analysis would place in the foreground the multiple ways in which Europe is composed and connected through such things as infrastructure and the assembling of a new administrative scenery (Barry 1993; Walters 2002). That is, the Latourian world, in its symmetrical socio-materiality, is immensely more embodied, rich and heavier than a discursive or social constructivist world.

### Mapping heterogeneity

Latourian mapping classically focuses on the context of production of (arte)facts, that is, the process by which a controversy is assembled into a non-controversial fact or smoothly functioning artefact (such as a map) which is subsequently used as

a building block or relay in the settlement of yet other controversies by others (Schouten 2014; Venturini 2010). In short, Latour maps processes of stabilization (Kaghan and Bowker 2001: 258). This means that rather than making a normative statement about the essence of a given security practice, map, or artefact, the research question Latour would pose is: how does an array of unpredictable elements become tied together and stabilized (and ultimately produced) as stable actor-networks? The parallel with the mapping process is not difficult to articulate. Indeed, Latour time and time again returns to the production of maps as an example of how realities and ontologies are constantly created anew. Yet, besides mapping trajectories of the successful formation of new, strong actor-networks,<sup>7</sup> one can also study the many cases of the failure to assemble powerful actor-networks (i.e., Latour 1996). That is – returning to our cartographic example – a map can easily break down into gift-wrapping or a historical curiosity, simply because the elements assembled could not be held in place in a stable manner. This additional focus on the unmaking of maps, meanings, objects and security arrangements is a first point where Latourian mapping differs from Bourdieuan network analysis, which provides tools predominantly for studying the emergence of new configurations of relations in fields of power.

So how does one arrive at a Latourian mapping? Latour differs from Bourdieu by insisting more adamantly on having the actors themselves describe the connections, passage points, inequalities and imbalances that make up an actor-network. It is also the actors' own objectives that help constitute the measure of success in the establishment of a strong network. For Latour, the dictum is then to 'follow the actors' – whether they are maps, armies, drones, statistics, immigrants, or mentalities of rule. In this way, Latourian mapping can best be understood as being close to anthropology, with the main difference that ANT 'does' ethnography of trajectories. Latourian mapping differs from Bourdieuan mapping of social relations in that the trajectories of heterogeneous actors do not move within or between a fixed pre-given 'field' such as 'the economy' or 'bureaucracy', but rather concerns the making and unmaking of such ontologically stable differences. Importantly, this process does not end when an (arte)fact like a map is finished. Often, its significance derives from the context of appropriation – how it is subsequently circulated through other contexts and is used by other actors for purposes not foreseen during the process of assembling. This emphasizes the general stance of ANT that it is never only about actors, but rather about their networked nature: how they are composed and became relevant through connections between heterogeneous elements (Schouten 2013b). In order to map such actor-networks or assemblages, one has to trace *associations* by asking:

- How causes and effects are attributed,
- What points are linked to which other,
- What size and strength these links have,
- Who the most legitimate spokespersons are,
- And how all these elements are modified during the controversy.

(Latour 1987: 202)

Luckily, the processes of assembling and closing controversies, leaves traces: actors are constantly in the process of indicating who should or should not be considered part of their group (Latour 2005: 30ff). In order to map networks, the researcher must attempt to understand what the actors in the network are doing and attempting to do. This means that all intricacies of political practice must potentially be taken seriously by the researcher. As the phenomena to be mapped are assemblages of heterogeneous actants – such as technological tools, natural entities, statistical effects, discursive constructions and human bodies – the mapper him- or herself needs to deploy a variety of mapping tools. As such, ANT requires one to deploy a variety of methods in his or her mapping toolbox: interviewing is needed to have spokespersons attribute agency and causality; participant observation helps relate discursive renderings to the circulations of objects and their relations to institutionalized practice. In terms of method, ANT places the same burden on researchers as varieties of non-local ethnography (cf. Feldman 2011): the mapper needs to situate him- or herself *in media res* and deploy the full spectrum of his or her senses to register agency. Thus, as with topology, the researcher's position plays a pivotal role in accounting for the mapping produced. Indeed, in our academic mapping exercises, we are the most important tool. For Latour, following Merleau-Ponty, understanding the world is not separate from engaging with it. This means that ANT sees the work of the mapper as the same feat as the object of study: if an actor-network is assembled by a series of translations, then a mapping is to be seen as another such translation. The end product of Latourian mapping is a final translation by the social scientist (an inscription such as a narrative, image, map or moving thing on a screen)<sup>8</sup> displaying a series of previous translations. Importantly, this final translation is itself implicated in (dis)assembling the social – it acts as a spokesperson that shifts, distorts, and contributes to a different rendering of the elements assembled (Ruming 2009; also see Chapter 5 in this volume). This also means that Latour sees a great responsibility for social scientists as complicit in crafting the world around us: as the maps we study, our (no matter how un/critical) mappings of the world equally travel and act in the world. As the researcher delves into the life of security assemblages, a life that cuts across context of production and appropriation, ANT challenges the very distinction between the production of ontologically stable objects of inquiry and their circulation.

### ***Mapping and power***

Latour does not localize power in specific classes of actors but rather in connections and translation processes between humans and nonhumans (Passoth and Rowland 2010). As such, power is never held within one individual but should rather be conceptualized as relational, held collectively – but never symmetrically – within the actor-network. ‘The word “network” indicates that resources are concentrated in a few places – the knots and the nodes – which

are connected with one another – the links and the mesh: these connections transform the scattered resources into a net that may seem to extend everywhere’ (Latour 1987: 180). Power in this sense is always fluid, with strong parallels to Foucault’s understanding: for both, power is practised and relational (Deleuze 1988: 71), it is ‘action upon action’, articulated in efforts ‘to incite, to seduce, to make easy or difficult, to enlarge or limit, to make more or less probable, and so on’ (Deleuze 1988: 70). As another ANT scholar, John Law, argues, power should be mapped as an *effect* rather than a cause (1992: 387) – we cannot assume the a priori presence of power in certain locales or actors, but need to show how power is the assembled outcome of translations – thus uncovering at the same time how power itself is unstable. This stands in contrast at least to part of critical studies whose criticality is defined as the a priori assumption that power can be stably situated in certain configurations – something underpinning both neogramscian IPE (International Political Economy) (Cox 1981) and certain branches of critical security studies that assume – rather than show – certain voices to be structurally marginalized by dominant power arrangements, thus in fact contributing to the mystification of the very power structures they mean to challenge.

Let’s illustrate this with the example of cartographic map-making. For Latourians, mapping is a political process, for two reasons. First, the process is essentially a violent struggle of silencing, separating out, and resistance. Second, mapping is political because the map, once stabilized, creates a power asymmetry in the subsequent settlement of yet *other* controversies.

The first political aspect of mapping is that it comprises the translation of partial interpretations of controversies and matters of concern into authoritative representations of matter of fact. Often, this involves the flattening of confusing three-dimensional places and movements into less confusing two-dimensional representations (Latour and Woolgar 1986). Actor-network theory sees a map as an engine, not as a camera (MacKenzie 2006): it is a *dispositif* that changes, distorts, acts in the world.<sup>9</sup> Yet, Latourian mapping, rather than effacing this process of distortion, aims to show how this translation is neither easily achieved nor permanent, by effectuating the reverse movement, tracing stable fact or power arrangement back to when it was still a controversy. This entails uncovering the intense process of separating out and assembling, the artefact ‘map’ is made to overcome, straighten out, and hold stable the multiplicity, controversy, and resistance that were part of the struggle inherent in the mapping process. These elements have now become stabilized, cleaned out, and separated.<sup>10</sup> And yet, pending its circulation, interpretation and use in the world, the seemingly stable order is always at risk of breaking down. The map needs always to be reproduced, upheld, and enacted. Methodologically, this stance implies that a focus on the context of production of a map is not enough to understand – and destabilize – an object of inquiry, be it a security arrangement or a map; the ontology of the object of inquiry continues to undergo important shifts during its subsequent life as it circulates through contexts of appropriation.

## MAPS, POWER, AND COLONIAL EXPANSION

Colonial expansion is a recurring theme in classical ANT studies. John Law, in his essay 'Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of the Portuguese Expansion' (1987), delves into the Portuguese struggle to overcome the Cape Bojador, a point in the ocean near the African coast notoriously difficult to navigate by sailing ship due to its strong winds. Portuguese expansion, he argues, was not a matter of some immanent superiority, but rather an exciting struggle to overcome and enlist the forces of nature inside the socio-technical assemblage of the galleass – the large merchant galley. Latour equally devotes much attention to explain how pivotal maps were in producing the colonial power to govern at a distance. For Latour, the reason why the Portuguese, French, and Dutch conquered the world in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has less to do with advanced weaponry and more to do with the concentration of maps in European 'centres of calculation' that enabled European rulers to take decisions regarding far-flung places – without ever having been there (Latour 1987: 219).

Commercial interests, capitalist spirit, imperialism, thirst for knowledge, are empty terms as long as one does not take into account Mercator's projection, marine clocks and their markers, copper engraving of maps, rutters, the keeping of 'log books', and the many printed editions of Cook's voyages that La Pérouse carries with him.

*(Latour 2011b: 6)*

Related to this, an increasing number of studies have started mapping the internal projection of state power in Western history. As an example, Carroll shows how mapping created a power asymmetry between the mapper and those mapped: maps allowed the British to settle controversies in their interest, against those of Irish local communities (Carroll 2006). In the same vein, Mitchell (2002) shows how establishing British rule in Egypt was essentially a diverse technical process, involving the introduction of accounting methods, infrastructure schemes, and the assembling of the 'great land map of Egypt' that renders Egypt as an immense agriculture project. One of the main points he drives home is that economics or more generally expert knowledge 'works to format social relations, never simply to report or picture them' (2002: 118). James C. Scott famously argued that state-produced, centralized mapping efforts are inevitably political and often contested by the mental maps local communities draw of their environment; maps that are silenced by imposing a 'hegemonic' mapping from the centre. Local communities have often violently resisted the mapping efforts imposed from capitals, as these mapping efforts distort or rule out

their own map, their own understanding of their surroundings (Scott 1998). Finally, Harley's work draws on the impact of colonial maps on the Native American peoples, which representationally cleared their presence from their traditional lands making it *available* for the taking (1989). This diverse body of work shares a critical focus on the map, and mapping, as a (contingent) agent in political struggles of control over territories and populations; struggles that are mediated by a heterogeneous ensemble of colonial mapping practices.

Power to rule across the globe, then, derives not from some abstract (discursive) force of superiority but rather from knowledge devices connecting and travelling through fragile technical assemblages (Latour 2005: 70–76). This is exactly what Miller and Rose meant when they tried to capture the distinctiveness of modern government by combining notions deriving from governmentality with vocabulary from ANT. They describe neo-liberal governance as 'government at a distance' through 'loose and mobile networks' (Miller and Rose 1990: 1). Yet, for ANT-mappers, power does not simply float around. Rather, ANT helps to account for the simple fact that the capacity to create a map itself is the outcome of a cumulative process of assembling that results in a disparity of power: mapping requires an expansive and expensive array of tools, devices, and voyages to assemble the elements captured in a map.

For ANT, by extension, power can *always* be mapped and localized because it is always attributed or translated by, or mediated through, observable phenomena. This poses either a heavy methodological burden on those interested in mapping power, or can alternatively mean a relief for those with empiricist inclinations. ANT, in this way, is at odds with approaches to politics conceiving of power as immanent, de-territorialized, or infested in ungraspable social phenomena: if the researcher cannot map a relation of domination but needs to read it in a security discourse by adding layers of interpretation, it is not an ANT mapping.

Second, ANT-mappers caution us that the struggle does not stop at the limits of the context of production, that is, when a map is produced and the complex reality has been nicely tied together in a black box, the political life of technologies such as maps continues into the context of appropriation, and is determined by what other actors do to it next, how do they enable or limit other actors to pursue their agendas? This means that for the mapper, looking at the production of maps is only half of the story. After production, maps need to be continuously enacted and performed: it is not enough for borders to be drawn on a map to speak of country borders (Passoth and Rowland 2010). Whole assemblages of practices, discourse, and material elements need to be in place to speak felicitously of a 'state border'. As such, *powerful* maps of nation-states are entangled, and often become political or juridical instruments, with security practices in 'sociotechnical imaginaries' (Jasanoff and Kim 2009).

## Mapping security

As Wight noted in 2004, there had hitherto been a marked absence of engagement with ANT in international relations (Wight 2004). However, interest in ANT is emerging in IR, and two prevalent lines of inquiry can be distinguished. The first shows the contingency and political nature of mappings, while the second emphasizes the material in the constitution of international order and discord.

In the first line of inquiry one finds, for example, studies mapping how human security has arisen out of controversy, to subsequently be adopted by others as powerful actants in yet other struggles.<sup>11</sup> For example, Büger (2008) interrogates the emergent concept of human security as a 'boundary object' and its impact on the existent landscape of 'communities of security practice'. As part of understanding the emergence of the concept Büger applies Latour's notion of 'black boxing', referring to the process involving translation and mediation to produce an unquestioned *fact*, by smoothing out all the disagreement in the final object of human security that is made to circulate in epistemic communities concerned. More broadly, Stritzel argues that 'securitization' should be understood as the circulation of meanings in communities (2011a, b), a process greatly facilitated by 'immutable mobiles'<sup>12</sup> such as maps. If, as he argues, securitization concerns essentially the *localization* of a threat, then successful securitization is indeed as much about understandings of threat engendered by such artefacts as maps, as it is about the fabrication of new maps localizing dangers itself. This is illustrated in, for instance, criminology where the practice of surveillance has been analysed as an assemblage of technologies and practices that are no longer confined to state institutions. Rather, risk management is contingent upon circulation of 'immutable mobiles' in the form of statistics, measurements and indicators in 'security assemblages' composed of security specialists, social workers, and health professionals (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Deleuze 1992; Haggerty and Ericson 2000). Such security assemblages, while made up of dispersed and heterogeneous elements, can also be analysed and studied as actants that act upon particular concerns in a specific way. They are global but not de-territorialized; rather, they converge around specific sites or spheres of activities (Schouten 2011). A number of studies stand out in this line; they both show how migration is mapped, and how the migrant is acted upon by such security assemblages. William Walters emphasizes how popular maps of migration frame it as a security issue threatening the West. Through a detailed reading of a variety of such maps, he shows how these selective representations depoliticize migration by keeping out of view the forces that cause migration in the first place (2010). In the same vein, Voelkner (2011) shows how human security allowed the Thai government to depoliticize migrant health by translating it into a technical matter. Feldman shifts the focus from the maps to the process of mapping of illegal migrants, situating it in an assemblage made up of GIS systems, treaties, biometric passport data and large-scale IT-systems that mediate and constrain how disparate migration officials act upon the migrant (Feldman 2011). Finally, Bellanova and Fuster (2013) and Schouten (2014) map how the emergence of the security scanner at European

airports entails the reassembling of heterogeneous elements and, ultimately, the disappearance of earlier, less convenient, security solutions. Actor-network theory can help to map how such dispersed elements are made to act as one in governance processes, and hence can be considered an actant. While studies that focus on the production of novel security governance arrangements can have a tendency to present us with rather gloomy, totalizing apparatuses, counter-mappings are increasingly being drawn out, aimed at using the same method to open up a space of contestation in the context of appropriation and circulation of such security assemblages (Crampton 2008). One example, introduced by Walters, is the ‘Geografía crítica del Estrecho de Gibraltar’, a mapping project showing us a critical account of the militarization of borders, conflicts, dangers and exclusion mechanisms at work to keep migrants out of the EU.<sup>13</sup> Thus, ANT mappings challenge a focus on either the context of production or appropriation of security arrangements and follows the ‘life’ of security assemblages over time (cf. Adey and Anderson 2012).

The second line of inquiry is represented by studies emphasizing the role of material arrangements and technologies in restricting and enabling international security politics.<sup>14</sup> Bourne challenges CSS to take seriously the roles that weapons play in mediating and limiting international politics, while Pouliot (2010) argues that NATO and Russia’s diplomatic practices ontologically collapse natural, cultural and organizational artefacts into a single level of understanding – something inadequately captured by either realism or social constructivism. Methodologically, Gusterson (2004) takes it one step further, conducting ethnographic fieldwork inside the contemporary nuclear weapons complex, to probe the global distribution of imaginaries of identity and power mediated by the asymmetrical distribution of weapons. Finally, Wasinski (2011) argues that coordinating war requires defining soldiers, which relies on the diffusion of strategic thinking mediated by software and military institutions. These examples go to illustrate the affinities between the topological approach to Bourdieuan mapping developed by Bigo and ANT in the sense that they deploy a similar focus on entities-in-relation as the object of mapping (cf. Marres 2012); yet one cardinal difference is between the ontological focus on *social* power relations in the former and a refusal to decide a priori on an ontological focal point in the latter.

### **EXAMPLE: MAPS PRACTICING SECURITY AND CRIME**

The agency of maps in security practices is both very concrete and ambiguous. Actor-network theory demands us to show how (in)security is made ‘real’ outside of the localized context of production (‘security assemblages’ such as government offices, insurance companies), a process contingent upon popularization, divulging an acceptance by broader audiences. Maps play such a role, translating dangerous crime into a ‘real’, tangible, everyday sensation. In downtown Johannesburg, Schouten (2012) shows how (in)security is made

real through an assemblage composed of police, private security companies and CCTV upholding the 'safe' areas. Yet space in Johannesburg is also produced as (in)secure through maps that the municipality freely distributes to South Africans and tourists. The map separates out the secure colourful areas – where the rules of the market hold – from an insecure sea of grey on the map. As such, the map translates a multitude of controversies (Where to navigate? What is (in)security?) into a government-endorsed artefact that objectifies the formal economy as secure, and the informal economy as insecure. Visitors to downtown Johannesburg are seduced into moving through restricted, government-endorsed, and privately secured spaces – a restriction mediated pivotally by maps. Rather than a mere discursive move, the political securitization of the informal economy in South Africa entails the constant assembling of an array of heterogeneous elements, including crime statistics, popular news items, private security guards and tourist maps.

Methodologically, mapping the map as an actor in the construction of crime and insecurity, involves tracing crime statistics produced in governmental 'centres of calculation' through the security assemblage made up by police stations, private security guards, GIS technologies and tourist maps. In practice, this entails 'following the map' both into the context of production – the police units where crime is turned from a question mark into a 'stable' entity through inscription in statistics and geocoding – and into the context of appropriation – where private security companies capitalize on mapped crime 'quantifacts' to sell their services and enact mapped (in)security, thus amplifying the racialized spatialization of (in)security along the border between the grey and the coloured areas on the map of downtown Johannesburg.

What both lines of research share – those that map the life of security arrangements over time, and those that emphasize the role of materiality and technologies in security assemblages – is that they force us to rethink that the terrain to be mapped logically encompasses not discourse or materiality, but the entanglements of both in specific instances. These examples show that ANT uncovers vast new terrains, cross-cutting any type of foundational dichotomy that typically structures the field of enquiry of security studies: binary categories like state/non-state, private/public, domestic/foreign, politics/science, or even discursive/material or natural/technological (Mayer and Schouten 2011). One can say that Latourian mapping helps to elucidate and open up entanglements of discourse, practice and artefact that are involved in contemporary security governance. The methodological imperative of symmetry in ANT and science and technology studies (STS) – not deciding a priori whether discourse or practice, humans or technologies matter most – means that the researcher needs to apply the same kind of analysis to graphs, accounting, and statistics as to securitization, terrorism, and biopower (Schouten 2014). One of the biggest points of ANT that yet remains to be translated into IR is the observation

that assemblages fall apart when no longer performed (Latour 2005: 25, 76). If social and political institutions and insecurities require efforts to uphold, it means that – even more radically than for social constructivism – anarchy, failing financial markets, and terrorism are fabrications of our own making (Mitchell 2002: 3). Yet, against securitization theory, such risks are not merely discursively constituted, but materially as well. Indeed, if studies of nuclear proliferation and security studies more generally are to take the material seriously, then the coalitions that become the subject of inquiry – entanglements of weapons, soldiers, and alliances of regulations, risks, and infrastructures – form terrains far from easy to capture. Yet by opening up the academic gaze of critical security studies to the polyvalency of (in)security, ANT as method has the potential to render criticality empirically graspable and to expand the scope of politics into even wider realms.

In sum, ANT mapping is unique in combining an ethnographic-like sensitivity to empirical concerns with a set of theoretical ‘anti’-assumptions that require the researcher to *refrain* from deciding beforehand where to place the focus in entering the field, which itself stretches across context of production and appropriation of security arrangements. Taken together, these two premises open up an exciting matrix of largely unexplored research topics in security studies.

### ***Comparison and conclusion***

Bourdieu and Latour have both been gaining traction in critical security studies and discussions on how to apply their respective methodologies to the field are rife. Having discussed their two approaches to mapping in security studies in-depth, in this final section we take some distance to look at points of encounter and critical purchase of both methods.

### ***Overlaps***

First, while there are significant differences between Latour- and Bourdieu-inspired maps and mapping processes, there are ways that their accounts may overlap. We are interested in teasing out how they might relate and indeed speak to each other. We regard this as an important first step to be taken before entering the circulating debate on their irreconcilable disciplinarity or theoretical differences as is sometimes assumed (even by the theorists themselves).

First, both Bourdieuan and Latourian approaches to security would argue that there is more to security than discursive approaches would imply. For both, security is practised in a myriad of ways beyond speech acts – even if they have different ideas on the critical components of security practices to be mapped. Bourdieuans warrant a focus on technical expertise and the bureaucratic layers of security practitioners that keep the entire system of security governance afloat; Latourians emphasize the entanglements of discourse, practice and materialities in specific security assemblages. Although they may map different phenomena, they share a move away from focusing on discourse or speech acts.

Second, in rendering fields and actor-networks respectively, instability seems to be an ontological characteristic. Both Latour and Bourdieu, due to their relational ontology, see change and modification of position or network as entirely possible. Bourdieu holds the relations (or structure) to be primary in constraining or allowing change – gradual change can be uncovered in a repeated mapping of social relations – while Latour sees change as the natural state, with actors required to work very hard to prevent it – maps being one of the ways in which actors ‘hold’ a particular configuration stable over time. Their work amounts to a significant opening vis-à-vis extant approaches to security that start from fixed threats, deep structures, or other exogenous analytical points of departure.

Third, both Bourdieu and Latour, albeit to a different extent, allow the actors investigated to map out the limits of the field or actor-network respectively. This overlap is especially strong between the topological approach to field mapping and ANT. What it means is that both approaches require a proclivity for empirical research and rely on more or less the same data-gathering techniques, including interviewing, participant observation, archival and other documentary research. Slight differences in methodological preferences might however be highlighted. While Latourians tend to conduct semi-structured interviews embedded in participant observation, in Bourdieuan mapping bigger groups of individuals are usually targeted, meaning that interviewing moves towards social survey methods and that participant observation is combined with data, often in statistical form, on the relevant attributes of the social agents under consideration. That said, both methodologies entail different ways of analysing the collected data as previously seen.

A final overlap in terms of mapping is their stance towards space and time. To provide a rough sketch, we might say that Bourdieu’s approach to mapping is a single snapshot with an impressive ability to change scale when necessary. On the other hand, Latour’s approach is more akin to a slide show of the journey unfolding into the present.<sup>15</sup> For Bourdieu, relations of power, once mapped, can be seen on both large and small scale, in both the instance and the general. In this way, such a map is interested in the spaces of power – where it is located and mobilized. It is a wonderful tool for pictorializing what might not have been readily apparent from inside the relations being described as it might not be easy to see the landscape of power while influenced by its relations. In contrast, and what is often forgotten by ANT practitioners, Latour’s approach and his now classic mappings are often more about time than about space. An ANT account of settling a controversy provides a vantage point through which the reader is involved in the life of a map by tracing different moments in its creation. We see when and how it was established, what routes it took on the way to settlement or the category of ‘black box’.<sup>16</sup>

### **Criticality**

The issue of criticality presents itself in different ways within Latour- and Bourdieu-inspired mappings. What makes a map is its ability to fix space (temporarily) so that others may ‘see’ what the mapper has seen. Fixity, then, appears as a key attribute

of maps, but it does not guarantee either criticality or ‘uncriticality’. Rather, in light of the argument introduced in the beginning of the chapter, that maps do bring forth new territories, or rather that maps co-constitute space, reflexivity seems crucial for the conduct of critical work.

For Bourdieu, mapping is method, and the map a tool to expose relations of power, rather than an object of investigation in itself. The map sets out, in visual terms, the structures that uphold social life yet the world outside the map takes precedent and is not held in check by the mapper’s representation. This means that it is incumbent upon the researcher to ‘add criticality’ by investing meaning and purpose in the maps they produce. What is at stake in the addition of ‘topology’ is an attempt to add new dimensions to what would have otherwise been the tempting trap of the two-dimensional and ‘complete’ map. Reflexivity is only now being introduced to the mapping process, a questioning of the researchers’ own position in the mapping process, and the frank impossibility of seeing all.

Much like a Foucaultian genealogy, Latourian mapping seeks to unwind a now stable entity back into the past, tracing it back to when it was still a controversy. This mapping process, is for Latour, itself a profoundly reflexive struggle, leading to a contestable and partial settling of a controversy. The map here, for Latour, is explicitly political first because description renders new realities amenable for scrutiny, and second since, in tracing back stable entities to when they were still controversial, mapping reveals possible alternative pathways that did not ‘win’ the ‘battle’. Assembling a parsimonious fact, map, or scholarly account needs by necessity to exclude more than it includes (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 1999). In this, ANT never tires to emphasize the researcher’s active role in assembling his or her object of research (Çalışkan and Callon 2009: 371; Chilvers and Evans 2009: 359; Ruming 2009). For Latour, ‘society’ itself only exists because it has been actively assembled – imposed – by researchers upon their research subject (Latour 2005: 33–34). In the same vein, the ‘economy’ is the admirable product of economists (Çalışkan and Callon 2009; MacKenzie 2006; Mitchell 2005). Actor-network theory forces the researcher to make explicit his or her own responsibility as spokesperson for the very assemblage that he or she engages with, and the performative effect of research output as an ‘actor’ that can be assembled in unpredictable ways, for a multiplicity of purposes, by others.

Ultimately, the biggest difference between Bourdieuan and Latourian mapping may reside in their underlying ambition, which seeps through in every aspect of their respective approaches. Bourdieuans, in mapping security practices, have the ambition to ‘try to extract the general principles of an economy of symbolic goods’ (Bourdieu 1998: 93), that is, the ‘stake at stake’. Sociologists should focus on the field, not on individuals. Individual actors and their preferences are ‘exponents of a field’ (Schinkel 2007: 710, 720) produced and constrained by the map Bourdieuans draw. Latourians, by contrast, see no field but only an on-going proliferation and movement of individual entities, connecting, disconnecting, and re-assembling. They side with Whitehead’s observation that ‘there are no whole truths; all truths are half-truths. It is trying to treat them as whole truths that plays

the devil' (Whitehead 2001: 13). The difference between Latour and Bourdieu can be put starkly:

Bourdieu and Latour can be seen as trying to capture the same transformation from opposing perspectives: Bourdieu, the director of the leading state-supported research institute in the social sciences, critiquing the ways the state has buckled under external economic pressures; Latour, the resident sociologist at a leading beneficiary of the emerging neoliberal order, denying that the state ever had much control in the first place.

*(Fuller 2000: 16)*

Latour is interested in explaining how out of 'reality multiple' ultimately one version of a map emerged as dominant. In rigorous ANT, 'if a description remains in need of an explanation, it means that it is a bad description' (Latour 2005: 137). From this follows a lot of critique from post-Marxist social scientists at ANT's refusal to take a priori a critical stance. Because the ethnographic proximity it requires raises issues in contexts that are either highly insecure or non-democratic, ANT has been wedded to the industrialized, democratic context of unfolding Weberian rationalization and thus, most ANT studies are conducted either inside laboratories or large corporations, where all aspects of controversies are readily available (cf. Barry 2013). A survey of literature conducted for this chapter shows that there are hardly any ANT studies available on war, terrorism, and physical violence more generally or in 'non-Weberian' areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa. Studying (in)security often involves secrecy and violence, distorting the actor-network accessible to the researcher, or simply precluding access. Perhaps this is why Latour makes a fictitious student argue the following in a platonic dialogue on 'doing' ANT: 'You might not like Bourdieu very much, but at least he was a real scientist, and even better, he was politically relevant. As far as I can tell, your ANT is neither.' (Latour 2005: 155) Yet the same criticism can, to a large extent, be raised with Bourdieuan analysis. It would be hard to imagine conducting a large and rigorous survey on, say, the 'subfield' of rebel movements in Eastern Congo. Yet where for Latour the map in itself, the mapping of how a map, or another artefact or entity came into being, is the self-sufficient end-point of analysis, for Bourdieu subsequent scrutiny of the power relations now revealed is the real 'stake at stake'. Bourdieuans see their mapping as a martial art, with an explicitly critical agenda, which makes it fit more comfortably into critical security studies. Nevertheless, it might be argued that in deciding a priori what is critical, Bourdieu takes the 'god's view from nowhere' and this ideological rigour means he loses out on the potential of scientific discovery through empirical research: ANT is a methodology of surprises that allows the researcher to enter the field and emerge with something he or she didn't know beforehand.

## Notes

- 1 The authors would like to thank first Christopher Alderson for his elaborate collaboration at an early stage of this chapter, and furthermore those attending the series of ICCM

- meetings and Maximilian Mayer and Christophe Wasinski for their comments on previous versions of this chapter.
- 2 See, for instance, Adler and Pouliot (2011), Büger and Villumsen (2007), Huysmans (2011), Neumann 2002.
  - 3 A small selection of abundant examples: Andreas (2003), Cerny (2009), Coward (2009), Higate and Henry (2009), Reid-Henry (2011), Der Derian (2001), Dupont (2006), Stern and Öjendal (2010).
  - 4 See <http://mappingcontroversies.net>. Accessed 3 May 2014.
  - 5 What we mean here is that the methodologies used in topology, as the mathematical study of spaces and shapes, are not followed by the 'Paris School', nor are they intended to be. When Didier Bigo refers in his work to the Klein bottle or the Möbius strip it is foremost to draw attention, by analogy, to some of the concrete limits of our geographical understandings of security rather than to imply a concrete methodology derived from topological mathematics.
  - 6 See most notably contributions to the special issue of *Millennium* (41:3, June 2013) on Materialism in International Relations.
  - 7 Or assemblages, or associations, or black boxes, or *dispositifs* – Latour, in a typically French tradition of fast-thinking philosophers, is not at ease with stable terminology.
  - 8 See Venturini (2010; 2012) for an elaborate discussion of inscription methods used to map controversies.
  - 9 Note the overlap with Foucaultian thinking. Foucault describes the *dispositif* (or apparatus) as 'a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid' (1980: 194).
  - 10 For more discussion on assembling as exclusion, see Bloomfield and Vurdubakis (1999).
  - 11 Büger (2008), Büger and Bethke (2014), Mayer (2012), Stritzel (2011a, b).
  - 12 'Immutable mobiles' refers to assemblages that behave as single artefacts but are at once (contingent on) 'networks'. The notion started gaining its current purchase, however, after the introduction of the concept in a different, post-modern meaning by Deleuze and Guattari (2005 [1987]). They use the concept to unpack the singularity infested in phenomena: a book is an assemblage, because it is – amongst the many other readings they give it – an attempt to join and fix lines and meaning in space, while at the same time opening up lines of flight and deterritorialization; both a product of nature and human artefacts (ibid: 3–4).
  - 13 For maps see [http://mcs.hackitectura.net/tiki-browse\\_gallery.php?galleryId=7&offset=0](http://mcs.hackitectura.net/tiki-browse_gallery.php?galleryId=7&offset=0). Accessed 27 March 2014.
  - 14 Bourne (2012), Flanck (1994), Fridlund (2011), Peoples (2010), Pouliot (2010), Ritchie (2010), Schouten (2013a), Wasinski (2011). Interestingly, most of this work focuses on nuclear proliferation. For the same call for materiality in CSS, inspired by the work of Haraway and Barad, see Aradau (2010) and Feigenbaum (2010).
  - 15 Note again the overlap with Foucaultian thinking ('archeology/history of the present'), cf. Deleuze (1992).
  - 16 See figure in Mayer (2012: 168).

## References

- Abrahamsen, R., and Williams, M.C. (2009). 'Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics'. *International Political Sociology*, 3(1): 1–17.
- Adey, Peter, and Anderson, B. (2012). 'Anticipating Emergencies: Technologies of Preparedness and the Matter of Security'. *Security Dialogue*, 43(2): 99–117.
- Adler, E., and Pouliot, V. (2011). 'International Practices'. *International Theory*, 3(01): 1–36.
- Adler-Nissen, R. (ed.) (2012). *Bourdieu in International Relations. Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*. London: Routledge.

- Agnew, J. (1994). 'The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory'. *Review of International Political Economy*, 1(1): 53–80.
- Amoore, L., and de Goede, M. (2005). 'Governance, Risk and Dataveillance in the War on Terror'. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 43(2): 149–173.
- Andreas, P. (2003). 'Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-first Century'. *International Security*, 28(2): 78–111.
- Aradau, C. (2010). 'Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection'. *Security Dialogue*, 41(5): 491–514.
- Balzacq, T., Basaran, T., Bigo, D., Guittet, E., and Olsson, C. (2010). 'Security Practices' in Robert A. Denemark (ed.) *International Studies Encyclopedia Online*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Barnett, T.P.M. (2003). 'The Pentagon's New Map'. *Esquire*, March, 174–176.
- Barry, A. (1993). 'The European Community and European Government: Harmonization, Mobility and Space'. *Economy and Society*, 22(3): 314–326.
- (2013). 'The Translation Zone: Between Actor-Network Theory and International Relations'. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 41(3): 413–429.
- Bellanova, R., and Fuster, G.G. (2013). 'Politics of Disappearance: Scanners and (Unobserved) Bodies as Mediators of Security Practices'. *International Political Sociology*, 7(2): 188–209.
- Bigo, D. (1996). *Polices en réseaux. L'expérience européenne*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- (2001). 'The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)' in Mathias, A. (ed.), *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking international relations theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 91–116.
- (2005a). 'Gérer les transhumances. La surveillance à distance dans le champ transnational de la sécurité' in *Penser avec Foucault. Théorie critique et pratiques politiques*. M. C. Grangeon (ed.), Paris: Karthala. pp. 129–160.
- (2005b). 'La mondialisation de l'(in)sécurité? Réflexions sur le champ des professionnels de la gestion des inquiétudes et analytique de la transnationalisation des processus d'(in)sécurisation'. *Cultures & Conflits*, 58, summer.
- (2011). 'Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of Power', *International Political Sociology*, 5(3): 225–258.
- Bigo, D., and Walker, R.B.J. (2007). 'International, Political, Sociology', *International Political Sociology*, 1(1): 1–5.
- Bigo, D., and Tsoukala, A. (eds.) (2008). *Terror, Liberty and Security: Illiberal practices of illiberal regimes*. London: Routledge.
- Bloomfield, B.P., and Vurdubakis, T. (1999). 'The Outer Limits: Monsters, Actor Networks and the Writing of Displacement'. *Organization*, 6(4): 625–647.
- Boin, A., and Ekengren, M. (2009). 'Preparing for the World Risk Society: Towards a New Security Paradigm for the European Union'. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 17(4): 285–294.
- Bonelli, L. (2008). *La France a peur. Une histoire sociale de l'insécurité*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Bourdieu, P. (1980). 'Le capital social. Notes provisoires', *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 31(January): 2–3.
- (1984). *Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- (1991). *Language and Symbolic Power*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- (1998). *Practical Reason: On the theory of action*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- (1999). *Homo Academicus*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- (2003). *Counterfire: Against the tyranny of the market*. London: Verso.
- (2004). *Science of Science and Reflexivity*. Oxford: Polity Press.

- Bourdieu, P., and Wacquant, L. (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Bourdieu, P., and Fritsch, P. (2000) *Propos sur le champ politique*. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon.
- Bourne, M. (2012). 'Guns Don't Kill People, Cyborgs do: A Latourian Provocation for Transformatory Arms Control and Disarmament'. *Global Change, Peace & Security*, 24(1): 141–163.
- Branch, J. (2011). 'Mapping the Sovereign State: Technology, Authority, and Systemic Change'. *International Organization*, 65(01): 1–36.
- Büger, C. (2008). Human Security – What's the use of it? Unpublished Working Paper. European University Institute. Available at: [www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/bueger/Documents/B%C3%BCger,%20Christian%20\(2008\)%20Human%20Security%20\(Final%20Version\).pdf](http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/bueger/Documents/B%C3%BCger,%20Christian%20(2008)%20Human%20Security%20(Final%20Version).pdf) Accessed 27 March 2014.
- Büger, C., and Villumsen, T. (2007). 'Beyond the Gap: Relevance, Fields of Practice and the Securitizing Consequences of (Democratic Peace) Research'. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 10(4): 417–448.
- Büger, C., and Bethke, F. (2014). 'Actor-networking the "failed state": An Inquiry into the Life of Concepts'. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 17: 30–60.
- Butler, J. (2008). *Sexual Politics, Social Change and the Power of Performativity*. New York: Routledge.
- Çalışkan, K., and Callon, M. (2009). 'Economization, Part 1: Shifting Attention from the Economy Towards Processes of Economization'. *Economy and Society*, 38(3): 369–398.
- Carroll, P. (2006). *Science, Culture, and Modern State Formation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- C.A.S.E. Collective (2006). 'Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto', *Security Dialogue*, 37(4): 443–487.
- Cerny, P.G. (2009). 'Multi-nodal Politics: Globalisation is What Actors Make of it'. *Review of International Studies*, 35(02): 421–449.
- Chilvers, J., and Evans, J. (2009). 'Understanding Networks at the Science-policy Interface'. *Geoforum*, 40(3): 355–362.
- Collier, S.J., and Lakoff, A. (2009). 'On Vital Systems Security'. International Affairs Working Paper, February.
- Coulangeon, P., and Lemel, Y. (2009). 'The Homology Thesis: Distinction Revisited' in Robson, K. and Sanders, C. (eds), *Quantifying Theory: Pierre Bourdieu*. Toronto: Springer. 47–60.
- Coward, M. (2009). 'Network-Centric Violence, Critical Infrastructure and the Urbanization of Security'. *Security Dialogue*, 40(4–5): 399–418.
- Cox, R.W. (1981). 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 10(2), 126–155.
- Crampton, J. (2008). 'Cartography: Maps 2.0'. *Progress in Human Geography*, 33(6).
- Cronin, C. (1996). 'Bourdieu and Foucault on Power and Modernity'. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 22(6): 55–85.
- Czarniawska, B., and Sevón, G. (eds.), (2005). *Global Ideas. How Ideas, Objects and Practices Travel in the Global Economy*. Malmö: Liber & Copenhagen Business School Press.
- Dezalay, Y., and Garth, B. (2002). *The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, economists, and the contest to transform Latin American states*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F. (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1988). *Foucault*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1992). 'What is a dispositive?' in T.J. Armstrong (ed.), *Michel Foucault, Philosopher: Essays translated from the French and German*. New York: Routledge. pp. 159–168.
- Deleuze, G. (1992). 'Postscript on the Societies of Control'. *October*, 59, 3–7.

- Der Derian, J. (2001). *Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- Dupont, B. (2006). 'Mapping Security Networks: From Metaphorical Concept to Empirical Model' in J. Fleming and J. Wood (eds), *Fighting Crime Together: The challenges of policing and security networks*. Sydney, NSW Australia: UNSW Press. pp. 35–59.
- Feigenbaum, A. (2010). 'Concrete Needs No Metaphor: Globalized Fences as Sites of Political Struggle'. *Ephemera*, 10(2): 119–133.
- Feldman, G. (2011). 'If Ethnography is More Than Participant-Observation, Then Relations are More Than Connections: The Case For Nonlocal Ethnography in a World of Apparatuses'. *Anthropological Theory*, 11(4): 375–395.
- Flanck, S. (1994). 'Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation'. *Security Studies*, 3(2): 259–294.
- Foucault, M. (1980). 'The Confession of the Flesh' in C. Gordon (ed.) *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings (1972–1977)*. Brighton: Harvester Press. pp. 194–228.
- (2007). 'Spaces of Security: The Example of the Town'. Lecture of 11 January 1978. *Political Geography*, 26(1): 48–56.
- Fridlund, M. (2011). 'Buckets, Bollards and Bombs: Towards Subject Histories of Technologies and Terrors'. *History and Technology*, 27(4): 391–416.
- Fuller, S. (2000). 'Why Science Studies Has Never Been Critical of Science. Some Recent Lessons on How to Be a Helpful Nuisance and a Harmless Radical'. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 30(1): 5–32.
- Gusterson, H. (2004). *People of the Bomb: Portraits of America's nuclear complex*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Haggerty, K.D., and Ericson, R.V. (2000). 'The Surveillant Assemblage'. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 51(4): 605–622.
- Hameiri, S. (2011). 'State Transformation, Territorial Politics and the Management of Transnational Risk'. *International Relations*, 25(3): 381–397.
- Hannah, M.G. (2000). *Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harley, J.B. (1989). 'Deconstructing the Map'. *Cartographica*, 26(2): 1–20.
- Higate, P., and Henry, M. (2009). *Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia*. London/New York: Zed Books/Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hopf, T. (2010). 'The Logic of Habit in IR Theory', *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(4): 539–561.
- Huysmans, J. (2011). 'What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings'. *Security Dialogue*, 42(4–5): 371–383.
- Jasanoff, S., and Kim, S.-H. (2009). 'Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea'. *Minerva*, 47(2): 119–146.
- Kaghan, W.N., and Bowker, G.C. (2001). 'Out of Machine Age?: Complexity, Sociotechnical Systems and Actor Network Theory'. *Journal of Engineering and Technology Management*, 18(3–4): 253–269.
- Latour, B. (1986). *Visualization and Cognition: Drawing Things Together*. Available at: <http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1270717.files/Visualization%20and%20Cognition.pdf>. Accessed 5 May 2014.
- (1987). *Science in Action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- (1988). 'Mixing Humans and Nonhumans Together: The Sociology of a Door-Closer'. *Social Problems*, 35(3): 298–310.
- (2005). *Reassembling the Social: An introduction to actor-network theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- (2011a). 'Networks, Societies, Spheres: Reflections of an Actor-Network Theorist'. *International Journal of Communication*, 5, 796–810.
- (2011b). 'Drawing Things Together' in *The Map Reader*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. pp. 65–72.
- Latour, B., and Woolgar, S. (1986). *Laboratory Life: The construction of scientific facts*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Law, J. (1987). 'Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of the Portuguese Expansion' in W.E. Bijker, T.P. Hughes and T.J. Pinch (eds.), *The Social Construction of Technical Systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology*. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 111–134.
- (1992). 'Notes on the Theory of the Actor-network: Ordering, Strategy, and Heterogeneity'. *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, 5(4): 379–393.
- Leander, A. (2005). 'The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies'. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 33(3): 803–825.
- (2010). 'Habitus and Field' in *Blackwell: International Studies Compendium Project*, edited by Robert A. Denemark. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 3255–3270.
- MacKenzie, D.A. (2006). *An Engine, Not a Camera: How financial models shape markets*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Marcus, G.E. (1995). 'Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography'. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24(1): 95–117.
- Marres, N. (2012). 'On Some Uses and Abuses of Topology in the Social Analysis of Technology (or the Problem with Smart Meters)'. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 29(4–5): 288–310.
- Mayer, M. (2012). 'Chaotic Climate Change and Security'. *International Political Sociology*, 6(2): 165–185.
- Mayer, M., and Schouten, P. (2011). 'Energy Security and Climate Security under Conditions of the Anthropocene' in L. Anceschi and J. Symons (eds.), *Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 13–35.
- Mérand, F., and Pouliot, V. (2008). 'Le monde de Pierre Bourdieu: Éléments pour une théorie sociale des Relations internationales'. *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique*, 41(03): 603–625.
- Mérand, F., and Forget, A. (2012). 'Strategy' in Rebecca Adler-Nissen (ed), *Bourdieu in International Relations. Rethinking Key Concepts in IR*. London: Routledge.
- Miller, P., and Rose, N. (1990). 'Governing Economic Life'. *Economy and Society*, 19(1): 1–31.
- Mitchell, T. (2002). *Rule of Experts: Egypt, techno-politics, modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (2005). 'The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes its World'. *European Journal of Sociology*, 45(2): 297–320.
- Neumann, I.B. (2002). 'Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy'. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 31(3): 627–651.
- Passoth, J.-H., and Rowland, N.J. (2010). 'Actor-Network State: Integrating Actor-Network Theory and State Theory'. *International Sociology*, 25(6): 818–841.
- Peoples, C. (2010). *Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence: Technology, security and culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pickles, J. (2004). *A History of Spaces: Cartographic reason, mapping and the geo-coded world*. New York: Routledge.
- Pouliot, V. (2008). 'The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities'. *International Organization*, 62(02): 257–288.
- (2010). 'The Materials of Practice: Nuclear Warheads, Rhetorical Commonplaces and Committee Meetings in Russian-Atlantic Relations'. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 45(3): 294–311.

- Reid-Henry, S. (2011). 'Spaces of Security and Development'. *Security Dialogue*, 42(1): 97–104.
- Ritchie, N. (2010). 'Relinquishing Nuclear Weapons: Identities, Networks and the British Bomb'. *International Affairs*, 86(2): 465–487.
- Ruming, K. (2009). 'Following the Actors: Mobilising an Actor-Network Theory Methodology in Geography'. *Australian Geographer*, 40(4): 451–469.
- Schinkel, W. (2007). 'Sociological Discourse of the Relational: The Cases of Bourdieu and Latour'. *Sociological Review*, 55(4): 707–729.
- Schouten, P. (2011). 'Political Topographies of Private Security in Sub-Saharan Africa' in T. Dietz, K. Havnevik, M. Kaag, T. Oestigaard (eds.) *African Engagements*. Leiden: Brill. pp. 56–83.
- (2012). 'The Art of Separating Out: Zones of Qualification and the Production of Illicit Economies in Johannesburg's City Improvement Districts'. *St Antony's International Review*, 7(2): 32–50.
- (2013a). 'The Materiality of State Failure: Social Contract Theory, Infrastructure and Governmental Power in Congo'. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 41(3): 553–574.
- (2013b). 'Security in Action: How John Dewey can Help us Follow the Production of Security Assemblages' in M. Acuto and S. Curtis (eds.), *Re-assembling IR Theory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 85–92.
- (2014). 'Security as Controversy – Reassembling Security at Amsterdam Airport'. *Security Dialogue*, 45(1): 23–42.
- Scott, J.C. (1998). *Seeing Like a State: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Stern, M., and Öjendal, J. (2010). 'Mapping the Security – Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?'. *Security Dialogue*, 41(1): 5–29.
- Strandsbjerg, J. (2010). *Territory, Globalization, and International Relations: The cartographic reality of space*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sritzel, H. (2011a). 'Security as Translation: Threats, Discourse, and the Politics of Localisation'. *Review of International Studies*, 37(5): 2491–2517.
- (2011b). 'Security, the Translation'. *Security Dialogue*, 42(4–5): 343–355.
- Venturini, T. (2010a). 'Diving in Magma: How to Explore Controversies With Actor-Network Theory'. *Public Understanding of Science*, 19(3): 258–273.
- (2012). 'Building on faults: How to represent controversies with digital methods'. *Public Understanding of Science*, 21(7), 796–812.
- Voelkner, N. (2011). 'Managing Pathogenic Circulation: Human Security and the Migrant Health Assemblage in Thailand'. *Security Dialogue*, 42(3): 239–259.
- Wæver, O. (2004). 'Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen. New "Schools" in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery'. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, 17 March 2004.
- Walker, R.B.J. (1993). *Inside/outside: International relations as political theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walters, W. (2002). 'The Power of Inscription: Beyond Social Construction and Deconstruction in European Integration Studies'. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, 31(1): 83–108.
- (2010). 'Anti-Political Economy: Cartographies of "Illegal Immigration" and the Displacement of the Economy' in J. Best and M. Paterson (eds.). *Cultural Political Economy*. London: Routledge. pp. 113–138.
- Wasinski, C. (2011). 'On Making War Possible'. *Security Dialogue*, 42(1): 57–76. [Interestingly, most of this work focuses on nuclear proliferation.]
- Weber, M. (2002). *The Protestant Ethic and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism and other Writings*. London: Penguin.

- Whitehead, A.N. (2001). *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead*. Boston: David R. Godine.
- Wight, C. (2004). 'State Agency: Social Action without Human Activity?'. *Review of International Studies*, 30(02): 269–280.
- Wood, D. (1993). 'The Fine Line Between Mapping and Mapmaking'. *Cartographica*, 30(4), 50–60.

# 3

## DISCOURSE/MATERIALITY

*Claudia Aradau, Martin Coward, Eva Herschinger,  
Owen D. Thomas and Nadine Voelkner*

### Introduction

In August 2006, UK police discovered a plot to destroy aircraft destined for the United States using homemade explosive concealed in drinks bottles. In response to the plot, airplane passengers' hand luggage was subject to an outright ban. Only the barest essentials (such as travel documents, wallets, baby food and nappies) were permitted on board, and such items had to be carried by passengers in a separate transparent plastic bag. Although the restrictions on hand luggage have now been relaxed, strict rules remain in place limiting the amount of liquid that passengers can carry onto a flight in hand luggage. By 2009, it was estimated that the fluids ban had cost the British aviation industry £100 million and led to the employment of several thousand more security staff (Webster 2009). The ban also had a significant impact on travellers: at Heathrow Airport two tonnes of alcohol were confiscated every month along with thousands of bottles containing perfumes and toiletries; at Newcastle Airport, 450 litres of material – from sun cream to water and jam – were seized every day (Webster 2009). With the development of new technological devices able to scrutinize liquids within hand luggage, the EU passed regulations requiring airports to lift the liquids ban by 2013. At the time of writing, however, a number of actors – among them the Airport Operators Association – have refused to comply arguing that the new devices are not sufficiently developed to handle the volume of passengers and would cause chaos at airports (Massey 2012). The liquids ban continues.

The liquids ban at airports makes visible the role of the objects as well as the subjects of insecurity. The terror threat is not simply about who is (said to be) threatened and who is (represented to be) threatening, but equally about material objects that are (considered) threatening and risky. Terrorism is made governable by both discourses of threat and danger, and arrangements of objects. Both

dangerous and protective, objects are integral to the governance of security problems. Security might entail the banning of particular things or the designation of objects for/of protection, such as infrastructures, architectures or databases. The world of security professionals, of citizens and of the media is thus not only crowded with representations and constructions of an increasingly global terrorist threat but also increasingly inhabited by a wide array of dangerous and endangered objects. As Susan Hekman (2010: 1) has remarked, '[t]he first years of the twenty-first century seem to be characterized by events with overwhelming material consequences. Terrorist attacks, tsunamis, hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes dominate the news'. Next to discourses of danger, (material) objects have always occupied a prominent place on the security agenda: as both threat and referent; that which is to be countered and that which is to be secured.

The proliferation of dangerous and/or protective objects raises the question of how this 'dangerousness' of matter becomes meaningful, or how dangerous and endangered objects are entangled with our existence. It raises the question of the role of, and the relation between, discourse and materiality in international relations (IR) and critical security studies (CSS). More specifically, if one agrees that there is a relation between discourse and materiality then the question arises: how can we understand and analyse this relation critically? This is a question of both methodology and method.

For the purposes of this chapter, we take 'materiality' to refer to the matter out of which the world is composed: the nonhuman things that make up our everyday existence as well as the corporeality of our embodiments. 'Discourse' is the meaning-making activity that 'constitutes our social world and the structures that define it. It also constitutes the natural world by providing us with concepts that structure that world' (Hekman 2010: 1). Put simply then, our question is about the relation between matter and meaning making. As Karen Barad (2003) notes, recent social science has tended to disavow matter in favour of a linguistic turn that has often reduced discourse to language. Indeed, she goes as far as to contend that 'language has been granted too much power' (Barad 2003: 802) often leading to matter being taken to be mere stuff, inert things onto which meaning is inscribed.<sup>1</sup>

CSS is not immune to such criticisms even though critical security scholars have at times deployed a quite broad understanding of discourse that makes room for institutions, knowledge and practice (see e.g., Milliken 1999). However, many analyses of the constitution of security have tended to privilege words over things and have often had recourse to a mostly linguistic understanding of discourse. More recently, feminist scholars have paid attention to the role of the body in security practice, while the materiality of everyday objects, technical devices, infrastructure or architecture has only recently started to garner attention in CSS and IR.

As the story of the liquids ban with which we started this chapter shows, given the ubiquity of materiality in questions of human life, governance, security and politics, it is important to include objects and matter in our analyses of (in)security. This does not mean privileging materiality over discourse or vice versa, but devising a framework to analyse contemporary security practices that both encompasses this

relationship while embodying a critical sensibility. If critical discussions of what ‘matters’ have started to be formulated in critical security studies (see e.g., Aradau 2010; Coward 2006; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011; Voelkner 2011), methodology and method have been largely absent from these discussions.<sup>2</sup> In this chapter, we examine and rearticulate the way in which discourse and materiality can together be given due attention in CSS with the purpose of developing a series of methodological implications for critical security research.<sup>3</sup>

The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section outlines the main ways in which materiality and discourse have been analysed in IR and CSS in particular. In the second section, we sketch out a critical methodological approach that investigates the relations between materiality and discourse in three ways: through *dispositifs*, performativity, and agency. Different methodological implications are developed in each of these cases and briefly explored in three empirical sites: the use of biometrics in India, the securitization of drugs and the protection of critical infrastructure. We conclude by outlining the critical potential of our approach.

## Methodological dilemmas in IR and CSS

How have IR and CSS approached discourse and materiality? What have been the methodological debates in the discipline? In this section, we discuss some of the debates about materiality and discourse in IR and CSS and suggest that previous understandings of the matter–discourse relation have been unsatisfactory insofar as they have ultimately privileged one over the other. Moreover, there has been little – if any – discussion about the methodological implications of privileging discourse or materiality.

For the purposes of our discussion, we follow Sandra Harding’s (1989: x) definition of methodology as a ‘theory and analysis of how research should proceed’. This does not mean that we privilege theorizing at the expense of more mundane debates about method. Rather, if methodology can be taken to ‘refer to the intellectual process...guiding self-conscious reflections on epistemological assumptions, ontological perspective, ethical responsibilities, and method choices’ (Ackerly, Stern, and True 2006: 6), methods are also part of this analytical process. While methods are often characterized, as ‘the kind of tool of research or analysis that a researcher adopts’ (ibid.: 6), we see methods as performative, constructing particular accounts of the way in which the world is composed as well as the entities and forces within it (see the Introduction to this book for a fuller discussion). Law and Urry (2004: 390) note that methods ‘[help to] make social realities and social worlds’. Both method and methodology are instrumental in identifying *what counts* for research. Indeed, the method by which the world is investigated is imbricated with the way in which one knows the world and the elements constitutive of this world.

Therefore, we propose to outline some methodological frameworks and show how they can be experimented with in relation to concrete questions and problems.<sup>4</sup>

These are not prescriptive, but an attempt to make explicit particular relations between ontological assumptions, epistemological stakes, critical analysis, theory and empirical problems. We then show how these frameworks can shape critical security research.

The methodological problem of *what counts* for research is evident in the constant tension and debate concerning the relative importance of materiality and discourse, of subjects and objects, things and language in the study of international politics. Three dominant examples of debates in IR – rationalism, constructivism and poststructuralism – show clearly that either materiality or discourse is privileged over each other.

Rationalist debates such as the neo-neo reformulations of realism and liberalism that emerged in the 1980s share an ontological understanding according to which the actors of international relations are always already fully constituted rational individuals who compete for, and can be measured in terms of, their material capabilities (Keohane 1988). These material capabilities are ‘out there’ and, according to rationalists, can be measured objectively. Importantly, this privileging of the rational actor model does not mean that material ‘things’ cannot impose intrinsic constraints upon actors. In a security take on this model that sees materiality as resources, scholars such as Michael Klare (2002) have suggested that scarcity of natural resources might drive conflict (a highly disputed assumption within the realm of peace and conflict studies, cf. Warner and Zeitoun 2008, Homer-Dixon 2001, Gleditsch 1998).

The ‘constructivist turn’ sought to expand the theoretical contours of the discipline by arguing that, in addition to material resources, social analysis ought to acknowledge that human interaction is shaped by ideational factors. The most important of these ideational factors are ‘intersubjective’ beliefs, which are irreducible to one or a few individuals. These shared constructs are the primary determinants of the interests and identities of actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Ruggie 1998: 3302; Wendt 1999: 2656). Money is an often-used example of such intersubjective beliefs since its function is not dependent on any intrinsic properties but on the exchange value that society collectively assigns to it (Searle 1995). Moreover, by taking the idea of social construction seriously it is possible to challenge the notion of a single objective reality, especially given that social constructions change across space and time. This has consequences for how constructivists think about materiality. Material ‘things’ only acquire their meaning and socio-political significance through intersubjective dynamics and discourse (Wendt 1995). As Wendt (1994: 389) notes, ‘British nuclear capabilities were a very different social fact for the United States from Soviet nuclear capabilities’. This does not mean that the material world is insignificant for constructivists. Indeed, Wendt argues that no matter the ideational factors at work, pigs won’t fly and a bullet in the head has an unavoidable finality; states are argued to have similarly brute characteristics (Krasner 1999: 51; Wendt 1999: 113).

Poststructuralism has challenged these assumptions in both IR and security studies. David Campbell has suggested that constructivism and rationalism share a

common assumption about the set of material entities that make up the world (Campbell 2001: 442). Both rationalists and constructivists rely on “‘epistemic realism” whereby the world comprises objects independent of ideas or beliefs about them’ (Campbell 1998 [1992]: 221). Thus, what unites both the rationalist and constructivist positions is the manner in which for both ‘the world seems to be...divided from the beginning into two neatly opposed realms, a material order on the one hand and a separate sphere of meaning or culture on the other’ (Mitchell 1990: 546).

Poststructuralist work has challenged this dualism by redefining discourse as material. Securitization, for instance, emphasized the performative force of language (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998). Other poststructuralist work embraced a more expansive notion of discourse in which things are taken to be part of the production of meaning. However, poststructuralism has generally been castigated for its over-reliance on language (Howarth 2000: 5). From its poststructuralist foundations, therefore, CSS research does not necessarily have to reproduce the separation between discourse and materiality, or to subsume discourse to language and materiality to ‘brute reality’. Yet, partly as a consequence of working within the ‘linguistic turn’, contemporary CSS research is often at risk of ignoring the importance of matter in concrete analyses or of unwittingly reintroducing the separation of matter and discourse. Other CSS scholars, such as Ken Booth (2007) for instance, also maintain a distinction between ideas and reality. Similarly, sociological approaches to (in)security focusing on practice also do not fully move beyond the separation of discourse and materiality (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006).

In order to avoid privileging either language or materiality in analyses of security, we propose to start with relationality as a methodological principle. Relationality allows us to understand the mutual imbrications of matter and discourse that will help us analyse critically the contemporary proliferation of objects of fear and their role in the constitution of security problems. Our subsequent methodological operationalizations of relationality – *dispositifs*, performativity and agency – are inspired by this relational approach to discourse and materiality.

## Relationality as methodological principle

This brief account of the debates around material and ideational/discursive factors shows that conceptualizing the relationship between the discursive and the material as discrete entities encourages an unwarranted tension, such that the world appears to be neatly divided into separate realms of materiality and discourse. Even where materiality is included in understandings of security discourse or practices, it is either the materiality of bodies or that of experts, networks and institutions. Objects by and large fall out of these analyses.

We consider approaches in which subjects and objects, discourse and materiality are co-constitutive and do not pre-exist their relations. We argue that the separation of matter and discourse is inattentive to the modes in which the two emerge

conjointly. To assume that things and representation are independent is to deprive either of force upon the other (i.e., that objects are unscathed by representation and vice versa). A 'material turn' in IR and CSS has meant that several authors have started, in different ways, to engage with the distinction between brute reality and human action by regarding the discursive and the material as co-constitutive of social order. However, method and methodology have remained underdeveloped in the debates about materiality.

Relationality as a principle allows us to reclaim a series of theoretical approaches for methodological purposes and show how they can be operationalized for critical security research. Starting with relationality has the potential to avoid entanglement in philosophy of social sciences debates as to whether there is a materiality independent of human representation or discursive construction. Rather, in order to trace how subjects and objects of insecurity are constructed, one needs to conceptualize relationality with regard to its role in articulating matter and meaning together and at the same time.

Karen Barad has noted that 'materialization is not only a matter of how discourse comes to matter but how matter comes to matter' (1998: 108). This implies an affirmation of 'the material character of every discursive structure' (Laclau and Mouffe 2001 [1985]: 108). Hence, matter is not inert nor the passive end product of discourses but an active factor in the construction of relationships in discursive-material processes; it actively shapes how subjects and objects of insecurity are constructed, regulated and materialized in discourse. For instance, in the case of the liquids ban with which we started, liquids up to 100ml are now supposed to be screened separately due to the potential danger they pose (identified as a consequence of the disruption of the initial bomb plot). In rendering 100ml containers as a scanned image the screening device literally brings about the constitution of liquids including gels, pastes and baby food as a distinctive object/entity. This observation is less surprising to scientists or historians of science who know that neither scientific discourse nor experimentation is possible without adequate instrumentation. In our case, the materiality of a 'liquid' is the effect of screening technologies and other instrumentation to detect the dangerous object.

Yet, the 'liquid' that emerges through the screening processes is simultaneously constituted through discourses of the threat of terrorism, surveillance and precautionary measures. It is thus a particular potentially dangerous object. The dangerousness of the 'liquid' is a product of the co-constitutive relation between materiality and discourse; it is the product of neither one nor the other alone. Dangerous liquids emerge through an array of security discourses, political economies of production and circulation, and screening instrumentation.

In light of such co-constitution of matter and discourse, relationality allows for an analysis of how both are involved in the construction of insecurity. Barad, for instance, translates the relational analysis of meaning and matter through the concept of 'intra-action', which signifies 'the inseparability of "objects" and "agencies of observation"' (Barad 1998: 96), it is the 'mutual constitution of entangled agencies' (Barad 2007: 33). While interaction presupposes given agencies

of matter and meaning which can be neatly separated, intra-action is an ‘open-ended practice involving dynamic entanglements of humans and nonhumans, through which these acquire their specific boundaries and properties’ (Aradau 2010). For instance, the boundaries of critical infrastructure are enacted through such entanglements of materials (‘hard technologies’), knowledge (emergency planning, civil engineering, architecture and design), security and economic actors, and practices of capitalist expansion.

Crucially, the principle of relationality suggests that the extent to which a given discursive or material phenomena is significant in the constitution of political events is not understood by its discursive/material, human/nonhuman, or objective/subjective qualities but by the extent to which the thing is important as a point of reference, as a ‘node’ in Martin Coward’s words, in a particular, meaningful set of elements (2006). Relationality conveys an articulation of heterogeneous elements – the discursive and the material – bound to each other in a particular arrangement constitutive of meaning. As such, rather than trying to make general determinations as to the political significance of ‘things’, it is important to recognize that the relations between discourses and materialities are not universal but undergoing constant rearrangement according to the elements gathered together and the circumstances under which this occurs.

Methodologically, this is a fruitful means to avoid technologically deterministic approaches to materiality or assume that security discourses achieve the same results everywhere. By grasping relationality as both intra-action and articulation, the researcher can then seek to establish where exactly and how elements are located and intra-related such that they are rendered meaningful through their relations, intersections, entwinement and/or juxtaposition. What is required therefore are methods capable of tracing these connections and relations. In what follows, we investigate three different – and to some extent overlapping – ways in which the principle of relationality can be operationalized as a methodological principle in CSS.

In what follows we deploy the methodological ‘principle’ of relationality to analyse the co-constitution of discourse and materiality in security practices and operationalize it in three ways: *dispositifs*, performativity and agency. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s work, recent literature has debated the role of the *dispositif* of security in the transformation of security from a geopolitical to a biopolitical concept (see e.g., Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). We argue that the *dispositif* can be operationalized as a methodological device that attends to the heterogeneous articulation of discourse and materiality. ‘Performativity’ has been at the heart of CSS through its theorization of security speech acts. As a methodological device, performativity is particularly apt to capture the co-constitution of discourse and materiality through the stabilization of boundaries. Finally, ‘agency’ has increasingly entered the security debates, particularly in relation to marginalized categories of people who are excluded from the purview of security or rendered abject through (in)securitization. However, agency has so far been limited to a particular understanding of humans and language rather than inclusive of assemblages of humans and nonhumans, discourse and materiality. Methodologically, agency

draws attention to how boundaries can shift and transform. We will examine each of these operationalizations of relationality in turn.

The three operationalizations we propose are not the only possible ways to deploy relationality as a methodological principle. However, as we show in the final section of the chapter, for us these three operationalizations carry particular critical weight. These operationalizations can also be deployed for other methodological purposes: for instance, the *dispositif* can underpin a genealogical analysis (see Chapter 7) and performativity is an assumption in mapping methods (see Chapter 2). Moreover, there are, as one might expect, points of overlap, contention and comparison between the *dispositif*, performativity and agency, and we make reference to these throughout the chapter.

### *Dispositifs*

The first operationalization we propose is that of *dispositifs*: a methodological device for analysing how strategies of security governance are constituted, often in an unintended manner, through changing connections between seemingly unconnected elements. Closely associated with Foucault's work (1979, 1980), the *dispositif* has received little attention as a method in comparison to Foucault's archaeology and genealogy (see Chapter 7 on the connections between genealogy and *dispositif*). The concept of the *dispositif* appears in Foucault's work from the 1970s as a replacement for the earlier concept of episteme. The latter referred to discursive structures of knowledge but not to material elements (Revel 2002). Other similar concepts include 'apparatus' (Agamben 2009; Barad 2007; Deleuze 1992), 'assemblage' (Bennett 2010), and 'network' (Latour 2005). These are all attempts to think beyond a separation of material/discursive realms, to consider approaches in which discourse and materiality – meaning and matter – are co-constitutive. As there are important differences between the meaning and use of these similar terms, in this chapter, our use of the term *dispositif* is inspired primarily by Foucault.

The *dispositif* can be seen to be characterized by three important features: the heterogeneous nature of the ensemble, mobile relations, and a self-sustaining dynamic. We will first outline these features, before exploring how the *dispositif* can be put to work in an empirical site: that of digital biometrics in India.

First, the *dispositif* refers to 'a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of discursive and non-discursive elements' (Foucault 1980: 194). It can include 'virtually anything linguistic and nonlinguistic' (Agamben 2009: 3). The categories of discursive and non-discursive are analytically inseparable: 'this is *not* to say that these are separate domains...that there is, on the one hand, the field of things...and on the other, that of signs' (Foucault 2002: 339, our emphasis). The importance of the non-discursive has already been noted in Foucault's analyses of punishment or madness (Foucault 1973, 1991 [1977]). Discourses of crime, responsibility and rehabilitation depend upon and are rearticulated in relation to the design and operations of the prison.

Methodologically, the heterogeneity of the *dispositif* means tracing the multiple constituent elements connected to a strategic need of, say, airport security. Actually tracing the elements and connections of an ensemble could be achieved in several ways: for instance, one could use a genealogical approach to understand how a *dispositif* has been constituted over time (see the discussion in [Chapter 7](#)); one could follow a subject, that is to say one could trace the experience of an individual subject – like a traveller through airport security – in order to understand and reveal all the forces and elements at work in the *dispositif* that constitutes our political lives; finally, one could look for tensions between the elements of a *dispositif* as exemplified below. The researcher is interested not only in the elements that constitute a problem and strategic need – like an airport scanner or a biometric identification machine – but other elements that, through accidental means, come to influence how an apparatus of security performs its role in a wider structure.

Second, *dispositifs* are characterized by an inherent mobility and instability due to the potentially endless variability of relations between elements which gives rise to tension and movements immanent to the *dispositif* (Foucault 1979; Deleuze 1992: 159). Consequently, there is instability to the power effects produced by a *dispositif*; power effects may alter, breakdown or reverse themselves altogether. The heterogeneity and mobility of elements produces differential effects that enter ‘into resonance or contradiction’ with each other, perpetually calling for a ‘re-adjustment [...] of the heterogeneous elements’, producing new, and for the human element potentially unintended and undesirable, effects (Foucault 1980: 195–6). As a consequence of continual variation – the *dispositif* is constantly undergoing rearrangement. In Deleuze’s words, the *dispositif* is a tangle of lines ‘of splitting, breakage, fracture all of which criss-cross and mingle together, some lines reproducing or giving rise to others, by means of variations or even changes in the way they are grouped’ (Deleuze 1992: 162). Utilizing the *dispositif* as a method requires that one seeks out these shifting power relations, the ‘patterns of modifications’ that change depending on the configuration of elements in the *dispositif* (Foucault 1979).

For instance, security actors might design a programme of security governance to work in a particular way, but when the intended programme is put to work in local, concrete situations there may be unintended consequences brought about by the connections established between new and unexpected elements in the ensemble. As Rabinow suggests ‘[t]here were feedback loops and counter effects that escaped from all the planning, programmes, and paranoia these rational actors had produced and so proudly deployed’ (2003: 53). In Foucault’s oft-cited example, the prison system ‘failed’ in that it produced a delinquent milieu as an unintended effect, yet this milieu became re-utilized for economic and political ends (Foucault 1980: 194–5). The side effect of delinquency did not destroy the *dispositif* of punishment but, in the end, was used to reinforce it. We explore another example of unintended effects in the example below.

Third, whilst a *dispositif* is inherently unstable and mobile, it has a self-sustaining strategy of power. This reiterative dynamic is an important characteristic of the

*dispositif*. Heterogeneous, 'local' (Foucault 1979) practices are mobilized into a larger ensemble. A *dispositif* is constituted by, and constitutive of, relations of power that reinforce its particular configuration of elements giving it durability. The *dispositif* has a 'dominant strategic function...for example, the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy' (Foucault 1980: 195). Analysing this strategic function requires attention to local practices and as broader social, political and economic considerations.

Using the *dispositif* as a methodological device implies analysing relations between discursive and material elements, identifying places where a heterogeneous set of elements has been disturbed and reformed and attending to the overall 'strategic effect' that stabilizes the *dispositif* spatially and temporally. We offer a brief illustration below of how the *dispositif* can be deployed as a methodological device.

### **DIGITAL BIOMETRICS AND 'ANONYMOUS EXCLUSIONS' IN THE INDIAN SECURITY *DISPOSITIF***

In 2009, the Indian government began a project to provide its 1.2 billion-strong population with unique identification numbers (UID) based on digital biometrics. The project designers responded to a need for reliable identity verification, the lack of which often excludes Indian residents (particular members of the rural poor and tribal communities) from welfare programmes and private finance opportunities such as bank accounts and microcredit. By contrast, UIDs are expected to improve border security, reduce waste and fraud in welfare programmes, and increase the proportion of the population that can access welfare subsidies and contribute to economic prosperity by investing capital and consuming credit (UIDAI 2010).

Critical security studies scholars have argued that biometric technologies simultaneously quicken the flows of global capital and the management of society and protect populations from threats of terrorism, crime, and illegal immigration (Amoore 2006; Muller 2009; Vaughan-Williams 2010). Using the *dispositif* as a methodological device can add further depth to these analyses by highlighting the heterogeneity, mobility and fallibility of the strategies of power anchored by biometric technology in different times and places. This requires thinking beyond biometric technologies, and the bodies that they operate on as 'black boxes', and considering their operation and the possibilities of governance they afford as a particular set of interrelated heterogeneous elements.

The advancements of governance afforded by UIDs are possible, advocates argue, because *digital* biometric technology allows the body to be treated as an indisputable anchor of identity (see also Aas 2006). The technology works by scanning a biometric attribute like a fingerprint or iris) and converting that scanned attribute into a digital template – a string of alphanumeric characters stored in a database and linked to the subject's demographic identity (like

subject's name, address and perhaps government records). When a subject wants to use this identity (e.g., when passing through a security checkpoint or opening a bank account) they are scanned again and the new biometric template is compared against the one held on the database. The excitement for advocates of UID hinges on the methodological and epistemological assumption that biometric technology can produce a 'brute' material image of the subject based on measurements of intrinsic human physiology. Under this 'epistemological hubris' (Dillon and Reid 2009: 144), the identification of a person seems beyond question.

Yet attaining a valid biometric template is not a given. The technologies of measurement are deployed in relation to bodies, forms of expertise, institutions, legal and political norms. How do all these elements hold together? In order to provide a UID by converting an attribute to a template, the biometric sensor requires strong ridges in fingerprints and clear iris textures. Yet in India, millions of UID applicants do not have these machine-readable attributes. A manual labourer who undertakes physically exerting labour in hot humid conditions without access to regular care is less likely to possess the strong fingerprint ridges and an unclouded iris texture prescribed by the biometric assemblage. The identities of these subjects cannot be authenticated. A biometric template, in India or elsewhere, is never a perfect reproduction of the attribute; templates are not brought into being independently of the context – the ensemble in which the subject is constituted and the scanner is constructed – in which they are captured (see also Magnet 2011).

The heterogeneous elements in this *dispositif* include those that constitute the emergence of identity as a historical problem and strategic need in India, those that constitute the UID programme – including computers and scanners – but also rituals and tools of labour, social divisions and even environmental conditions. The life of the subject bears upon their body, and the body bears upon the life of the subject. The UIDAI's most optimistic estimate is that the percentage of individuals without usable biometric data is 0.14% (UIDAI 2012). However, in a population of 1.2 billion, this equals 1.68 million people.

Many from the demographic that the project aims to help the most – those who struggle to prove their identity within the current bureaucratic system – are those most likely to be rejected. The 'strategic effect' of the *dispositif* is that of reproducing exclusions through the technology that requires certain characteristics in order to function. In a programme of governance in which UID is quickly becoming the preferred form of identity proof, the UIDAI not only denies access to those who simply cannot be recognized by the existing biometric technology, and thus intensifies their exclusion. As new relations between elements form, the subjectivities at the centre of this security regime alter too; what it means to be a citizen-subject in contemporary India is changing to include certain physical characteristics that themselves tend to proscribe certain lifestyles.

This exclusion is an intensification, rather than a failure, of an overarching strategy to encourage the population to adopt new productive behaviours. When analysed in conjunction with the fact that inclusion in the biometric database does not secure any right to welfare, housing or health (Jacobsen 2012), it becomes clear that a strategy from the ensemble emerges to govern poor and vulnerable populations rather than put an end to poverty. The exclusions effected by this *dispositif* appear durable and yet willed by no one in particular.<sup>5</sup>

Deploying the *dispositif* as a methodological device entails studying the fragile and perhaps unique sets of relations established between discursive and material elements that are brought together in response to an ‘urgent need’. Taking the example of the biometric security *dispositif* above, biometric identifiers are meaningful in contingent relation with dust, tools, water, aging processes, as well as discourses about poverty, security, and citizenship. It is the relations between all of them, a web of connections ruptured in some places, but ultimately identifiable as a set possessing its own specific logic, from which new and shifting strategies of power emerge.

The operationalization of the *dispositif* requires a way into the connections that constitute it – starting with connections that are set in place in response to a problem. An analysis of the *dispositif* follows the connections that must exist for the strategy to emerge as a meaningful practice. The analysis thus starts with a practice or thing and traces the contingent connections that bind it to both discursive tropes and things to delineate the strategy these connections comprise. Enough of these relations need to be analysed to understand how a strategy emerges from local and multiple practices. Moreover, for Foucault, a strategy could be discerned through the comparison of different *dispositifs*: e.g., a *dispositif* of sovereignty in relation to a *dispositif* of security (Foucault 2007). Alongside this historical analysis, an analysis of the situation in which a *dispositif* is deployed – for instance, in our case, economic and social relations in India – allows for an understanding of how a strategy can emerge from multiple and disparate relations.

## Performativity

The second methodological operationalization of relationality that we focus on is performativity. While the *dispositif* helps us analyse how unintended but productive strategies are constituted through heterogeneous ‘constellations’, performativity helps us analyse more concretely how shifting discursive and material relations seemingly give rise to fixed objects. Performativity attends to the constitution of particular objects rather than to the heterogeneity of relations out of which a strategy emerged. Methodologically, performativity entails studying the relationality between discourse and materiality by focusing on how repetition and iteration of particular discursive/material relations stabilize and destabilize boundaries, i.e., how objects and subjects (and their relations) are produced and embodied, fixed

and categorized. Performativity and the *dispositif* are not mutually exclusive concepts. Indeed, the *dispositif* could be said to be performative insofar as its relations only acquire a semblance of fixity through reiteration.

Performativity is often associated with Judith Butler's work on gender (Butler 1993) in which she attempts to capture 'the ways in which gender and sexual identifications are continually remade through repetition...of dominant discourses' (Nelson 1999: 331). Butler's analysis of performativity has been used in critical security studies generally and in securitization approaches in particular. Securitization approaches ask how something comes to be considered an existential threat (i.e., is securitized), thus allowing specific actors to request extraordinary measures in response (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998: 23–6; Huysmans 1998; Stritzel 2007 for criticism). Securitization shares with poststructuralist IR an interest in the effects of language, the constitution of identity, self/other relations and the (re)production of the state (Campbell 1998 [1992]; Weber 1998).<sup>6</sup>

Although critical security scholars have at times adopted a more encompassing concept of discourse inspired by the poststructuralist literature, material objects have not played a pronounced role in concrete analyses. For instance, in a discussion of performativity, Bialasiewicz *et al.* (2007: 406) note that 'states are made possible by a wide range of discursive practices that includes immigration policies, military deployment and strategies, cultural debates about normal social behaviour, political speeches and economic investments'. Materiality is, however, not incorporated in this rendering of performativity that Bialasiewicz *et al.* offer; what about the passport as a technique of making states, for instance (see Torpey 2000; Salter 2003)?

In contrast to this neglect of the material, performativity can be a very apt device to capture the enactment of corporeality as well as other nonhuman things. Particularly in feminist analyses of insecurity and violence, the materiality enacted is that of gendered vulnerable bodies (see e.g., Shepherd 2009). Bodies, subjects and identities are what *matters* in analyses of performativity. In acting in particular ways, performance 'enacts or produces that which it names' (Butler 1993: 23). In the case of the body, for Butler, the body's boundaries are maintained by reiterations of particular corporeal practices (Butler 1990: 133). Repetition or reiteration is key to Butler's notion of performativity: indeed, bodies, identities, and objects require 'the stylized repetition of acts through time', 'a regulated process of repetition' (Butler 1990: 145) if they are to persist over time.

Although Butler has been criticized for focusing on corporeality and emphasizing the power of language, what is interesting for us is how performativity has been taken up in a wide range of research exactly to render the co-constitutive relation between discourse and materiality. Performativity is now widely used in science and technology studies, actor-network theory (ANT) or material feminist studies. For Law and Singleton (2000: 771), performativity implies that 'humans and nonhumans perform together to produce effects', for instance, in the use of technology. For Barad (2003: 808), posthumanist performativity entails attention to processes of materialization and 'calls into question the givenness of the differential categories of "human" and "nonhuman"', examining the practices through which these differential

boundaries are stabilized and destabilized' (see the following section on agency). The uses of performativity to understand markets is perhaps most interesting for our purposes. Sociologists have deployed performativity to analyse how economic models, equations and theory performatively constitute markets (Callon 2006; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007). For Callon (2006: 24), performativity 'refuses the distance between the object and the discourse about it'. These analyses are particularly relevant for our understanding of how security is performed as well.

Methodologically, performativity entails particular attention to repetitive and iterative practices through which boundaries are established and fixed. An analysis of security as performative investigates the repetitions and reiterations through which particular threats, objects and subjects are given a seemingly fixed character. Performativity as our second operationalization of relationality thus reveals that discourses are material. Performativity in such understanding places emphasis on the materiality of 'life in its doing' (Dewsbury 2000: 473) but also on how material objects are durable in concrete settings. What matters both methodologically and critically is how objects/subjects are enacted in order to fix their identities. Methodologically speaking, this performative relation can be successfully analysed by unpacking reiterations, i.e., the repeated acts necessary to stabilize their boundaries. Overall, performativity prompts us to think more concretely about how power is performed through reiteration in materializing and categorizing discursive and material environments. In comparison to the *dispositif*, which focuses on the manner in which heterogeneous elements are connected, performativity focuses on the manner in which such connections can acquire seeming fixity. As we will show, the regime of global drug prohibition provides an illustration of the importance of performativity as a methodological device.

### **PERFORMING 'DANGEROUS DRUGS'**

A quick glance at the history of drugs shows that drugs have been consumed in various societies for hundreds, if not thousands of years. Their consumption has played an important socio-cultural role for medicinal, ritual or recreational purposes (Weil 1986: 1). Around the eve of the twentieth century, the interpretation of a great number of drugs like opium or morphine as illicit and the subsequent problematization of their global trade gained ground. Ultimately, from 1961 to 1988, three United Nations conventions established a global drug prohibition regime that not only cemented the interpretation of drugs as evil and their trade as illegal but also constructed their consumption as deviant behaviour (Bewley-Taylor 2002). The importance of the securitization of drugs for the performance of national identity and self/other relations has been well established in international relations (Grayson 2008; Herschinger 2011). At the same time, performativity can be deployed as a device to understand how drugs are also enacted as dangerous.

How do drugs become dangerous? According to the global drug prohibition regime, 'drug means any of the substances in Schedules I and II, whether natural or synthetic'.<sup>7</sup> The Schedules are long lists of incriminated substances, including well-known substances like morphine or coca leaves but also preparations of drugs and so-called precursor chemicals that can be transformed into a drug. Schedules I and II encompass substances liable to abuse and productive ill effects or convertible into a drug. The Schedules enumerate the chemical agents responsible for the psychoactive or mind-altering effect of the respective drug. In these Schedules a materiality emerges on which the 'concept' drugs draw: under the name 'drug' figures a 'thing', a 'plant', a 'root' or a 'substance' (Derrida 1989: 197) that is considered to be able to continuously transform its aggregate state as it pleases, to form an apparently endless number of combinations and derivatives. In order to solve the 'conflict' between protecting humans from harm whilst benefiting from drugs to remedy pain and cure illnesses, the schedules juxtapose the licit to the illicit use of drugs, with the former being the medicinal, the good use, and the latter being the illegal, the bad use.

One way to analyse the performativity of dangerous drugs here is to take into account the way boundaries of dangerous drugs are enacted via the repetition of such juxtapositions. The Schedules grapple with the instability of drugs, i.e., with the inherent mobility of their materiality. Hence, the Schedules, which are regularly updated, are an attempt to fix something that constantly transforms. Through reiteration, the Schedules attempt to stabilize the distinction between licit and illicit drugs and form the boundaries of dangerous substances. However, drugs materialize as a highly mobile matter that is able to form an infinite number of different combinations and derivatives; indeed, it is 'impossible to predict future developments' (United Nations 1964: 190), even any development in drugs. By enumerating a substance under a specific heading in the Schedules – like 'Acetylmethadol' – and then highlighting its materiality by displaying the molecules – in the case of 'Acetylmethadol' it is '3-acetoxy-6-dimethylamino-4,4-diphenylheptane', the Schedules stabilize materiality by establishing an explicit chain of molecules, singling out the unambiguous chemical properties of 'Acetylmethadol', i.e., giving the matter a clear profile by drawing seemingly clear boundaries in the form of chained molecules.

Essentially, this is how drugs come to matter: the Schedules bring to light the know-how humans have acquired about the respective substances and the constant need to keep the drugs' exuberant materiality at bay. The Schedules perform dangerous drugs at a moment in time and simultaneously make visible that drugs cannot be fully controlled. Dangerous drugs are performed through a series of repetitions of the distinction between licit and illicit: the global prohibition discourse articulates drugs as an object of (in)security that needs to be controlled internationally to hinder any 'bad' use, and fuel a 'good' use (Herschinger 2011, [Chapter 3](#)).

However, such juxtapositions of 'good' vs. 'bad' drug use are quickly undermined when new combinations and derivatives of drugs are discovered. These new combinations cannot be considered separate from the material chemistry that allows these combinations to occur, but neither from structures of knowledge and historically situated practices from which the need to enact a combination takes place. The need to relate such new derivatives to either 'legal' or 'illegal' regulations is sparked by the ambivalent materiality of drugs. Since the discourse cannot decisively specify the nature of drugs due to their ambivalent chemistry it generates a performative process juxtaposing good and evil uses in an attempt to provide some fixity of boundaries. As such, drugs are an object of insecurity around which there is a continual performance of a juxtaposition of control to medicinal benefits.

## Agency

In this section, we turn to a third operationalization of relationality: agency. The *dispositif* allows us to analyse the way strategies of governance emerge from shifting heterogeneity; performativity helps to trace how durable objects arise from iterative actions; agency helps us to understand the effects of discursive and material relations in particular micro-environments.

Agency has only recently entered the agenda of CSS, particularly in debates about the political effects that security practices have for marginalized people (for a discussion, see Aradau and van Munster 2009). The previous discussion of performativity as a methodological framework to analyse 'dangerous' drugs indicates that drugs might always exceed attempts to 'perform' them in particular ways. This opens up a question that has gained traction for CSS given the encounter with science and technology studies (STS), 'new materialism', and feminist materialism in particular. Following Bennett's work on agency, Latour's analysis of actants and Barad's work on posthumanist performativity, CSS scholars have begun to attend to the many materialities of (in)security: from critical infrastructure to the health card and from the e-passport to the built environment or biometric technologies (Coward 2009a; Aradau 2010; Voelkner 2011; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011). How is the agency of things mobilized for security purposes and how can we analyse these forms of agency in CSS?

Many authors outside CSS argue against an understanding of materiality in which things appear either as inert 'given' constraints on social relations or as empty receptacles that are rendered meaningful only by discursive acts. Latour (2005) encourages thinking about social interaction in terms of an ontology of 'networked' human and nonhuman 'actants'. The mutability and 'recalcitrance' of objects constitutes a form of material agency in the capacity of 'anthropomorphic objects' (such as a door-closer) to shape human action in a manner not fully anticipated by those that engineered the object – by prescribing what sort of people

(or 'ideal users') should interact with the object successfully (Latour 1992). Similarly Jane Bennett (2004) evokes the notion of things as 'spirited actants' in a way that exceeds the social activity of humans. For example, Bennett shows the manner in which electricity can exceed the expectations of the grid built to channel it around the eastern seaboard resulting in a cascading failure beyond the full control of systems engineers (Bennett 2005). This does not mean, however, that the notion of agency is fairy-tale-like. After all, Latour has cautioned that '[t]he lab coats are not so deranged as to believe that particles, fossils, economies, or black holes speak on their own, without intermediaries, without any investigation, and without instruments, in short, without a fabulously complex and extremely fragile speech prosthesis' (Latour 2004: 67).

Agency is closely connected with performativity. However, if performativity has been extended to include, for instance, technology (Law and Singleton 2000), economic models (Callon 2006) or apparatuses of measurement (Barad 2007), agency has been the concept most often associated with individual and collective humans. Agency added an element of freedom in debates about performativity. Methodologically, starting with agency allows us to attend not just to iteration but also to the unexpected, to change that does not happen through repetition. Butler's subordination of agency to reiterative practices has been criticized for being too residual and leaving little space for a more varied account of agency and change (McNay 2003). In this section, we develop two ways of analysing agency, drawing on the work of Jane Bennett and Karen Barad respectively: *distributive and composite agency* and *entangled agency*. We also offer a series of suggestions for the methods implied and their uses for CSS.

### ***Distributed and composite agency***

Jane Bennett (2010) is perhaps the most often quoted representative of this perspective whose work has started to inspire research in CSS. Bennett has deconstructed the notion of human agency in political theory by highlighting three interrelated notions: efficacy, directionality, and causality. Wherever it looks, Bennett (2005: 455) cautions, 'social science tends to see only the social activity of *humans*'. Instead, the mutability and 'recalcitrance' of objects constitutes a form of material agency. For instance, Bennett defines the electrical power grid as an assemblage of humans and nonhumans. The elements of the assemblage, she argues, 'while they include humans and their constructions, also include some very active and powerful nonhumans: electrons, trees, wind, electromagnetic fields' (Bennett 2005: 446). Bennett thus emphasizes 'the distributive and composite nature of agency' (Bennett 2005: 446).

What does *distributive agency* entail methodologically? It implies taking into account how different forms of agency are mobilized and how they relate to other institutions, actors, discourses and so on. This means that agency cannot be reduced to particular institutions, experts, dominant practices or hegemonic discourses. Starting with distributed agency rather than the *dispositif* would imply that the

analysis is focused on sites where distributions of agency become manifest rather than in tracing the heterogeneous and disperse complexities of the *dispositif*. Where an analysis of the *dispositif* focuses on the connections between elements, an analysis of agency focuses on those moments or locations in the *dispositif* where a set of connections has the effect of generating a particular action, of becoming an agent engaged in a particular form of activity.

Methodologically, distributed agency asks how states of affairs are constituted by the capacities and potentialities of various humans and nonhumans. In particular, distributed agency is best observed where the matter–discourse relation generates unexpected outcomes (commonly regarded as failures). For example, what does the failure of the facial recognition algorithm or the body scanner as a consequence of the inability of electronic circuits to match scanned body contours to data sets imply for the *dispositif* of security at the airport? Bennett highlights this well in her discussion of the 2003 North American blackout:

The electrical grid, by blacking out, lit up quite a lot: the shabby condition of the public utilities infrastructure, the law-abidingness of New York City residents during the blackout, the disproportionate and accelerating consumption of energy by North Americans, and the element of unpredictability marking assemblages composed of intersecting and resonating elements. Thus spoke the grid.

(Bennett 2005: 462)

Distributed agency draws attention to failures of performativity in these sites by showing the precariousness of connections between heterogeneous elements. Failure represents an interruption of the repetitions that gave the impression of durability. However, successful durability also entails an analysis of distributed agency: how is airport security related to the smooth functioning of distributed capacities – electrons, circuits, and chips as well as embodied data such as algorithms? It also asks questions about how agency is distributed in a *dispositif* of security and in concrete space and at particular times. Distributed agency asks us to focus on particular ‘things’ and establish their relations in a sort of micro–environment (the scanning process at the airport) to then understand wider reverberations for security practices. Methodologically, analysing distributed agency attends to the emergence of capacities for action among the human/nonhuman elements of particular *dispositifs*.

### ***Entangled agency***

Entangled agency, like distributive agency, extends the realm of agency. The terminology of ‘entangled agency’ has been coined by Karen Barad (2007). Methodologically, we would argue, it implies attention to the constitution of boundaries between what counts as human and nonhuman, between discourse and materiality. This attention to the constitution of boundaries entails a methodological interest in events. Methodologically, entangled agency starts with an event rather

than iteration. This implies that rather than gathering information about the make-up of the *dispositif*, or following the circulation of an object, entangled agencies are followed through an analysis of events or what Barad has called 'phenomena'. The difference between a methodology of distributed (and composite) agency and an entangled agency could be captured through the difference between: 'follow the object' and 'follow the event'. For the former approach, it is a matter of tracing the way in which connections are formed or disrupted by particular elements; while for the latter it is a question of examining how a particular event illuminates the manner in which a specific set of elements have coalesced into an ensemble.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, for Barad (2007), subject and object, matter and meaning are both formed and transformed through intra-action. Intra-action is one of the most important terms in Barad's reconceptualization of performativity and agency. It signifies the '*mutual constitution of entangled agencies*' (Barad 2007: 33, original emphasis) and is opposed to interaction, which assumes pre-existing agencies. Rather than interaction, entangled agency is the effect of intra-action – an open-ended practice involving dynamic entanglements of humans and nonhumans, through which these acquire their specific boundaries and properties. In this approach, agency is 'a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or something has' (Barad 2007: 178).

In an important corrective to the focus of CSS on high profile instances of (in)security, Barad notes that events need not be spectacular (Barad 2007: 227). An analysis of entangled agency can set out from regular number of everyday events. Indeed, it would be premature to assume that entangled agency can be analysed in situations of breakdown only. Rather, a methodology of entangled agency starts with events, and traces out the way in which an event reveals a complex intra-action between elements through which the specific agencies of those elements that are productive of that event are constituted. It is important to note that for Barad the phenomena illuminated by events are different from objects-in-themselves; they are 'specific intra-actions' (Barad 2007: 128). Barad is concerned with intra-actions of humans and nonhumans and emergence of phenomena and related materializations as a consequence of this dynamic interplay of agencies. This can be illustrated through Barad's account of the sonogram. The imaging of the foetus is an event that materializes the existence of the unborn as an entity. This event illuminates a complex interplay of discourse and things: scientific understandings of sound and imaging as well as the capacities of the piezoelectric crystal. These elements intra-act with one another elements of a whole whose effect on each other generates a particular event: the image (Barad 2007: 148).

What methodological implications does entangled agency have for the analysis of insecurity? The method implied by an entangled agency approach is not only about making visible the materialities of the world, but about locating events and phenomena and paying attention to the manner in which things are related in a particular way insofar as they are elements of these events. It is not relationality itself that defines the gathering together of things (as it is with distributed agency), but the way an event inflects things together in a particular manner and creates

boundaries of subjects and objects. In this regard, 'small details', argued Barad, 'can make profound differences' (Barad 2007: 92). The so-called 'liquids ban' mentioned in the introduction is useful to think about Barad's point on small details. Through the 'liquids ban', the questions of what is a liquid, and particularly, what is a dangerous liquid cannot be taken for granted – it is the effect of an event through which gels and toothpastes appear to harbour risks and dangers. Dangerous liquids emerge out of intra-actions in which different apparatuses are entangled. The liquid is thus not neutral, an object to be located, screened and destroyed as a way to prevent terrorism. Rather it emerges out of the details of what apparatuses can measure and what not. At the same time, entangled agency also asks the researcher to analyse what new boundaries are enacted and what exclusions of what 'matters' happen in this process.

### **CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND DISTRIBUTED AGENCY**

In August 2005, the massive category 5 Hurricane Katrina hit the gulf coast of America and devastated the city of New Orleans. The destruction wrought by the hurricane immediately brought to the forefront the materiality of disaster and the role of infrastructure: from the collapse of the levees to the differential materialities that allowed for the mobility of particular categories of the population (for instance, those without cars could not evacuate). The problem of the destruction of infrastructure that the event of the disaster made clear was immediately placed in a continuum with the problem of 'terrorist attacks'. After all, critical infrastructure protection had gained increased prominence with the New York and London attacks. In a report published by the RAND corporation in 2007, the continuum natural disaster–terrorist attack is again reinforced: Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic domestic emergency that, in its deaths and destruction, had many of the possible characteristics of future terrorist attacks, especially those that could occur simultaneously in different parts of the United States or involve the use of weapons of mass destruction (RAND 2007). The literature engaging critically with the responses to the disaster has pointed out the 'unnaturalness' of the 'natural' disaster, challenged the continuum of terrorism–homeland security–environmental disasters; it has also pointed out the differential performative effects of the disaster in terms of gender, race and class and questioned the *dispositif* of risk management and emergency response deployed in response to the disaster. For instance, Stephen Graham has noted that '[m]uch of the funding for Bush's homeland security drive has been achieved through the cuts in broad-scale urban, social, and welfare funding that have been a prime feature of Bush's fiscal reengineering of the U.S. state along neoconservative lines' (Graham 2006: 64).

One of the many ways to explore how agency could be deployed methodologically in the analysis of Hurricane Katrina, is to ask how agency was distributed across human/nonhuman relations. In order to grasp the complex distribution of agency in Katrina's effect on New Orleans we have to look to the levees, their construction and maintenance (or lack thereof). These levees are both material ramparts against water as well as discursive entities constituted in federal and municipal strategy and legal documents. One cannot be understood without the other. However, one cannot stop with the levees. Graham, for example, suggests that it is necessary to understand Katrina in the context of American oil dependence. If we heed Graham, we would have to look not only at the coastal oil exploitation around New Orleans, but also the oil dependencies of automobility in the US and their link to climate change and the rising sea levels it will bring (to which low-lying New Orleans will have to respond and which Katrina is a forewarning of). We could also look to the materialities of federal response and its entanglement with discourses of race that produced a conceptualization of a crippled city as a zone appropriate for first quarantine, then militarized intervention. At no stage in these analyses can we say anything 'caused' the disaster that followed Katrina, however, we can analyse the distribution and composition of agency that led to violence and death.

If Graham 'follows the money' and the institutional changes in the governance of security, analysing distributed and composite agency can also be done by 'following the object' of infrastructure in the *dispositif* of security. Post-9/11, critical infrastructures have become a security concern as objects of disruption, interruption and failure. The all-hazards approach to critical infrastructure protection is concerned with unpredictable and unexpected failure (see also Aradau 2010). Yet, the agency of infrastructure becomes manifest in a different form of unpredictability: corrosion, erosion and decay. Following the object of infrastructure also sheds light on a different dimension of distributed and composite agency. All experts in critical infrastructure protection acknowledge the interconnectedness of infrastructures, their mutual dependency and the spiralling effects that the destruction of one element has upon others. However, agency is also differentially distributed in infrastructures. 'The connective technologies of critical infrastructure', argues Coward (2009b: 412), 'can thus arrange point-to-point interconnections that connect across vast distances and yet at the same time pass over entire areas and populations'.

## The criticality and politics of method

A reconceptualization of the relationship between discourse and materiality in the way discussed begs a number of political questions intertwined with methodological ones. With regard to the former, one might ask how political responses to public problems would change if we take the materiality of things seriously (cf. Bennett

2010: viii). One way to do this, taking into account that systems of relations like the *dispositif* entail exclusions, could be to inquire how boundary-practices, so prominent in security practices, are altered when we pay attention to materiality. For example, crossing the boundary between safe and dangerous – between the object that is mundane object and the object that is threatening – arises from the performative iteration of a particular material–discursive relation. Crossing a boundary can be recast as redrawing the limits of inclusion and exclusion. (In)security is precisely about the manner in which the rearticulation of relations redraws the limits according to which the safe is to be included and the dangerous is to be excluded. Ultimately, the performance of dangerous objects establishes the boundary of the safe and thus establishes who or what might be excluded as dangerous. At the same time, the materialization of dangerous objects appears more ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ than the materialization of dangerous people. Deploying relationality as a methodological principle allows us, as researchers, to dispel these dominant understandings.

A second, even more crucial political question, is who or what is responsible or accountable for the consequences of (in)security practices? The methods and methodologies discussed here are above all intimately connected with political questions about accountability and responsibility. What happens to accountability in a heterogenous *dispositif* for instance? In relation to the extension of agency, Bennett (2005: 463) asks, ‘Does the acknowledgment of nonhuman actants relieve individual humans of the burden of being held responsible for their actions?’ Indeed, in drawing out the relations of human and nonhuman elements in engendering (in)security, can the human element ever be held entirely responsible? Considering the constitutive role of nonhuman elements in security *dispositifs*, the human element is never entirely in control. This is because the interrelation between human and nonhuman elements gives rise to different effects that, following Foucault, enter ‘into resonance or contradiction’ with each other, perpetually calling for a ‘re-adjustment...of the heterogeneous elements’, producing new – and, for the human element, potentially unintended and undesirable – security effects (Foucault 1980: 195–6).

Analyses of security have relied on the intentionality of human action in the production of insecurity (e.g., the intentional use of particular objects to cause destruction by a suspected terrorist), and, in response, security strategies rely on intentional action to secure infrastructure – as in the case of the liquids ban. Yet, methodologies that deploy *dispositifs*, performativity or agency challenge the capacity of supposedly rational human agents to have full control over the outcomes they seek in any *dispositif*. This implies that questions of accountability and responsibility can also not be equated with a subject or object. Barad’s discussion of accountability in the wake of the hyper-responsibilization of mothers towards the unborn foetus contains a series of helpful suggestions:

The real questions of accountability include accountability for the consequences of the construction of foetal subjectivity, which emerges out of particular material–discursive practices; accountability for the consequences

of inadequate health care and nutrition apparatuses in their differential effects on particular pregnant women; accountability for the consequences of global neo-colonialism, including the uneven distribution of wealth and poverty; and many other factors.

(Barad 2007: 218)

In a similar manner we might also note that questions of the destruction of the built urban environment framed only in terms of the human agency of aggressors displace questions about the 'sharing of built environment with others that the public nature of building entails' (Coward 2006: 430). That is, framing the discussion only in terms of what those that fire weapons seek to achieve fails to understand the agency of the built environment itself in constituting precisely that which is targeted: shared, public space and the being-with-others it supports.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the role of, and the relation between, discourse and materiality. We have argued that the methodological principle of relationality can be deployed to develop new frameworks for a critical analysis of security practices. The chapter has outlined a methodological approach that operationalizes the relations between materiality and discourse in three ways: through *dispositifs*, performativity, and (distributed and entangled) agency.

We used the *dispositif* as a heuristic device and showed that it can work as a methodological framework for the identification of seemingly unconnected elements. The *dispositif* entails inquiring into the heterogeneous and fragile relations established between discursive and non-discursive elements. In a second operationalization, we have shown how performativity enables us to analyse apparently durable objects by considering the way in which repetition fixes and categorizes the relationship between discursive and material elements. In these connections, the agency of subjects and objects is mobilized differently, movements we aimed to capture by a more varied understanding agency as distributed (agency as distributed in relations between humans and nonhumans) and entangled (agency as emerging through particular intra-actions which become visible through events). Methodologically speaking, distributed agency implied to 'follow the object', whereas entangled agency is about 'following the event'.

Ultimately, proposing relationality as a methodological principle to research the relation between materiality and discourse in CSS has provoked a number of political questions. What are the consequences of the methodological work we have undertaken here? We have argued that the methodological approach to discourse and materiality we have outlined incorporates a critical ethos. An understanding of the mutually constitutive relation of materiality and discourse which gives due priority to both terms is critical for three reasons: first, it requires us to think about what counts and thus disrupts naturalized notions of separability of matter and ideas; second, it will recognize the inherent instability of discursive-material relations; and

third, it will value agency and focus on the various ways in which heterogeneous ensembles are performed. It is precisely this critical ethos that generates a questioning of the boundaries of political analysis noted above.

Implicit in our discussions of the three critical operationalizations in this chapter is the trope of contingency. Relationality, *dispositifs*, performativity and agency are possible because of the contingency of the social and political realm. Contingency is the basis for the recombinant potentiality of the relations between material and discursive elements. It is the condition of possibility of the shifting and reforming relationality that characterize the everyday world. And it is that which makes possible acts of agency that would otherwise be determined by the structures that seek to bind them. Overall, the methodological principles we have outlined disclose the critical potential of contingency and seek to understand the complex heterogeneous relationality that characterizes the various events of (in)security that mark both international politics and our everyday lives.

## Notes

- 1 For a critique of this understanding of objects in social sciences, see Bruno Latour (1999).
- 2 For a recent example that includes materiality in discussions of methodology in CSS, see Mark Salter and Can Mutlu (2012).
- 3 It is a matter of debate whether Security Studies is a discipline in its own right. For the purposes of our initial survey of the problematic we will assume that questions of international security arise in the broad field of IR as well as the narrower confines of Security Studies. A number of authors/writings can be located at the intersection of IR and Security Studies, speaking to both fields/disciplines. In addition, materiality has been discussed in various philosophical, political and theoretical strands (like, for instance, Marxism) which we will not be able to discuss here as we aim to address the specific relation between materiality and discourse in the field of security.
- 4 On experimentation and method, see the Introduction to this book.
- 5 For a more detailed account of this case see Owen D. Thomas (forthcoming).
- 6 See Mark Laffey (2000) for a criticism of the uses of performativity in IR as too focused on culture and regimes of signification at the expense of an analysis of capital.
- 7 See Article 1 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (as amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961). The final text of the 1961 convention is available at: [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/single-convention.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/single-convention.html). Accessed 5 October 2012.

## References

- Aas, K.F. (2006). '“The Body Does Not Lie”: Identity, Risk and Trust in Technoculture'. *Crime, Media, Culture*, 2(2): 143–158.
- Ackerly, B.A., M. Stern, and J. True (2006). 'Feminist Methodologies for International Relations'. In *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern and Jacqui True. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3–18.
- Agamben, G. (2009). *What Is an Apparatus?* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Amoore, L. (2006). 'Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror'. *Political Geography*, 25(3): 336–351.
- Aradau, C. (2010). 'Security That Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection'. *Security Dialogue*, 41(5): 491–514.

- Aradau, C., and R. van Munster (2009). 'Poststructuralism, Continental Philosophy, and the Remaking of Security Studies'. In *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, edited by Victor Mauer and Myriam Dunn Cavelty. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 73–83.
- Barad, K. (1998). 'Getting Real: Technoscientific Practices and the Materialization of Reality'. *Differences*, 10(2): 87–128.
- (2003). 'Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter'. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28(3): 801–831.
- (2007). *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Bennett, J. (2004). 'The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter'. *Political Theory*, 32(3): 347–372.
- (2005). 'The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout'. *Public Culture*, 17(3): 445–466.
- (2010). *Vibrant Matter: A political ecology of things*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Bewley-Taylor, D.R. (2002). *United States and International Drug Control, 1909–1997*. London: Continuum.
- Bialasiewicz, L., D. Campbell, S. Elden, S. Graham, A. Jeffrey, and A.J. Williams (2007). 'Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy'. *Political Geography*, 26(4): 405–422.
- Bigo, D. (2002). 'Security and Immigration: Toward A Critique of the Governmentality of Unease'. *Alternatives*, 27(Special Issue): 63–92.
- Booth, K. (2007). *Theory of World Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Butler, J. (1990). *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity*. London: Routledge.
- (1993). *Bodies that Matter. On the discursive limits of 'sex'*. London: Routledge.
- Buzan, B., O. Wæver, and J. de Wilde (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Callon, M. (2006). What does it mean to say that Economics is Performative? *CSI Working Paper Series* 005. Available at: [http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/09/15/96/PDF/WP\\_CSI\\_005.pdf](http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/09/15/96/PDF/WP_CSI_005.pdf). Accessed 28 March 2014.
- Campbell, D. (1998 [1992]). *Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. 2nd edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- (2001). 'International Engagements: The Politics of North American International Relations Theory'. *Political Theory*, 29(3): 432–448.
- Coward, M. (2006). 'Against Anthropocentrism: The Destruction of the Built Environment as a Distinct form of Political Violence'. *Review of International Studies*, 32(03): 419–437.
- (2009a). 'Network-Centric Violence, Critical Infrastructure and the Urbanization of Security'. *Security Dialogue*, 40(4–5): 399–418.
- (2009b). *Urbicide: The politics of urban destruction*. London: Routledge.
- Deleuze, G. (1992). 'What is a dispositif'. In *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, edited by Timothy Armstrong. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp. 159–168.
- Derrida, J. (1989). 'Rhétorique de la drogue'. *Autrement* (106): 197–214.
- Dewsbury, J.D. (2000). 'Performativity and the Event: Enacting a Philosophy of Difference'. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 18(4): 473–496.
- Dillon, M., and L. Lobo-Guerrero (2008). 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction'. *Review of International Studies*, 34(2): 265–292.
- Dillon, M., and J. Reid (2009). *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to make life live*. London: Routledge.
- Finnemore, M., and K. Sikkink (2001). 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics'. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1): 391–416.

- Foucault, M. (1973). *The Birth of the Clinic*. London: Tavistock.
- (1979). *History of Sexuality*. London: Allen Lane.
- (1980). 'The Confession of the Flesh'. In *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings*, edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Book. pp. 194–228.
- (1991 [1977]). *Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison*. London: Penguin.
- (2002). 'The Subject and Power'. In *Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, edited by James D. Faubion. London: Penguin Books.
- (2007). *Security, Territory, Population*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Gleditsch, N.P. (1998). 'Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(3): 381–400.
- Graham, S. (2006). "Homeland" Insecurities? Katrina and the Politics of "security" in Metropolitan America'. *Space and Culture*, 9(1): 63–67.
- Grayson, K. (2008). *Chasing Dragons: Security, identity, and illicit drugs in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Harding, S. (1989). 'Is there a Feminist Method'. In *Feminism & Science*, edited by Nancy Tuana. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. pp. 17–31.
- Hekman, S. (2010). *The Material of Knowledge: Feminist Disclosures*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Herschinger, E. (2011). *Constructing Global Enemies: Hegemony and identity in international discourses on terrorism and drug prohibition*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Homer-Dixon, T. (2001). *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Howarth, D. (2000). *Discourse*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Huysmans, J. (1998). 'Revisiting Copenhagen, or: On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(4): 479–505.
- (2006). *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Jacobsen, E.K.U. (2012). 'Unique Identification: Inclusion and Surveillance in the Indian Biometric Assemblage'. *Security Dialogue*, 43(5): 457–474.
- Keohane, R.O. (1988). 'International Institutions: Two Approaches'. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4): 379–396.
- Klare, M.T. (2002). *Resource Wars: The new landscape of global conflict*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Krasner, S.D. (1999). *Sovereignty: Organized hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (2001 [1985]). *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics*. 2nd edition. London: Verso.
- Laffey, M. (2000). 'Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action'. *Review of International Studies*, 26(03): 429–444.
- Latour, B. (1992). 'Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts'. In *Shaping technology/building society: Studies in sociotechnical change*, edited by Weibe Bijker and John Law. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 225–258.
- (1999). *Pandora's Hope: An essay on the reality of science studies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- (2004). *Politics of Nature: How to bring the sciences into democracy*. Translated by Catherine Porter, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- (2005). *Reassembling the Social: An introduction to actor-network-theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Law, J., and V. Singleton (2000). 'Performing Technology's Stories: On Social Constructivism, Performance, and Performativity'. *Technology and Culture*, 41(4): 765–775.

- Law, J., and J. Urry (2004). 'Enacting the Social'. *Economy and Society*, 33(3): 390–410.
- Lundborg, T., and N. Vaughan-Williams (2011). 'Resilience, Critical Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of "Life" in Biopolitics'. *International Political Sociology*, 5(4): 367–383.
- MacKenzie, D.A., F. Muniesa, and L. Siu (2007). *Do Economists Make Markets?: On the performativity of economics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Magnet, S. (2011). *When Biometrics Fail: Gender, race, and the technology of identity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Massey, R. (2012). "Don't Lift the Liquids Ban!" Airport Bosses Fear Increased Security Risk Along With "Chaos And Confusion" if Rules are Relaxed'. *Daily Mail*, 31 May 2012.
- McNay, L. (2003). 'Agency, Anticipation and Indeterminacy in Feminist Theory'. *Feminist Theory*, 4(2): 139–148.
- Milliken, J. (1999). 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2): 225–254.
- Mitchell, T. (1990). 'Everyday Metaphors of Power'. *Theory and Society*, 19(5): 545–577.
- Muller, B.J. (2009). *Security, Risk and the Biometric State: Governing borders and bodies*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Nelson, L. (1999). 'Bodies (and Spaces) Do Matter: The Limits of Performativity'. *Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography*, 6(4): 331–353.
- Rabinow, P. (2003). *Anthropos Today. Reflections on Modern Equipment*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- RAND (2007). *Hurricane Katrina. Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Revel, J. (2002). *Le vocabulaire de Foucault*. Paris: Ellipses.
- Ruggie, J.G. (1998). 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge'. *International Organization*, 52(4): 855–885.
- Salter, M., and C. Mutlu (2012). *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Salter, M.B. (2003). *Rights of Passage: The passport in international relations*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Searle, J.R. (1995). *Construction of Social Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- Shepherd, L. (2009). *Gender Matters in Global Politics: A feminist introduction to international relations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Stritzel, H. (2007). 'Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3): 357–383.
- Thomas, O.D. (forthcoming). 'Foucaultian Dispositifs as Methodology: The Case of Exclusions by Unique Identification (UID) in India'. *International Political Sociology*.
- Torpey, J. (2000). *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, citizenship and the state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- UIDAI (2010). *UIDAI Strategy Overview: Creating a unique identity number for every resident in India*. New Delhi: UIDAI.
- (2012). *Role of Biometric Technology in Aadhaar Enrollment*. New Delhi: UIDAI.
- United Nations (1964). *Official Records of United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs*. Vol. I. New York: United Nations.
- Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010). 'The UK Border Security Continuum: Virtual Biopolitics and the Simulation of the Sovereign Ban'. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 28(6): 1071–1083.
- Voelkner, N. (2011). 'Managing Pathogenic Circulation'. *Security Dialogue*, 42(3): 239–259.

- Warner, J.F., and M. Zeitoun (2008). 'International Relations Theory and Water do Mix: A Response to Furlong's Troubled Waters, Hydro-Hegemony and International Water Relations'. *Political Geography*, 27(7): 802–810.
- Weber, C. (1998). 'Performative States'. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 27(1): 77–95.
- Webster, B. (2009). 'New Airport Scanner Promises end to Ban on Liquids in Luggage'. *The Times*, 30 May 2009. Available at [www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article1967325.ece](http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article1967325.ece). Accessed 28 March 2014.
- Weil, A.T.. (1986). *The Natural Mind: An investigation of drugs and the higher consciousness*. Revised editon. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Wendt, A. (1994). 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State'. *The American Political Science Review*, 88(2): 384–396.
- (1995). 'Constructing International Politics'. *International Security*, 20(1): 71–81.
- (1999). *Social Theory of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

# 4

## VISUALITY

*Rune Saugmann Andersen, Juha A. Vuori and Can E. Mutlu*

### Introduction

Visuals matter to socio-political analysis, and they do so in a categorically different way than words. Sight, or the act of seeing, is one of the key human senses and thereby ‘visuality’, either in the form of rendering visible, invisible, or visible in particular ways, is a vital part of most forms of representation.<sup>1</sup> Visuality – both as ‘ways of seeing’, and in the form of the artefacts produced through them (such as still or moving images, signs, symbols, charts, graphs, sculptures and so on) – plays a central role in numerous manifestations of security practices. Yet, the vast majority of works in critical approaches to security have focused on the verbal and the written rather than the visual as the modality through which security can be analysed. In other words, critical reflection on visuality and the uses of visuals is still relatively limited within the critical security studies literature. This is understandable, in that the study of visual objects and signs eventually encounters the limits of language (Barthes 1973: 9). Visual aspects of meaning making and discourse have properties that discourse analysis of written or spoken artefacts cannot reach. Indeed, to get a comprehensive grasp of meaning on the one hand and practice on the other, critical scholars of security need to engage visual modalities in addition to verbal or written ones (cf. Williams 2003; McDonald 2008).

The importance of visual analyses that focus on images<sup>2</sup> and other forms of visual representations for critical security studies can be seen in several articles, special issues, and books that have examined the role of visual artefacts in security studies in the last two decades.<sup>3</sup> In this growing body of literature, relatively little emphasis has been placed on image/language reflexivity and/or the methodological aspects of examining visual artefacts as ambiguous objects of study, however. A majority of these contributions have focused on the cultural and political role of images rather than reflecting on methodological questions that surround the study

of visuality, and how these interact with security practices. In this chapter, we address the methodological implications and opportunities for future developments of visual analysis in critical security studies.

We argue for a broader focus on ‘visuality’ rather than on stand-alone ‘images’ or visual artefacts. In particular, we champion the notion of visuality as a methodology or an analytical sensibility that can enrich the critical study of security. We argue for the relevance of thinking about visuality in studies of security, no matter what the particular area of security under study happens to be – and in doing so argue that probing the ways security is made to look in different areas, or thinking about how it would be if it looked different, can yield critical insights. It is important to note that images are always polysemous – they have the possibility of different meanings – and therefore one can never be sure that one has ‘seen it all’. For the same reason, different theoretical or methodological approaches to visuality and visual artefacts can produce different outcomes, and may be used to supplement one another.

The added value of our contribution is that we move away from existing trends in critical approaches to security that tend to treat visuals as objects (e.g., an image, a cartoon, a video), and use forms of discourse analysis of these objects modelled on the study of text. By doing so, we also seek to move away from the inherent assumption that ‘the visual’ could be studied uniformly as ‘visual security’ and integrated as such in security studies. Instead, we start from the ‘polysemy’ and ambiguity of the visual (Mitchell 1994, 2011; Mirzoeff 2009). Polysemy is the capacity of signs to have multiple meanings, or a large semantic field. This means that the visual does not form a distinct field of human practice, it cannot be studied with a single method, and it is not fixed to objects or artefacts. All of these facets of visuality have methodological implications for the critical study of security, and as such they inform the structure of the present chapter. First, we review how visuals and visuality have been present in critical studies on security, and set out how acknowledging polysemy can contribute to this literature and expand the ways in which security and the visual are seen as connected. Second, we discuss how visuality can be analysed as a mode of constituting truths, as affect, and as banal spectacles. Finally, we conclude the chapter with a discussion of the methodological implications of incorporating visuality in the critical study of security.

## From visual security to visuality in security

The question of visuality and security has been somewhat haunted by a tendency to assume that *the visual*, as a field of objects, could be studied uniformly and integrated in security studies as ‘visual security’. The clearest expression of this, and the most elaborate attempt to provide a framework for how to study images like this, is Lene Hansen’s article ‘Theorizing the image for security studies’ (2011a). Visual security, in this case, refers to the idea that images should be studied as a distinct sphere of security practice: since visual artefacts have political implications, they should be taken seriously as an object of security analysis.

Visual objects and media can take many forms as is also apparent from previous studies in the field: 'the visual' has been approached via the examination of public broadcasts of missile launch videos supplied by the military (Baudrillard 1995), links between the military and visual entertainment industries (Der Derian 2001), private photographs of prisoner abuse that has escaped their creators (Laustsen 2008; Shepherd 2008), artworks conceived to question the spectator's relationship to death (Möller 2009), icons designed to reinforce organizational messages (Vuori 2010), satiric cartoons designed to provoke and intervene in a debate (Hansen 2011a, b), and the justificatory acts of magazine-cover photography (Schlag and Heck 2012) to name a few examples. Such diversity in terms of objects, modalities, and mediums suggests that there should be diversity if not in methodology, at least in methods that we use to study the visual. Similarly, it may be difficult, or even counterproductive, to produce a single 'question' or a unidirectional 'research programme' of the visual in critical studies of security. Indeed, whether specific visualities situated in relation to particular security practices call for different treatment or analysis should be explored in more depth.

## VARIETY IN STUDIES OF VISUAL SECURITIZATION

Visuals have been useful for studies guided by securitization theory. Yet even in this theoretical community, there has been variety in how the visual has been approached. For example, Lene Hansen (2011a, b) has discussed the Danish 'Muhammad cartoon crisis' through the prism of visual securitization. A series of polemic cartoons on Danish-Muslim relations published in a Danish newspaper became the focal point of a major international crisis for Denmark with boycotts and even attacks on Danish embassies. Although the cartoons entered an already strained political context, the image received an iconic status for the political issue on both sides of the crisis. This example shows how iconic images narrow down the number of interpretations available for an audience, and the securitizing capacity of images is expressed by them.

As other studies have shown, the function of images in securitization processes need not be restricted to the use of narratives such as cartoons. Schlag and Heck (2012) have examined a cover of *TIME* magazine that displayed the photograph of Aisha, an Afghan woman whose face had been mutilated to restore her husband's family's honour. The picture-text relation of the cover and the iconic act of the image perform a securitizing move to legitimate the war effort in Afghanistan as the female body constitutes a threatened referent object; the protection of which is the viewer's responsibility. This is suggested by the 'anchor' (Barthes 1977: 38), or preferred reading of the cover image: the title caption reads 'What happens if we leave Afghanistan?'. This combination suggests that leaving Afghanistan would result in continuation of gendered violence.

Another example of how visual images are part and parcel of securitization processes is the Doomsday Clock of the Atomic Scientists. Vuori (2010) views the image of the symbolic clock as a visual aspect of the securitization of nuclear weapons as a threat to human civilization. The Doomsday Clock demonstrates how symbols can be intertwined with security discourse. The symbol of the clock evokes, and thereby facilitates, all of the crucial ingredients involved in a securitization grammar: the lateness of the hour (urgency), impending doom (existential threat), as well as the possibility to reverse course by moving the hands of time far away from midnight (way out). At the same time, the clock has become a ‘visual master signifier’ of the anti-nuclear securitization: to display the clock is enough to evoke the security argument about the danger of nuclear weapons for humanity.

There are numerous entry points into an epistemological spectrum of visual analysis. In this chapter, we envision a spectrum that ranges from ‘visual security’ to ‘visualities of security’. At the ‘visual security’ end of the spectrum, we have those studies that treat visuals as politically meaningful artefacts. In critical IR and (critical) security studies, this approach to studying visuals manifests itself in explorations of visual artefacts in terms of how they enact the international (Campbell 2007), question security practices (Möller 2007), or take part in securitizing (as in the examples in the textbox on page 00). At the other end of the spectrum, ‘visualities of security’ focus on the role of the visual in the development of techniques of knowledge, and thereby on the responses to or uses of polysemy – the ability of visual signification to contain multiple meanings. Such investigations can, for example, examine how vision and (in)visibility is an integral part of practices and modulations of the social and the political, and of security (Haggerty and Ericson 2006), and is central to cultural governance of war (Campbell 2003). This type of conceptualization presents visualities as implicated in ways of knowing, and treats them as spheres to be known. Examples here include how the colouring of uniforms worn by security officials (Guillaume *et al.* 2012), or how the prohibitions on photography in an expanding range of public places (Simon 2012) contribute to security practices, not by securitizing and pointing to threats, but by attempting to direct the understanding of security through manipulating what the security apparatus looks like, and by controlling representations of it.




FIGURE 4.1 The epistemological spectrum of visual analysis

The epistemological spectrum shown in [Figure 4.1](#) implies that visibility and the visual can be approached from a multitude of angles. To begin with, we can approach visuals from the fields of Arts and Aesthetics. These fields mostly work with or produce visuals as objects and artefacts, and thus come closer to the ‘visual security’ end of the spectrum described above. In security studies, Möller (2007) has used both professional and non-professional photography to investigate how memory and security play together after 9/11, and Campbell (2004) uses juxtapositions of old and new images to question how atrocities are imagined. Lisle (2004, 2010) has drawn on artworks and theories to analyse visual objects and incorporated them into discussions of identity and nationalism, and investigated how art can trigger reflexive engagements with insecurity (2011), while Van Veen (2010) has investigated how photographs of the detainee camp at Guantanamo imagine the place and the bodies and institutions there. These kinds of studies examine how security plays out in a set of material objects that show something or someone, for example a painting, a map, or a photograph.

Second, there are also important studies that treat visibility as implicated in broader questions of subjectivity and knowledge. Rose (2007: 2) defines visibility as ‘the way in which vision is constructed’, a question that pertains both to a specific object and to a set of practices. Visibility, thus, refers to ‘how we see, how we are able, allowed, or made to see, and how we see this seeing and the unseeing therein’ (Foster 1988: ix). In asking such questions, these approaches work with the polysemy at play in seeing – i.e., that the same things can be seen very differently. Within the broader social sciences, the variety of approaches that focus on visuals span a range of aspects of visibility and techniques of knowledge. For example, there has been an interest in the gendered aspects of the ‘gaze’ and the anxious state of being that comes with knowing that one is being watched. Of key interest here are the intersubjective relations between those that can watch, and those who are (in)visible (Mulvey 1977, 1990). In particular, the viewer’s position can be one of power, whereas the watched person’s position is one of subjugation. Yet, displaying something that would have been otherwise hidden can also be a source of empowerment. The examination of power relations between the viewer and the displayed has drawn attention to interpretations (and performativity) of specific objects. At the same time, it has become apparent how the structures that surround production, mediation, and interpretation play a significant role in making some bodies or themes visible and others invisible (Butler 2009; Chouliaraki 2006).

Third, broader conceptions of visibility have also been used to study how systems of signification operate visually, constraining and enabling thought. Indeed, for Rancière (2011: 99), ‘[a]n image never stands alone. It belongs to a system of visibility’. Such systems of visibility are a part of aesthetic regimes that modulate what is seen and said. As such, these systems play a role in co-producing the limits and boundaries for what is done and what can be done. They do so by producing an a priori distribution of the sensible within fields of life, i.e., the modes of articulation between forms of action, production, perception and thought

(Rancière 2008). Such regimes form a prior aesthetic division of the visible and the invisible, the audible and the inaudible, the 'sayable' and the 'unsayable' (ibid.), and work to form a common sense of the visual (Rancière 2011).

To view images from the vantage-point of common sense and regimes of the sensible will take us a step further in evaluating 'what images are, what they do and the effects they create' (Rancière 2011: 95) in regard to security and related practices. Images and visibility are important aspects of both systems of signification, and systems of the sensible. Images are then not only about justification or about political communication. They are about the 'secondary architecture' (Kiefer 1970) around us: various signs and signals, in for example traffic and urban spaces, tell us what to do and how to behave. Not only the physical manipulation of an environment, but signs and signals that guide its use can be viewed as layers of architecture, and both can have semiotic aspects to them. Indeed, images work together with other symbolic, discursive, and material elements in the production of power relations and grids of operation. They are not only of immense value for practitioners of security, but for the operation of security in general.

Indeed, visibility and making visible have been major concerns for both military and security practitioners (cameras, scanners, thermal imaging, and so on), and consequently the examination of the economies of 'making (in)visible' has been of major interest in critical surveillance studies (Lyon 1994, 2006; Koskela 2000) and in work on the networks involved in the visual production of foreign politics in the broadest sense (Der Derian 2000, 2009; Campbell 2003). Artworks have been used to question the representative codes that make security infrastructure (in)visible in particular ways (Andersen and Möller 2013). These kinds of studies come closer to dealing with 'the visibility of [a topic]' rather than with images as a topic in themselves, even if studies such as Campbell (2003) and Andersen and Möller (2013) use specific images to investigate broader questions about the imagination of war and security. They do so, though, within a rather conventional sphere of 'security': militaries, war, and atrocities. An important area of future research would be to apply similar analytic strategies to less conventional aspects of (in)security such as private security companies, 'kettling' techniques of crowd control by police forces (see [Chapter 7](#) in this volume) or climate security.

Visuals have also been viewed as a subgroup (or subgroups) of signs in more general terms. In semiotic terms, signs have multiple modalities (e.g., auditory and tactile signs), of which visibility is only one. Visuals have most prominently been viewed as a subgroup of signs in studies that draw on semiotics (Shapiro 1988; Vuori 2011; Vuori *et al.* forthcoming), but also in studies that depart from notions of intertextuality drawn from discourse analysis (Campbell 2004; Hansen 2011a). Visibility is also central to the ways in which social scientists imagine and present complex systems or notions (e.g., human geography; [Chapter 2](#) in this volume).

The following table summarizes the three approaches to visual security introduced in this section.

**TABLE 4.1** Approaches to visual security

| <i>Visuality can be studied as...</i> | <i>Which means...</i>                                                                          | <i>Examples of this include...</i>                                                        |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| An object                             | Engaging with how specific images enact or represent.                                          | The Doomsday Clock (Vuori 2010) and Images of Guantanamo (Van Veeren 2010).               |
| A modality                            | Viewing visuality as related to seeing, rather than to specific visual artefacts.              | Guillaume <i>et al.</i> (forthcoming) on how colour-use shapes meanings of security.      |
| A category of signs                   | Studying how visual signs differ from and relate to verbal or other categories of signs/texts. | Shapiro (1988) on images in foreign policy and Hansen's (2011a) theoretization of images. |

Such a brief presentation of how questions that touch upon visuality and security have been approached (as an object, a modality, a category of signs), already shows that a single article or introductory chapter cannot engage with every possible aspect, let alone with the (implicit) details of the methods used to study them. However, visuality is a vital aspect of most practices and processes of meaning making that pertain to security. The question is then how to enter this polysemous terrain of visuality. We propose to start from taking visuality as an analytical sensibility to representational practices or regimes of sight and display, inclusive of the structuration of public and private spaces, as well as cognitive and material images.

## Visualities, genres, and critical potential

The proposed shift from the 'visual object' to visuality can help us disentangle a difficulty that seems to have proven problematic for the critical literature on images and security: how to account for the repressive and emancipative potentialities of images without making different genres of images placeholders for different potentialities. In other words, how can we examine how images operate in repressive and emancipatory ways without a prior attribution of the images as either one or the other based on their genre or their medium?

The dilemma of reproducing genre-biases is perhaps due to images and visual analysis being 'latecomers', both in their own right, and in their introduction into the field of IR. They entered the field mainly through poststructuralism's concern with countering domination, simulacra, and spectacle. Concomitantly, images have mainly been analysed in view of a critical stance towards security. This combination has had the rather unfortunate effect of often leading to characterizations of certain genres as inherently this or that: either as tools maintaining spectacular domination or as vehicles of critique and demystification. For example, 'mainstream' film and news images have often been portrayed as complicit in dominant and

repressive security practices. This is the case in Der Derian's (2001) outline of the visual integration of the theatre of war in home theatre entertainment, or in Campbell's (2003) investigation of what he terms 'cultural governance'. Such a view is also present in Mirzoeff's (2005) account of imagery of the 2003 Iraq War, and – albeit less unambiguously – in Shapiro's exposure of the stereotyping practices of representation found in the production of foreign policy (1988).

Artistic images and relatively 'slow' photojournalistic work, on the other hand, have been brought to critical security studies as vehicles with which to resist domination by security practices and spectacular representations of security practice in mainstream news and films. In Möller's (2007) analysis of how artistic photography can perform desecuritization, images are seen to possess an ever-present surplus of meaning which always offers some space for resistance. Yet, such spaces are only explored in relation to artistic images. Similarly, Campbell's (2003) work on cultural governance and pictorial resistance locates resistance with 'slow' genres of photography, following Sontag's (2004) emphasis of the 'slowness' of some genres in comparison to other more speedy genres. The speedy nature of the ever-faster news cycle makes it more difficult for mass media to resist familiar framings and representations of issues. Despite the favouring of resistance, Campbell's (2003: 73) final conclusion is to note the failure of such 'resistance to be timelier, more in tune with the speed of contemporary war'. Yet, this cannot be blamed on the world alone: the slowness of the resistance he finds is at least partly engendered by his analysis, which looks for and locates resistance with 'slow' genres, and which does not explore quicker forms of resistance that can be found, for example, in internet memes – i.e., concepts, images, jokes, and so on which pass from person to person via the internet.

In view of previous work on imagery in critical studies of security, we take the visual to have implications beyond genres of representation or spheres of aesthetics. Because images are polysemous and ambiguous, we cannot close off their operation by theoretical fiat. The genre of images on its own does not preordain whether or not an image can work towards critique and emancipation. Such questions are to be examined empirically, with, for example, reception studies.

Furthermore, to move away from the study of images as 'visual security' is to move away from the notion of images as part of a pre-defined realm of security. Visual security cannot be contained as an isolated realm of its own, such as images of war and military operations, or images that are used in justifying security politics. Instead, visibility is part and parcel of many practices that may or may not be viewed as partial to security and thereby, of the politics of security. Such a move away from 'visual security' as a realm of its own is towards engagement of the visibility of whichever security-related practice one is dealing with. This move works to break down the rather crude stereotyping of genres of images, which often tends to follow a quite predictable and problematic division between 'mass' and 'fine' or 'high' culture.

Important steps in this direction already exist, notably Shapiro's (2009) book on how mainstream film both participates in engendering and resists the 'violent

cartographies' that surround issues such as immigration and war. And even if Hansen's (2011a, b) work on the image is very much attuned towards the image as an object lodged in existing political discourse, categories such as immediacy and circulability, and the situation of the image in an elaborate (and, in her account somewhat dominating) intertextual environment, can also be employed to think about the visibility of a set of security practices.

Furthermore, to shift attention towards visibility as a part of everyday sociality, and as a methodology for studying security practices that are not exclusively visual, will hopefully enable critical studies of security to heed Williams's (2003: 512) call to 'confront the fact that contemporary political communication is increasingly embedded within televisual images'. Indeed, 'a consideration of the role of contemporary communications media in the representation and conduct of security relations is almost inescapable' (Williams 2003: 522). Thereby, visibility as an analytic sensibility or methodology should not be the exotic business of those who study 'visual security', and be confined to its own circles. Rather, it should constitute an integral part of the analytical sensibilities that inform critical examinations of security practices.

Likewise, the specific methods of analysing image production, circulation, and reception should be brought into contact with the visibility of security, and not restricted to analyses of research objects already constituted as (only) a visual artefact. The visual practices employed in the detainee camp at Guantanamo Bay, for example, can tell us a lot about how the 'War on Terror' is imagined (Van Veeren 2010); the colour-use of emergency vehicles, or how neon vests have become ubiquitous in the everyday can allow entry into how the logics of prevention and risk are enacted in contemporary societies (Guillaume *et al.* forthcoming). This integration of visibility into examinations of security practice would, to an extent, mirror the development of gender studies. Indeed, gender has evolved from a separate sphere of inquiry absorbed largely in its own debates and viewed by outsiders as a separate field, to a methodological concern seen as leaving a mark on most studies of security practices, including visual ones (e.g., Shepherd 2008; Weber 2007; Campbell 2003).

To make the integration of visuals as a concern in the critical examination of security practices fruitful, scholars should be able to use productive methods of studying visibility, developed in other disciplines. In return, these approaches should be combined with analytic strategies and theoretical approaches that focus on security. Such a rigorous engagement is crucial to open up hitherto unnoticed visual aspects of security (Vuori and Andersen, forthcoming) for critical scrutiny. Building on this point, in the next section, we expand on a few of such approaches, and discuss how they have proven relevant for critical studies of security.

## Methodologies of the visual/imaginings of the image

The way we have approached visibility in methodological terms has been to emphasize what Rancière (2011) terms 'aesthetic regimes', i.e., the rules and

systematics that govern visibility, seeing, and displaying, as well as the practices by which they are enacted. Pertinent here is how visibility understood in this manner gets transformative capacity, and how it is that visualizations and the visual side of objects and practices become powerful. We examine these questions through three approaches to visibility, each of which has its own methodological implications: how do visual objects and visualizations operate in 1) the constitution of truths, 2) affection and emotional processes, and 3) the displacement of mythical with banal power and doing with seeing.

### ***Pictorial power in the constitution of truths***

Since Shapiro's (1988) intervention for the significance of visibility in the politics of representation, research projects on the role of images and visibility in critical studies of security have tended to see images as powerful in contemporary politics. Such studies have often followed Shapiro's analysis in looking at the role of images in constituting some representations of politics as natural and true. This kind of visual production of truth can work through different mediums and practices, as the analysis of maps in Shapiro (1988) shows, yet most studies to date have dealt with photographs.

Both in accounts that depict images as potentially liberating and in accounts that render them complicit in practices of domination and hegemony, the view that visual power permeates politics is taken as a background observation, rather than the main object of investigation. Yet these studies demonstrate that visibility can reveal aspects of politics that are hardly graspable without attention to the visual. As befits the inherent ambiguity and polysemy of images, the power of pictures is looked upon both with scepticism and optimism. Hansen's work (2011a) forms a kind of middle-position here, as she notes that the question of whether visual ambiguity facilitates or hinders securitization cannot be decided by theoretical fiat, but depends on empirical investigation. Irrespective of whether the power of images is configured as visual resistance (Möller 2007; Campbell 2003) or as partaking in domination (Der Derian 2001), the immanent power of images is the premise that studies of images are grounded in.

#### **FOREGROUNDING THE BACKGROUND: MICHAEL SHAPIRO'S EARLY WORK ON THE POLITICAL POWER OF PHOTOGRAPHY**

One of the first and most thorough attempts to understand images as intensely political is Michael Shapiro's chapter on the political rhetoric of photography in *The Politics of Representation*. Drawing on theoretizations of photography such as that of Walter Benjamin, Victor Burgin, Allan Sekula and Roland Barthes, his text departs from a concern with photography as problematic, capable of engendering 'a pacification, a reinforcement of the kinds of

interpretive codes that lend an aura of naturalness and permanence to the existing structures' (1988: 126). It calls for 'a politicized reading practice, one which situates the images in order to discern their complicities with prevailing power and authority as well as their challenges' (1988: 131). This, importantly, is achieved by bringing in the Barthesian notion of 'code' as a set of common understandings by which the viewer and the visual artefact interact, the codes themselves 'performing a kind of captioning' of the image by telling the viewer what to see and how to see (1988: 150).

An excellent illustration of this captioning, that also points further than the images themselves and extends the role of such captioning to everyday seeing, is Shapiro's analysis of photography and 'the criminal' (1988: 141ff). By analysing the advent of photography in the late nineteenth century in conjunction with ideas about the scientific determination of people's character from, for example, the shape of their skull, Shapiro is able to show how the idea that criminality can be attributed to certain types of people and *seen* in mugshots. As the codes that guide this seeing are sedimented, and mugshots become how criminals are perceived, they further guide seeing in the everyday, and create, for example, unease around immigrants and low-income men, and confidence around people of wealth. Shapiro's analysis uses the discursive structures derived from studying photographs of the criminal to interrogate how society views criminality as linked to 'types' of persons (profiling), tentatively venturing into what we term here the 'visuality of security'.

Most often, the assumptions of special powers inherent in images are not taken autonomously by analysts. They reflect views of how society relates to the images that are part of it, i.e., the prevalent discourses about images. As such, pictorial power is not something that is pre-given; visual power remains something seen as culturally constituted in most accounts. As most analysts of visibility come out of traditions affiliated with poststructuralist and linguistic lines of thought, they are well aware of the constructedness of such pictorial power. Yet, they frequently appear more interested in asserting that pictorial power abounds in contemporary visual culture than in trying to investigate its constructedness. Therefore, paradoxically, while the processes through which images make the cultural and contingent look natural are frequently studied, the wider societal discourse about images as powerful is rarely assessed.

When critical security studies has engaged with the construction of visual power, a key element of theorizing this construction has been the assumption of a powerful intertextuality around the image. These analyses draw heavily on discourse analysis and thus on linguistic frameworks. Such theorization has led to claims that images, in themselves, are not very politically powerful. Hansen (2011a: 54), to take a recent example, goes as far as to insist that 'the image does not enter the political without being the subject of debate or engaging with the discourses already in place'. This position leads her to a framework in which the image itself

is largely powerless. The methodological implication of this is a focus on text and discursive acts performed on the image, rather than on the visual work that the image itself does. For example, Hansen concludes her analysis of the ‘Muhammad cartoon crisis’ with the statement that her framework is able to ‘examine situations where visuals *are constituted as* “speaking security”’ (Hansen 2011a: 70, emphasis added). This conclusion constitutes the image as an object rather than subject, acted *upon* rather than acting. Paraphrasing John Berger’s comment on the role of men and women in classical painting (in *Ways of Seeing* 2008 [1972]), we might say that in such a framework ‘discourses *act*, and images *appear*’.

Despite emphasizing the discursive aspects, Hansen at least takes the question of whether images can be political without being subject to debate as a starting point for elaborating a rigorous analytical framework, for studying the attribution of political meaning. Likewise, in Campbell’s (2004: 71) conclusion that ‘the dominant social understandings existing at the moment of production and reception are more important than the specific form or content of the image for the creation of meaning’ the image is in danger of vanishing as a placeholder for its context. While it is surely important how images are talked about, and the context in which they are produced and interpreted, we hold that images and visibility can and do indeed give us insights that are neither in their context, nor in how they are talked about. This entails that we need means to engage visibility beyond the analysis of discourse, speech acts, and communication.

There are also approaches that put a larger emphasis on the content of the image, and how it enters into a dialogue with its context. Schlag and Heck (2012: 8) deploy the work of Bredekamp (2010) and Kjörup (1978) to argue that while images are not analogous to words in the functional terms of speech acts, images take the metaphorical position of the speaker and are thereby able to ‘speak’. Such a viewpoint suggests that images possess ‘*Eigenaktivität*’, or auto-activity by being able to speak in a metaphorical sense. This equates pictures with speaking in a conceptual sense, where the continuum of speaking is more relevant than individual words (Schlag and Heck 2012: 8). In contrast to Hansen’s approach, not only discourses, but also the images can act, and thereby they should be examined not only as sites of the negotiation or actualization of existing discourse, but in terms of what images do too (see text box on page 00). For Schlag and Heck (2012: 2), images can work as iconic acts of showing and seeing: images are analysed as *images*.

As the above examples also show, in a move similar to constructivism’s focus on how the socio-political world is shaped by human interaction (Hacking 1999), students of visibility have frequently directed their attention to the visual production of socially accepted knowledge. The main point of such discussion is that the power of images is a construct, and is not naturally emerging. A thorough and influential take on this is Shapiro’s (1988) discussion of how the ‘real’ emerges in visual discourse. As described in the example of visual profiling of criminality (see textbox page 00), the ‘real’ emerges in an intertextual dialogue within and partially as a product of the genre of the visual object or practice. This happens through ‘the social, administrative, political and other processes through which various

interpretive practices become canonical, customary, and so thoroughly entangled with the very act of viewing [that] they cease to be recognized as practices' (Shapiro 1988: 135). For example, the very name given to the security technology *profiling* stems from the now infamous efforts to see criminal tendencies in physical characteristics, such as the shape of people's ears or the colour of their hair.

Socially accepted knowledge that stems from visuality, thus, is constituted by how the dominant practices interpret images and visual phenomena. Such practices are in turn always re-shaped by the images they serve to interpret. Visual power, therefore, is at once socially constituted by the practices of production and interpretation in society, and at the same time participates in the re-shaping of these practices. Indeed, visual production of truth works through different mediums and practices. For example, medieval cathedrals as visual objects have constructed visual truths in quite a different manner than the multi-media environments of today. Practices, and taken-for-granted beliefs, are tied to the visuality they interpret; different visual genres are seen to produce different practices.

Yet, the connections between practices and genres of visuality should not be taken for granted. When we study the politics of visuality, materials such as films, comic books, fine art, and other artefacts of visual culture are crucially important. Genres, stereotypes, and archetypes are maintained and reproduced through such works of 'fiction' (see for example Kangas 2007 on the political imagery of comics). Similarly important are the visual aspects of news and other genres of mass communication, whether in print, on the airwaves, or online.

Here the intentionality of visual production is very visible: there are editors and directors who modulate what is shown and in which context. Various tropes and frames are key aspects of not only the reading of imagery, but also their production: visual professionals also have certain conventions and (media) frames that influence how they produce their images. These create not one power of visuality, but many powers of different kinds of visuals, in different societies. Visuality is thus neither inherently repressive nor emancipating; it is configurable – constantly, though slowly configured and reconfigured. The codes that guide the visual production of truth – the socially acceptable knowledge – thus are always changing and vary between different societies. Indeed, even the powerful discourse which links photographic representation with knowledge in both science and everyday life might change. In any analysis, one therefore needs to substantiate and point out how certain ways of seeing lend strength to (or discredit) an image in question (e.g., Andersen 2012).

In this way, clusters of social practices that surround visual production, mediation, and viewing are seen to create 'an implicit epistemological code hovering around' the visual object (Shapiro 1988: 124). As a special case, and the most thoroughly studied genre of visuality, the photograph is an interesting starting point that can serve as a guide to how 'Western' visual practices configure and slowly reconfigure the meaning of visuality and thus reconfigure the social truth that will emerge from society's reading of a photograph.

Present in many studies of visuality, and also built upon by Shapiro, is the seminal idea of Barthesian semiotics that the photograph is casually read as a 'message

without a code' – even though images do contain codes, 'myths', or even 'ideologies' (Barthes 1977: 44). Although history is full of examples of manipulated images, Barthes argues that the 'code' of the image – the basic 'grammar' that is required to understand the meaning of the images – is one of resemblance, of 'looking like'. Because the basic code seems in this way transparent, we tend to read the image as pure denotation, as a representation of 'something that was really there'.

This tendency provides images a tremendous naturalizing force in the political constitution of the 'truth' of situations, referent objects, and so on. This means that images can be very powerful in conjuring or hiding the objects and subjects that make up 'security'. First, images can provide easily depicted referent objects (e.g., missiles as a threat), but also less straightforward ones (e.g., climatic changes). Such effects are amplified with the repetition of certain images, which gain an iconic status and come to represent truths in regard to certain events. The repetition of planes crashing into skyscrapers as an iconic truth about 9/11 and its political implications is a good example here.

The ability to naturalize the cultural as incontestable truth, i.e., to naturalize its own representation of the world, is one of the key common traits of studies in visuality. The naturalizing force of photography is the base of its powerful demand to be taken as factual. Looking at the photograph thus easily dissimulates itself as looking at the world – in Shapiro's words 'of all modes of representation, it is the one most easily assimilated into the discourses of knowledge and truth, for it is thought to be an unmediated simulacrum, a copy of what we consider the "real"' (Shapiro 1988: 124).

## SYSTEMS OF SIGNIFICATION

Roland Barthes (1973) has observed that visual signs form 'systems of signification' rather than languages. The field of semiotics examines any such system of signs. The realm of security is replete with systems of signification. For example, national flags (Vuori *et al.* forthcoming), military uniforms (Guillaume *et al.* 2012), and the signs and signals of urban spaces (Jackson 2014) can all be examined as systems of signification.

Systems of signification differ in how strong they are: some systems are very formalized and limited while others can allow for very rich and varied forms of expression. Strong systems make for poor syntagms,<sup>4</sup> or units, and exact meaning (i.e., strong systems make for simple elements with fewer syntactic variables and thereby stronger rules of meaning making – e.g., traffic signs) while weaker systems with greater syntagmatic complexes make for ambiguous meaning (and weaker rules of meaning making). Units with only a few semiotic elements in them (e.g., pictograms or traffic signs) allow for quick and easy deciphering whereas semiotic complexity requires more effort and provides for multiplicity in meaning (e.g., visual art).

Systems of signification set limits to their 'field of dispersal', which is formed by the possibilities of variation of a unit as long as these variations do not result in a variation of meaning. Visual art then is more open in this sense than visual advertising for example. This may explain why critical scholars of security have identified possibilities for resistance precisely in artistic (Möller 2007) and slower photojournalistic images (Campbell 2003), rather than in the more tightly codified practices of television news for example.

For Barthes (2000: 128–131, 142–143), the goal of examining systems of signification (as described on page 00) is to denaturalize the depoliticized language of myth. Myths are for him narratives or stories that replace cultural–ideological structures of power and turn the particular into the universal and natural. Myths appear in both written and pictorial texts; mythical 'speech' can be supported by not only written discourse, but by photography, cinema, shows, and so on. Of special interest to Barthes are second-order semiological systems. He (Barthes 2000: 114–115) views myths as global signs that go beyond the details of linguistic schema or 'language objects'. Such an approach allows the analyst to go beyond the individual first order sign, or the signifier and signified, to examine the myth within the second order meaning that the specific sign participates in. In this sense, claims of social truth were not in the individual signs, but in the second order mythologies their meaning drew from. For example, in first order terms, we can analyse the semiotic features that make up a particular national flag. While this can be quite relevant for those with an interest in vexillology, of importance for students of politics is the second order of the international system of national flags, and the naturalizations therein. Similarly, through the analysis of a particular photograph, of Osama bin Laden for example, Barthes's approach suggests that we can gain entry into more general systems of meaning and power, for example those that make up the myths about Islamist terrorism as the contemporary Other of the 'West', and thereby naturalize and reify both.

Following this understanding of the constructedness of pictorial power leads critical studies of security and visibility to analyse the naturalizing effects and effects of domination of images and their visibility, in the manner of Barthes. However, given that images and visibility are polysemous, it remains important to also analyse instances of images articulating resistance and alternative spaces of meaning and practice. Analogous to how labelling has been studied in Security Studies, visibility has a strong influence on the production of 'truths'. Once an issue or referent object or situation is visible, it becomes hard to further question its 'reality', even by a central policymaker. The visibility of issues, processes, referent objects, or situations has to do both with its intrinsic merits – its visualizability – and with the networks and other resources of power of interested parties that wish to visualize it in this or that form – or conceal it. Studying the many visibilities involved in security thus requires attention to regimes of production and circulation of images, the

phenomenon itself (e.g., climate change security; kettling or war crimes) and the codes involved in visualizing it. Once we have a visual icon of something, we get the notion that there is this definite kind of thing, be that climate change, uprisings in distant countries or methods of repressing urban protests. Visual aspects or representations of an issue may also bring in affective responses that might otherwise not be there. Images can reach people's sensibilities with less resistance than in the case of words (we turn to this question more explicitly in the next section).

Finally, visual studies that stem from critical approaches to security often urge that we should change the way images are looked at. Visuality, of course, is not a magic wand but works in close intertextual connection to the surrounding culture and socio-political context. Indeed, visuals receive marks of the culture in which it is produced, circulated and interpreted.

[T]o the extent that a given image accords with the familiar and already known, it is naturalized and read as an unproblematic representation, and insofar as the preponderance of images accord with the pertinent codes in a social formation, the codes themselves, which perform a kind of captioning without leaving a mark on or near the image, do the ideational work.

*(Shapiro 1988: 150)*

The way in which these codes are challenged and evolve can be driven by both socio-cultural and material factors. As digitization has enveloped the photographic genres, it has contributed to tensions in the interpretative codes that surround it. Digital processing disrupts the mechanical processes of photographic film, which has led to an expectation that the strong code which equates photography with something real would be disrupted (see e.g., Möller 2012). As intertextuality is inescapable in the step from sheer visibility to meaning, 'there are no visual media':<sup>5</sup> visual media does not work in strict isolation from other discursive modalities such as speech or writing which may accompany the image in the media in which it circulates.<sup>6</sup>

To conclude, focusing on the constitution of truth leads scholars to engage with how specific or generic images operate on, and within discourses and wider practices. This strand of analysis can be useful to uncover the epistemological code as well as the productive and interpretative practices that govern the configuration of visibility in a specific setting (Andersen 2012). Thus it can be used to analyse specific visual artefacts but also to move from these to the regimes of visibility constituting truths through governing 'ways of seeing' that operate in and around them.

### ***Affect and visuals***

As we have already noted above, images can reach people's sensibilities with less resistance than in the case of words. Indeed, affective intensities inform the seemingly rational decisions in everyday life. Affects are not pre-, post-, or beyond rationality; they form an integral part of rationality, which in return is considered to inform practices of power and politics. With 'affect' we refer to the psychosomatic

intensities that can be both pre- and post-sociolinguistic (Massumi 2002). Visuals and visualities represent media that come highly charged with affect and emotions; visuals move people and they do so in different ways than words do. As such, affective intensities are important to the study of (the power of) visuals and as forces in regimes of visibility. Whereas in the previous section we looked at the construction of 'truth-claims' and production of (visual) realities through representational theories, in this section we focus on the affective power of visuals by looking at non-representational theories. Indeed, the analytics presented in this section are inspired by the non-representational theory originally articulated by Thrift (2007). Non-representational theory focuses on the emergence, enactment, and performance of human and nonhuman practices.

According to Massumi (2002), affect and emotions are interlinked concepts, in that emotions constitute a subset of affect. On the one hand, affect is pre-emotion and is indescribable as it is a priori to the socio-linguistic; on the other, emotion is, 'a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing [of affect]' (Massumi 2002: 28). In other words, emotion is affect filtered through the bounds of the socio-linguistic domain and embedded within the social imaginary that shapes collective memory. Affect is experienced through bodily intensities that can be measured through corporeal experiences (such as increase/decrease in heart rate and blood pressure, changes in facial expressions or various other 'gut reactions') which have a significant effect on the 'half-second responses' that shape human behaviour. In contrast, emotions are 'more permanent feelings of the type normally labelled affect or sentiment [...] positive responses to symbols of various kinds; and negative versions of each of these' (Jasper 1998: 401–402).

Visuals in particular, as objects of analysis, are imbued with affect and emotions. Some visuals make us cry, while others make us laugh or ponder about memories. Visuals allow us to feel a connection to others; establish empathy. If seeing is, in fact, believing, then seeing is also feeling. Through visuals, we feel empathy for those who are less fortunate or who are suffering through hardships. Similarly, we share the joy of others when looking at pictures of celebration and happiness. Within these affective economies or atmospheres of everyday life, visualities play an important role.

Within the context of the visuals, emotions as socio-linguistically fixed and shared intensities can be studied through discursive methods. The production and circulation of emotions as discursively expressed feelings lend themselves to the representational theories that we focused on in the previous section. Visuals as objects, and emotions attributed to such objects, can be identified more easily than affective intensities. Saurette's (2006) analysis of post-9/11 US foreign policy and the impact of the humiliation associated with the 9/11 attacks on those policies is a good example of such a methodological approach to studying emotions as discursive entities. Compared to emotions, affective intensities are much harder to study from a methodological point of view, because they are much harder to identify. Affects cannot be fully captured by representational theories; studying them requires non-representational theories that focus on phenomenological

registers that experience affects. Such registers are inevitably personal. Attempts to generalize these registers usually depend on generalizing concepts such as discussions of affective ‘atmospheres’ (Anderson 2009) or ‘economies’ (Ahmed 2004). These concepts provide the basis for making intersubjective claims that pertain to affective intensities.

The main point we make in this section is twofold. First, affective dimensions of visibility matter to forms of political communication practices. Second, these affective intensities require non-representational theories for studying them methodologically. Affective intensities of visuals serves as an important force that shapes the political power of discourses of truth and securitization. Yet, they require a different approach from the ones outlined above; they demand a method to study intensities that cannot be easily represented discursively.

Whereas the philosophical tradition that studies the role of affect in political practices goes back to Spinoza, the revived interest in contemporary political theory can be traced back to Deleuze and Guattari (1987). In recent years, starting with geography, but also in social and political theory, there has been an ‘affective turn’ (Clough 2007). This literature has introduced affect and emotion-attuned approaches that move beyond the representational theories that became prominent in social sciences during the mid 1980s (Gregg and Seigworth 2010; Mutlu 2013). Affect-attuned approaches to political theory underline the role of affect in self-interested, or rational actions, with a particular focus on the role of affects as catalysts.

For the field of critical IR, Damasio (1994, 2003), Connolly (2002), and Massumi (1995, 2002, 2005) have been particularly influential. Here, we can see a focus on the role of affect and emotions in everyday international practices (Crawford 2000; Mattern 2011; Mercer 2006, 2010). From the viewpoint of security studies, Edkins’s (2002) discussion of the traumatic effects in relation to the American responses to 9/11 is a useful example.

In addition to the viewpoint of everyday practice, two concepts of affect are particularly useful in the study of visuals: affective atmospheres (Anderson 2009) and affective economies (Ahmed 2004). Both concepts allow for bringing non-representational theories to the study of visualities. The concept of *affective economies* looks at ways in which affects acquire intersubjective meaning that circulates between bodies; the concept depicts the processes through which we collectively construct shared understandings for our individual affect intensities. Ahmed criticizes the description of ‘feelings via an analogy with “commodity fetishism”’: feelings appear in objects, or indeed as objects with a life of their own, only by the concealment of how they are shaped by histories, including histories of production (labour and labour time), as well as circulation or exchange’ (Ahmed 2004: 120–121). Meanings of emotions are not fixed; they fluctuate across time and space. Indeed, some emotions do not translate into other languages (e.g., the meaning of the Turkish word *hüzün* is lost in translation when translated as ‘melancholia’ or ‘blues’ [Isin 2010]) while others change meaning as they translate and transverse. Yet, it is important to note here that ‘while emotions do not positively reside in a subject or figure, they still work to bind subjects together’ (Ahmed 2004: 119).

The concept of *affective atmospheres* refers to ‘a class of experiences that occur before and alongside the formation of subjectivity, across human and nonhuman materialities, and in-between subject/object distinctions’ (Anderson 2009: 78). Both of these concepts are useful in developing non-representational concepts to study affect-attuned methodologies. As Anderson (2009: 77) suggests, it is ‘the very ambiguity of affective atmospheres – between presence and absence, between subject and object, and between the definite and indefinite – that enable us to reflect on affective experience as occurring beyond, around, and alongside the formation of subjectivity’. While affective economies present a methodological opening to pursue studies on the intersubjective understandings of the affective impact of visuals, the concept of affective atmospheres allows us to look at affects’ impact on *the (ab)uses of visuals*.

The connection between affect and visuals is one that is becoming relevant for political scientists in general, but also for critical scholars of security in particular, due to the increased access to and use of visuals in the framing of security discourses and practices. Visuals, and in particular, affective visuals are carefully selected to manage and govern affective atmospheres and economies. As Massumi argues, ‘[a]ffect is central to an understanding of our information-and-image-based late capitalist culture’ (quoted in Anderson 2006: 734).

While the connection between affect, emotions and visualities is generally accepted in arts, communications, and psychology (Döveling *et al.* 2010; Fahmy *et al.* 2006; Kember 1996; Parisi and Terranova 2001; Sutton 1992), the relationship is not as well-developed in social sciences in general and IR in particular. There are, however, a few exceptions. Perhaps the best example here is a collection of essays from Butler (2009), in which she reflects on the role of images in relation to the emotional economies of grief (see the text box, Affective frames of war).

### **AFFECTIVE FRAMES OF WAR**

In her 2010 collection of essays ‘Frames of War’ Butler looks at the role of photography in the way in which suffering and torture is presented and the kinds of affective economies those (re)presentations interact with. In particular she argues that ‘whether and how we respond to the suffering of others, how we formulate more criticisms, how we articulate political analyses depends upon a certain field of perceptible reality having already been established’ (Butler 2009: 64). In particular, she focuses on the question of framing and what is being left out.

Visuals serve as a condition of possibility for practices of establishing authenticity and truth, which we have already discussed in the previous section. The audience needs to have an affective connection to the visuals used in these constructs. Politics of affect, when it comes to visualities, rests with managing, or having the

ability to control, this connection. Visuals are edited or re-framed to correspond with pre-mediated affective intensities and related discourses. Because of this, methodologically, visuals as objects, has the potential to function as nodes that connect representational and non-representational theories. Visuals often exist in relation to discursive constructs; images are often accompanied with texts that provide meaning and/or context that explain what is to be seen. In this sense, visuals function as artefacts within representational theories. Approaching visualities from an affective registry, however, we cannot solely rely on representational theories. This dual purchase of visuals and visualities as objects of both representational and non-representational theories allows for them to act as a bridge between the two approaches.

To give an example, we can look at images from the 9/11 attacks from two perspectives. From the first perspective, we can consider them to be a part of the affective (pre)mediation of post-9/11 securitization moves. In this sense, the emotional purchase of visuals serves a purpose within the context of the broader discourses of post-9/11 securitization. From the second perspective, we can look at visuals and visualities from the 9/11 attacks to acquire a better understanding of the affective atmospheres or economies that shaped the ensuing developments by shaping intersubjective public discourses. These approaches differ in the way they treat visuals and visualities. They also differ in the way they conceptualize and utilize affect and emotions. The first one looks at affect and emotions within discursive constructs, while the second approach views the role of affective intensities in shaping the conditions of possibility for discursive constructs.

Visuals, as affective 'spark plugs', have the potential to move us socially, and politically. Looking at editorial, institutional and technical limitations of photographs as visual mediums that shape affective economies is one way to measure the power of visuals and visualities. Methodologically, the implications of this observation are twofold.

First, visuals as objects of study are useful for understanding social and political mobilization necessary for securitization moves (Hansen 2011a; Vuori 2010; Williams 2003). Whether we are looking at Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, the symbolism of the Doomsday Clock, or pictures of NATO bombings in Libya, visuals have the capacity to move or mobilize people. Second, the kinds of affective intensities provoked by visualities, and subsequent (ab)uses of these visualities provide a valuable insight into understanding the role of affective registers in the politics of everyday security practices.

These two methodological points are undoubtedly related. They present two sides of the same coin. Whereas one side looks at the role of visuals and representational theories, the other side focuses on the affective power of seeing through non-representational theories. As mentioned before, studying the role of affective intensities not only generates a bridge between representational and non-representational theories, but also depends on that bridge to provide a more complete picture of the affective intensities embedded in visual mediums. Studying the significance of visuality need not be limited to analysis of cultural production,

circulation, and coding. Also the roles of affect and emotions and affective intensities evoked by visuals are in need of analysis.

### ***From mythical power to banal spectacles in the digital age***

As we have shown in the previous two sections, photographic images have been imbued with a strong naturalizing power, irrespective of whether we view them as constitutors of truths or causes for affective responses. This naturalizing force has largely been due to the way photographic images have been produced: what the aperture of a camera captures is what leaves a mark on the film. Yet, setting up the situations captured, framing the picture, determining the focal length, and forms of image manipulation have been part of photography since its inception. The spread of the capacity to take photographs, and later, the digital revolution in image manipulation have produced challenges for the dominant naturalistic understanding of photographs, which has played an important role in visual truth production.

Digital images, especially digital photographs, have served as a lever to overcome the schism between acknowledging visibility's socially constituted power to establish 'the real' and its revocability; rather than to be taken as some human independent truth, widespread knowledge of the processes of image creation will reinforce the understanding that images indeed are manmade, and this is precisely what gives them their power (compare Latour 2010). The easy manipulability of digital images, in this view, ought to finally do away with much of the 'grammar of quasi-identity' that has protected visuals to a considerable degree from critical interrogation of the truths they represent. By drawing attention to the constructedness of visual mimesis – an imitation of something perceptible that is not actually there or is something else altogether – the manipulating effect of images are made very explicitly present. Experience with digital image manipulation, thus, would intervene to 'end the interlude of "false innocence" in which the referential veracity of the photographic image was too often unquestioned' (Mitchell 1992, here from Campbell 2003, similar ideas found in Möller 2012), and bring forth the latent constructionist criticality of the viewing subject. The change of genre characteristics, thus, is anticipated to change the viewer's relationship to the viewed, highlighting the transformative aspect of visibility.

The transformative potentialities of digital images and their circulation beyond the mass media have put into question many of the premises that drove much of twentieth century philosophy on the politics of visibility. In the twentieth century, as photography became more prevalent and artworks became mechanically mass-produced, philosophers and sociologists who drew from the Marxist tradition of the critique of appearances presented dystopic views of a loss of authenticity as well as posited fears of the power of images (Benjamin 1999; Horkheimer and Adorno 2002; Debord 1992). As we have already noted, with such premises, many have worked to decrease the 'power' of images. For example, Barthes's project was, as shown above, to decode or uncover the hidden myths and codes that are part of photographic images. The task of Barthes's semiology was to demystify images, and

many current strands of semiotics still seek to have the same function as denaturalization (Chandler 2007).

Yet, Rancière (2008) has a different view to the projects that aim for the demystification of images. He (ibid.: 21–22) notes how such projects are no longer sensible since because rather than masking some secret to be uncovered, the problem now is that there is nothing for pictures to hide. Reality is not transformed into images by some hidden secret of cultural production (Rancière 2011: 48). For Rancière, many philosophers of the visual are nostalgic for the eras when images were powerful, and could still move people's souls. Yet, while images and visibility are still important, they have become banal rather than mystical. As with other approaches that have been inspired by poststructuralism, the main 'point' of the critical examination of images within security studies has been to uncover workings of power and to destabilize them. A possible drawback with visual analysis that draws on this tradition is its 'left-wing melancholy' of the image, as Rancière (2011: 33) puts it.

The melancholy is apparent in that the critical tradition that draws on these methods often laments the loss of real experience and its replacement with the spectacle. What is at issue here is the relation of the 'real' and representations of the 'real'. For Debord, famed critic of societies of the 'spectacle', we lose the pipe with the spectacle of the image of a pipe (cf. Magritte's painting *La Trahison des Images*); similarly, for Baudrillard (2010), the fear is that spectacles or simulations become more important and relevant than lived experience. For example, media images of war become more real and relevant for societies of the spectacle than the life-world experiences of those being bombed or doing the bombing. For Debord, truth is non-separation (Rancière 2011: 6–7). He becomes an iconoclast for fear that seeing replaced doing. For Debord (1992: 23), the more a person contemplates, the less he or she lives. From this viewpoint, mass spectacles like cinema and television have separated people from their life-world realities. The world of representations is in this view therefore not something that adds to reality or creates a new reality, but rather something that stands in the way of individuals grasping their true reality, which for Debord is that of the hierarchical society. Contemplation separates appearance from its truth. Such fears can be traceable at least back to Benjamin's (1999) concern for how the mass-production of artworks could render art no more than a sign.

Many of the studies that have focused on the production side of images were for a long time inspired by the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* of Horkheimer and Adorno (2002). In their treatise of philosophical fragments, they viewed the 'masses' as 'victims of the cultural industry'. Perhaps due to the success of propaganda in Nazi Germany, they gave no possibilities for the consumers or readers of mass-cultural artefacts to interpret them beyond the intended messages of the propagandist (while they themselves seemed capable of this). Like many iconoclasts before them, they naïvely believed (Latour 2010) in mass-cultural products on behalf of mass-audiences.

For Horkheimer and Adorno (2002), false propaganda obscured the reality of social relations. Subsequent generations of scholars have produced new approaches to the study of images, but they seem to be repeating the same wistful description of how the 'machine' of cultural domination operates. This sense of cultural

domination is combined with a sense of loss with reality and lived experiences vanishing into representations and the spectacles of the cultural industry (e.g., Debord 1992; Baudrillard 2010). As people view spectacles rather than do things, they are thought to be robbed of their own essence; images and spectacles are illusions. A viewer loses his or her agency in this line of thought, as appearances continually hide real states of affairs and relations of power.

Such premises lead to a perpetual melancholy and impotence. Critical agency has gone. Moreover, in cultural industries emancipation becomes free play with identities and appearances and takes place in immaterial forms of production. For critics of the society of spectacle this has resulted in nostalgia for set social positions, equivalent to the working class as the site for true progressiveness. The classical critique of the illusory aspect of images turned into a critique of the illusion of reality. In this operation, the original emancipatory deconstruction of illusionary images sends the viewer deeper into the prison of the 'machine': 'to know the logic of the spectacle is to know how it endlessly reproduces the falsification that is identical to its reality' (Rancière 2011: 37–45). Similarly, for Bruno Latour (2010: 11), an inversion (images are empty) of the inversion (images dominate) leads to an unstable world, where it is no longer clear who acts and who is alienated.

Horkheimer and Adorno's (2002) views on cultural production followed Benjamin's (1999) thoughts on images in the era of mechanical reproduction. The 'massness' of mass culture seemed to be abhorrent for Horkheimer and Adorno (2002). For them, there could be no culture in a capitalist cultural industry. Yet, in the digital age, the logic of cultural production prevalent in the era of mechanical reproduction seems to be, if not undermined, at least in crisis. With the worldwide spread of digital technologies, the reproduction of cultural artefacts no longer requires the types of capital and other capacities that mechanical reproduction required. Digital copies can be made quickly and without need for mass storage in terms of physical space (server farms are still tiny in comparison to the space required by paper books, painted canvases and films for example). The digital revolution is also undermining Horkheimer and Adorno's (2002) dread of the masses as victims of cultural industries.

Yet, popular cultural artefacts can be disseminated worldwide without recourse to cultural industries (but, such dissemination seems to be dependent on the industry of commercial digital platforms, such as Facebook, YouTube, and so on). The digital revolution has enabled new forms of resistance against the institutions of cultural industry. Celebrities are dimmed or even deconstructed through edited online videos relishing in their quirks and bad manners. Online memes reappropriate and pervert many forms of authority. For example, copyright violations can be seen as forms of resistance against the industrial aspects of cultural industry. In the digital age, those once incapacitated by the cultural industries in Horkheimer and Adorno's time are now capable. There is no hidden secret of cultural production, no hidden mechanism that transforms reality into image (cf. Rancière 2011: 48). The capacities and incapacities of digital production/reproduction are different to those of mechanical production/reproduction. In methodological terms, the quick

appearance, dissemination, and disappearance of, for example, internet-memes is a challenge for scholars investigating the sociological or historical aspects of image production and reception.

One of the core issues in the question of the 'real' and separation from it, is the link between the represented and its representation. What Debord and Benjamin left under-articulated is that a representation is merely an *equivalent*, not a duplicate. A photograph does not steal the soul of the one photographed, but merely produces an equivalent which resembles the target of the lens. Indeed, as Mitchell (2011, xvii) notes, all metaphors and images are 'errors' in the sense that they are simulations, imitations, and not the thing they purport to be. Magritte's investigation of resemblance and similitude in *La Trahison des Images* are relevant here. For Magritte an image of a pipe is not a pipe, and we do not lose the real pipe with an image of it (nor do we gain one). As Magritte noted to Foucault (1983 [1973]), things have similitude and thoughts have resemblance. Similar objects have between them relations of similitude, or perceptible likeness, in both visible (e.g., colour, form, size) and invisible (e.g., weight, taste, smell) terms. Objects do not have relations of resemblance, only thoughts do. It is important to make this distinction because resemblance is often thought to provide ontological superiority to the reality claimed to be represented. With similitude, such privilege is not there: it is thought and the arbitrary signs that produce privilege.

For Magritte (*ibid.*), thought becomes what the world offers it. In these terms, a painted image as a representation hides nothing, while a tangible visual object can hide other objects. In terms of visual production, similitude, then, serves repetition and replication while resemblance serves representation. This entails that appearance and the thing itself have to be separate in the examination of representations and ideas, and that to study the representation of a thing is not to study the thing itself. Magritte worked visually to destroy the notion that a representation would be necessarily connected to that which is represented; as in the signs of language, painting as representation is arbitrary.<sup>7</sup>


Of consequence here is how images play with the relations of the sayable and the visible (Rancière 2008; 2011). Indeed, one of the functions of art, such as in the case of Magritte's studies, is to make the familiar strange (Chandler 2007). For Rancière (2007: 116), entities of representation are fictional entities, and thereby exempt from judgments of existence or ontological consistency. Yet, this has nothing to do with the reality – or unreality – of things. Political, scholarly and even fictional statements can still shape reality. Statements on the real, or of pure fiction, can have a modulating effect on 'the seeable, the doable, and the sayable' (*ibid.*). Here, the confusion between similitude and resemblance can be politically useful, both as an instrument of power and of resistance. Indeed, irrespective of the unreality of images, they have operative reality (Mitchell 2011; see 'The Phantom Truck' below). This applies to admittedly fictional images too: for example, the re-enactments and portrayal of relative truths in Errol Morris's (1988) documentary 'The Thin Blue Line' resulted in the release of a prisoner on death row. Methodologically, this leads us to the study of performativity of images and visibility rather than representation.

## THE PHANTOM TRUCK

The operative power of unreal images, and their subversive potential, is apparent in the example of the 'phantom truck'. The phantom truck refers to the computerized image of mobile biological weapons labs contained in trucks that Colin Powell used as partial evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in his infamous presentation to the United Nations Security Council on 5 February 2003. No such claimed labs within trucks were recovered during the occupation of Iraq. Instead, a truck of similar design was used to launch weather balloons (Mitchell 2011: 86).

What is of relevance here is not whether the image of a mobile plant for making biological weapons referred to an actual plant. What is of import is that such an image was a perfect visual match for the narratives about Saddam Hussein and for the necessity to invade Iraq, a point driven home by Inigo Manglano-Ovalle's installation *Phantom Truck* (Mitchell 2011: 86, 137). Images like those used by Powell in his presentation, albeit manufactured and deceptive, work to produce visual evidence for the verbal justifications of certain policies; they are 'imaginary casus belli' (ibid.: 138).

While these kinds of images can operate to produce legitimacy for political action, they may at the same time open up space for resisting precisely those policies. If an authority figure claims some image to represent a true matter of affairs, this image can bind the authority, and may thereby become a means of contestation or even of resistance. This is precisely what happened to the PowerPoint images shown by Colin Powell as evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, including the 'phantom truck'.



**FIGURE 4.2** Mobile production facilities for biological agents. *Source:* Slide used in Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary Colin L. Powell.

Technological development together with the dissemination of information and computing capacities allow the production and circulation of still and moving images on an unprecedented scale. While images can be used politically to justify certain courses of action, the example of internet-memes, or visual references that spread from person to person over the internet, reinforces the need to focus on performative analysis, and reveals the subversive potential of imagery in contemporary societies. For example, although the phantom truck was initially used as a source of plausibility for 'Iraqi weapons of mass destruction', the images transpired to become ones of ridicule and jest.

The example of the truck displays the way out of the melancholy of the image. Rancière's (2011: 13) remedy for the melancholic tendency is to emancipate the viewer by emphasizing that viewing is an act in itself. This move repeats what has happened in the field of literature studies and the role of the reader. For de Certeau (1988), reading is not passive, for the reader enters the text, moves back and forth along it, and 'lives' within it. Rancière (2011) has emancipated the spectator in a similar sense. Indeed, reading a text or viewing a play/film creates an intertextual situation, where every instance of 'reading/viewing', even of the same 'text' by the same person, has the potential to be unique, as the reader/spectator will connect the text with different connotations, texts and experiences. Those that support the theory of intertextuality often view such reading as 'writing'. Methodologically, this entails that while readings of such texts by scholars may be interesting, to get at the actual political implications of such texts also requires reception studies because what the auditory (or audience) takes from the text varies from individual to individual.

Furthermore, seeing something does not necessarily entail domination, even if that is why the image was produced. The viewer too 'observes, selects, compares, interprets' (Rancière 2011: 13). Indeed, it is important to understand what the perceiver, or consumer, of the images does with them. Images intended to facilitate an argument may actually, contrarily, end up impeding it. The consumer or receiver of an image can also resist the general flow of signs (Tarasti 2006). In methodological terms, this too entails a shift away from the study of visual representations to the study of visual performativity.

Another remedy to the melancholy of the image is offered by Latour (2010), who suggests that the way out of the conundrum of iconoclasm is to detoxify from the urge of emancipation: to smash an idol is only to replace it with another. To claim the discovery of a pure truth, a world devoid of human-made intermediaries is to obscure the process of how such claims themselves are human-made. We should not try to hide the human hand's involvement either in the production of facts or of images; we should relish it. The more that images are explicitly and publicly shown as constructed and fabricated, the more we will have respect for their power (Latour 2010: 71–72). Mediation is a necessity (*ibid.*: 82), and rather than 'freezing' images, they should be allowed to flow and elongate the cascades of mediations further (*ibid.*: 123).

The digital revolution provides opportunities to achieve such liberation of the spectator from the melancholy of the image. New information technologies and

the wide availability of cameras and forums for distributing images has produced whole subcultures of internet-memes that jeopardize the authority of many images. Indeed, the digital revolution works against the pessimism that has characterized much of the literature in the era of the mechanized reproduction of art since Walter Benjamin's (1999 [1936]) seminal essay on the topic. Yet, the potential for resistance often remains just a potentiality: the possibility of resistance and dissemination of it does not mean that all spectators resist and disseminate their own re-appropriations of images or produce their own stories and mash-ups.

The key point is that the boundaries between 'those who act and those who look' are being blurred (Rancière 2011: 19), which raises questions about the methodologies for studying visuality. In particular it demands a move from methods that focus on representation and/or spectacle to the performativity of visuals and the effects of visual actions by various actors. Indeed, the spectator has to agree to a degree with what is presented for a political effect to take place: mimesis, or the imitative effect of visual art and political communication is a negotiation and cannot be forced on the spectator. Here, both the pessimism of structuralist views on consumers as victims and over-optimistic views of the capacities of 'spectators' have to be avoided. How the performativity of visuality works out depends on the situation and is thus an empirical question that cannot be resolved by philosophical fiat.

This means that we should not only view images differently, we should also view the spectator differently. This will allow us to examine what images do and effectuate in practices and processes that pertain to security. An image is not an idol without human creation, and a spectator is not a victim. Yet, spectators are also not super individuals with vast resources for criticism and reflection. Even if second-generation internet media builds upon individuals distributing and redistributing their thoughts, most individuals remain far from a distributive capacity that can meaningfully counteract, say, carefully doctored image releases from a distant battlefield that are redistributed by the 24-hour news cycle.

In this way, the digital image's anticipated erosion of 'false innocence', and the thereby implied victimized 'false consciousness' of the interpreting community, is maybe a special case of a more general tendency. The assumption often is that power and possibilities are configured differently in different genres of images according to their potential to deceive, rather than power being configurable in single images. Empirical studies have shown how 'interpretive communities' can share not only denotative but also connotative readings (Fish 1980). A shared background, culture, tendency to view things, or 'common sense' of the sensible may even be a pre-requisite for understanding in certain situations. This means that after we have realized the potential openness of interpretation, we should investigate such 'interpretive communities' empirically in our studies of visuality in relation to security. This could be done with reception studies. Instead of reliance on the sophisticated readings of images, we also need to get more general impressions of how certain images under investigation are read. Surveys and media-laboratory tests can be used to ascertain whether certain communities interpret images the same way. The production of internet-memes too could be a new approach to

these communities: memes are about quick circulation and shared interpretations. It would seem that memes rely on interpretive communities for their ironic and humorous effects.

## **Conclusions: Visuality as methodology and criticality of visual analysis**

In this chapter we have argued that analysing visuals requires a broader focus on visuality rather than studying images as such. Visualization is powerful in the sense of reproduction, fixation of meanings, construction of truths, and channelling affects. Such an approach has two important implications for the understanding of visuals in CSS. First, visuals have retained a transformative capacity which means that they can be used to disrupt established meanings, emotions, and other habits in political processes. Second, the power of visuality cannot be closed off by theoretical fiat, but has to be examined in empirical terms and operationalized for the purposes of individual studies.

Methodologically, we have made three arguments. First, for analysing the constitution of truths by visual means, we propose a strong empirical orientation. Pictorial power is constructed and polysemous, which implies that it varies from situation to situation. Of major importance here is that visual productions of truth can work through multiple and variable mediums and practices. Indeed, there are many powers of visuality and these are not repressive or emancipatory by default. This means that we need to understand on each occasion what makes a particular image or sight, i.e., the practices of production and interpretation of visuals that govern the configuration of visuality in its specific settings.

Second, in terms of affect and visuality, we have put forth the view that the study of visual artefacts is vital for investigating the social and political mobilization that is necessary for successful securitization moves. Rather than just investigating meanings, studies of the visual need to take into account the emotive power of images, as well as the economies and atmospheres of affect. Understanding the affective work of visuals is useful for comprehending the everyday politics of security.

Third, in terms of spectacles and banal visuality, we have argued that it is necessary to make the move from the perpetual deconstruction of myths to the emancipation of the spectator and the erasure of assumptions of naïvety of spectators. To achieve this, we should study visual performativity, flows of images, and interpretative communities. This means that we should not just look at images differently, but view the spectator in a different manner too. We should no longer just iconoclastically smash images, but rather see what they do, and what their viewers do with them.

The above methodological points are vital for students of security, as visuality is not only important for the justification of political actions and values, but for the practices and practitioners of security as well. The multiplicity and ubiquity of visuals should sharpen critical scholars of security to incorporate them in their studies overall, and not merely in a specific realm of visual security studies.

Concerns about how visibility relates to the social constitution of truths, how it mobilizes and directs affective responses, or how it can be used by engaged citizens to resist the truths images are used to constitute are concerns that relate to general and widespread phenomena that take place in one form or another in any securitizing process. Visual analysis should therefore not be limited to those with a special interest in visual artefacts.

Social interaction has an important visual dimension, and working with this visual dimension can be used both for progressive and repressive purposes. Engaging this dimension opens up space for a range of critical interrogations of security. We have argued in favour of beginning such an engagement by moving from a too exclusive focus on visual security – the study of visual artefacts in relation to security – to the study of visibility of security – the study of how seeing and visibility is important to the objects, feelings and practices we associate with security.

## Notes

- 1 Obviously excluding audible and tactile modalities of representation, though even these can produce mental images.
- 2 For Mitchell (2011: 70) images are to pictures as species are to specimens. Building on this, he (Mitchell 1986) provides a semiotic typology of images. These are: 1) graphic images (e.g., pictures, statues, designs); 2) optical images (e.g., mirrors, projections); 3) perceptual images (e.g., sense data); 4) mental images (e.g., memories, ideas); and 5) verbal images (e.g., metaphors).
- 3 Among others: Shapiro 1990; Campbell 2003; Williams 2003; Möller 2005; Weber 2006' 2007; Campbell and Shapiro 2007; Chouliaraki 2008; Shepherd 2008; Vuori 2010, 2013; Lisle 2011; Hansen 2011a, b; Schlag and Heck 2012; Moore and Farrands 2013; Andersen and Möller 2013; Special issue of *Security Dialogue* 2007; Special Section of *Review of International Studies* 2009.
- 4 A 'syntagma' is a construct of elements in a syntactic relation to each other which abides to particular rules of meaning making.
- 5 The apt title of W.J.T. Mitchell's (2005) piece about intertextuality and the image.
- 6 For an analysis of how video as a medium influences the reading of its content, see Andersen (2015).
- 7 Although he worked with fine art, he worked against the naturalistic tendencies of photography too.

## References

- Ahmed, S. (2004). 'Affective Economies', *Social Text*, 22(2): 117–139.
- Andersen, R.S. (2012). 'Remediating #IranElection: Journalistic Strategies for Positioning Citizen-made Snapshots and Text Bites from the 2009 Iranian Post-election Conflict', *Journalism Practice*, 6(3): 317–336.
- (2015). 'Video: A Ma(r)ker of the International', in Salter (ed.) *Making Things International*.
- Andersen, R.S. and Möller, F. (2013). 'Engaging the Limits of Visibility: Photography, Security and Surveillance', *Security Dialogue*, 44(3): 203–221.
- Anderson, B. (2006). 'Becoming and Being Hopeful: Towards a Theory of Affect', *Environment and Planning*, 24(5): 733.
- (2009). 'Affective atmospheres', *Emotion, Space and Society*, 2(2): 77–81.

- Barthes, R. (1973/1964). *Elements of Semiology*, trans. A. Lavers and C. Smith, New York: Hill and Wang.
- (1977). *Image–Music–Text*, London: Fontana.
- (2000/1957). *Mythologies*, trans. J. Cape, London: Vintage.
- Baudrillard, J. (2010/1981). *Simulacra and Simulation*, trans. S.F. Glaser, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Benjamin, W. (1999/1950). ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, in H. Arendt (ed.) (1999/1940) *Illuminations*, London: Pimlico. pp. 211–244.
- Berger, J. (2008). *Ways of Seeing*, London and New York: Penguin.
- Bredenkamp, H. (2010). *Theorie des Bildakts*, Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Butler, J. (2009). *Frames of War: When is life grievable?*, London: Verso.
- Campbell, D. (2003). ‘Cultural Governance and Pictorial Resistance: Reflections on the Imaging of War’, *Review of International Studies*, 29(1): 57–73.
- (2004). ‘Horrific Blindness: Images of Death in Contemporary Media’, *Journal for Cultural Research*, 8(1): 55–74.
- (2007). ‘Geopolitics and Visuality: Sighting the Darfur Conflict’, *Political Geography*, 26(4): 357–382.
- Campbell, D. and Shapiro, M.J. (2007). ‘Guest Editors’ Introduction’, *Security Dialogue*, 38(2): 131–137. Retrieved February 9, 2012.
- de Certeau, M. (1988/1984). *The Practice of Everyday Life*; trans. S. Rendall, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Chandler, D. (2007/2002). *Semiotics: The basics*, London: Routledge.
- Chouliraki, L. (2006). *The Spectatorship of Suffering*, Thousand Oak: SAGE Publications.
- (2008). ‘The mediation of Suffering and the Vision of a Cosmopolitan Public’, *Television & New Media*, 9(5): 371–391.
- Clough, P. (2007). Introduction. In Clough, P. and Halley, J. (eds.) *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social*, Durham: Duke University Press. pp. 1–33.
- Connolly, W. (2002). *Neuropolitics: Thinking, culture, speed*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Crawford, N.C. (2000). ‘The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships’, *International Security*, 24(4): 116–156.
- Damasio, A. (1994). *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain*, New York: Putnam.
- (2003). *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain*, New York: Harcourt.
- Debord, G. (1992/1967). *Society of the Spectacle*. London: Rebel Press.
- Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Der Derian, J. (2000). ‘Virtuous War/Virtual Theory’, *International Affairs*, 76(4): 771–788.
- (2001). *Virtuous War: Mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment network*, 2nd edition, New York: Routledge.
- Döveling, K., von Scheve, C. and Konijn, E.A. (2010). ‘Emotions and Mass media’ in Katrin Döveling, Christian von Scheve and Elly A. Konijn (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Emotions and Mass Media*. London: Routledge. pp. 1–13.
- Edkins, J. (2002). ‘Forget Trauma? Responses to September 11’, *International Relations*, 16(2): 243–256.
- Fahmy, S., Cho, S., Wanta, W., and Song Y. (2006). ‘Visual Agenda-setting after 9/11: Individuals’ Emotions, Image Recall, and Concern with Terrorism’. *Visual Communication Quarterly*, 13(1): 4–15.
- Fish, S. (1980). *Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of interpretive communities*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Foster, H. (1988). *Vision and Visuality: Discussions in contemporary culture*. Seattle/New York: Bay Press/Dia Center for the Arts.
- Foucault, M. (1983/1973). *This is not a Pipe*; trans. and ed. J. Harkness, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Gregg, M. and Seigworth, G.J. (2010). *The Affect Theory Reader*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Guillaume, X., Andersen, R.S. and Vuori, J.A. (2012). 'Paint it Black: Colours and the Social Meaning of the Battlefield'. Paper presented at the Visual Aspects of Security workshop, Centre for Advanced Security Theory, Copenhagen.
- Guillaume, X., Vuori, J.A. and Andersen, R.S. (forthcoming). *The Colours of Security: An international political sociology of colour-use*.
- Hacking, I. (1999). *The Social Construction of What?*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Haggerty, K.D. and Ericson, R.V. (2006). *The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Hansen, L. (2011a). 'Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis', *European Journal of International Relations*, 17(1): 51–74.
- (2011b). 'The Politics of Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis: A Post-structuralist Perspective', *Security Dialogue*, 42(4–5): 357–369.
- Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T.W. (2002/1947). *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. E. Jephcott, ed. G.S. Noerr, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Isin, E.F. (2010). 'The Soul of a City: *Hüzün*, *keyif*, longing' in D. Göktürk, S. Levent and I. Türeli (eds) *Orienting Istanbul: Cultural Capital of Europe?*, Abingdon and New York: Routledge. pp. 35–47.
- Jackson, E.L. (2014). 'Colour and the New Security'. Paper presented at the 2014 ISA in Toronto.
- Jasper, J.M. (1998). 'The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and Around Social Movements', *Sociological Forum*, 13(3): 397–424.
- Kangas, A. (2007). *The Knight, the Beast and the Treasure: A semiotic inquiry into the Finnish political imaginary of Russia, 1918–1930s*. Dissertation, Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 1283, Tampere: Tampere University Press.
- Kember, S. (1996). 'The Shadow of the Object: Photography and Realism', *Textual Practice*, 10(1): 145–163.
- Kiefer, G.K. (1970). *Zur Semiotisierung der Umwelt. Eine exemplarische Erörterung der sekundären Architektur*, Stuttgart: University of Stuttgart.
- Kjørup, S. (1978). 'Pictorial Speech Acts', *Erkenntnis*, 12(1): 55–71.
- Koskela, H. (2000). "'The Gaze without Eyes": Video-surveillance and the Changing Nature of Urban Space', *Progress in Human Geography*, 24(2): 243–265.
- Latour, B. (2010). *On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods*, Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Laustsen, C.B. (2008). 'The Camera as a Weapon: On Abu Ghraib and Related Matters', *Journal for Cultural Research*, 12(2): 123–142.
- Lisle, D. (2004). 'Gazing at Ground Zero: Tourism, Voyeurism and Spectacle', *Journal for Cultural Research*, 8(1): 3–21.
- (2010). 'The Art of International Relations', *International Studies Review*, 12(4): 656–657.
- (2011). 'The Surprising Detritus of Leisure: Encountering the Late Photography of War', *Environment and Planning*, 29(5): 873.
- Lyon, D. (1994). *The Electronic Eye: The rise of surveillance society*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- (2006). *Theorizing Surveillance: The panopticon and beyond*, Devon: Willan Publishing.

- Massumi, B. (1995). 'The Autonomy of Affect', *Cultural Critique*, 31: 83–109.
- (2002). *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, affect, sensation*, Duke University Press Books.
- (2005). 'Fear (The Spectrum Said)', *Positions*, 13(1): 31–48.
- Mattern, J.B. (2011). 'A Practice Theory of Emotion for International Relations', in E. Adler and V. Pouliot, *International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 63–86.
- McDonald, M. (2008). 'Securitization and the Construction of Security', *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(4): 563–587.
- Mercer, J. (2006). 'Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9(3): 288–303.
- (2010). 'Emotional Beliefs', *International Organization*, 64: 1–31.
- Mirzoeff, N. (2005). *Watching Babylon. The War in Iraq and Global Visual Culture*, New York & London: Routledge.
- (2009). *An Introduction to Visual Culture*, 2nd edition, Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge.
- Mitchell, W.J.T. (1986). *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (1994). *Picture Theory*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- (2011). *Cloning Terror: The war of images, 9/11 to the present*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Möller, F. (2005). 'Friction and Discomfort: Visual Representations and Security Policy', *New Directions in Peace and Conflict Research*, (8): 69–92.
- (2007). 'Photographic Interventions in Post-9/11 Security Policy', *Security Dialogue*, 38(2): 179–196.
- (2009). 'The Looking/not looking Dilemma', *Review of International Studies* 35(4): 781–794.
- (2012). 'Celebration and Concern: Digitization, Camera Phones and the Citizen-Photographer', in C. Martin and T. von Pape, *Images in Mobile Communication; New Content, New Uses, New Perspectives*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. pp. 57–78.
- Moore, C. and Farrands, C. (2013). 'Visual Analysis', in L. J. Shepherd (ed.) *Critical Approaches to Security: An introduction to theories and methods*, Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 221–235.
- Mulvey, L. (1977). 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', in R.R. Warhol and D.P. Herndl, *Feminisms: An anthology of literary theory and criticism*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. pp. 438–448.
- (1990). *Afterthoughts on "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" inspired by Duel in the Sun*. Online. Available at: <http://afc-theliterature.blogspot.dk/2007/07/afterthoughts-on-visual-pleasure-and.html>. (Accessed 29 July 2013).
- Mutlu, C.E. (2013). 'Emotional Optics', in M.B. Salter and C.E. Mutlu, (eds) *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An introduction*, New York: Routledge.
- Parisi, L. and Terranova, T. (2001). 'A Matter of Affect: Digital Images and the Cybernetic Re-wiring of Vision', *Parallax*, 7(4): 122–127.
- Powell, C. (2003). Slide used in 'Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary Colin L. Powell, February 5, 2003'. Available at [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Powell\\_UN\\_Iraq\\_presentation,\\_alleged\\_Mobile\\_Production\\_Facilities.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Powell_UN_Iraq_presentation,_alleged_Mobile_Production_Facilities.jpg). (Accessed 7 July 2014).
- Ranci re, J. (2007/2003). *The Future of the Image*, trans. G. Elliott, London and New York: Verso.
- (2008/2000). *The Politics of Aesthetics*, trans. G. Rockhill, London: Continuum.
- (2011/2008). *The Emancipated Spectator*, trans. G. Elliott, London and New York: Verso.
- Rose, G. (2007). *Visual Methodologies. An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials*, 2nd edition, SAGE: London.

- Saurette, P. (2006). 'You dissin' me? Humiliation and Post-9/11 Global Politics', *Review of International Studies*, 32: 495–522.
- Schlag, G. and Heck, A. (2012). 'Securitizing Images: The Female Body and the War in Afghanistan', *European Journal of International Relations*, online version, 27 April 2012: 1–26.
- Shapiro, M.J. (1988). *The Politics of Representation*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- (1990). 'Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation of "Security Policy" in the Video Age', *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(3): 327–400.
- (2009). *Cinematic Geopolitics*. Routledge: London.
- Shepherd, L.J. (2008). 'Visualising Violence: Legitimacy and Authority in the "War on Terror"', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1(2): 213–226.
- Simon, S. (2012) 'Suspicious Encounters: Ordinary Preemption and the Securitization of Photography' *Security Dialogue*, 43(2): 157–173.
- Sontag, S. (2004). *Regarding the Pain of Others*, New York: Picador.
- Special issue (2007). 'Securitization, Militarization and Visual Culture in the Worlds of Post-9/11', (ed.) D. Campbell and M.J. Shapiro, *Security Dialogue*, 38(2).
- Special section on Art and War (2009). introduced by A. Danchev and D. Lisle, *Review of International Studies*, 35(4).
- Sutton, R.I. (1992). 'Feelings about a Disneyland Visit Photography and the Reconstruction of Bygone Emotions', *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 1(4): 278–287.
- Tarasti, E. (2006). 'Vastarinnan Semiotiikkaa: Oleminen, Muisti, Historia – Merkkien Vastarinta', *Synteesi*, 24(1): 2–29.
- Thrift, N. (2007). *Non-representational Theory: Space, politics, affect*, New York: Routledge.
- Van Veeren, E. (2010). 'Captured by the Camera's Eye: Guantánamo and the Shifting Frame of the Global War on Terror', *Review of International Studies*, 37(4): 1721–1749.
- Vuori, J.A. (2010). 'A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object', *Security Dialogue*, 41(3): 255–277.
- (2011). 'Towards a Methodology for Studying the Semiotics of Securitization'. Paper presented at ISA.
- (2013). 'Pictorial Texts', in M.B. Salter, and C.E. Mutlu (eds.) *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An introduction*, New York: Routledge. pp. 199–202.
- Vuori, J.A., and Andersen, R.S. (eds.) (forthcoming). *Visual Aspects of Security: Sights and spectacles of insecurity and war*.
- Vuori, J.A., Andersen, R.S. and Guillaume, X. (forthcoming). 'Flags' in M.B. Salter (ed.) *Making Things International II: Assemblages*, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
- Weber, C. (2006). *Imagining America at War: Morality, politics, and film*, London: Routledge.
- (2007). 'I am an American': portraits of post-9/11 US citizens. Online. Available at: [www.opendemocracy.net/article/i\\_am\\_an\\_american\\_portraits\\_of\\_post\\_9\\_11\\_us\\_citizens](http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/i_am_an_american_portraits_of_post_9_11_us_citizens). (Accessed 29 July 2013).
- Williams, M.C. (2003). 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4): 511–531.

# 5

## PROXIMITY<sup>1</sup>

*Christian Bueger and Manuel Mireanu*

### **Proximity and practice in security studies**

Critical security studies are frequently considered as a project of gaining distance to the discourses of policy and its practitioners. Such a mode of (dis)engagement underlying much of critical security studies arguably can be traced back to early disciplinary formulations in international relations of what it means to do critical research. Robert Cox introduced an influential understanding of ‘critical’ by suggesting a classification of two types of theory: critical theory and problem-solving theory. In Cox’s formulation problem-solving theory ‘takes the world as it finds it’ (Cox 1981: 130), while critical theory ‘is critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world’ (Cox 1981: 130). Cox’s delineation of two types of theories became remarkably influential in international relations as well as in security studies not the least since the distinction was immediately apprehended by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz (1986). Waltz regarded the distinction to be a ‘nice’ one, and laconically responded that ‘Cox would transcend the world as it is, meanwhile we have to live in it’ (Waltz 1986: 338). In his understanding, ‘Critical theory seeks to interpret the world historically and philosophically. Problem-solving theory seeks to understand and explain it’ (Waltz 1986: 341). Whether Waltz had misunderstood Cox’s distinction or not – it is likely he had – critical theorizing has become understood as a detached practice of historicizing and intellectualizing. Here, scholarship gains its worth through distance: the good critical scholar engages in philosophical reasoning, large-scale histories and genealogies and seeks distance from security practitioners and the processes of making security.

In this chapter, we challenge such an understanding. Our main claim is that, rather than distance, what should define security scholarship is a well-negotiated *proximity* to practice. Underlying our argument is a redefinition of critical

scholarship that has been introduced variously as ‘practice turn’, ‘praxeology’ or ‘praxiography’.<sup>2</sup> A return to practice stresses the need for seeking proximity to the world of practitioners and their activities, and more carefully listening and talking to those whose lives are at stake. Security from such a perspective is best understood by a focus on the practices constituting security, and the variety of diffused and mundane actions and objects – some of them of a profoundly oppressive character – by which security practice is performed.<sup>3</sup> Security studies then are a project of proximity and close engagement with the flow and the infrastructures of the everyday and the mundane, and those discriminated by security practices.

For at least three of the major approaches of contemporary security research such a re-definition is central. This includes, first, the study of security as fields of insecurity expertise in which security worlds are analysed through the lens of ‘fields of practice’,<sup>4</sup> and second, the study of security as a (or series of) performative act(s),<sup>5</sup> and, third, the study of communities of security practice.<sup>6</sup> In building upon the works of anthropologists (such as Pierre Bourdieu), performative linguists (including John Austin) and organizational ethnographers (such as Etienne Wenger), these three approaches agree on the importance of paying attention to the empirical details of the sites of security, the priority they give to acts, objects and practice as analytical units, and the burden they put on empirical work. While much ink has been spilt on elaborations of theoretical apparatuses and vocabularies (or the ‘what’ to study), less attention has been given to the question of the ‘how’ – the methodological questions of how in research practice, scholars can engage with the world, seek proximity and study it in an empirically rich and sensitive way (see also [Chapter 1](#) in this volume).

In the remainder of this chapter, we draw on contemporary practice theorists and pragmatist thinkers to investigate in more detail the move towards a critical security methodology driven by proximity. We discuss the importance of recognizing and strengthening the multifaceted networks in which research is embedded, the practical value of academic knowledge and how our understanding of theory and methodology transforms from such a perspective. We then proceed to outline how participant observation provides a repository of terms and modes of engagement for negotiating proximity in such a way (section three). Drawing on examples of participant observation on security we explore core dimensions of negotiating proximity.

## **Academic research and its networks: towards proximity**

Conceptual and meta-theoretical debates in critical security studies have been increasingly supplemented by an engagement with method and practice. This is thanks to the considerable effort in formulating a deeply empirical perspective of discourse analysis (e.g., following Hansen 2006), and indeed the increasing visibility of practice-driven investigations. Yet, there remains a widespread glorification of meta-theory and a hesitation to breathe the dust of archives, get dirty hands doing fieldwork, or become intoxicated by contact with bureaucratic demons, ‘evil’

policymakers, threatening security professionals or simply, the mob, the everyday people. Recognizing how deeply problematic a reluctance to engage in empirical work is, practice-oriented approaches offer a redefinition of the critical project. The practice-theoretical perspective resists purifying and isolating critical discourse, and instead lays out the task to multiply and intensify the various social ties researchers have to their empirical material, but also to their 'peers', 'funders' and 'clients'. Such a position aims at moving security studies in the midst of societal problem-solving, strengthening the ties to empirical work while retaining critical intentions.

Our argument is *not* against theory, nor does it equate to an over-glorification of empirical work (which for some even has to be purified from theory). Nor is it an argument for a simple upgrading of the amount of empirical work conducted to test some hypotheses in the so-called real world. The argument here is for recognizing how deeply empirical and theoretical work interpenetrate, the commitment that a good theory is, to draw on Latour (2004b: 63), about 'how to study things, [...] or, rather, how to let the actors have some room to express themselves', and that good abstractions rely on good empirical reconstruction work (Latour 2010). In other words, it is to argue that a well-negotiated proximity between academic practice and the practices studied is needed. Two moves are crucial to develop such a position. The first is to shift from an understanding of security studies as merely intellectual exercise towards the richer understanding of academic research as a social practice as it has been developed in science and technology studies (e.g., Rouse 1996). The second move is to rely on an instrumental understanding of academic practice as productive of social change and innovation.<sup>7</sup> Such a pragmatist re-reading of social science as social inquiry redirects security studies towards 'problems', that is, issues that require intellectual attention not because they are 'matters of fact', but because they are 'matters of concern' (Latour 2004a). We will now exemplify these two core moves.

Similar to other cultural domains, academic research is a social practice (Rouse 1996). As participants in this practice, academics are deeply (and inescapably) entangled in a rich network of relations comprised not only of peers and fellow practitioners but also diverse actors including funding agencies, advocacy organizations, state bureaucracies, or professional politicians (Bueger and Gadinger 2007). Research in social studies of science has well documented how all researchers are entangled in a web of relations to a degree that it does not make sense to split between any scientific (or disciplinary) 'inside' and an (non-scientific) 'outside' (Latour 1999; Pickering 1992). Against the assumption of a scientific hard core which requires protection from any external influence in order to guarantee the untainted, objective possibility of knowledge, practice-theorists suggest that dense relations are not a problem, but instead a precondition for successful academic research. Hence, the multiple connections of academic research to actors, fields and practice are actually its strength and not a distortion that requires correction. Such an understanding takes up formulations of the character of academic practice by early pragmatists, such as John Dewey. While pragmatists mainly formulated a prescriptive argument, sociologists of science have forcefully shown through case

study work that successful research depends on such strong network ties. The stronger the ties of the network are, the more robust the knowledge will be.

Making these ties visible and arguing for paying attention to them is not necessarily an argument for more awareness and reflexivity (although not unimportant, it risks returning to a purification exercise). It is, instead, an argument for building even stronger ties between researchers and other actors and ensuring that they are sustainable. Put another way, identifying the extended social networks in which any academic research is embedded is not important because the ties need to be regulated and controlled as they might distort the production of pure, objective knowledge: by identifying ties, researchers are attempting to strengthen them in order to produce more robust and practically valuable knowledge. Critical security studies have identified the relationship between academic security knowledge and processes of securitization as inherently problematic, starting from early poststructuralist arguments that identified security expertise as productive of security realities (e.g., Klein 1994) and Huysmans's (2002) outline of the dilemma that any type of security analysis performs a security reality, even if it wants to counter it. Yet, these arguments have hardly been carried forward into a more extended research programme that studies how forms of security expertise are linked to security realities, the types of performative effects security expertise has or how security experts can be assisted in creating better, stronger ties with the diverse audiences of security knowledge (Berling and Bueger 2013).

To take the robustness and practical value of the knowledge produced as a core quality criterion for academic practice stresses that knowledge should have resonance for other practitioners than immediate peers (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009). This position transcends the Coxian dichotomy, and foregrounds the importance of critically engaged academic expertise for addressing problematic issues. A recognition of the performative effects of scholarship that emphasizes the importance of research as bringing issues and objects into being and understanding the relation between the knower and the known as a process by which the research object is changed, finds its roots in pragmatist understandings of scientific practice. Such an understanding has been outlined originally by scholars such as John Dewey and is echoed in contemporary practice theories (e.g., the work of Bruno Latour and Michel Callon).

Pragmatists have long stressed an instrumental understanding of theory as a tool for providing insights on how means and ends might be adapted to each other. It stresses the importance of thinking where problems come from and allows new purposes to develop through the process of inquiry (Joas 1996). For Dewey, the core function of academia was to construct and reconstruct problematizations. Problematizations were considered to be the outcome of a process by which indeterminate and ambiguous situations are translated into actual public problems which, in turn, can be mastered by distinct coping mechanisms (Brown 2009). The goal was to advance coping mechanisms for society through the process of inquiry. Centrally, Bruno Latour (2004a, 2010) has carried this argument forward. He suggests that given the performativity of scholarship, academics should turn towards

what he calls ‘matters of concern’ (2004a) and invest more energy in ‘composing’ new and better realities, rather than deconstructing and destroying common wisdoms and societal truths (2010).

Understanding social science in such instrumental terms is again rooted in the idea that academic research is a social practice. As such it is a refined version of everyday knowing and experience. It is more a way of thinking than a particular body of knowledge. As Brown summarizes it, ‘for Dewey, science is a refinement of common sense inquiry – its potential enormously magnified through methods, techniques, and instruments, but otherwise basically similar to everyday efforts to resolve problems by intervening in the world’ (Brown 2009: 160). Brown gives the example of water: ‘by translating “water” into “H<sub>2</sub>O”, scientists open up a range of possible connections and transformations that remain hidden to the common sense’ (Brown 2009: 152). Hence, the value of science over common sense lies in its greater ‘practical power’ (Dewey 1958: 385).

How significantly such a position changes our understanding of the relationship between theory and methodology has been maybe the most forcefully stressed by actor-network theorists (ANT) further developing Deweyan insights. Latour (2005), for instance, speaks of theory as ‘infra-language’, as an enabling conceptual infrastructure. Annemarie Mol (2010: 262) goes as far as fully conflating theory and methodology. As she phrases it, ‘a “theory” is something that helps scholars to attune to the world, to see and hear and feel and taste it. Indeed, to appreciate it’. Then theory can be understood as ‘a repository of terms and modes of engaging with the world, a set of methodological reflexes. These help in getting a sense of what is going on, what deserves concern or care, anger or love, or simply attention’ (Mol 2010: 262).

Others following the pragmatic path prefer to uphold a separation of theory, methodology and methods but, nonetheless, stress their close connection. Organizational theorist Davide Nicolini (2009), for instance, speaks about ‘packages of theory and method’ in which theory provides pivotal ‘sensitizing concepts’ for research. As he argues, ‘for studying practices one needs to employ an internally coherent approach where ontological assumptions (the basic assumptions about how the world is) and methodological choices (how to study things so that a particular ontology materializes) work together’ (Nicolini 2009: 121). Ontology (or theory) provides sensitizing concepts which help to ‘orient the interests [...] by guiding the collection of data and the process of writing up the results of inquiry’ (Nicolini 2009: 122). Nicolini describes academic practices as constantly moving between data and theory. And methodology provides the toolkit for such moving. For him, theorizing begins with the choice of what to represent when moving from observation to representation (Nicolini 2009: 127). Methodology then ‘provides tools for working through the data and allowing the emergence of theoretical considerations of the local “whats” and “hows” of the production of [...] effects. It is, in effect, a tool for zooming in on details and a device for taking stock, so that patterns, regularities, and provisional “phenomena” come to light’ (Nicolini 2009: 127).

In such an understanding, methodology is the *movement* from the world to academic practice (and back) by which, to use a Latourian expression, the world is *mobilized*. In such a mobilization, chains of references are built between concepts, academic practices and the world studied. Methodology then becomes the art of building chains of references stable enough to survive peer criticism and disputes about their reliability. Through such chains of references, academic statements about the world are produced. Building references is also a process of translation. Various procedures of translation are necessary to produce a network of references that are enduring. What happens in one situation must be represented in another. A social scientist has to extract, generalize and abstract aspects of security-related events, processes and actions to turn them into a product such as an article intelligible to his peers. The world is mobilized in academic discourse and turned into an academic artefact – a PowerPoint slide, a lecture script, an article, or a book (Latour 1987; Bueger and Gadinger 2007). As Freeman (2009: 430) understands it,

the research process can be described as one of successive translations, from theoretical formulation to operationalisation, transcription, interpretation and dissemination. Theorisation is a process of reciprocal back and forth between theory and fact, in which conceptions of each are revised in order that one comes to fit the other.

In the conduct of methodology, academics describe, categorize or generalize, abstract, calculate and model. In these practices, scholars negotiate with the world they study. They translate the world. They represent it differently.

Such an understanding has profound consequences for security studies. It raises questions such as: Which problems do we want to reconstruct in using which sensitizing concepts? Which links do we want to strengthen towards whom or what? How do we move and translate and thereby produce realities? All three of these questions stress the need to be closer to the problems, to the problematization practices and the actions and objects that constitute them. They require us to think through proximity and how it can be negotiated well.

In the next section we discuss how participant observation provides us with a key repository of sensitizing concepts, guidelines and rules of thumb for addressing these issues. In following the arguments made by practice theorists, pragmatists as well as actor-network theorists (authors discussed above),<sup>8</sup> we suggest that participant observation is capable to spur a new type of security studies attuned to problem coping, practices and criticality. We discuss core features of participant observation and draw on examples of security research, which has already utilized this set of sensitizing negotiation and translation concepts.

## **Participant observation: Negotiating proximity**

Participant observation has come to be understood as one of the most promising means for studying the problematizations, practice, actions and objects that

constitute it.<sup>9</sup> The central tenet is to initiate the research process from the point of view of the ‘natives’, the practitioners or the actors participating in a practice. Rather than limiting oneself to conceptual development, the intention is to understand from within, to seek proximity to the mundane and to start the translation between theory and fact while standing knee-deep in empirical material. Hence, this is an invitation to security studies scholars to drag themselves out of the university and attempt to talk to the natives. However, the concern is not only with ordinary language, but also with the many bodily movements and artefacts which are part of social interaction. Knowledge claims are hence based on ‘being there’ – of having a grasp of the situations, structures and artefacts in which meaning is situated.

There is a growing body of literature that documents how participative observation can provide telling insights to understand security practice. There are at least two types of literatures documenting the promises of participant observation: *participant observation in violent settings* and in *institutional* or *office settings*. The former has been developed as a rich body of research at the crossroads of anthropology, development studies and criminology.<sup>10</sup> The latter has been formulated at the intersection of policy studies, comparative politics, international relations and policy anthropology.<sup>11</sup>

Anthropologists who study political violence and its implications attend to the victims of everyday forms of political violence including civil wars, state repression, gender oppression or paramilitary activities. Juliana Ochs’s (2011) account of how security permeates every fibre of daily life in Israel provides a major example for a study of everyday security practice through participant observation. Drawing on fieldwork during the ‘second Intifada’, Ochs explores the myriad forms that security takes. She lived among people and talked to them in an effort to outline their everyday practices and their ‘subjectivities and experiences’ (Ochs 2011: 15). Working from a more direct confrontation with violent settings, Lee Ann Fujii (2010) asks how questions of the veracity of personal narratives and local histories can be dealt with in post-violent societies. Relying on a nine-month period of fieldwork in Rwanda to investigate the involvement of ‘ordinary’ people in genocide (Fujii 2008), she reveals ‘the spoken and unspoken expressions about people’s interior thoughts and feelings, which they do not always articulate’ in regular interviews: rumours, inventions, denials, evasions, and silences (Fujii 2010: 232).

Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992) and Teresa Caldeira (2002) provide examples of research in Brazil. Scheper-Hughes reveals how, in Brazilian society, violence and death become anonymous and taken for granted. She points out how murders, kidnappings and tortures are horrifyingly routine. Perpetrated by the police, by ‘death squads’ acting under state sponsorship, or by gangs, this violence is often carried out against specific marginal groups (Scheper-Hughes 2006: 154). Her fieldwork among such groups revealed how race and class stigmatize individuals as dangerous; racial hatred, she argues, becomes a justification for extreme violence (Scheper-Hughes 1992: 216–260). Yet this fieldwork was complemented by an active participation in the political life of the communities exposed to violence.

Scheper-Hughes worked with a peasant union in north-east Brazil and gradually earned the trust of her respondents by working alongside them. Her ‘interviews’ were not conducted in the standard manner of direct questions, but through a great deal of listening, trying to become integrated within the community, living with, and learning the ways of the people she was interested in (Kreiser 2000). In a similar vein, Caldeira looks at state-sponsored violence in Brazil, and argues that Brazilian citizens consider it to be an exception rather than the rule for the police force to respect their rights (Caldeira 2002: 241). Using participant observation, she documents how poverty can become criminalized and how a large part of the population actively supports and demands a tough stance from the State (Caldeira and Holston 1999: 699; 705). Caldeira used participant observation as a tool for gaining proximity to the everyday lives of people, as well as the spaces they inhabit. Most of the participatory work was performed in the areas of ‘working class periphery’, where she engaged in the local social movements (Caldeira 2000: 13).

Such studies, however, are not necessarily always set in conflict zones. Loïc Wacquant’s studies of urban marginality in Chicago and Paris identify the intersection of class and race in the systematic exclusion and criminalization that occurs in the Chicagoan ghettos and French *banlieues*. He argues that ‘ethnographic observation emerges as an indispensable tool [...] to capture the everyday reality of the marginal city dweller’ (Wacquant 2008: 9). His work is an account of how insecurity is rendered an ‘organizing principle’ of daily collective life in advanced democracies (Wacquant 2008: 119), and how the welfare state is making room for a punitive, penal state (Wacquant 2009). He refers to his methodological tactics as ‘observant participation’ – acquiring as much proximity and immersion within the field, and at the same time maintaining the ‘capacity for reflexivity and analysis’ (Wacquant 2011: 87). More concretely, in the course of his study, Wacquant joined a boxing gym in Chicago and participated in boxing competitions; he used the gym as a ‘platform for observation inside the ghetto, a place to meet potential informants’ (Wacquant 2011: 84).

Other authors have paid attention not so much to the interplay between security and the everyday life permeated by violence, but more to the ways in which security is being framed and reinforced by security elites, and to the production of security within Western offices, among elites and experts. Rather than visiting distant places, this second line of participant observation – research in *institutional* or *office settings* – studies everyday practices in the acclimatized and comfortably furnished offices of (Western) elites, experts, bureaucrats and politicians.

Richard Fenno (1986, 1990) was one of the first to use participant observation in a political science context to study the daily life of US senators and congressmen. Scholars continuing such a line of research on politicians include Frank Nullmeier and his team working on committee decision-making and education policy (Nullmeier and Pritzlaff 2011; Nullmeier *et al.* 2003), R.A.W. Rhodes’s (2011) complex multi-year study of British government, or Ruth Wodak’s (2009) research on the European parliament. A second set of researchers is more concerned about the daily life of bureaucrats. This concerns street-level bureaucrats in all forms and locales

(e.g., Wagenaar 2004; Mosse 2004, 2006) or high-level bureaucrats in institutions such as central banks (e.g., Holmes and Marcus 2005; Riles 2011), United Nations negotiations (e.g., Dimitrov 2010; Riles 2006), international organizations such as the International Financial Institutions (e.g., Harper 1998), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Barnett 1997) or diplomatic culture and foreign ministries (Neumann 2012). Hugh Gusterson's (2004) work on the American 'nuclear complex' is maybe the best example of such a type of research directly attending security in the stream of office ethnography. Gusterson's fieldwork is in the 'tribe' of nuclear security experts. Through participant observation he explores how these experts socialize in and around 'the lab'. His contribution lies in the way he converges the 'results' of his multi-sited field research with his theoretical reflections and analyses into a key conceptual tool, which he calls the 'securityscape' (Gusterson 2004: 66), and which illustrates the key role played by security experts and defence intellectuals in the 'nuclear complex'. The concept has been picked up and applied to 'African' security by Niklas Hultin, who argues for explicit attention to be given to how 'security actors constitute themselves as such' (Hultin 2010: 109). This implies that in order to understand how security works, participant observation is needed among those with 'the power to define the security agenda'. In the case of African security, the absence of such focus has serious implications, as Hultin argues that this contributes to the 'othering' of Africa, alongside accounts that depict the everyday violence and security deficit that powerless groups are exposed to (Hultin 2010: 118). This argument can be extended to Europe as well, as the dominant security institutions – such as those pertaining to the EU (including ESDP, EDA, and FRONTEX) – are promising subjects to be exposed to thorough participant observation driven research (see Kurowska and Tallis 2013).

These two sets of literature highlight the creativity of research that draws on participant observation and how our understanding of what it means to do critical security studies changes. These studies reveal that participant observation brings us closer to the problems and practices, and offers strengthened ties to the objects of research. However, they also encounter major criticisms that have been levelled against participant observation more generally. First, these studies document that violent actors, including gangs, paramilitaries, the police and indeed also terrorist groups (Mahmood 2001; Dolnik 2011) can be examined by participant observation, although some distinct precautions and ethical considerations for 'fieldwork under fire' are necessary (see Sriram *et al.* 2009). Second, these studies encounter the idea of inaccessibility: the notion that cultures of secrecy prevailing in security-related fields make these fields inaccessible to the participant observer. Instead, this literature suggests appreciating secrecy and disclosure as a basic problem faced by any type of participant observation: it might be as difficult to get access to life in the slaughterhouse as to the Pentagon. This is not to argue that access to security-related fields is not difficult, yet, there is no foundational difference compared to other fields. Let us draw on these examples and others to exemplify the different forms of movements, translations and negotiations that participant observation entails and that leads to security studies driven by proximity.

Participant observation is ‘immersing oneself and being there’ in order to be capable of ‘appreciating, understanding, and translating the situated, temporal, creative, interpretive and, above all moral and committed nature’ of practice (Nicolini 2009: 134–135). It is the attempt to get as close as possible to the ‘field’ studied and the data from which one can learn about its practices. Participant observation involves a range of negotiations of how to intensify relations. We draw attention to the following ones: the multiplication of experience, the negotiation of the field, the negotiation of control, and performativity and representation.

In the first instance, participant observation is an attempt to utilize all of the available human senses to collect data and interpret it. It involves feeling around, seeing, hearing, and tasting. As a research practice deeply immersed in a local context, participant observation allows recording very specific types of data which otherwise stay hidden, or are not immediately visible: bodily movements, emotions and smiles, utterances and silences, the handling of artefacts and machines.

‘Dwelling’ implies doing a lot of talking – interviews, discussions, asking ‘off-topic’ questions – but it also implies listening (Gerard Forsey 2010). Some things are not said in interviews, and this is why listening to informal speech and to actors that talk among themselves in their own environment is crucial for understanding what is going on (Walsh 2009: 170–171). It is worthwhile paying attention to jokes, curses, jargon and even gossip. It actually matters little if the actors are honest or lie or are even not able to remember things. The task of participant observation is not to ascertain the truth, but to understand the way meaning is produced. In her fieldwork among survivors of wartime violence, Fujii (2010) found that a significant number of her interlocutors were lying, or mixing lies with truth. Yet, the value of testimonies lies in the interpretations provided, and their unspoken meanings that can be deciphered, not by their accuracy or truth (Fujii 2010: 234).

Crucially, not only human agents bear meaning, but also the nonhumans and the inanimate environment. Spaces and infrastructures can be interpreted as part of the analysed situation. Examples of meaningful spaces in security studies are: border spaces, public spaces with intense surveillance such as embassies or public squares, gentrified neighbourhoods, air or maritime space. For instance, dwelling in the central train station of Milan allows one to unravel that the ensemble of the station – its architecture, location, neighbourhood areas, and CCTV network – plays a crucial role in the ‘securityscape’ which nests the vigilante groups that act in the area (Mireanu 2011). The material elements that are present in the spaces that are part of the analysed situation are often crucial (Chapter 3 in this volume). Such material elements include body movements, buildings and monuments, surveillance and weapons technology cameras, advertisements (Ochs 2011; Graham 2010), fences and barriers, clothes and uniforms, or forms and documents (Riles 2006; Walters 2002).

Participant observers are capable of experiencing what actors do and say to a degree they would not be able if studying from distance, or relying only on the representations (texts, or visual products) produced in such situations. In doing what others are doing they come as close as thinkable to the tacit knowledge

relevant in the practices at play in situations. Phrased otherwise, participant observation allows for increasing the resolution and making visible the tacit side of practice as well as the material one. It allows for capturing forms of meaning other than the one inscribed in texts and artefacts such as documents, or policy papers which are conventionally the object of analysis. Participant observation multiplies experience and hence the modes of engaging with the world studied. Participant observers have to juggle various forms of experience. Juggling, however, also involves negotiating how many balls can be kept simultaneously in movement. Hence, participant observation foregrounds the ‘negotiation of selectivity’, that is, the question: Which of the corpus of material compiled in participant observation is to be put on stage? It requires decisions about which material is to be included in the narrative produced in the research.

Second, in terms of gaining proximity to the ‘field’, participant observation is often equated with field research. It is understood to be a process of entering a ‘field’ and conducting research *in* it. In at least two regards such an understanding is problematic; first, field research is a larger umbrella term that does not necessarily involve participant observation. For instance, field research often comprises of (expert) interviews in distant places. Second, if one finds the concept of ‘a field’ productive, a field is not already set or simply ‘out there’. The classical participant observation study in anthropology was designed to maximize the amount of time spent in the field, often one year minimum. The argument was that as much time as possible had to be spent with the ‘interlocutors’ in the field. Classically, field research took place in a territorially-bounded site, that is, primarily a village, but also a laboratory, a city, or a nation state. Since the 1980s anthropologists have successfully challenged such understandings. Following this critique, the ‘field’ is best conceived as an artificial construct, its boundaries are negotiated and produced in the conduct of research design.<sup>12</sup> Yet, if a field is in essence the outcome of the negotiation of researchers with their material, the space of the field can have other topologies than that of a region demarcated by boundaries.

## WHAT IS THE FIELD?

The ‘field’ can be a network, a fluid space, a rhizome or an assemblage (Law 1994; Nicolini 2009; Collier and Ong 2005). In the latter, participant observers adopt a strategy of following people, artefacts or objects to observe the flows, traces and circulations that make up the field.<sup>13</sup> They visit multiple sites, rather than just one site. Consequently, this strategy has been described as ‘multi-sited research’ (Marcus 1995). How important such an understanding of the field is in a security context has been shown by many. For instance, Carol Cohn has studied US security and nuclear practices and discourses and her ‘subject has been a moving target’ (Cohn 2006: 92), and therefore she had to use a multitude of approaches and to visit multiple sites. Often, there will be

also an overlap between different topologies of the field. Iver Neumann (2007), for instance, reconstructed the practice of diplomatic speech writing. While he worked as a participant observer *in* the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (a bounded site), he was following the outline of a speech across offices. By following the connections and flows between offices, he revealed the structures of circulation in which the document is twisted and transformed to stand for the Ministry as a whole. Participant observation hence involves the negotiation of topologies and structures in the conduct of research.

Third, working with participant observation is to give up partial control over the research process. Many researchers underline that the experiences of the ‘field’ have significantly altered their initial research questions (Coleman and Hughes in this volume; Pachirat 2011; Zirakzadeh 2009). Yet, this is not a deficit, but the strength of this methodology – versatility and flexibility allow for a more dynamic research experience driven by surprise and spontaneity. Working with a palette of ‘sensitizing concepts’ (Nicolini 2009; Mol 2010) or an analytical ‘infralanguage’ (Latour 2005), allows the researched subject a significant influence over the meaning of these concepts. It is, to paraphrase Latour (2005), the attempt of letting the actors do the theoretical work themselves. As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012: 73–74) suggest:

Rather than being research ‘subjects’ who participate in (positivist) research on the researcher’s terms, in interpretive research it is the researcher who participates in the local’s activities, in their settings, on their turf. [...] This means that they are understood as having the power to affect initial research designs actively in various ways.

Participant observation then leads to a different form of representing the subjects studied in academic discourse. Rather than imposing meaning on the researched, more voice is given to them and they are also allowed to speak for themselves. Yet, this shift in control also entails a higher degree of complexity. In tracing meaning across different sites, the participant observer can grasp the multiplicity of meanings or the multi-vocality of situations. Such a cacophony of voices can be as Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009: 33) argue, referring to Latour, ‘fun to read – for a while. Then the amount of describing voices becomes a bit wearying’. Leaving writing style aside, sacrificing control has the benefits of allowing researched subjects to resist and to represent themselves and their worlds, but it also allows the researcher to be open to surprise (and hence tell fascinating, surprising narratives, rather than boring verification ones). In sum, participant observation foregrounds the importance of the constant negotiations between the researchers and their research projects on the one side, and what is to be researched on the other. It is the negotiation of control.

## The politics of proximity

Participant observation embraces a specific type of reflexivity. This concerns firstly positionality. It is to reflect on 'the ways that a researcher's demographic characteristics and personal background may be critical' (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 67). Positionality 'can profoundly affect what the researcher sees or does not see, learns and does not learn' (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 68). Reflexivity towards positionality is hence crucial not only to increase trust in the narratives told, but also to be transparent towards any biases that participant observation entails. There is a play of constant negotiations of the author's subjectivity in a dialogue with the environment in which the research is conducted. The 'data' is not merely gathered, but processed, internalized and experienced by the authors, who in turn are forced to change the initial parameters of their research in the light of the new experiences on the field. All these elements are part of the situatedness of the researcher vis-à-vis those actors and contexts that are under scrutiny. While doing participant observation, the authors themselves become embedded in the vast array of social interactions that constitute the field(s) of research, and this embeddedness gets internalized and reflected in the experience of the fieldwork. Positionality also increases awareness towards the problem that the knowledge the observers bring to the field interacts with the local knowledge of the 'subjects' of research and with the resulting (published) knowledge in ways that are always contingent and unpredictable.

Second, 'participation', goes beyond the immersion in situations with the aim of observing, recording and gathering data. If we take the argument that knowledge affects social relations a step further, we will have to ask the question of the actual influence of the presence and participation of the researcher within the field(s). If participation leaves traces, what kind of trace do we want it to be? If participation is able to shape social reality, can one render this influence to have positive effects? Understood in such a way, participatory observation is a mode of engagement that can take the form of direct political interventions (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 38–9; Coutin and Hirsch 1998). It holds the potential to transform the lives of the subjects studied, whether it is the experts in ministries making security, or parts of the society marginalized or oppressed by security practices. Indeed, participating in security practices means that there are other stakes involved, besides the generation of knowledge or the careers of scholars. For instance, in challenging the oppressive nature of the security apparatus, an entire array of state institutions and discourses that legitimate the existing order can be contested. Counter-expertise can be developed and perform a different security reality. For instance, Amedeo Policante argues that his participation in groups of protestors that were kettled by the police provided him with a way to counter the hegemony of authoritative expert knowledge that shapes the discussions about police violence (Policante 2012: 66).

The focus on the performative effects of research is meant to provide empowering means for the subaltern groups, as Dana-Ain Davis argues: 'participatory research provides people with the analytic and practical tools to

document their lives and offers a language for articulating the unique strengths of a group. Using this model we can ensure that the voices and expertise of our constituents are not lost in the effort to achieve scientific validity' (Davis 2008: 233). There are different forms in which this empowering may take place, from 'speaking up' for the oppressed groups and making their struggles public and known to wider audiences, to actively engaging in the everyday struggles and actively being in solidarity with these groups (Schaumberg 2008: 211; Colectivo Situaciones 2005). Some authors posit the possibility of a 'third space' between activism and academia, 'a space that enables the disruption of both sites in both directions' and that generates the possibility of politically engaged academic research in which participatory observation plays the central role (Routledge 1996: 402, 406; Coronado and Staudt 2005).

The participant observer can have the capacity to directly engage the discrimination and exclusion felt by marginalized groups. Through participation, he or she can 'shoulder the burden' of the struggle fought by these groups (Selmeczi 2009, see also Graeber 2008), or merely be a vehicle for their oppressed voices (see Coleman and Hughes in this volume). These considerations are based on the idea that participant observation is not just another way of generating academic knowledge for its own sake, but has an interventionist character with an emancipatory scope. Securityscapes have particularly high stakes in this respect: conducting participatory observation in a field where security is being performed raises not only concerns of safety for the researcher, but also serious ethical problems for how this participation reinforces the violence of security. While seeking to approach the practices of Italian patrols and Hungarian civil militias, Mireanu (2011, 2013) found that to join vigilante groups in their patrols would contribute to increasing the marginalization and violent exclusion of certain groups. These patrols were acting in neighbourhoods with high concentrations of 'undesired' minorities (immigrants, Roma people). Thus, being 'one of them' in this case would imply an undesired complicity with the acts of intimidation performed by vigilante groups.

While the degree to which participant observation should be a device of political activism, is and will remain contested, the above reflections bring the discussion of the effects of scholarly analysis right where it belongs: to the heart of researching and writing practices. Often such reflection on scholarly effects has been delegated to sub-discourses and separate debates. The debate on participant observation instead stresses that the reflection on effects is better understood as an integral part of any scholarly practices. Researchers are situated among a myriad of vectors of power, contexts and histories, to which they bring their own background and experiences (see Coleman and Hughes in this volume). It is usually assumed that there is a power asymmetry between the observers and the researched group that dates back to the times when anthropology was the assisting discipline of colonialism. There is always an implicit privilege of the participant observers in relation to the ones they are observing, if only for the fact that at the end of the day researchers can always exit the field at their own will and return

to their career, while for everybody else the ‘field’ constitutes everyday reality. This is obvious in settings where violence is a tragic part of people’s lives, while for the observer such experience is only temporary.<sup>14</sup> There is the need for reflexivity and lucidity about one’s situatedness in such contexts, and the effects that research produces.

Yet asymmetry can function in reverse as well. The participant observers might find themselves – even against their will – in a position of power inferiority. For instance, if the interlocutors are high-positioned actors – politicians, leaders, and generally people with more capabilities than an academic – this risk is permanent. Such actors might even attempt to make the researcher adhere to their agendas. The danger of becoming ‘co-opted’ and beget a form of intimacy leading to a lack of distinction between the researcher and the researched, raises major questions on the effects of participation. The case of anthropologists partaking in military operations (Zehfuss 2012; Gusterson forthcoming) or providing evidence in court (Mahmood 2001) are revealing in this regard. In the security field, participation may easily translate into ‘complicity’ in the political and military situations that one researches (Zehfuss 2012: 185).

### COMPLICITY OR PROXIMITY?

Katherine Verdery conducted several ethnographical research projects in Romania during its Socialist period. In the mid 1970s she obtained access to Romania and began her work by spending 16 months in a Transylvanian village. Her ethnographical tools were typical: interviews, dwelling, crafting social connections and performing some archival work. In the resultant book (Verdery 1983), she admits that doing fieldwork was less complicated for her than reporting and interpreting the data she had obtained. This difficulty was caused by her situatedness as an American researcher in a Socialist country and the foreseeable stereotypes that she had to juggle. But it was also caused by her reticence regarding the protection of her informants, since these were people that ‘could later be made accountable for what they said or might have said’ (Verdery 1983: 22–3).

The Romanian secret police (*‘Securitate’*) were operating a vast and invisible network of surveillance across the country and even abroad. The *Securitate* was a repressive apparatus whose job was to collect and process information from and about the entire population, in order to serve ‘national security’ and to strengthen the Communist Party’s position. This apparatus can be seen as a productive form of applied social science and gathering knowledge, rather than merely as a repressive security force (Poenaru 2013). After Romania became capitalist, the archives of the secret police were made public, and Verdery was astonished to read her own file, containing numerous reports about her activities in Romania (Verdery 2013).

The *Securitate* closely examined Verdery's behaviour and reported their findings. In doing so, they employed a specific interpretive lens that was influenced by the Cold War binaries, which led to Verdery's actions being perceived as suspicious. She was thought to be a spy, because of her information-gathering practices, which they likened to their own: collecting socio-political information, taking field notes on things that were not her direct object of research, using a special code in writing these field notes, writing in excess about the contexts in which her discussions were taking place, and even using a mini-cassette recorder that was similar to the ones used by the secret police. Both Verdery and the *Securitate* recruited and used informers, and referred to them as such (see also Verdery 1983: 374, fts. 12 and 13).

Reflecting on her experience, Gusterson writes: 'Verdery was not only an object of the [secret police's] regime of surveillance, she was an involuntary instrument for it too' (Gusterson 2012: 26). This forces us to rethink the relation between proximity and security. In the name of national security, the *Securitate* was using tools that can be deemed ethnographic (Verdery 2013). These tools were serving the purpose of gathering all possible information on people's lives. But they were also used for repressive purposes, as the *Securitate* was responsible for identifying and purging the 'enemies of the people'. Proximity may be misused by certain agencies for suppressive purposes. On the other hand, Verdery's proximity also ended up endangering people. Her 'informants' were now suspicious in the eyes of the regime, and could either be seen as traitors, or recruited as informants for the secret police. Too much ethnographic detail can jeopardize people's lives, especially in societies with such dense and repressive security apparatuses.

What does this say about ethnographic tools and about the extent of their invasiveness when such tools are used by a repressive apparatus to gain knowledge for dictatorial uses? Verdery's experience shows that intimacy can be problematic and proximity is not a virtue in itself, because some of the knowledge that is gathered by the participant observer may be compromising for the individuals observed if it is wrongly appropriated. The danger of appropriation also underlines the potential power inferiority position that the participant observer can find him- or herself in. All these considerations feed into our continuous stress on the negotiation of proximity.

Upon return from the field, the participant observer turns the 'cacophony of voices' into academic narratives. As discussed, this translation process is everything but linear in that the researcher follows an orderly progression from access and observation to writing up. The process of participant observation is circular and the researcher will go through several cycles of access, observation, analysis and reflection. In this course, researchers will tinker and adjust their positions, their forms of participation or their sensitizing concepts. This process of turning the

world into observations and experiences involves constant negotiations and re-negotiations. It is a process of continuous sorting in and sorting out. It is a negotiation between the observed and unobserved (due to field access, choice of field, position in field, cultural blindness, or resource restrictions). It is a negotiation of which observed material becomes written down, turned into a field note and becomes part of the narrative. And it is a negotiation of what of this narrative is turned into an academic artefact available to the public and stored in libraries and collections, and which parts remain private or go in the bin.

In summary, participant observation provides us with a key repository of sensitizing concepts, guidelines and rules of thumb for the negotiations increasing the connectedness of practice and security studies. The multiplication of experience, the negotiations of the field, performativity and representation are all dimensions of these negotiations. They broaden our understanding of the ties that are made and unmade in the movement of methodology. Participant observation, thus, holds the capacity to spur a new type of security studies attuned to problem coping, practices and criticality. To suggest that a new type of security studies is possible that continuously builds better connections in the negotiations of participant observation is, however, not to argue for simply turning to anthropology. While anthropology has spearheaded many discussions on the negotiations in participant observation, security studies requires defining for itself and its own purposes the methodological potential of participant observation.

## Conclusion

In this chapter we argued for a methodology for security studies, which takes the negotiation of proximity as one of its core concerns. Our starting point was that too much of critical security studies has cut loose connections to the world and has pursued a mode of (dis)engagement which appraises the philosophical and abstract. Encountering such an understanding through the lenses of practice theory, pragmatism and actor-network theory we argued for a methodology that moves security studies in the midst of societal problem-solving, multiplies the connections to other actors than scholarly peers and suggests that the basis for abstractions has to be good empirical reconstruction work. Methodology in such an understanding is the constant movement between the world studied, the matters of concern and academic communities. It is an art of translating these worlds into each other by building chains of references that last. We have suggested that participant observation provides a repository of terms and modes of engagement, which sensitize us to the world, indeed allow us to appreciate it, and, most importantly, give us an understanding of what is at stake when negotiating proximity.

We outlined an extended understanding of participant observation, which is more than a technical tool that can be used in any type of study. Participant observation is a practice that provides a distinct way of translating what is not immediately present in a field of research. Participant observing is a sensory technique of recording what can be seen, smelled and heard. It is an interpretive

device; by participating we can learn the tacit knowledge underlying the practices at a site and the problems and problematizations at stake. Participant observation is also a commitment. Using what we record and learn through participating leads to a different form of representing once we develop narratives. Often, it will mean strengthening the voice of the participants. Practising participant observation increases our awareness for the performative effects that scholarly analysis has. It sensitizes to the intended and unintended consequences of research.

As we have argued in this contribution, participant observation is a device of negotiating proximity. It enables, or indeed even forces, researchers to think, to reflect, to talk about and to justify what modes of proximity they are relying on and what kinds of worlds they are producing. Its importance as a device that triggers reflexivity on proximity, movement and translation is the real value of participant observation, even in contexts where it initially appears that participation to observe is not feasible. This is the reason why participant observation is, for us, the methodological heart of redefining the critical project as a project of proximity that engages with practice.

## Notes

- 1 For comments and suggestions we are grateful to Nadine Voelkner, Jef Huysmans and the other participants in the International Collaboratory on Critical Methods in Security Studies.
- 2 See, among others, Reckwitz (2002), Spiegel (2005), Adler and Pouliot (2011a, b), Bueger (forthcoming), Bueger and Gadinger (2008). The term 'praxiography' was coined by Mol (2002).
- 3 See for instance Huysmans (2011), Doty (2007), or Aradau (2004).
- 4 See, among others, Berling and Bueger (2013), Bigo (2005), Villumsen (2008), or Huysmans (2006).
- 5 See the discussion around securitization theory in Waever (1995), Stritzel (2007), Vuori (2008), or Balzacq (2005).
- 6 See, among others, Adler (2008), or Pouliot (2010 a, b).
- 7 To foreground the instrumental character of academic practice should not be confused with the emphasis of the positivist project on gaining objective knowledge and control over social reality (Steinmetz 2005: *passim*). Nor should it be reduced to lobby work and influencing policymakers or to generate solutions to the problems defined by policy agendas (for a criticism of such positions, see Burawoy 2005: 511–523). As will be developed later in this chapter, our understanding of instrumentality research is in line with politically and academically engaged research that is aware of, and works within, the specific situations in which the researcher is embedded (Jackson 2011: 176).
- 8 Specifically, see Schatzki (2012), Reckwitz (2008), Joas (2004), Czarniawska (2008), Latour (1987), Nicolini (2009) and Bueger (forthcoming) for an elaboration of this argument.
- 9 Participant observation has often been equated with ethnography or anthropology. Yet it is important to keep these terms separate. Ethnography is a larger umbrella term and an ethnographic study conventionally would involve more than participant observation or eventually could even survive without any direct participant observation in a classical sense (see the discussion in Yanow 2009). Participant observation has been the defining methodology of anthropology, yet it is neither useful to equate participant observation with anthropology, which is a scientific discipline in the first place, nor does all of anthropology conduct participant observation. Our understanding stresses that participant observation is more than just a technique and represents a methodological position centred on the problem of proximity.

- 10 Richards (2004) provides a useful survey as do Sriram *et al.* (2009) and Avruch (2001).
- 11 A growing number of edited volumes address these intersections, including Schatz (2009) and Shore *et al.* (2011).
- 12 For a discussion and critique of the village-based 'field' terminology see Gupta and Ferguson (1992, 1997).
- 13 A discussion of the strategy of 'following' is provided in Czarniawska (2008).
- 14 Although see Scheper-Hughes's account (2010) of how she was invited to return to her initial field on account of her previous experiences with identifying the victims of death-squads (on the issue of 'returning to the field' see Burawoy 2003).

## References

- Adler, E. (2008). 'The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation', *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(2): 195–230.
- Adler, E. and V. Pouliot (2011a). 'International Practices', *International Theory*, 3(1): 1–36.
- (eds.) (2011b). *International Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alvesson, M., and K. Skoldberg (2009). *Reflexive Methodology. New Vistas for Qualitative Research*. 2nd ed. London and Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Aradau, C. (2004). 'Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 7(4): 388–413.
- Avruch, K. (2001). 'Notes Toward Ethnographies of Conflict and Violence', *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 30(5): 637–648.
- Balzacq, T. (2005). 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context', *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2): 171–201.
- (ed.) (2011). *Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Barnett, M.N. (1997). 'The UN Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda', *Cultural Anthropology*, 12(4): 551–578.
- Berling, T.V. and C. Bueger, (eds.) (2013). *Capturing Security Expertise: Practice, power, responsibility*.
- Bigo, D. (2005). 'Globalized in-security: the Field and the Ban-opticon', in J. Solomon and N. Sakai (eds), *Translation, Philosophy and Colonial Difference*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Brown, M. (2009). *Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Representation*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Bueger, C. (forthcoming). 'Pathways to Practice: Praxiography and International Politics', *European Political Science Review*. Doi: 10.1017/S1755773913000167.
- Bueger, C., and F. Gadinger (2007). 'Reassembling and Dissecting: International Relations Practice from a Science Studies Perspective', *International Studies Perspectives*, 8(1): 90–110.
- (2008). 'Praktisch Gedacht! Praxistheoretischer Konstruktivismus in den Internationalen Beziehungen', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, 15(2): 273–302.
- Burawoy, M. (2003). 'Revisits: An Outline of a Theory of Reflexive Ethnography', *American Sociological Review*, 68(5): 645–679.
- (2005). 'Provincializing the Social Sciences', in G. Steinmetz (ed.) *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences. Positivism and its Epistemological Others*, Duke University Press. pp. 508–525.
- Caldeira, T.P.R. (2000). *City of Walls. Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (2002). 'The Paradox of Police Violence in Democratic Brazil', *Ethnography* 3(3): 235–263.

- Caldeira, T.P.R. and J. Holston (1999). 'Democracy and Violence in Brazil', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 41: 691–729.
- Cohn, C. (2006). 'Motives and methods: using multi-sited ethnography to study US national security discourses', in B. Ackerly, M. Stern and J. True (eds.) *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 91–107.
- Colectivo Situaciones (2005). 'Something More on Research Militancy: Footnotes on Procedures and (In)Decisions', *Ephemeris*, 5(4): 602–614.
- Collier, S.J., and A. Ong, (eds.) (2005). *Global Assemblages. Technology, Politics and Ethics as Anthropological Problems*, Malden, MA; Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell Publishing.
- Coronado, I. and K. Staudt (2005). 'Resistance and *compromiso* at the global frontlines: gender wars at the US-Mexico border', in C. Eschle and B. Maiguaschca (eds.) *Critical Theories, International Relations and the 'Anti-Globalisation Movement'*. *The Politics of Resistance*, Oxon: Routledge, 139–153.
- Coutin, S.B., and S.F. Hirsch (1998). 'Naming Resistance: Ethnographers, Dissidents, and States', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 71(1): 1–16.
- Cox, R.W. (1981). 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10(2): 126–155.
- Czarniawska, B. (2008). 'Organizing: How to Study it and How to Write About it', *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal*, 3(1): 4–20.
- Davis, D-A. (2008). 'Knowledge in the service of a vision: politically engaged anthropology', in V. Sanford and A. Angel-Ajani (eds.) *Engaged Observer. Anthropology, Advocacy and Activism*, Rutgers University Press, 228–238.
- Dewey, J. (1958). *Experience and Nature*, Mineola: Dover Publications.
- Dimitrov, R.S. (2010). 'Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference', *Review of Policy Research*, 27 (6): 795–821.
- Dolnik, A. (2011). 'Conducting Field Research on Terrorism: a Brief Primer', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 5(2): 3–35.
- Doty, R.L. (2007). 'States of Exception on the Mexico-U.S. Border: Security, 'Decisions,' and Civilian Border Patrols', *International Political Sociology*, 1(2): 113–137.
- Fenno, R.F. Jr. (1986). 'Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study of Politics', *The American Political Science Review*, 80(1): 3–15.
- (1990). *Watching Politicians*, Berkley: Institute for Governmental Studies.
- Freeman, R. (2009). 'What is Translation?', *Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice*, 5(4): 429–447.
- Friedrichs, J. and F. Kratochwil (2009). 'On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology', *International Organization*, 63(3): 701–731.
- Fujii, L.A. (2008). 'The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide', *Security Studies*, 17(3): 568–597.
- (2010). 'Shades of Truth and Lies: Interpreting Testimonies of War and Violence', *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(2): 231–241.
- Gerard Forsey, M. (2010). 'Ethnography as Participant Listening', *Ethnography*, 11(4): 558–572.
- Graeber, D. (2008). *Direct Action: An Ethnography*, Oakland: AK Press.
- Graham, S. (2010). *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism*, London: Verso
- Gupta, A. and J. Ferguson (1992). 'Beyond Culture: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference', *Cultural Anthropology*, 7(1): 6–23.
- (eds.) (1997). *Anthropological Locations. Boundaries of a Field Science*, University of California Press.
- Gusterson, H. (2004). *People of the Bomb: Portraits of America's Nuclear Complex*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- (2012). 'What's in a Laptop?', *Anthropology Now*, 4(1): 26–31.
- (forthcoming). 'Ethics, Expertise and Human Terrain', in T.V. Berling and C. Bueger (eds.) *Capturing Security Expertise: Practice, Power, Responsibility*. London: Routledge.
- Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, Milton Park and New York: Routledge.
- Harper, R.H.R. (1998). *Inside the IMF. An Ethnography of Documents, Technology and Organisational Action*, San Diego: Academic Press.
- Holmes, D.R., and G.E. Marcus (2005). 'Cultures of Expertise and the Management of Globalization. Towards the Refunctioning of Ethnography', in A. Ong and S.J. Collier (eds.) *Global Assemblages*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hultin, N. (2010). 'Repositioning the Front Lines? Reflections on the Ethnography of African Securityscapes', *African Security*, 3(2): 104–125.
- Huysmans, J. (2002). 'Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27: 41–62.
- (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. Milton Park: Routledge
- (2011). 'What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings', *Security Dialogue*, 42(4–5): 371–383.
- Jackson, P.T. (2011). *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations. Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Joas, H. (1996). *Die Kreativität des Handelns*, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- (2004). 'The Changing Role of the Social Sciences: An Action-Theoretical Perspective', *International Sociology*, 19(3): 301–313.
- Klein, B.S. (1994). *Strategic Studies and World Order. The Global Politics of Deterrence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kreisler, H. (2000). *Interview with Nancy Scheper-Hughes*, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley. Available at: <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Scheper-Hughes/>. Accessed 2 April 2014.
- Kurowska, X. and B. Tallis (2013). 'Chiasmatic Crossings. A Reflexive Revisit of a Research Encounter in European Security', *Security Dialogue*, 44(1): 73–89.
- Latour, B. (1987). *Science in Action. How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1999). *Pandora's Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (2004a). 'Why has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern', *Critical Inquiry*, 30(2): 225–248.
- (2004b). 'On using ANT for studying information systems: a (somewhat) Socratic dialogue', in C. Avgerou, C. Ciborra, and F. Land (eds.) *The Social Study of Information and Communication Technology: Innovation, actors and contexts*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 62–76.
- (2005). *Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
- (2010). 'An Attempt at a "Compositionist Manifesto"', *New Literary History*, 41(3): 471–490.
- Law, J. (1994). *Organizing Modernity*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mahmood, C.K. (2001). 'Terrorism, Myth, and the Power of Ethnographic Praxis', *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 30(5): 520–545.
- Marcus, G.E. (1995). 'Ethnography in/of the World System: the Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24, pp. 95–117.

- McNamara, L.A. (2012). 'Interdisciplinary Research in the National Laboratories', in R. Albro, G. Marcus, L.A. McNamara and M. Schoch-Spana (eds.) *'Anthropologists in the Securityscape: Ethics, Practice, and Professional Identity'*, Left Coast Press. pp. 87–100.
- Mireanu, M. (2011). *The Milan Central Train Station as a Security-scape: Urban Security and the Criminalization of Poverty*. Paper presented at the Central European University, Budapest, April 2011.
- (2013). 'The spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary Groups', *Journal for the Study of Fascism*, 2(1): 68–93.
- Mol, A. (2002). *The Body Multiple: Ontology in medical practice*, Durham, NC & London: Duke University Press.
- (2010). 'Actor-Network Theory: Sensitive Terms and Enduring Tensions', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 50(1): 253–269.
- Mosse, D. (2004). 'Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice', *Development and Change*, 35(4): 639–671.
- (2006). 'Anti-social Anthropology? Objectivity, Objection, and the Ethnography of Public Policy and Professional Communities', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 12(4): 935–956.
- Neumann, I.B. (2002). 'Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 31(3) (July): 627–651.
- (2007). "'A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand For,' or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New.' *International Political Sociology* 1(2): 183–200.
- (2012). *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Nicolini, D. (2009). 'Zooming In and Zooming Out: A Package of Method and Theory to Study Work Practices', in S. Ybema, D. Yanow, H. Wels, and F. Kamsteeg (eds.) *Organizational Ethnography: Studying the complexities of everyday life*, London and Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. pp. 120–138.
- Nullmeier, F., T. Pritzlaff, and A. Wiesner (2003). *Mikro-Policy-Analyse: Ethnographische Politikforschung am Beispiel Hochschulpolitik*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag.
- Nullmeier, F. and T. Pritzlaff (2011). 'Capturing Practice', *Evidence & Policy*, 7(2): 137–154.
- Ochs, J. (2011). *Security and Suspicion: An Ethnography of Everyday Life in Israel. The Ethnography of Political Violence*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Pachirat, T. (2011). *Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized slaughter and the politics of sight*, Yale University Press.
- Pickering, A. (ed.) (1992). *Science as Practice and Culture*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Poenaru, F. (2013) *Contesting illusions: history and intellectual class struggle in post-communist Romania*. Doctoral thesis presented at the Central European University, October 2013. Available at: [www.etd.ceu.hu/2013/poenaru\\_florin.pdf](http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2013/poenaru_florin.pdf) (accessed 1/7/14).
- Policante, A. (2012). 'Of Cameras and Balaclavas: Violence, Myth and the Convulsive Kettle', in L. Coleman and K. Tucker (eds.) *Situating Global Resistance Between Discipline and Dissent*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Pouliot, V. (2010a). *International Security in Practice: the politics of NATO-Russia diplomacy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2010b). 'The Materials of Practice: Nuclear Warheads, Rhetorical Commonplaces and Committee Meetings in Russian – Atlantic Relations', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 45(3): 1–17.
- Reckwitz, A. (2002). 'Toward a Theory of Social Practices', *European Journal Of Social Theory*, 5(2): 243–263.
- (2008). 'Praktiken und Diskurse. Eine sozialtheoretische und methodologische Relation', in H. Kalthoff, S. Hirschauer, and G. Lindemann (eds.) *Theoretische Empirie. Zur Relevanzqualitativer Forschung*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 188–209.

- Rhodes, R.A.W. (2011). *Everyday Life in British Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Richards, D. (ed.) (2004). *No Peace No War: Anthropology Of contemporary armed conflicts*, Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Riles, A. (ed.) (2006). *Documents: Artifacts of modern knowledge*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- (2011). *Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rouse, J. (1996). *Engaging Science: How to understand its practices philosophically*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Routledge, P. (1996). 'The Third Space as Critical Engagement', *Antipode*, 28(4): 399–419.
- Schatz, E. (2009) 'Introduction: Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics', in E. Schatz (ed.) *Political Ethnography. What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1–22.
- Schatzki, T.R. (2012). 'A primer on practices'. In J. Higgs (ed.) *Practice-Based Education: Perspectives and strategies*, Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Schaumburg, H. (2008). 'Taking sides in the Oilfields: for a Politically Engaged anthropology', in H. Armbruster and A. Laerke (eds.) *Taking Sides: Ethics, politics and fieldwork in anthropology*, New York: Berghahn Books.
- Scheper-Hughes, N. (1992). *Death Without Weeping: The violence of everyday life in Brazil*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (2006). 'Death Squads and Democracy in Northeast Brazil', in J. and J. Comaroff (eds.) *Law and Order in the Postcolony*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 150–187.
- (2010). 'Face to Face with Abidoral Queiroz: Death Squads and Democracy in Northeast Brazil', in L. K. Cheliotis (ed.) *Roots, Rites and Sites of Resistance. The Banality of Good*, Basingstoke: Palgrave. pp. 151–177.
- Schwartz-Shea, P. and D. Yanow (2012). *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and processes*, New York: Routledge.
- Selmecci, A. (2009). '"... We Are Being Left to Burn Because We Do Not Count": Biopolitics, Abandonment, and Resistance', *Global Society*, 23(4): 519–538.
- Shore, C., S. Wright, and D. Perco, eds. (2011) *Policy Worlds: Anthropology and Analysis of Contemporary Power*. London & New York: Berghahn.
- Spiegel, G.M. (ed.) (2005). *Practicing History. New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn*, New York: Routledge.
- Sriram, C.L., J.C. King, J.A. Mertus, O. Martin-Ortega, and J. Herman (eds.) (2009). *Surviving Field Research: Working in violent and difficult situations*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Steinmetz, G. (ed.) (2005). *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences. Positivism and its Epistemological Others*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Stritzel, H. (2007) 'Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3): 357–383.
- Verdery, K. (1983). *Transylvanian Villagers: Three centuries of political, economic, and ethnic change*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (2013). *Secrets and Truths. Ethnography in the Archive of Romania's Secret Police*, Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Villumsen, T. (2008). Theory as Practice and Capital. NATO in a Bourdieusian Field of Security in Europe: towards a sociological approach to IR, *Department of Political Science*, Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen.
- Vuori, J.A. (2008). 'Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders', *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(1): 65–99.

- Wacquant, L. (2008). 'Ordering Insecurity. Social Polarization and the Punitive Upsurge', *Radical Philosophy Review*, 11(1): 9–27.
- (2009). *Prisons of Poverty*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- (2011). 'Habitus as Topic and Tool: Reflections on Becoming a Prizefighter', *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 8: 81–92.
- Wæver, O. (1995) 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in R.D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 46–86.
- Wagenaar, H. (2004). "'Knowing" the Rules: Administrative Work as Practice', *Public Administration Review*, 64(6): 643–656.
- Walsh, C. (2009). 'Scholars as Citizens: Studying Public Opinion through Ethnography', in E. Schatz (ed.) *Political Ethnography. What Immersion contributes to the Study of the Political*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp. 165–182.
- Walters, W. (2002). 'The Power of Inscription: Beyond Social Construction and Deconstruction in European Integration Studies.' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 31(1): 83–108.
- Waltz, K. (1986). 'Reflections on Theory of International Relations: A Response to my Critics', in R. Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 322–346.
- Wodak, R. (2009). *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as usual*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Yanow, D. (2009). 'Dear Author, Dear Reader: The Third Hermeneutic in Writing and Reviewing Ethnography', in E. Schatz (ed.) *Political Ethnography. What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power*, Chicago and London: Chicago University Press. pp. 275–302.
- Zehfuss, M. (2012). 'Culturally Sensitive War? The Human Terrain System and the Seduction of Ethics', *Security Dialogue* 43(2): 175–190.
- Zirakzadeh, C.E. (2009). 'When nationalists are not separatists: Discarding and recovering academic theories while doing fieldwork in the Basque region of Spain', in E. Schatz (ed.) *Political Ethnography. What Immersion contributes to the Study of the Political*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 97–118.

# 6

## DISTANCE<sup>1</sup>

*Lara Montesinos Coleman and Hannah R. Hughes*

### **Problematics, fieldwork and the limits of the field: Introduction**

This chapter puts the practice of problematizing at the centre of methodological enquiry. In the first part of the chapter, we point to the force that particular problematics or objects of interest exert upon thinking within a disciplinary field, and how we have grappled with these forces in our own research trajectories. We suggest that ‘security’ can be particularly powerful in this regard because as a concept it is deployed both to identify an empirical field of practices and as a central category for the definition of problematics within a field of study. ‘Security’ is readily reified, an ‘obligatory grid of intelligibility’ (Foucault 2008: 3) which sets limits to what – and how much – we can call into question. Turning from the thinking tools of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault to the sorts of scholarly ethos these thinkers embodied, we indicate how this may offer at least as much inspiration as the methods that have been appropriated from their work. Indeed, the way in which the concepts of Bourdieu and Foucault have been inserted within the discipline of security studies is often counter to such an ethos, in that they effectively serve to strengthen – rather than diminish – security’s hold on and over the problematization of politics.

With this in mind, in the second part of the chapter we set out to explore how greater space may be cultivated between ourselves and our objects of study through the practice of fieldwork. We suggest that in the process of moving between sites, problem-spaces and parameters of intelligibility, space may be created from which to reflect upon ready-made objects of study. Rather than approaching fieldwork as a method then, we explore it as an exercise in space-making, examining how the practice of fieldwork as such provides a reference point from which to call into question some of the more readily-available categories used in constructing the research problematic. Finally, we conclude with some reflections on the struggles over recognition at stake in this sort of intervention.

We have kept the back and forth format of the conversation through which we initially shaped our ideas, partly to bring out how each of us has struggled with these issues, but also to try to avoid settling back into the sort of conceptual and methodological closure that we want to escape. For the sort of critical/reflexive attitude that we point toward is itself a difficult, uncertain and ongoing process. It is not the cornerstone of a recognizable 'method' around which we can unite, nor is it something that can be simply picked up and 'applied' in security studies. Rather, such an ethos might be thought of as coming before both methods and 'security studies', informing the practice of problematization itself.

### Problematizing problematics: the field's force on our thinking

**Hannah:** Security is an appealing place to start in IR because it is one of those concepts that *does* something, both in the fields we study and within the discipline itself. This attraction to security exerts a force on our thinking – a force that needs further unpacking. Most of the time we are concerned with understanding and measuring the effect security has in and on the fields we are studying, neglecting the force it exerts on how we, as researchers, construct the research problematic. However, I would argue that security has as much of an effect on *our* thinking, albeit in different ways, as it does on *those* we study. For example, I was attracted to the mobilizing force of security because of the lack of political will to deal with climate change, and assumed political interest would be generated by identifying the security implications it posed.<sup>2</sup> I set about identifying the meaning of security through the environmental security literature in order to find a way to relate and link this to climate change.<sup>3</sup> Eventually it became clear that security – in the sense of a precisely definable object – didn't exist, which is what made Ole Waever's (1995) chapter on securitization so appealing. The securitization framework provided a way out of having to stretch the security concept to fit environmental degradation, as according to the Copenhagen school, security was what people said it was – a speech act (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde 1995). This approach identifies security as a process: an actor declares an issue to be an existential threat to a referent object, and if recognized as such by a relevant audience, the use of extraordinary measures to tackle the threat is legitimized.

The securitization framework makes it possible to explore how and why actors are attracted to and why they invoke security. I used this approach to study the British government's attempt to frame climate change as a security issue, and by analysing key texts and speeches it was possible to construct a convincing narrative of the government's securitizing move. However, as convincing as this narrative was, I began to wonder whether my hunt for the security speech-act had caused me to weave together unrelated events, practices and purposes (Hughes 2011). I had been so engrossed in identifying the government's securitizing move, I had completely forgotten to ask whether the problematic had anything to do with security at all. Climate change is a complex issue, which is apparent from the degree of political contestation and struggle over its meaning. And whilst analysing

the British government's securitizing move highlighted how actors use the force of security to promote a frame of the problematic that serves their interest, making security the nexus of the research problematic risks distorting the significance of both security and the British government's role in this struggle. I thought I had seen through the security concept when I took up the securitization framework, however, by continuing to privilege security as the central means for understanding and interpreting the government's actions, security continued to exert a force on my thinking.

**Lara:** What Hannah says about how she tried to forcibly interpret the problem of climate change through the lens of 'security' relates, I think, to the broader question of how critical thought is restricted by objects of study and by disciplinary problematics that are presented to us as obvious frameworks for thought. My own research experience has led me to grapple with this issue from a different direction. I didn't start with security but with trying to make sense of resistance and the complex relations between resistance and the making of world order. During a prolonged period of ethnographic engagement with the struggles of peasant farmers and workers in Colombia, I found that I constantly struggled to navigate between the distinct parameters of intelligibility at play in these struggles and those at play in the academic field of politics/IR. For example, it was very hard to talk about these very specific and situated struggles to some academic audiences without their being forcibly read as instances of some sort of global phenomenon deemed to capture the zeitgeist of contemporary political dissent (a global justice movement, a multitude etc.), and whose emancipatory potential had already been decided upon in the framing of this object of study. This persistently seemed to limit the sorts of questions that could be asked, and to render invisible or unintelligible other knowledges, problems, power relations and so on at stake in these struggles. It made it difficult to problematize resistance as something far more variegated and far more entangled with practices of order-building than tends to be recognized in accounts of 'global resistance' (see e.g., Coleman and Tucker 2011; Coleman and Tucker [eds.] 2012; Shaw 2003).

Although the concept of security was never central to the way I set up my problematic, I also became aware of how security as an object of study might exert a force on our thinking. Through my engagement in Colombia, I came to focus upon how the violent elimination of disruptive political subjects, the rendering of resistance as threat, is entangled in complex ways with much more subtle techniques to tame and domesticate dissent through discourses of rights, civil society, corporate responsibility and so on (Coleman 2013). These more subtle techniques aren't as readily visible if you look at the problem of order and resistance through the lens of security – at least if you look at how resistance is rendered dangerous, for example, or if you restrict your focus to techniques deployed within the field of security professionals. Alternatively, I might have limited my focus to look for resistance *to* security practices and at how this was managed and contained (rather than starting with struggles themselves, seeing how these were also – indeed predominantly – positioned in opposition to economic dispossession and a broader

logic of socio-legal abandonment). What I found interesting was that when I started to talk to people who identified more strongly with security studies as an academic field, they often tended to assume that I must be doing one of those things – it seemed difficult to frame a problem without talking about security somewhere. Before methods even enter the picture, ‘security’ seems to exert a curiously strong force upon the definition of problematics. Indeed, to talk about some of the same practices from within a different problem-space can sometimes be surprisingly difficult.

The process of engaging with concrete practices and struggles was, for both Hannah and I, a process that ultimately served to denaturalize the discipline’s ordering categories and ready-made objects of study. In the end, we both found ourselves having to take a step back from these and to begin to reflect upon these categories and objects of study themselves as problems (cf. Foucault 1984b: 388). I think, though, that it can be particularly challenging to reflect upon ‘security’ in this way because of the way that security has come to define an entire field (or series of subfields) of enquiry. ‘Security’ is used *both* to delineate an empirical field of practices (of security professionals, ‘security governance’ or what have you) *and* as a central analytical category for making sense of what goes on within that field. The key category through which the field of study is delineated becomes indispensable to analysing the practices themselves, because of the constitution of an academic field around that category. This circularity of concepts and problematics makes it very easy to reify security and to de-situate the practices that are framed in terms of security. Mark Neocleous brings this out in his *Critique of Security* (2008): although ‘security’ as a category has been central to liberal, capitalist order-building, the segregation of studies of security into an academic field makes this broader context invisible. ‘Security’ forms what Foucault might have called an ‘obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices’ (2008: 3).

**Hannah:** The ‘grid of intelligibility’ captures perfectly the relationship between what Bourdieu identified through the notions of field and *habitus*. That is why focusing on methodology is so important, as the construction of the problematic always delimits what can be discovered. Bourdieu then, didn’t develop thinking tools simply to get closer to the objects he was studying; he turned his scholarly gaze back on himself to identify how his disciplinary schemes of perception shaped his relationship to these objects and impacted the construction of the research problematic.<sup>4</sup> I would argue that this scholarly ethic of reflexivity is the most critical dimension of Bourdieu’s work, it certainly enabled me to step back from and problematize security. Without this practice of stepping back and reflecting on the disciplinary specific means for understanding and interpreting international political practices, we risk projecting field specific concepts and categories of comprehension ‘into the object of study’ (Wacquant 1989: 33). Despite the critical importance of this reflective practice, it seems that the thinking tools of Bourdieu and Foucault are more often taken up and applied than their scholarly ethos. Bourdieu’s tools, for instance, have proven popular with security scholars and have illuminated the field of security practices. However, many of these scholars have

been less willing to confront the limitations of maintaining security as the central object of interest.

Bourdieu's stress on the practical relation to the world enables us to explore the mechanisms through which disciplinary perspectives, or grids of intelligibility, are maintained and reproduced in and through scholarly practice. Bourdieu argued that objects of knowledge are not objectively recorded; they are constructed through practice, 'and the principle of this construction is the system of structured, structuring dispositions, the *habitus*, which is constituted in practice and is always orientated towards practical functions' (Bourdieu 1990a: 52). The *habitus* is the product of the socio-historical conditions in which it developed and in order to study the conditions of possibility that generate *habitus* to analysis, Bourdieu used the notion of field, understood as a particular 'space of social forces and struggles' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 102). The field concept can be used to delineate a particular social realm or academic discipline, such as the realm of government or the discipline of IR. These social spaces can be identified and delimited according to the objects that interest those that occupy that space, the forces these exert on them, and the shared activities that constitute the practices of the field.<sup>5</sup> It is actors' shared investment in the field's interests that constitute – through practice – comprehension in *habitus*, which highlights how schemes of perception for understanding and interpreting the world relate to the scholarly situation.

The notions of field and *habitus*, along with Bourdieu's other thinking tools, have been employed by IR scholars to study various international political spheres.<sup>6</sup> They have proven particularly popular within security studies, where they have illuminated the changing role of NATO (Huysmans 2002; Gheciu 2005; Pouliot 2010; Williams and Neumann 2002; Williams 2007); internal and external security forces (Bigo 2006; Bigo *et al.* 2007); the notion of human security (Stuvoy 2010); and alternative security practices (Abrahamsen and Williams 2012; Leander 2005). Whilst this scholarship has shed considerable light on a range of security-related practices, the majority of these scholars have not encountered how their own situation in a space of social forces and struggles impacts their thought.<sup>7</sup> And yet, if we are to take seriously Bourdieu's stress on our practical relation to the world, it is just as important to illuminate how our situation structures our thoughts and perceptions of so-called security practices and practitioners as it is to study the security practitioners themselves. Being situated within the field of security studies, or IR more broadly, exerts a force on our thinking, and unless we separate out our disciplinary practices and the forms of comprehension these generate from the social spaces we are interested in, we will assume that how these objects are comprehended is comparable between fields. But our interest in the security object is a condition of the disciplinary field. Within security studies, security is imbued with meaning and significance through specific disciplinary practices for understanding and producing knowledge on the subject. As a result, how *we* practice disciplinary knowledge production – through which *our* comprehension of security is formed – is very different from how say, the British government practices government – through which their comprehension of security is formed.

**Lara:** This is also relevant to how Foucault's work has been appropriated as a sort of general schema or framework for making sense of contemporary practices of security, war and violence. Here too, I think we see some of the force that certain ready-made objects of study and pre-given frameworks for thought can exert on our thinking. Foucault's concepts are readily picked up and inserted within quite alien problematics, without really paying attention to a scholarly ethos which – taken seriously – might nudge us in quite a different direction. One thing that Foucault certainly was not trying to do was to offer a general theory of liberal governance or of the mode of functioning of liberal societies, of the sort that can then be simply picked up and applied to analysis of practices in particular pre-defined fields of analysis.<sup>8</sup> Yet this appears to be a predominant approach to the insertion of Foucault into security studies and International Relations. In making this point, my concern is not to point to how Foucault could be more faithfully 'applied', nor is it to dismiss the insights of much of this work. Rather, I want to highlight what I think is a tendency to appropriate Foucault's concepts, extending or critiquing aspects of his analysis but ultimately enclosing them within a pre-defined field of security studies for which these concepts become part of a general conceptual framework for making sense of objects of analysis effectively already defined within the terms of that field. As a result of this conceptual enclosure, the seemingly 'unproblematizable' problematics of the field of security limit the critical potential of this work.

There isn't space here to give a detailed account of how Foucault's ideas tend to get used in this way, but a good example of this tendency would be Mick Dillon and Julian Reid's (2009) account of a 'liberal way of war', in terms of a mode of global governance oriented toward promoting life. This is presented as a sort of updated 'theory' of biopolitics, integrated with complexity theory and adapted for an 'age of emergence'. And Dillon and Reid are not alone in this sort of approach. A case in point here is a Brad Evans's recent review of 'Foucault's legacy' in contemporary studies of security, war and violence (2010). In a not uncommon move, Evans talks of 'Foucault's intervention into the field of security studies' (2010: 428), and talks of a 'biopolitical method' or series of concepts that can be – and have been – usefully 'applied' to that field by 'posing the problem of power biopolitically' (ibid.: 414–415). For Evans, then, the task for 'Foucauldian scholars' becomes to ask 'what happens to security discourses and practices when life itself becomes the principle object for political strategies?' (ibid.: 416).

It seems pretty clear that Foucault himself was more concerned with unpicking the contingent histories of problematics and objects of analysis in various domains of thought and practice than with offering up a general theory of liberal governance oriented toward human life. Indeed, to seize on Foucault's concepts and effectively make these too into fixed objects of analysis, is antithetical to the very spirit of Foucault's work. Let me repeat that I am not trying to suggest that security studies ought to be 'truer to Foucault'. Rather, I want to highlight how such questions only really make sense *as questions* from *within* an academic field whose conceptual boundaries are demarcated to some extent by the very categories and problematics

at play in the practices of military intervention, humanitarianism and so on that these scholars want to elucidate and critique. What is remarkable is how little these sorts of accounts actually problematize these categories and problematics themselves. For example, instead of taking it for granted that ‘species life’ *really is* the principle object of political strategies (which would be to conflate specific rationalities with the actualities of governance), might it not make more sense to interrogate the very convergence of ‘security’ and ‘humanity’ in the discourses of practitioners and policy-makers? This might imply detaching ourselves from the categories and problematics at play in those discourses, situating them within broader problem-space. Here, it might help to take a lesson from Foucault’s own more nominalist orientation. To paraphrase Foucault: if we suspend our belief in ‘security’, then what might we make of the different events and practices that are apparently organized around something that is supposed to be security? (Indeed, the same might be said for our belief in ‘biopolitics’...).

It is actually this difficult process of detaching ourselves from seemingly obvious frameworks and objects of analysis to which I think Foucault’s work is most relevant. Unearthing certainties and presuppositions in this way is a tricky business. It necessitates engagement with very situated practices and yet, at the same time, it requires ‘a distant view’, a degree of separation from those objects that are given to us (Foucault 1994: 448; 1984b: 388). For Foucault, the work of critique was indissociable from a particular sort of philosophical disposition – or ‘limit-attitude’ – one that embodies an ability to stand back from and problematize the present and one’s own conditioning within it (1984a: 45–46, see also *inter alia* Healy 2001; Strausz 2011). This implies elaborating a rather particular relationship, not only to one’s object of study, but also to oneself and to one’s own knowledge practices. For a critical attitude entails ‘a certain relationship to what exists, to what one knows, to what one does, a relationship to society, to culture and also a relationship to others’ (Foucault 1997: 42). It stands in tension with the pull of the academic field that wants us to ‘appeal to a “we”...whose consensus, values, whose traditions constitute the framework for a thought and define the conditions in which it can be validated’ (1984b: 385). Critique, for Foucault, is essentially an act of ‘voluntary insubordination’ or ‘reflected intractability’, whose function is our own ‘desubjugation...in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth’ (*ibid.*: 47). It is worth noting too that this isn’t the same as continuous deconstruction, unravelling frameworks for knowledge for the sake of it, or simply pointing to the ubiquity of power (*cf.* Foucault 1984b: 389). Nor is it a case of reducing critique to reflexivity. Rather, it implies an uncomfortable labour of interrogating the stakes, the arbitrary nature and the possibilities of transformation of whatever is presented to us as common sense and necessary, looking for what is contingent and singular in what appears most obvious and universal and thus testing ‘the limits that we might go beyond’ (Foucault 1984a: 46).

Such an ethos does not immediately translate into a research method. Rather, what is at stake is something like a space or a practice that each of us must cultivate through our own research processes. As we will explore below, fieldwork – and

the process of moving between sites this necessitates – can be an important means for achieving this. This is not to say that cultivating a space in this way does not have an affinity with certain sorts of methods, such as those that are more genealogical or archaeological in ambition (ibid.: 46). However, what we are pointing to here is not just a method: focused, for example, on *how* common-sense phenomena are historically constituted through problematizations across various fields of thought and practice. Rather, despite clear affinities with this sort of method, this analytical orientation is inseparable from a broader concern animating this discussion. What we want to focus upon is our *own* practices of problematization, and with calling into question and displacing the obligatory frameworks of thought through which we approach our objects of study and construct them as researchable problems (see Maniglier 2012: 22).

**Hannah:** Suspending belief in security as part of this practice of problematizing is perhaps vital to gaining this distant view and would also seem essential to any attempt at situating the practices that are called ‘security’ and through which security is rendered meaningful, which raises the question of why this isn’t done more often. How is it that the thinking tools and insights of Foucault and Bourdieu can become central to critical analyses of security when the ethical dimensions of their work clearly point towards the tensions in this appropriating style? Here, again, the force that security exerts on our thinking becomes apparent. Within the field of security studies, or arguably the wider discipline of IR, security is more than a word for identifying particular practices and a framework for problematizing these; it is an object of interest, even a practical demand – a condition of entry and requirement for continued recognition within the field. It is not easy to suspend belief in a concept that constitutes our scholarship. In the following section, we turn our attention to these tensions, suggesting that suspending belief in disciplinary grids of intelligibility requires space-making, and explore the possibility of making space between ourselves, the field we are situated in and the fields we are studying through the practice of fieldwork. We suggest that occupying multiple sites may provide a reference point for reflecting on the differences between social spaces: from the space of the disciplinary field and the practical demands it imposes, to the field of fieldwork, which imposes different demands and a different way of being and interacting, or *habitus*.

### The practice of fieldwork: a way out of the field?

**Lara:** The practice of fieldwork makes for an interesting reference point for thinking about how we might gain a ‘distant view’, how we might find space between ourselves and the worlds that we inhabit. In standard research methods training, participant observation or ethnography tends to be conceived as a ‘way in’ to a space conceived as ‘other’, as a means of ‘getting at’ data pertinent to a particular research problem, and generating a tendency to forcibly interpret what is observed through the mandatory problematics and modes of thought of the participant’s disciplinary origins (Bourdieu 2003). Yet fieldwork might be thought of more as a

'way out': a means of escaping conceptual enclosure, of attenuating the obviousness of disciplinary problematics. We can think of the practice of fieldwork as engagement, in this sense, as coming before method (conceived in the traditional sense): fieldwork itself can be part of the difficult process of problematization and of slowly defining our own problematics.<sup>9</sup>

Reflecting on our own experiences of being immersed in different spaces – both the academic field and the 'field' of fieldwork – both of us found that it was to some extent the practice of fieldwork itself that led us to take a distance from the objects and frameworks of analysis presented to us in each space. Having to continuously move between different parameters of legibility is an uncomfortable process and one that can sometimes force us to interrogate what is given as self-evident. The process of engagement with the practices that I was studying was particularly central in my case, because I was already engaged with these struggles and it was this experience itself that led me to embark upon academic research. From the beginning, my research played out in something like what Paul Routledge calls a 'third space' between activism and academia: rather than being uncritically involved in resistance or studying these processes at a distance, I was doing what Routledge describes as coming and going in a 'borderland zone between different modes of action' (Routledge 1996: 406) and – I should add – between different modes of knowing and ways of thinking. Yet this didn't automatically make the framing of a problem easier. There was never a sense of being able to see things *as they are* because of my proximity to an object of study. Instead, I felt I was always having to ask *what* things are, what concepts best make sense of this? What I think was important here was the *dissonance* between these different modes of thought and action (Coleman 2012). Having to navigate between spaces makes it difficult to stay too close to an object of study for too long.

**Hannah:** Being in the 'field' in this way also presents opportunities to collect forms of data that are easily overlooked as external to the research practice, when in fact fleeting experiences in the field may identify important forces on our thinking and the thinking of those we are studying. For instance, when I first started interviewing, I remember listening to respondents' replies and not knowing what anybody was talking about, but as I didn't want to appear stupid or as if I hadn't done my research, I would give knowing nods and grunts. Then at some point there were few acronyms and names dropped into the conversation that I didn't recognize – I had learnt the language of the organization I was studying and I was pleased to deploy it. I had to watch this eagerness to become fluent in the field's language, as it stopped me from asking certain questions and made me frame things in a manner that aligned with rather than illuminated the organization's way of thinking. This pull of the field is easily ignored or written out, but it is a valuable component of the research process because it indicates how our relationship to the objects we are studying changes over time and under the influence of new forces. Thus, whilst it may be true that navigating between spaces facilitates the process of distancing ourselves from common-sense objects, moving between sites is not all that is required for developing a reflective attitude, as these distances quickly lessen with time spent in the field.

It is difficult to remain at the limits of the field precisely because the field always exerts a force on who we are and what we know through the demands of its practice. Even the act of observing a field exerts an effect on both the observer and the field under observation. I noticed this when I observed a plenary session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an annual or bi-annual meeting of the panel's member governments. As I watched the proceedings and tapped away at my laptop, those around me increasingly noticed and acknowledged my presence. I wouldn't say it unnerved them, because new faces would have been expected. But sitting there, busily typing observations and recording how long each delegate spoke was something others became aware of, they looked over my shoulder as they walked past and held my gaze long enough for me to realize that my presence had been noted. I thereby disrupted the field that I was attempting to observe (although this in itself gave me an insight into the behaviour of the delegates). And we, as researchers, don't just have an effect on the field; the field exerts a force on us even when we are only observing it from the edges, which I also experienced during this meeting. I found myself caring about what people at the conference thought, taking sides and generally being swept into the pace and rhythm of the field. If I were to attend a lot of these meetings it would be easy to become slightly lost or at least disorientated by the field, as I became interested and invested along with everyone else in that space. And this is when we lose the advantage of alienness, of not knowing what things mean and taking meaning for granted.

These are forces that continue to have an effect even when we leave the field, as when I returned from fieldwork I gave consideration to the opinions and attitudes of those I'd interviewed in my writing. In fact, as Lara points out above, it is often during the interpretation of fieldwork that the tensions between our objects of study and the disciplinary field's categories of comprehension become most apparent, as both the field of fieldwork and the academic field through which the data is to be represented compete for space in our work. For instance, I found myself attempting to appeal to parties I'd interviewed *and* key figures in the academic field, which pulled my work in directions that were not necessarily true to the experiences I elucidate above. Cultivating and valuing sensitivity to the forces of field-thinking is critical to the research ethos we explore in this chapter, as it offers a way to draw our work back from common-sense ways of knowing and representing the world, which makes space for different, and dare I say, more critical analyses.

**Lara:** Remaining at the limits, maintaining a distant view toward the sites at which we are engaged can be hard. It is so easy to become too firmly attached to the ways of knowing and acting at play at our sites of engagement. I certainly found this to be a source of tension in my field research, where I was fully engaged at my sites of study – and in a very partisan way. I took sides and was deeply invested in the struggles that I was also studying, and this was sometimes a painful process. I remember at times – like the day an interviewee turned up with her seven-year-old grandson who'd been kidnapped by paramilitaries and had his head held underwater to stop him crying while his mother was 'disappeared', or sitting with a friend while she told me about her two teenage sons being shot by the army and

dressed up as a guerrilla – wondering if I really gave a damn about all this intellectual critique. But if you get too close, you can end up short-sighted. Thought can just as easily be restricted from the opposite direction, by appealing to the ‘subaltern’ knowledges at play in struggles, as if these provided an authentic view. Yet struggles can quickly become bound up within the system they profess to contest – dissent is readily domesticated, and what seems to be self-evidently emancipatory can give way to further forms of violence (Coleman 2013). Finding a ‘distant view’ from which to reflect upon what seems most obvious may be an urgent task that is often neglected in the context of political mobilizations. This is one of the reasons that I am wary of discussions of ‘activist scholarship’ – what Routledge describes as trying to close the gap ‘between the time of solidarity’ and the ‘time of writing’ (1996: 402). The focus on fixing the identity of the engaged intellectual, the activist academic can take us right back to writing for a ‘we’ again – this time operating from within the conceptual frameworks at play in struggles against oppression. I want to underline, though, that being at the limits is not incompatible with being fully engaged or immersed at sites of study. However, to maintain a critical disposition, it might not be such a bad thing to live with the gaps between solidarity and writing, to embrace the discomfort that this engenders, because it makes it difficult to take any one matrix of thought for granted.

It is significant here that I was also always slightly on the limits of these sites simply because of my own positionality: for example, despite living in Colombia, speaking the language and so on, it was still my outsider status (and related racialized privilege) that enabled me to be fully involved in protective accompaniment with Colombians under threat (see Henderson 2009). In Britain, I was immersed in a Latin American solidarity group where particular sorts of (masculine) bodies were endowed with authority. Here, I not only ‘didn’t fit’, in that I had the wrong body to be doing intellectual work, but I was also at odds with dominant styles of thought (Coleman and Bassi 2011). This might have made it less natural for me to be swept fully into the field, and more conscious of the gaps and tensions between the different sites of my fieldwork as well as of the dissonance between the academic world and the world of fieldwork.

However, equally, if not more important, was having to navigate *between* these different worlds. Having to move between and within distinct parameters of intelligibility can force the sort of problematizing move we mentioned above: when our academic parameters of intelligibility are unravelled by encounters in the field and vice versa, then we are pushed to question what it is that we think we know, or what it is that we think we ought to know: to interrogate the frames within which certain problems appear to be obvious problems to pose.

**Hannah:** This inhabiting of multiple sites certainly makes it more difficult to achieve the same degree and sense of fit that is reflected in those around you, and it’s this dissonance, as Lara puts it, which can illuminate the forces of the field. This sense of not quite being what you are meant to be means the field *habitus* isn’t fully internalized – you do not embody the field, and it is the embodiment of the field that enables a forgetting of the field all together. This is the effect of achieving a fit

between one's way of being and doing and the ways that are being reflected back by others occupying the same social space, which is why moving between sites can effectively unveil the illusion. The space between fields and the sense of not fitting force us to call into question our ways of being and knowing and to compare them with others, and becoming aware of these forces and attuned to the impact they have on our thinking and writing may offer a means for limiting their effect, which is why we suggest fieldwork may be an important *method* for developing a more reflexive attitude towards the problematization process.

For those more immersed in the field of IR and/or bound to the field of study and not moving between sites in this way, cultivating this ethos may require more active space-making. The practical demands of the field, in particular the need to produce recognizable knowledge, are not facilitative of this reflexive process. On the contrary, they require us to adopt particular grids of intelligibility that are recognizable to a community of scholars, whose practice it is to measure the fit of our contribution, i.e., that we write for a 'we'. And recognition is not just a practical demand of the field; it also translates into a form of capital that enables us to attain, retain and advance our position vis-à-vis other scholars in the field. These twin imperatives of producing recognizable knowledge and becoming a recognized figure within the field drive us out into the world to discover new territory that can be rendered knowable and brought into the folds of the discipline, and it is for identifying these previously uninhabitable terrains scholars gain recognition, yet isn't it worth asking what this actually achieves? Has anything really been discovered or has it simply been rendered recognizable to disciplinary specific ways of knowing?

I want to challenge what I think I know and, for me, that begins by interrogating *how* I know. It seems precisely at the moment when specific disciplinary rules and methods have become accepted that the space for learning – or critical thought – is at its narrowest. Thus, if we are to break with the ordering practices of disciplinary knowledge production, which sets practical limits to how the world is known, by whom and through what means, we need to turn our attention to research methods, but not necessarily collectively or in a particular institutionalized form. That is why in this piece we have laid the stress on our own situation – the scholar's relation to methods and the problematization process. In fact, I don't know any other *method* for cracking open and scrutinizing commonly accepted ways of knowing and representing the world other than by reflecting on my relation to and part in producing and maintaining these.

**Lara:** I think it is necessary to add here that neither of us would want to claim that this is a straightforward process or a practice that we have somehow managed to 'get right'. Recognition can be very seductive and the feeling of 'fitting' far more comfortable than that of being at the limits. I can definitely confess to having felt the lure of recognition when I started adapting Foucault's idea of a *dispositif* of security to make sense of some of the ways in which dissent was directed within manageable parameters. Although 'security' wasn't a concept central to how I framed my problem, and the way that 'security' featured in my analysis had very little to do with practices of security governance, I noticed that just using the word itself led people

to start to refer to me as doing ‘security studies’. Likewise, the mere fact of drawing on Foucault made me appear recognizable in a certain way and there were times when I started to notice that concepts like ‘biopolitics’ and ‘governmentality’ had got a hold on my thinking in a way that wasn’t far from the way that I’ve critiqued above – as a sort of general framework that it was comfortable to slip into only to have to try and throw it off again later. So our discussion in this chapter is not intended as a set of guidelines of ‘how to do it’ from those ‘in the know’. Rather, it is a self-critical account of how we have both grappled with the force of disciplinary problematics and tried – not always successfully – to create some distance between ourselves, our objects of study and the worlds we inhabit. Neither of us can fully claim to be ‘doing it’ because the very work of creating space in this way is by nature a work-in-progress, one that implies a persistent problematization of ourselves and our own knowledge production. Indeed, to offer up universally applicable guidelines of how to adopt a critical ethos would be to defeat the very idea of such an ethos.

## Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter has centred around the place and force of disciplinary problematics and problematizing within our methodological practice. The first half of the chapter identifies the force that ‘security’ exerts on the disciplinary *habitus*, not only in the construction of the research problematic, but also in how the thinking tools and theoretical approaches of thinkers like Bourdieu and Foucault are taken up and applied within and by the disciplinary field. The chapter argues that rather than enabling an interrogation of the common-sense view, this application of so-called ‘critical’ tools effectively strengthens disciplinary grids of intelligibility. For this reason, in the second half of the chapter, we discussed how, rather than incorporating the mechanics of such thinkers we can begin to infuse our methodological approach with the spirit and scholarly ethos that Bourdieu and Foucault embodied. Here we suggested that fieldwork, or engagement in multiple fields may create a reference point from which to illuminate the forces our situation exerts. Looking from our situation within various fields makes it possible to identify some of the difficulties of cultivating space between ourselves and the categories of thought demanded by our situation in the field – as all fields exert a constant force on our thinking even when only being observed at the limits. Despite this, Lara’s work illustrates how a sense of not fitting can work to our advantage, enabling us to call into question the common sense that a fit between field and *habitus* lead us to forget. And when this space can’t be created by moving between sites, as Hannah indicates, it may be necessary to actively space-make by becoming aware of how the practical demands of recognition tempt our practices of knowledge production. It is this active constituent of space-making that indicates the difficulties of developing a critical scholarly attitude, the main objective of which may not be to produce work for a critical field, but to incorporate into our methodological approach a sensitivity to the fact that we, as scholars, are as much subject and product of this world as the objects and subjects we study.

## Notes

- 1 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at workshops of the International Collaboratory on Critical Methods at the Open University in February 2011, at the University of Edinburgh in September 2011 and May 2012, and at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in San Diego in April 2012. We are grateful to Kyle Grayson, Peer Schouten and Nadine Voelkner for helpful and challenging comments as discussants at these events. This chapter was also stimulated by regular Skype conversations during 2010 and early 2011 with the Situated Knowledge Cluster of the ICCM: Christian Bueger, Xavier Guillaume, Jef Huysmans and Manuel Mireanu. We would also like to thank Jef and Nadine, alongside Claudia Aradau and Andrew Neal, for invaluable critical input into this chapter as convenors of the ICCM. Finally, we are grateful to the members of the Collaboratory as a whole for feedback on these ideas at the ICCM's various meetings.
- 2 This was back in 2005 when the link between climate change and security was less well established than it is today.
- 3 There is now extensive literature on the notion of environmental security and the climate change and security linkage. For an introduction to the concept and its evolution, see Barnett (2001); Dalby (2009); Deudney and Matthews (1999).
- 4 Bourdieu wrote extensively on reflexivity and the relationship between the scholar and object of study. See for example, Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1991); Bourdieu (1990a and b); Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992); Bourdieu (1993, 2004). He also practiced this reflexivity in many areas of his own life by undertaking research in his native region of Bearn, the field of academia and numerous self-socioanalyses (Bourdieu 1962, 1988, 2003, 2004, 2007).
- 5 Although, the limits of the field may not adhere to the boundaries of the discipline. For more on the field concept, see Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992).
- 6 For some of the most recent work see special issue of *International Political Sociology* (2011) 5:3, pp. 219–347.
- 7 For exceptions, see Bueger and Villumsen (2007); Eagleton-Pierce (2009); Leander (2002, 2008, 2011); Madsen (2011).
- 8 For a discussion of the distinctions between Foucault's ethos of inquiry and a sociology of rule see, for example, Rose (1999: 3–4, 19–20).
- 9 This perspective resonates with more recent work in anthropology which has tended to part company from conventional understandings of the 'field' (of fieldwork) as ready-delimited terrain (be it a bounded community, a clearly-delineated order within a certain sort of institution or, to give an example relevant to security studies, the pre-defined field of practices of certain sorts of professionals whose parameters overlap with the conceptual parameters of an academic discipline). Instead, the field is approached as an ongoing work of conceptual construction *created* in the process of fieldwork (e.g., Marcus 1995). Moreover, as subsequent contributions in anthropology have noted, the myth of the 'field' as 'a site of relationships and experiences set apart from the researcher's personal *habitus*' may not reflect the realities of fieldwork practice, which may be more messily entangled with the researcher's everyday life (Unnithan-Kumar and de Neve 2006: 5–6; see also Bourdieu 2003).

## References

- Abrahamsen, R., and M.C. Williams. 2012. *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bigo, D. (2006). 'Global (in)Security: The Field of the Professionals of Unease Management and the Ban-Opticon'. In Jon Solomon and Naoki Sakai (eds) *Traces: A Multilingual Series of Cultural Theory*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University. pp. 109–157.

- Bigo, D., P. Bondotti, L. Bonelli, and C. Olsson. (2007). 'Mapping the Field of EU Internal Security Agencies'. Paper produced for the Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security (CHALLENGE) Project of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).
- Bourdieu, P. (1988). *Homo Academicus*, Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell.
- (1990a). *The Logic of Practice*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (1990b). *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (1998). *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (2003). 'Participant Objectivation', *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 9(2): 281–294.
- (2004). *Science of Science and Reflexivity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (2007). *Sketch for a Self-Analysis*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P., and L.J.D. Wacquant. (1992). *Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bueger, C., and T. Villumsen. (2007). 'Beyond the Gap: Relevance, Fields of Practice and the Securitizing Consequences of (Democratic Peace) Research', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 10: 417–448.
- Buzan, B. (1983). *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
- Buzan, B., O. Waever, and J. de Wilde. (1998). *Securitization: A Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Coleman, L.M.. (2012). 'Critique and Commitment: Departing from Activist Scholarship'. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, April.
- (2013). 'The Making of Docile Dissent: Neoliberalization and Resistance in Colombia and Beyond', *International Political Sociology*, 7(2): 170–187.
- Coleman, L.M., and S. Bassi. (2011). 'Deconstructing Militant Manhood: Masculinities in the Disciplining of (anti-)globalisation Politics', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13(2): 204–224.
- Coleman, L.M., and K. Tucker. (2011). 'Between Discipline and Dissent: Situated Resistance and Global Order', *Globalizations*, 8(4): 397–410.
- (eds.) (2012). *Situating Global Resistance: Between Discipline and Dissent*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Deudney, D., and R. Matthews. (1999). *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics*, New York: State University New York Press.
- Dillon, M., and J. Reid. (2009). *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Duffield, M. (2007). *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*, Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.
- Eagleton-Pierce, M. (2009). 'Examining the Case for Reflexivity in International Relations: Insights from Bourdieu', *Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies*: 111–123.
- Evans, B. (2010). 'Foucault's Legacy: Security, War and Violence in the 21st Century', *Security Dialogue*, 41(4): 413–433.
- Foucault, M. (1984a). 'What is Enlightenment?'. In Paul Rabinow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader*, London: Penguin. pp. 32–50.
- (1984b). 'Polemics, Politics and Problematisations', in Paul Rabinow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader*, London: Penguin. pp. 381–390.
- (1994). 'For an Ethic of Discomfort'. In James D. Faubion (ed.) *Michel Foucault Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, London: Penguin. pp. 443–448.

- (1997). 'What is Critique?'. In Sylvère Lotringer (ed.) *Michel Foucault, The Politics of Truth*, trans. Lysa Hochroth, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). pp. 41–81.
- (2008 [1979]). *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979*, trans. Graham Burchell, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gheciu, A. (2005). 'Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? Nato and the "New Europe"'. *International Organization*: 973–1012.
- Guzzini, S. (2000). 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations'. *European Journal of International Relations*: 147–12.
- Hale, C.R. (2011). 'Resistencia para que? Territory, Autonomy and Neoliberal Entanglements in the "empty spaces" of Central America, *Economy and Society*, 40(2): 184–210.
- Healy, P. (2001). 'A "limit-attitude": Foucault, Autonomy, Critique', *History of the Human Sciences*, 14(1): 49–68.
- Henderson, V.L. (2009). 'Citizenship in the Line of Fire: Protective Accompaniment, Proxy Citizenship and Pathways for Transnational Solidarity in Guatemala', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 99(5): 969–976.
- Hughes, H.R. (2011). 'Enlisting Bourdieu to Situate Security: The Case of Climate Change and the British Government'. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, Montreal, March.
- Huysmans, J. (2002). 'Shape-Shifting Nato: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis', *Review of International Studies*: 599–618.
- International Political Sociology (2011). 'Special Issue Bourdieu and the International', *International Political Sociology*, 5(3): 219–347.
- Krause, K., and M.C. Williams. (1997). *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Leander, A. (2002). 'Do We Really Need Reflexivity in IPE? Bourdieu's Two Reasons for Answering Affirmatively', *Review of International Political Economy*, 9(4): 601–609.
- (2005). 'The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies'. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*: 803–825.
- (2008). 'Thinking Tools'. In Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (eds.) *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- (2011). 'The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of International Relations'. *International Political Sociology*, 5(3): 294–313.
- Madsen, M.R. (2011). 'Reflexivity and the Construction of the International Object: The Case of Human Rights'. *International Political Sociology*, 5(3): 259–275.
- Maniglier, P. (2012). 'What is a Problematic', *Radical Philosophy* 173: 21–22.
- Marcus, G.E. (1995). 'Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-sited Ethnography', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24: 95–117.
- Neocleous, M. (2008). *Critique of Security*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Pouliot, V. 2010. *International Security in Practice: The Politics of Nato-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Rose, N. (1999). *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Routledge, P. (1996). 'The Third Space as Critical Engagement', *Antipode*, 28(4): 399–419.
- Shaw, K. (2003). 'Whose Knowledge for What Politics', *Review of International Studies*, 29(1): 199–221.
- Strausz, E. (2011). 'Foucault's Critique: A Topology of Thought', *Law Critique*, 22: 119–133.
- Stuvoey, K. 2010. "Human Security Research Practices: Conceptualizing Security for Women's Crisis Centres in Russia" in *Security Dialogue* 41: 279–99.
- Ullman, R.H. (1983). 'Redefining Security'. *International Security*: 129–153.

- Unnithan-Kumar, M., and G. de Neve. (2006). 'Introduction: Producing Fields, Selves and Anthropology'. In Geert de Neve and Maya Unnithan-Kumar (eds.), *Critical Journeys: The Making of Anthropologists*, Ashgate: Aldershot and Burlington. pp. 1–16.
- Wacquant, L. (1989) Towards a reflexive sociology: a workshop with Pierre Bourdieu. *Sociological Theory*, 7(1): 26–63.
- Wæver, O. (1995). 'Securitization and Desecuritization'. In Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*.
- Williams, M.C. (2007) *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security*. London: Routledge.
- Williams, M.C., and I.B. Neumann. 2002. "From Alliance to Security Community: Nato, Russia, and the Power of Identity", in *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 29: 357–387.

# 7

## GENEALOGY

*Philippe Bonditti, Andrew Neal, Sven Opitz  
and Chris Zebrowski*

### Introduction

In this chapter we discuss the value of genealogy as a critical method to study security. A genealogical method would treat security not simply as an object of research, but as something embedded in historical struggles over truth, knowledge, authority, expertise and power. This is more complicated than it seems. The aim is to avoid assuming that we know what security is. This is especially important today. We are witnessing the proliferation of knowledges, practices and technologies that are somehow associated with security but that also destabilize the analytical categories through which we had come to make sense of ‘security’, such as the internal and the external, war and peace, the national and the international, law enforcement and the military.

One of the most important lessons from Foucault’s genealogical work is the fallacy that supposedly knowledgeable subjects (in this case, us) exist fully formed prior to encountering their object of analysis (in this case security), which they then reflect upon rationally. A genealogical approach would consider how the discourse of security (as a knowledge, discipline, practice) operates as a historical formation, constituting both its subjects (its analysts) and object (security ‘itself’). We can demonstrate this genealogical observation fairly easily by pointing out that security analysts are largely shaped and thus constituted by their adherence to disciplinary knowledges and assumptions, and by their claim to know what security is. In other words, the study of security always risks naturalizing security as an object of study and naturalizing the expert subjects who claim such knowledge (see also [Chapter 6](#) in this volume).

A genealogical method would be more sceptical about its claim to know security, and would be reflexive towards the constitutive effects of security as a discourse. For this purpose, it is important to note that the concept of discourse is

not reducible to language or linguistic entities such as signs or signifiers (Foucault 1972: 27, 100–109). It also comprises material practices, technological objects and bodily procedures. Central to a genealogical analysis of security is an engagement with the multiple knowledges and practices that have come to be associated with ‘security’ and the mechanisms of subjectivation and objectivation that constitute knowledgeable subjects and knowable objects in relation to security. This collection of things, we suggest, is best understood not through the unitary term ‘security’, but rather as a radically heterogeneous assemblage known as a *dispositif* in Foucauldian parlance (Foucault 1980: 194).

In this chapter, we discuss what it means to adopt a genealogical method for studying ‘security’ and aspects of it. Conceptually, we distinguish genealogy from ‘mere history’ and elaborate it in relation to concepts such as archaeology, *dispositif*, and problematization. In addition, we discuss what it means to use these traditional Foucauldian notions in a digital age: how does genealogical work change when the principles of archival organization seem to be shifting radically? We relate our methodological intervention to existing works in security studies, which we critique from a genealogical perspective. We begin with a discussion of the discipline of international relations (IR) for two reasons: first, because security studies has a constitutive heritage in IR; and second, because of the powerful insights of earlier genealogical critiques of IR itself. In the boxes that complement the argument in the running text, we illustrate our methodological claims through reflections on our separate research on the police practice of ‘kettling’.

## Genealogy and international relations

Within the discipline of international relations (IR), genealogies were first deployed to contest the universal presumptions of the epistemic realism that dominated international relations theories (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Ashley and Walker 1990; Der Derian 1995). Genealogies drew attention to the historical practices through which the State, sovereignty and ‘the international’ were constituted (Bartelson 1995), including diplomacy (Der Derian 1987; Constantinou 1996), foreign policy (Campbell 1998) and security (Der Derian 1993; Dillon 1996). Elsewhere in the social sciences, scholars produced genealogies of liberalism (Latham 1997; Dean 1991; Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996), freedom (Rose 1999) and communication (Mattelart 1996). While Foucault was the biggest influence on this research, productive uses of Nietzsche (Bartelson 1995; Elbe 2001, 2002) and Deleuze (Molloy 2006) suggest that more varied approaches may yet be articulated.

This literature formed part of the ‘critical turn’ in IR and opened up the study of international relations to new ways of working and thinking. Partly, this entailed a genealogy of the discipline itself (Ashley 1987; Walker 1993). The literature did not simply ask how IR was created historically (accounts of which already existed). Rather, it questioned how IR was a product of its time and how theories of IR and their assumptions were *expressions* of a particular historically situated spatial and political imaginary, and not simply ‘explanations’ of world politics (Walker 1993).

In genealogical terms, the critical turn posited the historical contingency of IR itself. Some traditional accounts of IR had been deliberately ahistorical, such as neorealism, but from a genealogical perspective these still had a history and were not 'timeless'. Other accounts, such as that of the English School, offered a version of IR's historical development, but from a genealogical perspective these were a parochial reflection of their authors' contingent historical position. For example, Hedley Bull thought that the evolution of the historical origins of the European state system should be the starting point for the study of international relations, neglecting the role of colonialism in the expansion of global European dominance (Keene 2002). Similarly, liberal forms of IR relied on uncritical and often unacknowledged progressive philosophies of history, which the genealogical perspective put back in their historical place. In short, genealogical approaches to IR questioned the timelessness of ahistorical accounts and the contingent parochialism of historical accounts.

IR had always claimed privileged knowledge of *security*, being primarily *state security*. However, IR came with a lot of baggage. Critical IR scholars drew on French theorists (Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Virilio and so on) to re-read IR's founding texts in political theory (e.g., Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant) in order to critique its basis of knowledge (epistemology) and its units and structures of analysis (ontology) (Ashley 1995; Connolly 1988; Walker 1993). They argued against the possibility of axiological neutrality, and for interpretivism and reflexivity. They stressed the role of ideas, language, discourses and technology in international politics. Urging epistemological and ontological pluralism, they favoured multiplicity, difference and heterogeneity over unity, identity and homogeneity. This marked a rupture with behaviourism, rational choice/game theory and quantitative methods. To achieve this, critical IR scholars imported intellectual resources from elsewhere, such as poststructuralist philosophy, but also feminism (Shepherd 2008) and postcolonial studies (Anghie 2007; Hobson 2004; Jabri 2012). Feminist scholars pointed out gendered configurations of the political and onto-epistemological assumptions of IR, (Enloe 1990; Sylvester 1994; Tickner 1988). Postcolonial scholars challenged unitary western accounts of the international order (Chatterjee, Bhabha, Doty). In so doing, they have been a rich source of counter-narratives in and against IR. All this was a way of demonstrating the contingent and contested nature of IR.

These critical interventions opened a disciplinary space for a new generation of scholars. They did not close down IR, rather through their genealogical critique they opened it up for more diverse forms of theoretical and empirical scholarship that were not bound by the strictures of orthodoxy. If any one thing unites the work that has followed the critical turn, it is a reflexive scepticism towards the disciplinary effects of IR itself. However, being itself historically contingent, the critical turn responded to the disciplinary problems of its time, and downplayed questions of method. Now that there is an established space for critical research, issues of method have become more pressing because critical security scholars are increasingly conducting empirical work rather than purely

theoretical critique. To understand how research in IR could proceed from a genealogical critique of IR we need to revisit genealogy, its meaning, its literature, and its implications. Once we have done this, we can consider what genealogy means for the contemporary study of security.

## Revisiting genealogy

### *Genealogy vs. (mere) history*

An important starting point for genealogy is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), who criticized modern historical methodology in his *Untimely Meditations* (Nietzsche 1997). In the essay ‘The Uses and Abuses of History’, Nietzsche diagnosed a ‘historical malady’ afflicting late nineteenth-century Europe. He attributed this malady to the efforts of modern history to model itself on science (Nietzsche 1997: 77). By adopting scientific values such as neutrality and indifference, modern history had become obsessed with establishing objective representations of past events and epochs. This required the historian to evaluate history from a vantage point somehow outside time. Objectivity, Nietzsche argued, presented an impossible ‘ideal’ that only served to hide the prejudices and presumptions of the historian. Claims to neutrality only served to naturalize the values and presumptions of the present, stifling the potential for criticism, creativity and change.

Nietzsche’s critique is rooted in the temporal character of human beings. History is not simply something ‘passed’. It is entangled with contemporary forms of life insofar as memory informs decisions in the present. History serves life. While history was important, a preoccupation that documented history for its own sake was not simply a bizarre prioritization, but a development that stifled innovation and depleted the vitality of life and culture in the present. An ‘excessive concern’ with the past was eroding the capacity of individuals and nations to live life creatively in the present. Nietzsche fashioned genealogy as the antidote to this European historical malady. Genealogy asserted that ‘history must itself resolve the problem of history, knowledge must turn its sting against itself’ (Nietzsche 1997: 102–103). Genealogy turns to history not to construct representations, but to disrupt and undermine them. The temporal orientation of genealogy is thus described by Nietzsche as *untimely*: ‘acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come’ (Nietzsche 1997: 60).

Genealogy first appears in Nietzsche’s *The Genealogy of Morals* (Nietzsche 1887). This sought to make evident the social and historical conditions that gave rise to the modern system of Western morality. Moral values are neither timeless nor universal. Rather, they have a history: they have *evolved* through time. As such, moral values cannot be located in some transcendent realm. They are produced through social interactions over time. More specifically, morals are forged through the unfolding of historical contests that play out within contexts defined by particular distributions of power. Of course, this conclusion was far from a simple statement of fact. If moral values evolved over time, then they were capable of

transformation in the future. At this point, the critical impact of the genealogical enterprise comes to light: its purpose is to undermine naturalized assumptions, reveal the contingent power relations behind them, and thus make new forms of freedom, change and creativity possible. In Nietzsche, genealogy acts as the blunt instrument through which conditions are fostered for the cultivation of 'higher values' and new forms of life (i.e., the 'Übermensch' or 'overman').

Morals are as historically contingent as any species of plant or animal.<sup>1</sup> 'Contingent' here does not mean random. Species are contingent because there is no inherent meaning guiding their evolution. Instead, their development is dependent upon contests and struggles marked by differential power relations between those who are more or less 'fit'. In the same way, neither humans nor their morals represent a prescribed outcome of the 'progress' of history. For the genealogist, history is not marked by the march of reason. This makes a radical break with forms of 'historicist' philosophy that tie together the unfolding of history and the unfolding of thought. Following Paul Veyne, we might think of history like the movements of a kaleidoscope (Veyne 1997: 167). Instead of linear progress or transcendental laws, the 'motor' of history is rooted in immanent forms of struggle, power and adaptation that result in contingent developments. Like Nietzsche, Foucault rejected the humanism central to most forms of Western reason: 'What is that fear which makes you seek beyond all boundaries, ruptures, shifts and divisions, the great historico-transcendental destiny of the Occident?' (Foucault 1972: 209).

In dismissing the existence of laws governing the march of history, the genealogist works on a historical field composed of battles too numerous to fully account. This complexity undermines the causality assumed in a universal conception of time, in which a linear path can be established between 'what happened' and 'what is happening'. In genealogy, innumerable quotidian struggles are as important as grand battles. Against the *method* of universal and teleological history, genealogy considers the historical field as too complex to fully represent. As such, genealogy does not aspire to representation but to a problematization of historical representation. Genealogy emphasizes relations of power and their constitutive role in the formation of discourses. Its aim is a 'history of the present' that analyses the lines of descent of contemporary perceived problems. It reveals the contingency of contemporary ideas, practices and values – otherwise taken as 'obvious' or 'natural' – by drawing attention to their gradual emergence. In so doing it does not 'search for origins' but considers that processes of historical emergence are multiple, and that the event of emergence is a distributed one. Genealogy should not be the writing of histories that validate and explain a present understanding or state of affairs as logical and natural, but rather a critical intervention that unsettles such histories. As we discuss below in the section entitled 'Genealogy and the study of security (studies)', there is a difference between a history of security studies that validates the present state of the discipline and a genealogy that exposes the power relations and stakes involved in constituting 'security' as an object of knowledge to be studied by authoritative, knowledgeable subjects. History is contingent because

it unfolds through interpretative rivalries, circumstance, and to an extent, chance. Genealogy, on the other hand, ‘records the history of interpretations’ and emphasizes how discursive rules are appropriated and used (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 108). In this sense, genealogy is not proper history but a contest over history and an examination of contests over history. Genealogy has to ‘identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us’ (Foucault 1984b: 81). It must become ‘able to recognize the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats’ (Foucault 1984b: 80). Genealogists work at systematically documenting the historical emergence and descent of those things that, ‘we tend to feel (Barad) without history’ (Foucault 1984b: 76). ‘It will seek out discontinuities where others found continuous development...find recurrences and play where others found progress and seriousness’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 106). After Nietzsche’s ‘wirkliche Historie’, Foucault also called this genealogical practice an ‘effective history’ (Foucault 1984b: 87–88; Dean 1994). By ‘introducing discontinuities into our very being’ (Foucault 1984b: 88), this ‘effective history’ calls into question the received narratives and associated lessons learned from history to reveal the contingency of the present. It shows that things did not have to be this way and that they could be otherwise. Genealogy aims to open up the field of action in the present. It critically destabilizes the given order and questions its conditions of acceptability. For example, in undermining the naturalized claim that IR was the ‘scientific’ study of the state system, feminist IR scholars exposed the gendered assumptions of international thought, delegitimizing its claims to authoritative knowledge and helping to put gender issues on the international agenda, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (see Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011 for a critical reading).

### ***Archaeology vs genealogy?***

Genealogy depends on other concepts that Foucault developed. Its relationship with these other concepts is important for understanding its significance and operation as a method. In subsequent sections we will discuss concepts such as problematization and *dispositif*, but first we need explore the relationship between genealogy and archaeology. Archaeology is the most discursive aspect of Foucault’s methodological work. It is a study of knowledge using a particular mode of discourse analysis that Foucault articulated most explicitly in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969). It is the study of how knowledge has developed over time. Like genealogy, it posits the historical contingency of truths and the entanglements of power and knowledge. However, it does so by making explicit the epistemic regimes of intelligibility and the immanent rules of discursive formation that govern specific fields of knowledge. Archaeology has influenced the development of discourse analysis in IR and the social sciences generally (e.g., Hansen 2006; Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis 2000; Shapiro 1990; Wodak 2009). Archaeology

and genealogy do not represent opposing methodologies, stages or periods in Foucault's work, but differences of emphasis. However, the distinction between them is important. The reasons why Foucault moved away from archaeology demonstrate what is at stake in the genealogical method.

Faced with widespread criticism that accompanied the publication of *The Order of Things* in 1966 and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* in 1969, Foucault realized that he could not justify a detached archaeological position from which to analyse the rules of discourse (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 103). Rather, the analyst is always already enmeshed in historical power relations and thus can only operate from within them. Genealogy can be understood as a response to this challenge posed to the archaeological method. It embraces this immanence by making power relations central to its method. This is significant because while we must appreciate how genealogy is related to forms of discourse analysis, it can never be a detached 'social scientific' method as some of those analyses have become. Genealogy is always immanent to struggles and self-consciously political.

Against those who, like Dreyfus and Rabinow, overplay the difference between archaeology and genealogy we consider that there *is* a difference between the two methods, but not a strict separation. The aims of genealogy were already at play in Foucault's early (archaeological) propositions (Potte-Bonneville 2004). This can be seen in *The Birth of the Clinic*, published in 1963: the book traces the historical formation of a particular form of medical vision linked to a bodily redistribution of symptoms of illness and the emergence of the institutional space of the clinic (Foucault 1994). Similarly, archaeology continues into genealogy, as Foucault himself suggested at the beginning of *Society Must be Defended* (Foucault 2003). Therefore, a methodological account of genealogy requires a solid understanding of archaeology.

Foucault's archaeological method ventured that knowledge was governed by 'historical a prioris'. These historical a prioris comprise systems of rules which Foucault termed the 'archive'. For Foucault, the archive has a more specific meaning than a collection of historical documents. The archive is not simply data. For Foucault, '[t]he archive is the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements (énoncés) as unique events' (Foucault 1972). In other words, the archive governs discourse. It determines how statements (énoncés) make sense, which have authority, and which come to be authorized as 'true' within a given historical setting. To draw an analogy, we might say that the archive governs discourse as grammar governs a sentence. When we speak, we do not consciously recognize that our speech is governed by a system of rules called 'grammar'. Yet, we may speak very well and still nonetheless find it difficult to describe these rules and how they work. However, the fact that these rules are in no way 'natural' becomes evident when one studies a foreign language or if one reads Shakespeare. Grammatical rules shift over time and across language systems. They are contingent. Likewise the 'rules' which comprise the archive shift over time. As such, they form historical a prioris. These systems of rules are neither obvious nor easy to articulate.

Studying these historical rules is different from studying the meaning of particular concepts (as in semantics or Reinhardt Koselleck's *Begriffsgeschichte*), the internal rules of language (as in linguistics) or systems of signs (as in semiotics). For example, an archaeological understanding of Darwin is not a critique of his arguments (Foucault 2002a: 143). Neither is it a study of the 'grammar' of his scientific propositions, nor the logical structure of his arguments. Neither is it an analysis of some kind of teleological process of scientific progress in a linear succession of ideas traced between subsequent authors (Foucault 2002a: 144). Rather, it is a historical analysis of the complex discursive space that links different authors, and not necessarily with their awareness:

so many authors who know or do not know one another, criticise one another, invalidate one another, pillage one another, meet without knowing it and obstinately intersect their unique discourse in a web of which they are not the masters, of which they cannot see the whole, and of whose breadth they have a very inadequate idea.

(Foucault 2002a: 143)

Archaeology is a method which tries to make this 'system of rules', the archive, explicit. It aims to show how the rules which govern what can and cannot be said at any historical moment have changed over time. As a system that is historically specific and never universal, the archive provides a way of understanding the emergence of regimes of knowledge in specific contexts. The historical emphasis means understanding the conditions of possibility under which regimes of knowledge appeared, and not simply their content or logic. These 'rules' are diverse and local and cannot be reduced to a single set, system or structure. They only multiply the more one looks: 'Far from being that which unifies everything that has been said in the great confused murmur of a discourse...[the archive] is that which differentiates discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their own duration' (Foucault 1972: 129).

Let us now translate this into method. Never assuming an essential truth or origin to a concept such as madness (Foucault 1988b) or sovereignty (Foucault 2003, 2007), Foucault approached his object of study *epiphenomenally*. Rather than taking their existence as a given, he tried to make sense of them as problems whose evolution can be traced through the mass of historical documents and statements that appear *around* them. Although we may never uncover the 'truth' of madness or security through historical enquiry, we may come to see how their 'truth' came to be understood historically, at different times and in different places. Archaeology works to unearth historically contingent truths through their archival traces.

From this archaeological work, genealogy is employed as a tactic to bring historical research into play against existing 'regimes of truth'. It shows how power relations influence the development of the archive, and the role of knowledge in orienting, conditioning and legitimating the exercise of power. Genealogy depends on the work done by archaeology, but does not stop with a detached analysis of the

historical emergence of discursive formations. It goes further by questioning the role of power in constituting not only discursive formations, but also subject positions (e.g., the 'scientist', the 'economist'), authorities (e.g., scientific and economic institutions), modes of being (e.g., new types of corporeal shaping of soldiers or workers), social changes (e.g., reorganizations of urban architecture and governmental technologies) and political struggles (e.g., the protagonists, winners and losers), such as the 'Third Estate' winning over the French aristocracy as Foucault describes in his lectures series 'Society Must be Defended' (Foucault 2002b; Neal 2004). With its emphasis on power, genealogy is more explicitly political than archaeology.

Together, archaeology and genealogy 'write against truth' (Dean 2003). By investigating the 'regimes of truth' that are in play in a particular episode, the method is to unveil the way 'truths' are naturalized and imposed. The method is to question the complex mechanisms by which a 'particular truth' becomes '*the* truth'. This is reflected in Foucault's interest in problems rather than solutions. The aim of making a history of 'problems' is to understand how a given object (e.g., madness or security) is constituted as a problematic object under particular circumstances. This is why genealogy can be understood as an 'art of problematizations', as we will explore in the next section.

With all this in mind, the lesson is that genealogical method depends on the patient historical work of archaeology, but it can never be a neutral historical analysis. Its historical accuracy remains open to challenge, but accuracy is not the main purpose of genealogy (Biebricher 2008: 370). Its aim is not to make its own claim to power-free historical truth, but to expose the role of power struggles in constituting that truth. Genealogy is the immanent, historical and critical exploration of power relations and their constitutive effects. It exposes the historical contingency, struggles, victors and vanquished inherent in regimes of truth, thus challenging received historical wisdom. In this sense, the method of genealogy is not to write 'history' but rather to intervene in history from within history.

## THE EMERGENCE OF KETTLING

'Kettling' is an unofficial label for a controversial police tactic that has been deployed with increased frequency as a means of preventing the disorder and violence that have accompanied some public demonstrations. The aim of kettling is to encircle protesters and contain them in a tight cordon (the 'kettle') from which they are prevented from leaving for several hours. It received considerable media attention in the UK when it was used to police student protests in London in the winter of 2010–11.

Kettling appeared to us to be a good topic for genealogical analysis for two reasons. First, it appealed to our interest in technologies of power because it

represented a governmental technology of police. Second, it was clear that kettling had a history in specific struggles. It was a site of political contestation: over its legal status, human rights concerns, its 'proportionate' deployment, and even over the meaning and origin of the term itself. We could trace the emergence of this technique in relation to the challenges to policing posed by new forms of protest that were more mobile and disruptive, and more recently enabled by new communication technologies. This problem was evident in, for example, the 1990 UK Poll Tax riots and the 2001 WTO protests in Seattle. We could also see that the controversy over kettling itself had a history, emerging in response to the use of kettling in the 2001 May Day demonstrations in London.

Most significantly, what drew our attention to kettling was a recognition of its historical singularity (kettling as an 'event'). In fact, the term 'kettling' itself is highly contested, reflecting the contemporary problematization of this technique. As our research showed, the relatively recent uptake of this term was politically constituted in the struggle over the legitimacy of the police practice. For example, under parliamentary questioning, the British police disavowed the term 'kettling' in favour of 'containment'. As a practice, however termed, kettling caught our attention insofar as it deviated from the strategic logic historically deployed in the management of crowds, but was also a novel transformation of existing police tactics. In contrast to traditional police practices of crowd *dispersal* (such as the use of water cannons, baton charges, cavalry charges, tear gas or the police formation of the 'flying wedge'), kettling operated through a logic of *containment*. And although the police have used various forms of containment as a tactic for many years, keeping a crowd contained for many hours rather than for short-term tactical reasons seemed to be something different. Kettling was not simply a historically divergent practice – one that emerged at a specific point in time to address a particular problem – but suggested a new logic of policing crowds.

Our genealogical research sought to trace the conditions under which the historical emergence of kettling was made possible. It was not simply a history of kettling, even if some empirical historical work was necessary to understand the historical and political significance of the practice beyond the immediate controversy. Rather, it was an analysis of the power struggles and interpretive rivalries through which 'kettling' emerged as a problematization. Our questions were: what is the governmental rationality supporting the tactic of kettling? How does it differ from previous governmental rationalities? How and when did this practice emerge? What is its descent? What is the problematic it seeks to address? How does this relate to the way in which security, public order and the crowd are understood? On what conditions is kettling itself being problematized?

## The elements of a genealogy

### *Problematization*

Our example of kettling shows how genealogy does not focus on discrete research objects but rather on the power relations and struggles surrounding them. Again, the premise is that there is no neutral analytical standpoint from which to conduct analysis, and that the researcher and research object are always already enmeshed in historical power relations and interpretive rivalries. This section explores the concept of ‘problematization’ in order to clarify the relationship between genealogy and its sites of intervention.

Foucault developed the concept of problematization relatively late in his work. The term appears in the introduction to the second volume of his history of sexuality (Foucault 1985b: 11), but also in some of his interviews (Foucault 1983, 1984a, 1997) and lecture courses (Foucault 1985a) from the early 1980s. Despite this late and somehow peripheral appearance, ‘problematization’ is important for at least two reasons. First, Foucault uses it to clarify the methodological premises of his work on the ‘politics of truth’ (Foucault and Lotringer 2007; Gros 2002). Simply put, the concept provides an answer to questions of what is being analysed and how the objects of analysis are being looked at. Second, the term has implications for the critical capacities of the genealogical enterprise. It indicates that no scholar stands isolated from their object of study, but is involved in ongoing processes of re-problematization.

Problematizations are historical incidents that animate genealogical analysis. According to Foucault (1985a: 65), one has to inquire ‘how...certain things... became a problem’. How, for example, have certain forms of behaviour been *problematized* as madness or crime? In what way, and with what consequences? Analogous to these Foucauldian cases, Nikolas Rose has linked the proliferation of advanced liberal modes of governance to a problematization of ‘the social’ as the historical referent of liberal governance (Rose 1996). By rendering a particular form of ‘the social’ problematic, the statement intervenes in a political debate on solidarity, freedom and responsibilities in order to promote new policies for forging different kinds of social organization. Designating particular phenomena as problems, in other words, is always a crucial step in turning them into governable entities. Genealogical analysis focuses on such decisive moments when forms of behaviours, entities or phenomena that for a long time appeared to be self-evident suddenly become problematic. Such moments mark dynamic thresholds at which new entities (such as madness or delinquency in the eighteenth century) and new political technologies (such as neo-liberal policies of individual responsabilization in the late twentieth century) emerge. The genealogist traces such moments of appearance and disappearance together with the re-configuration of power relations that accompanies them. For example, recent genealogical work in security studies has focused on how resilience has emerged as a response to the problematization of security brought on by the radical contingency of contemporary threat (Walker and Cooper 2011).

By focusing on historical events of problematization, Foucault also sought to resolve a particular misunderstanding that had haunted the reception of his work since he once provocatively declared that ‘madness does not exist’:

For when I say that I am studying the ‘problematization’ of madness, crime or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. [...] For I think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization.

*(Foucault and Pearson 2001: 171)*

However, Foucault’s insistence on the reality of phenomena should not be mistaken for a return to a brute ‘realism’ that posits the existence of self-evident facts:

A problematization does not mean the representation of a pre-existing object, nor the creation through discourse of an object that does not exist. It is the set of discursive and non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of true and false, and constitutes it as an object of thought (whether under the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis etc.).

*(Foucault 1988a: 257)*

Problematizations intervene into that which is taken for granted. They are productive by inserting objects into a ‘politics of truth’, thereby formatting objects in a particular way. Delinquency, in this respect, does not ‘exist’ independently, but is brought into ‘existence’ by problematizations of behaviours in terms of crime. It enters the play of true and false through correctional schemes and criminological theories, panoptical laboratories and reformist discourses.

In this sense, problematizations are related to sets of practices, ‘through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought’ (Foucault 1985b: 11). Acts of problematization put into question the unreflected practices and related rationalities through which we orient ourselves in the world. They open up a space for thought in which a practice can be modified or replaced:

Thought is that which permits a certain distance from a manner of acting or reacting, that which makes it possible to make that manner of acting into an object of reflection and to make it available for analysis of its meanings, its conditions and its goals. Thinking is the freedom one has in relation to what one does, the movement through which one detaches oneself as an object and reflects on all this as a problem.

*(Foucault quoted in Rabinow 2003: 46–47)*

A historical problematization is a particular kind of event: an event that brings an object, a concept or a practice to thought. This is why genealogy does not

transcend the problematizations it analyses, but confronts them immanently. Tracing the historical thresholds at which phenomena become problematic and are articulated as part of reconfigured relations of force is itself an act of problematization (Castel 1994: 237–252). Problematization therefore designates both the critical mode of activity of the genealogist and its object of study. Both aspects feed into each other: unearthing the transformations of power that take place when certain behaviours, phenomena or objects are being rendered problematic is a way of rendering these transformations problematic. For example, genealogical work on resilience in security studies is simultaneously an analysis of the problematization of security that traces the historical emergence of the concept of resilience in governmental rationales and practices, and a further problematization of resilience as a security strategy, that emphasizes its political implications and attendant power struggles.

In this sense, genealogy constitutes a reflexive art of problematization. As a critical enterprise, it starts with questions of our present, and operates on the past in order to trace out the hidden struggles that contributed to the present, thereby denaturalizing the taken-for-granted system that works as a regime of truth. This art of problematization is critical because it aims to open up the range of possibilities for thinking and acting, and thus is associated with freedom. As Thomas Biebricher argues, this freedom is not necessarily emancipatory in the traditional sense of ‘liberation from power, oppression or exploitation in general’ (Biebricher 2008: 368), but it does allow for a reconsideration of one’s world and one’s place within it. This is the critical politics involved in genealogical research.

## PROBLEMATIZING KETTLING

The notion of problematization, outlined above, has informed our genealogical analysis in three important ways. First, it was the current problematization of kettling within political discourses that drew our attention and encouraged us to choose it as a case study. Clearly, the practice of kettling did not emerge from nowhere. It has been developed and deployed for some time. Nor was this the first time ‘kettling’ had met with criticism or resistance. However, for many reasons (which we were curious to investigate) the use of the ‘kettle’ during the 2010–11 UK student protests generated a heated debate regarding its legitimacy in policing public protests. We could say the process of problematization raised ‘kettling’ to the level of public awareness by rendering it as a site of contestation and struggle between politicians, activists, experts, commentators and police. This was our point of departure. We were interested in how kettling became a problem.

Second, problematizations acted as referents within our genealogical analysis. Our genealogy was oriented towards historical problematizations as *events*. Methodologically, it sought first to identify a series of problematization

events in relation to which ‘kettling’ emerged as a solution. Our aim was not to be exhaustive (an impossible task) but to isolate a few of the major events impacting the development of kettling as a practice, such as the UK Poll Tax riots in 1990 and the May Day riots of 1999 and 2000. Analysis would then seek to make explicit the particular character of these problematizations. What was at stake? Who was involved? What responses were advocated? What resources (intellectual, material, or otherwise) did they draw upon? In asking these questions, we investigated how contests over problems and their possible solutions played out historically. How did problems identified in one episode of protest lead to the development and deployment of new police tactics in future events? Genealogy works with historical raw material to create a partial map of this emergence, such as government documents, news items, and contemporaneous commentaries. The emergence of kettling could then be situated in relation to these events and the power relations that played out through them.

Finally, as genealogists, we recognized the political stakes involved with studying kettling at this time. We were not content to investigate these questions in a detached manner, but were looking to carry on this momentum. We wanted to intervene in this debate and contribute to the contestation of this practice. Remember, to conduct genealogical work *is* to intervene. As such, problematization was not simply our starting point but our *objective*. We sought to augment the processes of problematization that preceded our own work by performing genealogical work on kettling. This meant exposing the power struggles that took place not only on the streets in sites of kettling themselves, but in the historical emergence of the practice.

### ***Dispositifs and strategy***

With genealogy taking shape as a decidedly interventionist and political perspective on history, the notion of strategy takes a new dimension in Foucault’s work. Strategy is a central aspect of a concept, the *dispositif*, he forged in the second half of the 1970s. Both Deleuze (1992) and Agamben (2009) note that the concept of ‘*dispositif*’ – which has somewhat confusingly been translated into English as apparatus, deployment, dispositive and ‘set up’ – (Bussolini 2010; Veyne 2010) appears at a particular point in Foucault’s thought where he placed greater emphasis on the materiality and relationality of power/knowledge (see also Paltrinieri 2012: 236–244; Rabinow 2003: 49–55; and [Chapter 3](#) in this volume).

In an interview subsequently published under the title ‘Confessions of the Flesh’ (Foucault 1980) Foucault was asked to elaborate on this concept. The *dispositif*, Foucault explains, is a ‘formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an *urgent need*’ (Foucault 1980: 195,

emphasis in original). This formation is constituted by a heterogeneous assemblage of elements: ‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid’ (Foucault 1980). The *dispositif*, Foucault clarifies, is more specifically ‘the system of relations (*réseau*) one can establish between [these] heterogeneous elements’ (Foucault 1980). The *dispositif* is not the individual elements themselves but the particular arrangement or configuration of relations that exists *between* them. They cohere around the ‘urgent needs’ entailed by problematizations. For example, as we show in the next box, the ‘kettle’ itself is one element in a *dispositif* of crowd control or security that includes the police, historical knowledges of past demonstrations, architectures, laws, and communication technologies.

As responses to an ‘urgent need’, *dispositifs* are formed through the adoption, adaptation and bundling together of existing knowledges, practices and technologies. In short, the ‘coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (*dispositif*) of knowledge–power’ (Foucault 2008: 19). Because they are composed in a spirit of *bricolage* – the assemblage of a myriad of existing ‘tools’ designed to address different, often unrelated, problems – it becomes impossible to define an ideal origin for any *dispositif*. A *dispositif* is not a coherent episteme or paradigm built around clear principles or concepts; what defines a *dispositif* is not intellectual coherence but a *strategic* coherence – without relying on the foundational subject of a strategist, of course. For example, the *dispositif* of surveillance problematized by revelations about the NSA, GCHQ, the Prism programme, and associations with other communications companies and social networking technologies does not have its sole origins in 9/11, but it has certainly been driven by a perceived ‘strategic need’ prompted by the hyper-problematization of security after 9/11. However, we cannot attribute the *dispositif* of surveillance solely to ‘strategists’, such as particular US presidents or heads of security agencies. This *dispositif* coheres around a strategic need that has grown with contingent and organic complexity. A genealogy of surveillance would need to reassemble the disparate and relational elements of this surveillance *dispositif* through the genealogical dimensions of history and power.

It is especially in its strategic orientation that the *dispositif* can help us to understand and analyse power as a distributed and mobile network of force relations: ‘The function of strategic logic is to establish the possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate. The logic of strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization of the contradictory’ (Foucault 2008). Foucault explains that the *dispositif* is: ‘essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them, etc.’ (Foucault 1980). *Dispositifs* involve material forms that institute strategic relations of force and epistemic relations of knowledge. As such, Agamben sums up a *dispositif* as, ‘a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, and supported

by, certain types of knowledge' (Agamben 2009). With Foucault, *dispositifs* are the techno-material articulation of discursive regimes of intelligibility. For example, 'security' is both a discursive idea and a concrete architecture. Thus, *dispositifs* crisscross the division between ideational meaning and substantial matter (Barad 2007: 132; see also [Chapter 3](#) in this volume). They are material infrastructures for power/knowledge. They orient relations of force and relations of knowledge in space and over time. The consolidation of practices into *dispositifs* is thus dependent upon a strategy of 'relaying, connecting, converging and prolonging' (Deleuze 1988).

On the one hand, the *dispositif* functions as a configuration bearing upon forces to direct or conduct them. On the other hand, it provides a conceptual apparatus for the genealogist to analyse this evolving contest. In that sense, as a methodological device for reassembling diverse elements, the *dispositif* is what 'operationalizes' the method (Bonditti 2012). The genealogist isolates the intelligibility of a practice together with its 'strategies of relations of forces supporting types of knowledge and inversely' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 121). He does so not by trying to uncover some kind of hidden motive (e.g., of a strategist), but by making explicit the multiple constitutive lines of evolution that have actualized the *dispositif* as a contingent assemblage (Deleuze 1992).

For the genealogist, the value of thinking of some things, such as sexuality or security, in terms of a *dispositif* helps *sustain* a genealogical perspective by looking at them as deprived of fixed essence and as having been cobbled together historically. Isolating a *dispositif* within different historical frames reveals a different composition of elements and forces aligned to a different purpose. For example, the articulation of 'security' or 'sexuality' mutates over time through the historical play of forces. In this respect, Deleuze's interpretation of the *dispositif* helps clarify the relationship between the *dispositif* and the archive that, strangely, Foucault's never did: '*Dispositifs* form our environment. We belong to them, and act in them' (Deleuze 1992: 162). It thereby enables us to diagnose who we are, through the excavation of the archive, *while* also being attentive to what is in the making. For example, genealogical research on the surveillance *dispositif* is not only about the disparate material and discursive architecture of security technologies, but also what it means to be an individual in the present. It means questioning the nature of privacy, freedom, association and expression in an age when our personal and social lives are increasingly embedded in networked technologies that turn out to be not at all 'secure'.

Not only does the question of the strategic nature of the *dispositif* matter, but also important is how to exploit the potentials immanent to them. *Dispositifs* are not fixed and rigid regimes of domination that require revolutionary subversion. They are immanent networks that shape the subject and contain the potential for resistance. As we will see in the next box, *dispositifs* do not emerge out of nowhere, but are produced in the strategic to-and-fro of forces attempting to out-do each other through new innovations in their practice, such as protestors and the police.

## KETTLING AND SECURITY *DISPOSITIF*

As part of our work we studied kettling as a technique of police. Recognizing the historical singularity of the kettle, particularly the logic of containment it enacted, we became interested in studying kettling as a means of investigating contemporary transformations within a wider security *dispositif* (Foucault). With regard to its strategic aspect, it is important to recognize that this technique co-exists and is most often exercised simultaneously with other policing techniques including surveillance, police escorts and designated protest routes. Accordingly, strategy – understood as an ‘art of combinations’ – was an important concept in both orienting and organizing our work. It helped us to understand kettling as one technique within a wider assemblage of social order policing. Identifying the conditions under which kettling could emerge as a technique of police entailed directing our attention to recent realignments of force relations in the contested field of (in)security.

The historical emergence of kettling thus has to take into account the context of struggles in which it was assembled. Kettling met an ‘urgent need’: the need to respond to the problem of ‘disruptive protest’ that explicitly aimed to disrupt circulations underpinning urban life as a means of raising attention to a cause. We were interested in how this style of protest developed by weaving new technologies and forms of social networking into tactics of evasion and manoeuvre over the course of a series of historical events including the 1990 Poll Tax riots in London, the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, 1999/2000 May Day riots in London among others. Disruptive protest, in other words, was itself a strategy *assembled* over time. Disruptive protest problematized traditional methods of crowd control based on crowd dispersal. Moreover, in doing so it prompted the development and adoption of kettling as a new technique of public order policing, which we could identify in historical policing literature (Waddington 1992, 2007).

Thus kettling emerged as a technique in a context of transformations in the power relations between protest and public order policing. On the one hand, we were interested in understanding how kettling emerged as a combination and adaptation of existing technologies of discipline and control. Here we traced the development of kettling to containment tactics derived from the battlefield, the harnessing of real-time telecommunications by military and police and the remote monitoring of crowd movements. On the other hand, we used the notion of strategy to organize our own research. Working collaboratively, we worked not just to identify important documents and events but to establish links between heterogeneous elements: legislation, expert reflections on crowd control, developments in military tactics, the development and adaptation of communications technologies. In particular, we were interested in investigating how these relations were (historically)

constituted and how they changed over time. This required taking quite a broad scope when collecting primary and secondary documents. Accounting for the historical emergence of kettling entailed understanding how this mobile field of power relations acted as a condition of possibility for the emergence of kettling.

## **Genealogy and the study of security (studies)**

This section applies the difference between history and genealogy to security studies itself. It discusses how histories of the discipline work to validate disciplinary authority in relation to security as a research object, rather than exploring the historical contingency and heterogeneity of problematizations of security in order to problematize security further.

Genealogies of IR have successfully posited the historical contingency and constitutive functions of the very concept of the ‘international’. It is not yet clear that security studies has undergone a similar challenge. The genealogy of IR showed that IR scholars did not rationally and dispassionately reflect upon their object of study (the ‘international’) as they claimed. Rather, they helped constitute the ‘international’ as an object, and were constituted as knowledgeable subjects through their relation to that object. This in turn had the effect of constituting the discipline of IR as a social science (Hoffmann 1977), and also played a wider role in naturalizing the otherwise historically contingent set of political arrangements represented by the international state system. Genealogies of IR, though not always named as such, unpacked how concepts such as the international (Der Derian 1995), sovereignty (Bartelson 1995; Walker 1993), realism (Molloy 2006) or the territorial state (Agnew 1994) became elements in a regime of truth that regulated what could be said to be ‘international’ and what could not. For example, Cynthia Enloe’s work showed how the diplomat’s actions were considered ‘international practice’, but not those of his wife or his servants (Enloe 1990: 94–123). Following the methodology of Foucault, the genealogical counter-narrative to IR in effect said ‘Let’s suppose that “the international” does not exist’: ‘If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can history make of the different events and practices which are apparently organized around something that is supposed to be “the international”?’ (paraphrasing Foucault 2008: 3; see also [Chapter 6](#) in this book). In this section, we argue that this genealogical move has yet to be fully played out in security studies.

Security studies is today becoming a discipline in its own right. It has a constitutive heritage in IR, and also in peace and conflict studies. International relations had from its disciplinary inception claimed a privileged knowledge of security as state security. This knowledge was also supported by what was known as ‘strategic studies’. And within security studies, critical security studies has emerged as a critique of this orthodoxy. These disciplinary developments have

been important, productive and constitutive of a new generation of scholars (new knowledgeable subjects). However, these developments have come to be told as a history, not a genealogy. Instead of genealogical counter-narratives, security studies is still dominated by *histories* of itself (e.g., Buzan and Hansen 2009; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). As discussed earlier, the contrast between a *history* and a *genealogy* is important and instructive. The dominant and well-rehearsed history of the origins and development of security studies does not deepen its own contingency, struggles and power relations, but validates it as a discipline. Such a history is about refining theories, concepts, cases and indeed methods for studying security. From a genealogical perspective, this history contributes to establishing security studies as an authoritative social scientific discipline and constitutes its practitioners as knowledgeable (and disciplined) subjects.

A genealogy of security studies would not write the history of security studies, but would investigate its historical contingency, struggles and constitutive effects (Shah 2010). In so doing, it would posit security as a corollary of power struggles, not simply a research object. By exposing the historical contingency of 'security', genealogy would further problematize its meanings and effects, whether construed as a universal human need, a timeless anchor of the international system of states, or a discrete research object for a scholarly discipline.

Take, for example, Buzan and Hansen's *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (2009), which retells the constitutive disciplinary account given at the beginning of the 'Copenhagen School's' *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Traditionally, this story says, IR and security studies were about states. Traditionalists considered security to be exclusively a matter of states and military force. 'Wideners' and 'deepeners' then challenged this orthodoxy on empirical and conceptual grounds, especially after the loss of Cold War certainties. They argued that security threats could take a variety of non-military forms (such as insurance) performed by a wide range of security actors (including international institutions, private military companies and NGOs) and expanded the scope of security referents (to areas including the environment and social identity). For example, Ken Booth (2005), Richard Wyn Jones (2000), Keith Krause and Michael Williams (1997) offered a conception of security based on the individual, now commonly known as 'human security'. One empirical expression of this is the 1994 UN Development Programme definition of human security, which added personal security, food, health and community to the range of already existing 'security objects'. In the 1990s, these perspectives were understood as critical because their conception of security broke with tradition. They no longer posed the State as the condition of security. Rather, the State was reconceptualized as a possible source of threat and producer of insecurity. This move de-equated the State and security, contra the IR orthodoxy. However, the 'history' of security studies stalls this critical project. Instead of rendering 'security' as the contingent product of historical power struggles and problematizations, it works to refine the disciplinary and scientific authority of 'security studies' in its scholarly relationship to 'security' as a research object.

In a related example, Ole Wæver's 'securitization theory' posited security as a 'grammar' in which language and speech acts constitute a process of 'securitization'. Krause argues that through this move, the 'why' question ('why do states go to war' for example) is substituted by the 'how' question ('how are security threats defined') (Krause 2003). This promised to undermine the core object of security studies by positing security as nothing other than a contingent construction. However, rather than undermine the very basis of the discipline by rendering its conditions of possibility as contingent (as the critical turn had done with IR), Wæver and his 'Copenhagen School' colleagues chose to work with the 'traditional meaning' of security (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998: 4). This meant that they held on to a core meaning of security inherited from the orthodoxy: security was about existential threats, entailed 'exceptional' means, and usually involved the State (Ciută 2009; Opitz 2011). While not necessarily fixing this 'grammar of security' as timeless and essential (although that is open to interpretation), they pragmatically kept it as a historical fact or *de facto* truth. The proposed research programme, which has been enthusiastically taken up by a subsequent generation of scholars, has continually refined itself, its theories, and its cases. In contrast to this account of disciplinary history, a genealogical perspective would show how this has not only been about refining approaches to a research object, but also about constituting new forms of disciplinary authority and power. While some have reflected on how security analysis itself risks contributing to the social construction of security (Huysmans 2002), few have considered how 'security' constructs the analyst, their expertise and their discipline (see [Chapter 6](#) on 'Distance'). Without rendering 'security' contingent, and without fully questioning their own disciplinary constitution in relation to this assumed 'object', histories of security studies fall short of a genealogy.

The genealogist should not simply refine security as an object of research, but throw security, its historical contingency and constitutive effects more radically into question. Genealogical research in security studies would ask what can we make of all these discourses, practices, knowledges that exist in relation to 'security'. This means taking security as an element in historically-situated problematizations, not simply as a research object. The aim must be to proceed empirically without assuming that 'security' exists as an already constituted (or constructed, but *de facto*) problem, but rather as a contingent element in diverse problematizations.

Genealogy as critical security method should displace security as a privileged object by performing historical empirical work on more heterogeneous *dispositifs* that relate to security but are not necessarily built around it as a foundational problematization. This would deepen the problematization of security by undermining it as a core research object. For example, recent works in security studies have employed genealogical methods to investigate catastrophes (Aradau and Munster 2011; Opitz and Tellmann 2014), civil defence (Collier and Lakoff 2008a), critical infrastructure (Collier and Lakoff 2008b), terrorism and counter-terrorism (Bonditti 2013), finance (Goede 2005), insurance (Lobo-Guerrero 2012), and resilience (Walker and Cooper 2011; Zebrowski 2013).

## Genealogy in a digital age

This section explores the implications of the digitization of 'the archive' for genealogical research. This complicates genealogical work while, at the same time, opening new possibilities for intervention. We can sum this up in two points. First, the digital archive represents new forms of archival *rules* in an archaeological sense. Second, the socially networked nature of much of the digital archive has implications for the political interventionism of genealogical work, particularly through online collaboration as a form of force multiplication and acceleration.

In addition to the imagery of battle, Foucault cultivated an image of genealogical work as a solitary trawling of dusty archives. He opens his essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', as follows: 'Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times' (Foucault 1984b: 76). Digitization challenges this image in three ways. First, the archive is no longer 'dusty' but increasingly electronic. For example, the Google Books Library Project aims 'to create a comprehensive, searchable, virtual card catalogue of all books in all languages' (Google 2012). Second, technology offers unprecedented opportunities for research collaboration, making genealogy a less solitary pursuit. Third, technology offers the possibility of an acceleration of research, in terms of speedy information-gathering from diverse sources, rapid mobilization of collaborative work around pressing political concerns, and swift digital publication processes circumventing traditional print production times.

Digitization also raises questions about archival 'rules', interpretive rivalries, and struggles in power/knowledge: how does digitization affect access to the kinds of books and documents scholars engage with? Which documents get digitized and which do not? Which are made accessible and which are not? What is prioritized and why? How do we value particular documents in a time of mass digitization? How does digitization impact on the daily conduct of research and, more specifically, on archaeological and genealogical research? How far does it help to put Foucauldian genealogy in motion?

The digital re-composition of 'the archive' is no smooth re-composition. Just as Foucault suggested that, '[w]e must conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things' (Foucault 1972: 229), digitization is a violence done to discourse. Just like the formation of archival 'rules' in the archaeological sense, digitization is not a politically neutral process. It entails new forms of struggle, and new relations of force. As with every kind of memory, the digital archive has its own combinations of remembering and forgetting. Digital genealogy requires an awareness of how the digital renders visible and conceals at the same time. Coinciding with the opportunities for accessibility, traceability, analysis and accumulation of archival documents by their digitization and online availability, the digital archive generates new forms of redundancy that are mechanisms of oblivion. This complicates archaeological and genealogical research, and makes them a more pressing necessity.

Digitization makes Foucault's characterization of the raw material of genealogy more relevant than ever; the digital archive is indeed a 'field of entangled and confused parchments on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times' (Foucault 1984b: 76). It consists of different layers, from the surface web that is easily accessible through a simple Google search; through deeper layers that do not show up on Google (whether by design or as a result of ranking algorithms) which require more specialized or knowledgeable means of access (e.g., using the electronic Hansard parliamentary archive); to the 'deep' or 'dark' web (Harrison 2010) which is not indexed by search engines and may include private sources, unlinked pages and content generated dynamically. Beyond this surface level archive, the 'deeper' web thus requires more specialized skills or technologies to access. Finding ways to excavate this may reveal research material overlooked by other researchers and has big implications for genealogical research and investigative journalism. The highly politicized activities of Wikileaks are a prime example.

Digitization offers an opportunity for new forms of genealogical interventionism through collaboration. It makes possible the rapid, tactical mobilization of groups of researchers around politicized issues. This might mean challenging and undermining official accounts of events, crowd-sourced analysis of large bodies of data, or creating innovative data visualizations to convey new perspectives on drone strikes or Iraq war casualties. Such genealogical products have the potential to 'go viral' on social media, increasing their political impact.

Digitization is therefore broader than simply rendering documents into a digital form and creating online archives. It also involves the development of research computing tools. Applications such as the file sharing service Dropbox offer the possibility to share part or the entirety of the research corpus, facilitating collaborative research on a shared material by scholars located in different parts of the world. In other words, it enables transnational collaborative archival research, possibly *transnational collaborative genealogies*. In this respect, technology blurs the physical and practical distinctions between the places and tools of research, writing, collaborating and communicating. Skype, social networking, Wikipedia and its offspring are built on models of collective use of information and collaborative interaction. Wikipedia, for example, has become an invaluable starting point for research, although its academic use often upsets rarefied scholarly sensibilities. It provides open access information and links that otherwise may not be found. Sometimes this is from sources more closely involved in the problematizations than would be found in more distanced academic sources (e.g., activists). The Wikipedia model also shows how digitization can offer greater possibilities for traceability: not just documenting changes made to a document (what, when and by whom?) but also providing a forum for discussing and justifying these changes.

Digitization cannot, however, be exclusively understood as a beneficial 'force multiplier'. These computing tools help to build a new kind of world of instantaneity, simultaneity, and synchronicity, which, as pointed out by Paul Virilio (1999), has multiple and largely unthought implications. If digitization helps gather

quantities of documents at speed, it is not always clear what to do with that overwhelming mass of documents. Search tools that allow the scholar to navigate a document via keywords exacerbate the tendency to 'cherry-pick' sections of a document or book without paying attention to its context. Similarly, collaborative wiki-like online pages have a homogenizing role. If they can contribute to an 'insurrection of subjugated knowledges' (Foucault 2003) and 'erase the author', they can also 'smooth' that knowledge, which is then widely disseminated through the web. One also has to keep in mind the growing instability of the digital archive, which exists in a process of being constantly overwritten. The dissenting views, bifurcations and impure origins that are so important to genealogy may drop out of sight. The 'gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary' (Foucault 1984b: 76) aspects of genealogy should not be neglected.

### **KETTLING: GENEALOGICAL RESEARCH IN THE DIGITAL ARCHIVE**

Transnational digital collaboration was essential to our genealogical work on kettling. Reassembling the *dispositif* of kettling in its international and historical dimensions required multiple languages, depths of local historical knowledge (e.g., relating to the history of protest in different countries), and our combined perspectives on specific political contexts and institutions. This section describes the steps of our process.

In order to investigate our questions on kettling, we first needed to assemble a research corpus that would help us to understand the various lines of argument and opinion (i.e., the 'discourse') surrounding kettling. For this phase of research, we drew heavily on open source materials on the Internet. We browsed different kinds of digital sources relating primarily to UK discussions of kettling, but extended our focus to Germany when we found instances of German kettling that preceded its use in the UK. While trying to gather and select documents, questions arose about our selection criteria and where we should look. Drawing on Deleuze's comments about Foucault's archival work (Deleuze 1988), we first selected a set of 'primary sources' gathered from around the 'focal point of power'. Our own research backgrounds in policing and security issues led us to look specifically at parliamentary debates, media reports and open-source government and police documents.

The following sources were openly available in the digital archive, though some were more accessible than others: news reports about kettling incidents, pictures of kettling incidents, entries on Wikipedia on kettling and on the policing of protest in general, parliamentary debates and hearings, statements of police experts, statements criticizing kettling incidents from human rights organizations and protest groups affected by kettling, critical blogs, court rulings after kettling incidents, statements of political actors, and official

reviews of police practice. These sources were not just a range of scholarly opinions on a topic, but a series of elements in a contested terrain of power/knowledge that cohered around the problematization of kettling.

We took a broad approach to the collection of these materials. That being said, there was also a danger of collecting too much – a challenge for the individual researcher exacerbated by the curiosity of our own research team. Rather than seeking to establish an exhaustive list of materials (another impossible task), our criteria for selection was based on our own sense of their importance: a) as key elements of the discourses surrounding kettling (e.g., Home Office papers, press statements by human rights organizations); b) the extent to which they reflected prominent lines of argumentation (e.g., newspaper editorials/stories); and c) the extent to which they provided insight into the processes of problematization surrounding the kettle. Following Foucault, we placed a higher priority on the regularity of statements (documents which were referenced repeatedly in other documents, lines of argument which were repeated by different actors) rather than on seeking to identify the first appearance of a particular statement or idea.

We ran a series of searches on keywords including 'kettling', 'police tactic', 'containment', 'crowd control', 'demonstration', 'riot' and 'protest'. Nonetheless, it quickly became clear from our weekly Skype discussions that this method of conducting research was already narrowing the research scope by assuming too much about 'kettling'. What were the conditions for example, which made it possible for 'kettling', and not another technique, to emerge as the appropriate way of dealing with the problem of demonstrations? We thus broadened our scope: we attempted to open the research horizon by running searches on 'social order', 'social disorder' and 'psychology of crowds', and by pursuing references found within the texts we had gathered. Here, the collaborative dynamic played an important role in compiling research materials. Harnessing the international distribution of our group allowed us to trace the migration and mutation of practices and discourses across borders. This could have escaped any of us working individually.

The knowledge we generated collaboratively drew out the connections between various documents, ideas and discourses. By assisting, encouraging and working off the ideas of each other we could construct these connections to a degree that superseded the sum of our parts (that is if each researcher had been working individually). In terms of the depth of our analysis and the speed at which our analysis progressed, our collaborative structure substantially benefited our genealogical analysis.

## Conclusion

In this chapter we have explored the value of genealogy as a critical security method. We began by explaining the achievements of the genealogical move in the ‘critical turn’ in IR in the last two decades. This created disciplinary space for new kinds of research not bound by orthodoxy. Most genealogical works in IR were theoretical and historical, taking the form of conceptual histories of the present. Instead of searching for the historical origins of the ‘international’, they inquired into how the history of ‘the international’ and its related concepts had been written with the effect of constituting the (quite recent) discipline of IR itself. The effect of these genealogies was to problematize and render contingent the discipline, the ‘scientific’ claims of its analysts, and the supposed ontological neutrality of its objects and concepts.

We took this as our starting point but have gone further. While genealogy is a method rooted in an approach to history, it need not only be a way of ‘doing’ history. One does not have to write a historical ‘genealogy of’ a particular object, concept or practice to make use of genealogical method. History is the raw material of genealogy, not its aim. Its method is to identify and intervene in historical problematizations. It asks certain questions. What ‘strategic need’ did problematizations respond to? What and who came to be reorganized around them? What struggles were involved? As the example of our ‘kettling’ research shows, genealogy and its related concepts can be used to identify current problematizations and situate them in a formation of historical lines of descent, subjective struggles, and recombinations of techniques and technologies, all of which have constitutive effects.

Genealogy identifies problematizations and problematizes them further. Its archives are not data; they are power/knowledge relations. Its problematizations are not ‘objects’ for dispassionate reflection; they are sites of struggle. Its *dispositifs* are not arrangements to be defined, described and delimited, but heterogeneous assemblages posited by the genealogist to further problematize such definitions, descriptions and delimitations.

## Note

- 1 While evolution provides a convenient metaphor for discussing contingency, Nietzsche’s (and Foucault’s) relationship to Darwinian evolution is, of course, more complicated (for a discussion see Ansell-Pearson 1997; Grosz 2004; Sarasin 2009).

## References

- Agamben, G. (2009). *“What is an apparatus?” and other essays*, Meridian, crossing aesthetics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Agnew, J. (1994). ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory.’ *Review of International Political Economy*, 1(1): 53–80.
- Anghie, A. (2007). ‘Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law’ in *Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law*. Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Ansell-Pearson, K. (1997). *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the transhuman condition*. London: Routledge.
- Aradau, C., and R. van Munster (2011). *Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the unknown, PRIO new security studies*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Ashley, R.K. (1987). 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics.' *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 12(4): 403–434.
- (1995). 'Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life.' In *International Theory: Critical investigations*, edited by James Der Derian. New York: New York University Press. pp. 94–129.
- Ashley, R.K., and R. Walker (1990). 'Introduction: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies.' *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(3): 259–268.
- Barad, K. (2007). *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning*. Durham, London: Duke University Press Books.
- Barry, A., T. Osborne, and N.S. Rose (1996). *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism, and rationalities of government*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bartelson, J. (1995). *A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge Studies in International Relations*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bhabha, H.K. (1994). *The Location of Culture*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Biebricher, T. (2008). 'Genealogy and Governmentality.' *Journal of the Philosophy of History*, 2(3): 363–396.
- Bonditti, P. (2012). 'Act Different, Think Dispositif.' In *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An introduction*, edited by Mark Salter and Can E. Mutlu. London; New York: Routledge. pp. 101–104.
- (2013). 'L'invention du terrorisme.' *Critique internationale* (4): Forthcoming.
- Booth, K. (2005). 'Critical Explorations', in Ken Booth (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1–25.
- Bussolini, J. (2010). 'What is a Dispositive?' *Foucault Studies* (10): 85–107.
- Buzan, B., and L. Hansen (2009). *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Buzan, B., O. Wæver, and J.D. Wilde (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub.
- Campbell, D. (1998). *Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. Rev. ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Castel, R. (1994). "'Problematization" as a Mode of Reading History.' In *Foucault and the Writing of History*, edited by Jan Goldstein. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 237–252.
- Chatterjee, P. (1993). *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories, Princeton studies in culture/power/history*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ciută, F. (2009). 'Security and the Problem of Context. A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitisation Theory.' *Review of International Studies*, 35(2): 301–326.
- Collier, S., and A. Lakoff (2008a). 'Distributed Preparedness: notes on the Genealogy of Homeland Security.' *Environment and Planning D: Space and Society*, 26(1): 7–28.
- (2008b). 'The Vulnerability of Vital Systems: How Critical Infrastructure became a Security Problem.' In *Securing 'the Homeland'. Critical infrastructure, risk and (in)security*, edited by Myriam Dunn and Kristian Soby Kristensen. London/New York: Routledge.
- Connolly, W.E. (1988). *Political Theory and Modernity*. Oxford, UK/New York, NY: Blackwell.
- Constantinou, C.M. (1996). *On the Way to Diplomacy, Borders*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Dean, M. (1991). *The Constitution of Poverty: Toward a genealogy of liberal governance*. London/New York: Routledge.

- (1994). *Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's methods and historical sociology*. London/New York: Routledge.
- (2003). 'Prologue for a Genealogy of War and Peace. Genealogical Approaches.' In *Handbook of Historical Sociology*, edited by Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Isin. London: Sage. pp. 180–190.
- Deleuze, G. (1988). *Foucault*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- (1992a). 'What is a Dispositif.' In *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, edited by Timothy J. Armstrong. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp. 159–168.
- Der Derian, J. (1987). *On Diplomacy: A genealogy of western estrangement*. Oxford, UK/New York, NY: Blackwell.
- (1993). 'The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard.' In *The Political Subject of Violence*, edited by David Campbell and Michael Dillon. Manchester: Manchester University Press. pp. 94–113.
- (1995). *International Theory. Critical Investigations*. London: Palgrave.
- Der Derian, J., and M.J. Shapiro (1989). *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern readings of world politics*. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
- Dillon, M. (1996). *The Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Doty, R.L. (1993). 'The Bounds of "Race" in International Relations.' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 22(3): 443–461.
- Dreyfus, H.L., and P. Rabinow (1982). *Michel Foucault, beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Elbe, S. (2001). "'We Good Europeans...'" Genealogical Reflections on the Idea of Europe.' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30(2): 259–284.
- (2002). 'Labyrinths of the Future: Nietzsche's Genealogy of Nationalism.' *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 7(1): 77–96.
- Enloe, C.H. (1990). *Bananas, Beaches & Bases: Making feminist sense of international politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge [1969] and the Discourse on Language [1971]*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- (1980). 'The Confession of the Flesh [1977].' In *Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings (1972–1977)*, edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books. pp. 194–228.
- (1983). 'Usage des plaisirs et techniques de soi.' *Le Débat* (27): 46–72.
- (1984a). Le souci de la vérité. *Magazine Littéraire*, 18–23.
- (1984b). 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971].' In *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow. London: Penguin. pp. 76–100.
- (1985a). *Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia [1983]*. Evanston: Northwestern University.
- (1985b). *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The use of pleasure [1984]*. New York: Vintage Books.
- (1988a). 'The Concern for Truth [1984].' In *Michel Foucault. Politics, philosophy, culture. Interviews and other writings 1977–1984*, edited by Lawrence D. Krizman, 255–267. London/New York: Routledge.
- (1988b). *Madness and Civilization: A history of insanity in the Age of Reason [1961]*. New York: Vintage.
- (1994). *The Birth of the Clinic: An archaeology of medical perception [1963]*. New York: Vintage.

- (1997). 'Polemics, Politics, and Problematisations: An Interview with Michel Foucault [1984].' In *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. The essential work of Foucault. 1954–1984 (vol. 1)*, edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press. pp. 111–119.
- (2002a). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith. London: Routledge.
- (2002b). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith. London: Routledge.
- (2003). *Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*. Translated by David Macey. New York: Picador.
- (2007). *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- (2008). *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Foucault, M., and S. Lotringer (2007). *The Politics of Truth, Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series*. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
- Foucault, M., and J. Pearson (2001). *Fearless Speech, Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series*. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
- Goede, M. de (2005). *Virtue, Fortune and Faith: A genealogy of finance, Borderlines*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Google (2012). Google Books Library Project. Available at: [www.google.com/googlebooks/library.html](http://www.google.com/googlebooks/library.html). Accessed 6 April 2014.
- Gros, F. (2002). *Foucault: Le courage de la vérité, Débats philosophiques*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Grosz, E. (2004). *The Nick of Time: Politics, evolution, and the untimely*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Hansen, L. (2006). *Security as Practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war, The New International Relations*. New York: Routledge.
- Harrison, R. (2010). 'Exorcising the "Plague of Fantasies": Mass Media and Archaeology's Role in the Present; or, Why We Need an Archaeology of "Now".' *World Archaeology*, 42(3): 328–340.
- Hobson, J.M. (2004). *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoffmann, S. (1977). 'An American Social Science: International Relations.' *Daedalus*, 106(3): 41–60.
- Howarth, D.R., A.J. Norval, and Y. Stavrakakis (2000). *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, hegemonies, and social change*. Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press.
- Huysmans, J. (2002). 'Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security.' *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27(Special Issue): 41–62.
- Jabri, V. (2012). *The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming politics/governing others in late modernity, Interventions*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Jones, R.W. (2000). *Critical Theory and World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub.
- Keene, E. (2002). *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, colonialism and order in world politics, LSE Monographs in International Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Krause, K. (2003). 'Approche critique et constructiviste des études de sécurité.' In *L'annuaire français de relations internationales*. Bruxelles: Bruylant. pp. 600–612.
- Krause, K. and M. Williams (1997). *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and strategies*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Latham, R. (1997). *The Liberal Moment: Modernity, security, and the making of postwar international order, New Directions in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Lobo-Guerrero, L. (2012). *Insuring War: Sovereignty, security and risk, Interventions*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Mattelat, A. (1996). *The Invention of Communication*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Molloy, S. (2006). *The Hidden History of Realism: A genealogy of power politics. The Palgrave Macmillan history of international thought series*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Neal, A. (2004). 'Cutting off the King's Head: Foucault's "Society Must be Defended" and the Problem of Sovereignty.' *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 4(29): 373–398.
- Nietzsche, F. (1997). *Untimely Meditations [1873–76]*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2007). *On the Genealogy of Morality [1887]*. Rev. student ed, *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Opitz, S. (2011). 'Government Unlimited: The Security Dispositif of Illiberal Governmentality.' In *Governmentality Current Issues and Future Challenges*, edited by Ulrich Bröckling, Susanne Krasmann and Thomas Lemke. New York: Routledge. pp. 93–114.
- Opitz, S., and U. Tellmann (2014). 'Future Emergencies: Temporal Politics in Law and Economy'. *Theory, Culture & Society* 31: Forthcoming.
- Paltrinieri, L. (2012). *L'expérience du concept. Michel Foucault entre épistémologie et histoire, La Philosophie à l'oeuvre*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.
- Potte-Bonneville, M. (2004). *L'inquiétude de l'histoire, Quadriga Essais Débats*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Pratt, N., and S. Richter-Devroe (2011). 'Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.' *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13(4): 489–503. doi: 10.1080/14616742.2011.611658.
- Rabinow, P. (2003). *Anthropos Today: Reflections on modern equipment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rose, N. (1996). 'The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government.' *Economy and Society*, 25(3): 327–356.
- (1999). *Powers of Freedom: Reframing political thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sarasin, P. (2009). *Darwin und Foucault: Genealogie und Geschichte im Zeitalter der Biologie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Shah, N. (2010). 'Security Must be Defended – or the Survival of Security'. *Security Dialogue*, 41(6): 631–638.
- Shapiro, M.J. (1990). 'Strategic Discourse/Discursive Strategy: The Representation Of "Security Policy" In the Video Age.' *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(3): 327–340.
- Shepherd, L.J. (2008). *Gender, Violence and Security: Discourse as practice*. London/New York: Zed Books.
- Sylvester, C. (1994). *Feminist Theory and International relations in a Postmodern era, Cambridge Studies in International Relations*. Cambridge UK/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tickner, A.J. (1988). 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation.' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 17(3): 429–440.
- Veyne, P. (1997). 'Foucault Revolutionizes History [1978].' In *Foucault and its Interlocutors*, edited by Davidson Arnold I. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- (2010). *Foucault: His thought, his character*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Virilio, P. (1999). *Polar Inertia [1990], Theory, Culture & Society*. London: Thousand Oaks/CA: Sage.
- Waddington, D.P. (1992). *Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder: A comparative and historical approach*. London/New York: Routledge.
- (2007). 'Implications for Theory and Practice.' *Policing*, 1(4): 380–389.
- Walker, J., and M. Cooper (2011). 'Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation.' *Security Dialogue*, 42(2): 143–160.

- Walker, R.B.J. (1993). *Inside/outside: International relations as political theory*. 24 vols, *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*. Cambridge UK/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wodak, R. (2009). *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics as usual*. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zebrowski, C. (2013). 'The Nature of Resilience.' *Resilience: International policies, practices and discourses*. doi: 10.1080/21693293.2013.804672.

# 8

## COLLABORATION<sup>1</sup>

*Xavier Guillaume*

This chapter offers some reflections about the conditions in which collaboration can be a critical methodology in social sciences, namely as a critical process of knowledge production, management and valorization. It does so by engaging with the process through which collaboration is fostered, managed and valorized. Most importantly, the critical potential of collaboration has to be problematized in relation with the question of authorship, as the latter holds a prominent place in modern academic self-image and systems of valorization. Thus, authorship is central to understanding how collaboration can provide a critical pathway to the production of knowledge. To be successful, collaboration needs to steer participants away from an intellectual state of idleness, where the effects of one's social, historical, institutional, ideological, gendered and cultural situatedness are 'in an unthought stage' (Bourdieu 1994: 217). To this purpose, collaboration can offer a networked and dynamic collaborative environment within and through which ideas are critically fostered and engaged with, but also an epistemic frame where the notion of individual(ist) production is not necessarily celebrated as a competitive feature of contemporary academia, but re-situated in the dialogical dynamics of knowledge production, management and valorization.

Collaboration thus takes on a specific meaning when it is employed as a critical methodology. I understand such form of collaborative endeavour to enable the creation, production, management and valorization of critical knowledge. At the same time, collaboration has to contribute to forms of institutional and individual redistributions as well as to heuristic engagements with a field of study. In order to do so, participants need to practically engage with the ways in which they can achieve the 'felicity conditions', the criteria set to assess the success of such endeavour as a critical endeavour, written in the design of the collaborative framework. A critical collaborative endeavour in that sense is a practical tool to enable not only a specific type of knowledge to be produced but also, through the

enactment of such collaborative, to counteract 'boundaries, marginalization, and silences' (Ackerly and True 2008: 695) that are not only visible in the knowledge produced but also in the institutional and intersubjective conditions of production of this knowledge. Moreover, this has to be done while explicitly assuming our own situatedness as researchers (see Haraway 1988).

First, the chapter engages with the notion of collaboration and the dominant idea of the individual(ist) production of knowledge. Collaboration may take different forms. While 'dyadic partnership' probably remains the most common and productive mode of collaboration (Stone and Thompson 2006: 6), recent experiences in collective writing – such as the c.a.s.e. collective 2006, 2007 in security studies – and in collaborative writing – such as those that have emerged from the Anthropological Research on the Contemporary ([www.anthropos-lab.net](http://www.anthropos-lab.net)) or those reflected in the contributions of this book and others that emerged from the International Collaboratory on Critical Methods (ICCM) dynamic (see [Chapter 1](#)) – have shown how social sciences, and more particularly security studies, started to counteract the dominant tendency found in social and human sciences to privilege an individual(ist) form of knowledge production (see Collier *et al.* 2006: 3–6). The second section of the chapter re-situates the critical potential of collaboration alongside three logics – knowledge produced (what knowledge), knowledge production (how and by whom it is produced) and institutional setting (where and in which conditions it is produced) – in order to introduce the concept of collaboratory and gauge its critical limits and strengths in a collaborative process. Finally, the endeavour of a collaboratory is gauged in light of the challenges posed by enacting a critical methodological process. Key moments of the discussion are illustrated either by some a priori counter-intuitive historical examples of knowledge production (Walter Benjamin and his mosaic methodology), or by the experiences of members of the ICCM collaboratory in their specific clusters.

## The romantic tale of the solitary author

Despite the insistent emphasis on collaboration found in research projects, the figure of the individual author remains a potent one in the contemporary academic world. *Prima facie* (see, however, the next section), collaboration, as a methodological process of knowledge production, seems to run counter in many ways to the contemporary systems of valorization which are the function of a general system of knowledge production and practice that is heavily reliant upon authorship as a means of evaluating performance, job applications, research grants, tenures, and almost every other aspects of a scholar's knowledge production and practice. Most notably, authorship fulfils three important functions: (a) attribution of credit; (b) attribution of ownership; and (c) 'enabling the accrual of reputation' (Birnholtz 2006: 1759–1760). These three functions possess an important place in modern academia, as authorship is the most common and acknowledged fashion by which someone's contribution to any field of studies is established. At the same time, authorship enables us to identify who is responsible for anyone's work (in the

case of controversies, debates, or fraud), something which can become problematic or dreaded in the case of collaborative work. Finally, authorship is the way by which scholars build up their reputation, their 'symbolic capital' (Bourdieu 1994: 160–161) through which careers are built. Authorship thus represents one of the cornerstones of an institutionalized practice by which individual scholars are evaluated and assessed but also of how scholars themselves come to perceive their insertion in the field of knowledge production, management and valorization.

The image of the solitary scholar remains a prominent image in the scholarly world, despite the growing importance of participating in collaborative endeavours. This 'heroic' image emphasizes the scholar's struggle(s) to be singled out (i.e., to be published, quoted, hired, cited, impacting, researched, etc.). As the most recent historiography of authorship and literature has shown, however, such an image is fairly recent, largely inaccurate, and emerged alongside the late modern and romantic ideal of the solitary creator (see Canfora 2012; Stone and Thompson 2006; see, however Hickey, 1996). Authorship can be seen as a collaborative process, from its narrowest to its most extensive sense. In its narrowest sense, collaboration is the actual act of collaborating with someone (e.g., co-authoring a text), while in its most extensive sense, collaboration can result in a single-authored text (such as this one) in which collaboration is the intertextual endeavour in terms of its inspiration, actual quotations, feedback received, and so on, that have resulted in the actual written text (see Bakhtin 1986 [1975]: 170; Stone and Thompson 2006: 10–14).

Moreover, as it becomes clear to anyone working or hoping to work in the academic world, collaboration is increasingly required in order to satisfy contemporary demands of university management, as in the ability to be part of networks and with them to secure funding – through national, regional and international research projects – and is a reflection of one's success as a scholar. Yet, this 'collaborative' success as an academic entrepreneur somehow still sets the researcher in an individualist mould. Emphasis is still put on the single author or on being singled out; for instance, most funding bodies require a single project investigator which then translates into registration and reporting processes that subordinate other collaborators. This is not only the case for social and human sciences but also for natural sciences, even as most, if not all, natural scientific research is done in collaborative frameworks and environments. This pressure, moreover, has a series of side effects regarding the quality and integrity of the knowledge produced (Zimmer 2012).

If the objective of a collaboratory is to make collaboration a critical methodology, collaboration then should mean more than 'to collaborate'. It should mean an ability to create, produce, manage and valorize collaboratively, from the narrowest to the most extensive sense, knowledge that has to contribute to forms of institutional and individual redistributions. It also should mean to practically engage with the ways by which participants can achieve the 'felicity conditions' of the collaboratory set in advance (see next section).

Before turning to this, a brief example can illustrate the tension that might arise when collaboration is understood as method of research. Unlike the more usual

reference to individuals working together doing pieces of research that are then brought together, collaboration as a mode of research also implies a particular way of understanding intellectual activity and presentation of research – a dialogical mode of approaching the generation of knowledge.

In 1925, Walter Benjamin unsuccessfully defended his habilitation dissertation (*Habilitationsschrift*). One of the reasons for this outcome according to Hannah Arendt (2011 [1971]: 20–21, 28, 98–101) was that his habilitation committee was not able to understand Benjamin's work as a legitimate endeavour from the perspective of an individual(ist) conception of what a dissertation entails. The committee's understanding of a dissertation probably was that of a more or less linear and systematic ordering of the material by imposing onto it, and onto the reader (here the committee), the singular voice of the individual author. Benjamin, on the contrary, offered a dissertation that was characterized by an invitation to participate to a collaborative moment of knowledge production. Benjamin himself was worried of this potential gap between his collaborative attempt and the committee's vision (see Gilloch 2002: 63–65). These fears proved accurate, as in a letter to Gerhard Scholem, Benjamin reports that the two members of the committee 'claimed not to understand anything of my dissertation' (Benjamin 1996 [21 July 1925]: 275). Literally, according to Graeme Gilloch (2002: 65), Benjamin's dissertation was 'met with bewilderment'.

What was so bewildering in Benjamin's work that it baffled his committee and put him at odds with certain expectations? For that matter, in Benjamin's invitation, what was at odds with the ideal-typical authorship model of the university? Here is how Benjamin described his text to Scholem a few months before his defence:

Yet what surprises me most of all at this time is that what I have written consists, as it were, almost entirely of quotations. It is the craziest mosaic technique you can imagine and, as such, may appear so odd for a work of this kind that I will probably touch up the fair copy in places.

(Benjamin 1996 [22 December 1924]: 256)

The 'mosaic' in Benjamin's work is actually a collaborative practice, in its extensive but practical sense, even if 'produced' individually. The mosaic is a methodology to produce knowledge via the establishment of *correspondences* (affinities) between a variety of pre-existing textual (snippets, quotations, etc.) and visual materials (paintings, pictures, drawings, etc.) that do not seem, a priori, to be interwoven (see Benjamin 1989 [1982]). The result of such a process is that the knowledge thus produced is not necessarily taken to be original enough to partake in a legitimate form of academic knowledge production. The *correspondences* are the result not just of the interweaving of a variety of materials, but also of collaboration between the 'author' and the 'audience'. What might have proved Benjamin's doom is the necessity for the audience, his *Habilitationsschrift's* committee, to participate, to collaborate, in his *correspondences*, as the meaning emerging from this interweaving would not, and should not, according to Benjamin, contain itself in itself, ready to be seized. Benjamin

is expecting the process of knowledge production to be a collaborative process, including the audience, as his 'main concern was to avoid all...that would suggest that the object of analysis...would contain a message ready for interpretation, a message that would be immediately communicated or would let itself be immediately communicated to the reader or to the visitor' (see Arendt 2011 [1971]: 20–21, 28, 98–101). In other words, the emergence of meaning itself is collaborative and results from a form of apprenticeship in which a collaboration participates.

This illustration is a reminder that any collaborative process is not only a practical experience of trials and errors, but also an exercise of enactment. Being part of a collaboratory is to be confronted with its politicality – as a counterpoint to a dominant conception of academia and academic valorization systems – and a constant reminder of the difficulties of working and producing knowledge in/as a group. These efforts are important to fulfil the potential critical purchase of a collaboratory, but they need to be part of a reflexive engagement with some 'felicity conditions' in the ways in which a collaborative methodology has been designed in order to be critical. Let's now turn to these conditions.

### **From collaboration to a collaboratory: the logics behind a critical design**

This section maps the engagement with and the enactment of collaborative processes in knowledge production and practice. More particularly, it concentrates on those processes and practices which offer counterpoints to the so-called individual(ist) model of knowledge practice and production and to collaborative processes and practices that actually reproduce forms of intellectual idleness, something Pierre Bourdieu terms the 'scholastic illusion' (1994: 217). The 'scholastic illusion' is a situation in which the effects of one's social, historical, institutional, ideological, gendered and cultural situatedness are 'in an unthought stage'; in other words, it is a situation in which a scholar denies consciously or unconsciously her/his own situatedness (Haraway 1988).

Yet, it is important to note first that, even if the individual(ist) model of knowledge practice and production in social sciences and the humanities is starting to change, as the growth of co-authored pieces and of collaborative research projects suggest, it does not mean that collaborative efforts at producing knowledge necessarily fulfil the critical potential of collaborative processes. Collaboration as method is not synonymous to a critical endeavour. It is thus important to identify criteria to evaluate how such endeavours may or may not fulfil these 'felicity conditions'. Of course, varied models of knowledge practice and production exist in the academia, depending on the field of study one is embedded in, as each field possesses its own conventions, 'cultural expectations', and varying degrees of socialization to authorship (Hyland 2000). It is therefore central to first understand why individual(ist) models of knowledge practice and production permeate our apprenticeship of the discipline<sup>2</sup> as this apprenticeship leads to setting the preconditions by which certain models of knowledge practice and production are

legitimized as well as 'regulate entry and control the modes under which practice occurs' (May 2005: 203). Second, it is important to critically situate these models as most of them are now collaborative in form as the pressure to secure external funding via local, national, and international institutions increasingly requires collaborative enterprises.

The idea behind a collaboratory in social and human sciences was precisely developed to critically engage with this individual(ist) model of knowledge practice and production and the (collaborative) models that might emerge from it (Collier *et al.* 2006: 3–6; Rabinow 2006). This precision is crucial, as collaboration intuitively possesses many definitions from the narrowest, such as the simple production of something by two or more individuals, to the broadest where any form of intertextuality would serve as an example of collaboration (Stone and Thompson 2006: 21–23, see Bakhtin 1986 [1975]: 170). Principally, though, collaboration in social and human sciences is centred on two things: 'the joint production of papers and research' and 'concept development, collective reflection, and shared standard of evaluation' (Collier *et al.* 2006: 1). In this configuration, a collaboratory is a specific process aimed at inventing 'practices of knowledge production, dissemination, and critique, that resolutely refuse the symbolic capital driven individualism so prevalent in an academic world permeated with its own form of consumer capitalism' (Rabinow 2006: 2). Rabinow's invitation has to be taken on two levels.

On the first level, scholars are more and more asked to adopt the habits of an economic entrepreneur. This role is reflective of the emergence over the past decades of a so-called 'triple helix' university–industry–government through which the production, valorization and management of knowledge is likened to an economic (neoliberal) endeavour (see, for instance, Glassman *et al.* 2003; Etzkowitz 2002). So while collaboration is encouraged in order to further the ability of universities to gather research funds within this triple helix, scholars are actually invited to adopt a specific competitive ethos (see Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) in which collaboration is not necessarily synonymous with critical production or even creativity, but rather with the conformity to and the reproduction of this 'symbolic capital-driven individualism' in order to be able to secure funding. In parallel, one can also witness the instrumental use of collaboration to secure funding but also to further one's own 'marketability' whether on the academic job market or in the field of academic funding institutions.


On the second and parallel level, scholars are facing the pressure to conform to modes of thinking that would ensure their ability to publish, and thus exist and survive in the academic world. In other words, individual creativity and, to a certain extent, intellectual integrity is now premised on the disciplinary effects of peer reviewing (Frey 2003). While peer reviewing is an almost unanimously accepted framework to evaluate the legitimacy of a scholar's work in his/her production of knowledge, it nonetheless remains a problematic framework from which to engage with non-traditional forms of knowledge production and

valorization, such as interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary work (Britt Holbrook 2010). In other words, collaborative forms of knowledge production and valorization might be adrift with a certain disciplinary *habitus* regarding knowledge evaluation, precisely privileging the ‘symbolic capital driven individualism’ (Rabinow 2006: 2) that members of the Anthropological Research on the Contemporary collaboratory have been engaging with by reflecting on and producing collaboratively designed knowledge projects.

The central question thus becomes not so much one about whether the production of knowledge has to be collaborative, since any knowledge production fundamentally is a collaborative endeavour, but rather a threefold questioning regarding the logics at work in a collaborative endeavour:

- a) what is the logic of knowledge animating collaboration?
- b) what is the logic of the production of knowledge driving collaboration?
- c) what is the institutional logic guiding collaboration?

One may visualize these three logics around three continua (see [Figure 8.1](#)). It is important to note that these continua represent ideal-typical situations that should help anyone planning to organize a collaboratory in social and human sciences to design their own ‘felicity conditions’ for their collaboratory to take the function of a critical methodology. A collaboratory thus is a specific configuration as to how collaboration should function as a way to produce knowledge or as how to organize the ways by which such knowledge is managed and produced. A collaboratory also manages the ways by which its life as a collaborative framework should unfold, whether in terms of the relations among its members, between its participating institutions, or in terms of the forms of valorization of knowledge that has been thus produced. Let’s now take each of the dimensions of these ‘felicity conditions’ in turn, bearing in mind that although they are often linked together in practice, they need to be analytically distinguished.



**FIGURE 8.1** Mapping collaborations

The first dimension (A) relates to the purpose of the collaboration in terms of the type of knowledge that is produced. In the classical distinction offered by Robert W. Cox (1986 [1981]: 207–210) for International Relations theory, the purpose of knowledge production is on the one hand to engage in a problem-solving endeavour viewing the world's problems in their taken-for-grantedness, that is abiding to the 'prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized'. Or, on the other hand, the purpose should be precisely to stand 'apart from the prevailing order and [to] ask[s] how that order came about'. However, it is important to note that a collaborative effort that is 'critical' in the type of knowledge it produces is not thereby necessarily to be considered critical *as a methodological process*. For example, the form taken by this collaborative project might be entrepreneurial, thus reproducing a form of academic managerialism and consumerism, and/or reproducing forms of academic and institutional hierarchies. As we will see in the next section, collaboration, as a critical methodology, is not only defined by producing a certain type of knowledge, but it also works to produce knowledge *in a certain way*. This 'certain way' can be further broken down alongside the two remaining ideal-typical dimensions of a collaborative endeavour.

A second dimension (B) relates to the question of whether the logic of knowledge production driving the collaboration is characterized by an entrepreneurial drive or by a heuristic drive. The entrepreneurial drive is not to be solely conceived as a marker of the further integration of academic institutions into the new economy by the adoption of managerial and consumerist logics through networks such as 'new circuits of knowledge... networks that intermediate between public and private sectors, [or] extended managerial capacity', but also through the emergence of 'new investment, marketing and consumption behaviors on the part of the members of the university community' (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004: 15). As some proponents of this shift explain, academic entrepreneurship means that,

faculty members and administrators [have to] find innovative ways to offer their services to do more with less. ...Therefore, it will be increasingly important for faculty members to act entrepreneurially in meeting challenges, finding opportunities, and being successful with less. Against this backdrop, university leaders need to create organizational environments that acknowledge the value of the market, especially that of academic entrepreneurs, provide support for their endeavors, and reward the success that the temple enjoys as a result of the entrepreneur's efforts.

(Glassman et al. 2003: 372)

Collaborative endeavours undertaken under such auspices usually remain within the parameters of how research should be marketed, promoted and valorized in order to be cited, to attract funding and to help reproduce forms of hierarchization in scholarly production in which a specific workforce (usually PhD students and early career scholars) are literarily becoming cheap labour for the perpetuation of these entrepreneurial dynamics. A heuristic logic of knowledge production,

however, does not delimit its horizon of production to an entrepreneurial logic but, on the contrary, seeks to centre upon the production of creative thinking. Creative thinking means a diffuse and horizontal collaborative process for 'the development of shared concepts' (Collier *et al.* 2006: 4). Whereas the entrepreneurial logic tends to rely on 'branding' to intellectually justify a research endeavour, the heuristic logic puts its emphasis on more horizontal deliberations and negotiations to mould new concepts in order to engage with a specific research *problématique*, keeping in mind that 'explicit and openly discussed lines of authority for organizational decision-making [are] clearly separated from authority in making knowledge claims' (Collier *et al.* 2006: 4).

Finally, the third dimension (C) questions whether the above (B) is institutionalized, and how, in academic hierarchies or in more horizontally-designed redistributive structures of 'individual and collective contributions' (Rabinow 2006: 2). To what extent does collaboration rest on and reproduce pre-existing institutional hierarchies between participating institutions? To what extent does collaboration crystallize academic hierarchies, between senior scholars and PhDs for instance, or actually enable more horizontal forms of participation? While the first question has been only partially addressed by a literature interested in the geographic distribution of research proposals and grants within different European Framework Programs (see Breschi and Cusmano 2004; Kleine and Bussmann 2011), the second question is more difficult to assess empirically, although it should be subjected to a clear methodological design within a collaborative project, as should also be the case in a collaborative experiment according to Rabinow (2006). Let's now turn to what an experiment in collaboration may look like by engaging with its strengths and limitations, thus re-situating collaboration as a critical methodology within the larger literature on collaboratories.

## Strengths and limits of a collaboratory

The concept of the collaboratory was born in the late 1980s (see National Research Council 1993; Wulf 1993) within natural and computer sciences scholarly circles. The concept of the collaboratory originally geared toward building a laboratory 'without walls', a laboratory that would not be delimited by its physical location by an extensive use of computer and network tools – for data storage, analysis, access, virtual interactions, and so on – in order to foster a situation akin to co-location (see Finholt 2003). The re-creation of co-location, through virtual tools, was considered key as a laboratory conveys an image of collaboration as sharing a delimited space; to collaborate is to be in a state of co-location. A shared working space is thus key as distance is not only seen as limiting communication but also the frequency and intensity of interactions, as well as the access to and sharing of certain facilities and resources. According to Nathan Bos and his co-authors (2007: 656):

A collaboratory is an organizational entity that spans distance, supports rich and recurring human interaction oriented to a common research area, and

fosters contact between researchers who are both known and unknown to each other, and provides access to data sources, artifacts, and tools required to accomplish research tasks.

This definition has emerged from a five-year project, 'The Science of Collaboratories' (SOC), funded by the National Science Foundation in the United States 'to study large-scale academic research collaborations across many disciplines' (Bos *et al.* 2007: 654). In their analysis of large-scale collaboratories, SOC identified seven types of collaboratory models: Distributed Research Centers, Shared Instruments, Community Data Systems, Open Community Contribution Systems, Virtual Communities of Practice, Virtual Learning Communities, and Community Infrastructure Projects (Bos *et al.* 2007). These models are distinguished by the type of activity they seek to foster (aggregative or co-creative) and by the type of resource that they primarily mobilize (instruments, information, knowledge) (Bos *et al.* 2007: 668). Following this distinction, a distributed research centre collaboratory may be one of the most promising configuration for collaborative critical social and human sciences because it functions 'like a university research centre but at a distance. It is an attempt to aggregate scientific talent, effort, and resources beyond the level of individual researchers. [It is] unified by a topic area of interest and joint projects in that area' (Bos *et al.* 2007: 664). Behind this rather abstract classification, however, it is important to highlight a certain number of concrete issues regarding the management of working relations in as well as effects and implications of working in a collaboratory.

## EXPERIMENTING WITH COLLABORATION

*By Philippe Bonditti, Andrew Neal, Sven Opitz and Christopher Zebrowski*

### 1. Cyberspace is the place

Since we were located at different universities in different countries we were not able to assemble in one room in front of one computer screen. Although face-to-face meetings took place twice and are, in general, sociologically assumed to be of utmost importance for stabilizing transnational cooperation (Urry 2007: Chapter 11), most of the time we had to revert to telecommunication media, such as email, Skype, and the different functions on the website of the ICCM. Whereas collaboration in a digital environment turned out to be a real 'force multiplier' at the stage of gathering empirical material, forming a coherent argument out of these multiple sources proved much more difficult.

Initially, we used the 'forum section' on the ICCM homepage for discussing the relevant literature. However, through our Skype meetings and email exchanges we soon agreed that we should switch to using a 'wiki' for collective writing, while keeping the forum for commenting on our decisions on the

wiki. Yet this dual strategy did not play out. We simply stayed on the wiki, inserting running text, questions, comments, links and alternative arguments. During our Skype meetings, we realized that we wanted to keep all these different sorts of text in one 'document'. We wanted to see, side by side, the core argument, its potentially different paths, and the qualifications from different perspectives. As a consequence, the wiki grew messy and chaotic. In parallel, we used Skype meetings and email discussions to coordinate different steps to condense the textual scrub. In short, our writing process began to rotate around the wiki. We were drawing selectively on other communication media in order to supplement the emergent properties of the wiki.

While collaboration via digital tools is increasingly seen as the best way to approach problem solving in knowledge intensive areas (for example, in software development), we encountered the multifarious problems that go along with these new capabilities of collaborative knowledge building. This especially holds true when it comes to the point of integrating different contributions into a coherent output.

## **2. Not a matter of speed and knowledge: The wiki as a boundary object**

The wiki clearly accelerated the gathering of ideas by juxtaposing various statements, sources and hypotheses. But when it came to condensing all this into a firm argument, the wiki did not speed us up – in fact, working alone would have been probably faster. The wiki seemed to serve, first and foremost, as the appropriate tool for re-arranging, re-ordering and re-configuring textual material. At least in the last stage of the working process, it has been the place for condensation and clarification. Hence, the most important function of the wiki has been the 'edit' button. Surprisingly, we did not use the other option to 'revert' in order to restore older versions of the text. Obviously, we used the wiki to proceed 'forward' – as if there had been an unspoken agreement to take the input of the others in any case into account and use it for a next step. Taken in sum, each of us accomplished different textual tasks to transform the textual material into a scientific article, at first in no particular order and without any division of labour: adding new paragraphs, deleting others, correcting grammar and spelling, checking facts, inserting new questions to clarify the goal of a particular section, rearranging sentences, adding secondary literature, introducing new sub-headings to clarify the structure of the argument, and so on.

The wiki provided the infrastructure that allowed us to reach beyond a single-authored 'one-site practice' (Star 2010: 611). It actually constituted the laboratory of scholarly writing into a co-laboratory. It offered us a 'place' at which we collectively shared information and tested arguments, claims and justifications. Complementing the properties of the boundary object, it can be said that the wiki allowed for tolerating dissent, while, at the same time, generating the consent necessary to write.

### 3. Supplementing the wiki: Re-assembling the author through re-inscribing tasks and hierarchies

Software development is often presented to be a case in point with regards to collaborative work practice. In fact, it does not seem too far removed from collaborative authoring case studies in the social sciences: both practices can be easily conceived of as practices of collaboratively writing one single text, while its authors are spatially dispersed across different places on the globe. In software development, as well as in the fabrication of our case study, interaction is no longer tied to spatial co-location. Furthermore, some scholars have discovered an organizational discrepancy lying at the heart of collaborative software development (cf. Bryant *et al.* 2006). While organizations traditionally prescribe a subdivision of tasks, a project plan and clearly circumscribed outputs, collaborative work via digital infrastructures turned out to be at odds with these organizational schemes. It is assumed that informational infrastructures, such as the wiki, have a kind of in-built tendency for flat hierarchies. Hence, the co-operational structure of the wiki stands in sharp contrast to a command-and-control mode of organizational steering. Even more, the activity of organizing as such is being problematized in terms of inhibiting those productive and passionate forces that might trigger creative input from different directions.

On a descriptive level, we can support these observations. At the same time, however, it became increasingly clear that in our case the wiki did not provide the necessary means for harnessing the diverse materials, ideas and sources we had accumulated. As a 'flat' infrastructure it did not offer appropriate means to coordinate or even discipline our proceedings. Thus, we needed to supplement our work on the wiki. We used Skype meetings to adjust the particular tasks to be carried out to the most recent development on the wiki. In this 'feedback process' we applied several techniques: at one point, we agreed that each of us would go through the whole wiki and strengthen the line of argument by introducing sub-headings or questions. At another point, we agreed upon a particular order of succession for cutting out what we perceived as unnecessary or redundant remarks. At yet another point, we assigned different tasks or responsibilities for different sections to be, then, re-edited by others in a further step. These techniques were designed to respond to our recurring concern that we might lose the overall argument and fail to integrate the multiple threads. We deployed these techniques, in other words, to re-assemble our authorship under the conditions of an infrastructure that induces the dissolution of classical authorship.

But why, then, did our collaborative work facilitated by the wiki require supplementary measures for coordination that normally are not to be found on an open wiki? We believe that this is due to the expected outcome. The format of a scientific paper – a presentation to become an article or chapter later on – is somehow more demanding. Instead of being a mere collection of

facts about a particular topic, an article should develop a coherent argument. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the subsection in which we gathered simple facts about historical occurrences of kettling needed the least coordination – when compared to the delicate task of composing the overall question in a close dialogue with the theoretical discussion going on in our field, while relating all this to our empirical data in a linear narrative where each paragraph folds itself organically into the subsequent one. One could, of course, argue that these difficulties might simply be a product of our insistence that our outputs follow a traditional form. We certainly would not encounter these problems if we accepted to write in a ‘rhizomatic form’ – for example, by using hypertext to link a distributed network of keywords and aphorisms together (cf. Landow 2006). This rhizomatic rootage may be more compatible with a relational way of thinking (Star and Ruhlander 1996) yet, in contemporary social sciences it would probably come with a price tag: the price of not being considered for publication in most academic journals.<sup>3</sup>

#### **4. The sociality of collective authorship: Be your own workshop!**

Whereas open and anonymous wikis have fully terminated the author, in a scientific collaboratory authorship is not completely withering away, but it is in fact undergoing a profound change. Instead of disappearing with one’s own name, each collaborator contributes to the thought of others and, in turn, bears responsibility for the contribution of others. To make this process work, each person has to navigate the difficult threshold between suspending one’s own authority while at certain points simultaneously taking the initiative. It becomes extremely important to recognize good ideas from others, to attune to them, take them up, and allow them to alter one’s frame of mind.

Conversely, the initial contributor has to accept that his ideas necessarily end up in a collaborative process of re-articulation. Although this might sound quite harmonious, it is not an easy task for traditional social scientists, accustomed to undivided decisional power over their own work. Seen from the angle of the normative self-description of science, however, collective authorship could also figure as the ultimate fulfilment of the scientific ethos. Science is prominently conceived of as an ‘ideal republic’ – a place of communicative exchange where members present their findings in a community of competent scholars, whose critique helps to further the quality of the contribution. In a sense, we have integrated this activity under the multi-headed heading of one agency, preliminarily called ‘collective authorship’. Where several authors usually confront each other, for example, at workshops, we implemented our own extended and intensified workshop with the help of social media, such as the wiki. In combination with Skype conferences, email conversations, and forum discussions our collaboration on the wiki achieved an extraordinary high degree of reflexivity: different instances

commenting on each other, different observers observing other observers observing each other. This is a fairly complex enterprise of assembling a truly collaborative authorship. But it is unlikely that it could be achieved with less effort. In a way, it saturates authorship with critical sociality and it signifies a political commitment to a different modality of knowledge production.

As this specific experiment in collaboration illustrates, collaborative endeavours span multiple and dispersed sites comprising not just a diverse range of members (doctoral students, early career researchers, experienced researchers) but also a variety of research activities (workshops, conferences, literature reviews), communications, interactions and exchanges (Skype meetings, video conferencing, the virtual collaboratory platform, blogs/wikis), tools and paraphernalia (emails, laptops, projectors, telephones, differential timezones). These already set out/circumscribe how a collaborative project has to proceed to choose more specific research *problématiques* relating to, for instance, security, risk or development, as well as how this project has to think about how to study those *problématiques*. These issues raise a number of methodological questions as to the critical function of a collaboratory. How are collaborators disciplined in the collaborative process? How do collaborators arrive at agreed norms, principles, values, rules (Cogburn 2003: 86)? How does the methodology of collaborative research and the methods used or developed in the process help to produce specific social realities (Law and Urry 2004)?

This social and political space is difficult to nurture because, as noted, the rarity of moments of actual co-location affects the dynamism of any project relying on virtual tools of collaboration and on a willingness to move beyond individual(ist) models of knowledge production, management and valorization. Yet, the collaborative rather than collective nature of a collaboratory may enable, to an extent, to balance the individual requirements to satisfy this dominant system and the collective political and productive aim of such endeavour. Whereas (usually punctual) collective writing, such as the c.a.s.e. collective, is an ideal tool for positioning individuals – one has only to think about a variety of art or literature manifestoes – it proves rather limited as a heuristic tool because the dynamic necessary for the thrust of the project relies heavily on a very limited number of individuals. A collaboratory, however, is a collaborative heuristic that hosts a variety of smaller projects bound together by key problematizations – e.g., critical methodologies – without requiring a massive coordination effort to reach a cohesive collective voice. This does not necessarily mean that a collaborative endeavour is without problems when it comes to co-authoring actual pieces. As the experience above illustrates, the actual co-writing of a paper in a co-authored collective or collaborative project is a complex process often involving conflicting personal and institutional rhythms, work ethos, skills, and so on.

Collaboratories then naturally also possess limitations and potential drawbacks. The general consensus, now based on more than two decades of experience in virtual collaborative environments, is that collaboratories are difficult to create, manage, support and sustain (Bos *et al.* 2007; Finholt 2003). While collaboratories offer a potential in expanding the number and in increasing the diversity of participants to research projects, it remains unclear if 'collaboratories have qualitatively changed scientific work'. Moreover, collaboratories 'require more effort, in terms of communicating the additional information required to achieve common ground' (Finholt 2003: 18, 19). Bos and his co-authors (2007: 653–654) have further identified three types of barriers to a collaboratory's experience, which are necessary to take into account in any project to develop a collaboratory: (1) knowledge is difficult to transfer unlike information (see the box above); (2) scholars are highly independent (read: scholars are still attached to the single-author model of knowledge production); and (3) difficulty of cross-institutional work.

Another important dimension to take into account among the limitations of a collaboratory concerns the actual material conditions of production of knowledge and how they impact on the ability to produce, manage and valorize knowledge collaboratively. Academic institutions and practitioners are largely dependent on these material conditions and they are also shaped by the interplays between these conditions and artifacts and the multiple temporalities of teaching, administrating and researching. Scholars, especially junior scholars, also face the conflicting requirements of the expected fast pace of publishing in order to develop a marketable publication profile (whether to obtain a permanent position or to get promoted) and the rather slow and constraining pace of collaboration and collaborative or collective writing. These conflicting, or at times reinforcing, rhythms are not only constituted by these material conditions but are also constitutive of how the materiality of knowledge production, management and valorization is engaged with by the scholars; for instance, whether or not they chose to engage in collaborative or collective projects in light of the potential career paths (see Guillaume and Kessler, forthcoming).

Despite the intention to create a different modality of knowledge production, collaboratories have still been shown to run the risk of reproducing divisions among scientific communities, privileging an elite scientific core against a periphery, and to reinforce a form of 'balkanization' of knowledge whereby epistemic circles will tend to close off from each other (Finholt 2003: 8–9). This may simply mirror the fact that in itself a laboratory is also a material space fostering disciplinary practices, (re)producing hierarchies and power relations. A collaboratory, whether enacted in a collectively elaborated paper or in a virtual conversation over the net, may reproduce these potentially negative effects (see Finholt 2003: 7; Hoskin 1993: 275–276). Despite the stark contrast that some scholars in social sciences and humanities want to draw with collaborative environments in natural sciences, the development of collaboratories in the former may not prove so different than their counterparts in the latter (compare Collier *et al.* 2006 and Finholt 2003; Finholt and Olsen 1997).

## Conclusion

This chapter has shown that collaboratories are potentially powerful environments for using collaboration as a critical methodology, despite a series of potential limitations. Collaboratories foster ‘encounters, discussions, and sharing of ideas’ (Finholt 2003: 22) like few other scientific environments. They enable continuous and distance collaborations among scholars, thus making possible a creative form of co-location that is essential in inventing ‘practices of knowledge production, dissemination, and critique that resolutely refuse the symbolic capital driven individualism so prevalent in an academic world permeated with its own form of consumer capitalism’ (Rabinow 2006: 2). This is so for several reasons.

A collaboratory may foster critical methodology (see Guillaume 2012), in the sense of a critical process of knowledge production, because the collaborative environment surrounding the researcher might help avoid the ‘scholastic illusion’ that takes for granted one’s own representations and logics. A collaborator turns the premises of one’s thinking – its social, historical, institutional, ideological, gendered and cultural conditions of possibility at the individual and social level – from ‘an unthought stage’ (Bourdieu 1994: 217) into a reflexive stage. This is so because a method of collaboration directs scholars’ attention to ‘the way different kinds of linguistic, social, political and theoretical elements are woven together in the process of knowledge development, during which empirical material is constructed, interpreted and written’ (Alvesson and Sköldbberg 2000: 5). In doing so, a collaboratory increases the awareness among researchers of the different dimensions of knowledge production, management and valorization.

Centrally, a collaboratory, that is, a specific design to methodologically implement collaboration as a critical endeavour, helps scholars avoid a form of disengagement (Haraway 1988: 590) from acknowledging and accepting that the knowledge originating from, pertaining to, and produced by the researcher is politically situated knowledge (Haraway 1988). A critical methodology through collaboration precisely aims to counteract the managerial and consumerist forms of knowledge production, management and valorization that present themselves as the ‘normal’ order of things in the academic world. To offset this, the drive behind a collaboratory has, in effect, to partake of the creation of a capacity to invent ‘new forms of work that redistribute individual and collective contributions’ (Rabinow 2006: 2); forms that are political in the sense of their critical engagement with the three logics of collaboration highlighted in the first section. This may be done through the enactment of a horizontal platform for knowledge production, management and valorization where traditional hierarchies (in terms of gender, professional experience, geographic location, academic location) are contested. The result of this process is a (hopefully) transformative experience in terms of the way knowledge has been produced, managed and valorized.

It is important, however, to avoid moving from the ‘romantic’ ideal of the single author to one about the collective or collaborative author. Collective and collaborative endeavours are not simply efficient and their ‘rewards’ in terms of the

current expectations of the academic world are not so many. Yet, authors participating in a collective, such as the c.a.s.e. collective, or collaboratory, such as the ICCM, are reflective of an interweaving of 'varying strands of influence and agency, absorbing or incorporating differing subjectivities, and speaking in multiple voices' (Stone and Thompson 2006: 19, 23) in a resulting published text. In the end, these interweavings have enabled the establishment of more or less sustainable intellectual networks of scholars but also of research dynamics among its participants even beyond such specific endeavours. These collective and collaborative networks and dynamics have been central to sustain a vision of collaboration as a critical methodology among these scholars precisely because they have offered a supportive environment when facing the constraints and demands of the current academic market.

## Notes

- 1 I would like to thank Claudia Aradau, Stefan Elbe, Matteo Gianni, Jef Huysmans, Darcy Leigh, Lara Montesinos Coleman and Trine Villumsen Berling as well as the participants of the 2011 and 2012 ICCM workshops in Edinburgh for their useful comments on previous drafts of this chapter. The views expressed in this chapter and the translations are the author's only, as are the possible remaining opacities and mistakes.
- 2 I take 'discipline' to mean here a set of discourses and practices about knowledge acquisition, management and production aiming at and resulting in an epistemic security and stability (Weingart 2010: 4).
- 3 It is worth noting here, in light of the above discussion about Benjamin, that it is not just publication formats that are affected here but also that rhizomatic knowledge would be read differently and would lead to a different conception of what is proper knowledge.

## References

- Ackerly, B., and True, J. (2008). 'Reflexivity in Practice: Power and Ethics in Feminist Research on International Relations', *International Studies Review*, 10(4): 693–707.
- Alvesson, M., and Sköldbberg, K. (2000). *Reflexive Methodology. New Vistas for Qualitative Research*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Arendt, H. (2011 [1971]) *Walter Benjamin, 1892–1940*. Paris: Editions Allia.
- Bakhtin, M.M. (1986 [1975]). 'Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences', in Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Translated by Vern W. McGee. Austin: University of Texas Press. pp. 159–172.
- Benjamin, W. (1989 [1982]) *Paris, capitale du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Le livre des passages*. Paris: Les éditions du Cerf.
- (1996). *The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910–1940*. Edited and annotated by Gerhard Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno, translated by Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Birnholtz, J.P. (2006). 'What does it Mean to be an Author? The Intersection of Credit, Contribution, and Collaboration in Science', *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology*, 57(13): 1758–1770.
- Bos, N., Zimmerman, A., Olsen, J., Yew, J., Yerkie, J., Dahl, E., and Olson, G. (2007). 'From Shared Databases to Communities of Practice: A Taxonomy of Collaboratories', *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, 12(2): 652–672.
- Bourdieu, P. (1994). *Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l'action*. Paris: Seuil.

- Breschi, S. and Cusmano, L. (2004). 'Unveiling the Texture of a European Research Area: Emergence of Oligarchic Networks under EU Framework Programmes', *International Journal of Technology Management*, 27(8): 747–772.
- Britt Holbrook, J. (2010). 'Peer Review', in Robert Frodeman, Julie T. Klein, Carl Mitcham and J. Britt Holbrook (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 321–332.
- Bryant, S., Romero, P., and du Boulay, B. (2006). 'The Collaborative Nature of Pair Programming', *Extreme Programming and Agile Processes in Software Engineering*, vol. 4044: 53–64.
- Canfora, L. (2012). *Le copiste comme auteur*. Toulouse: Anacharsis.
- c.a.s.e. collective (2006). 'Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto', *Security Dialogue*, 37(4): 443–487.
- (2007). 'Europe, Knowledge, Politics – Engaging with the Limits: The c.a.s.e. collective Responds', *Security Dialogue*, 38(4): 559–576.
- Cogburn, D. (2003). 'HCI in the So-called Developing World: What's in it for Everyone', *Interactions*, 10(2): 80–87.
- Collier, S., Lakoff, A., and Rabinow, P. (2006). 'What is a Laboratory in the Human Sciences?' *ARC Working Paper no. 1*.
- Cox, R.W. (1986 [1981]) 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 204–254.
- Etzkowitz, H. (2002). 'The Triple Helix and the Rise of the Entrepreneurial University', in Karl Grandin, Nina Wormbs and Sven Widmalm (eds.) *The Science-Industry Nexus. History, Policy, Implications*. Stockholm: Nobel Symposium. pp. 69–92.
- Finholt, T.A. (2003). 'Collaboratories as a New Form of Scientific Organization', *Economics of Innovation and New Technology*, 12(1): 5–25.
- Finholt, T.A., and Olson, G.M. (1997). 'From Laboratories to Collaboratories: A New Organizational Form for Scientific Collaboration', *Psychological Science*, 8(1): 28–36.
- Frey, B.S. (2003). 'Publishing as Prostitution? Choosing Between One's Own Ideas and Academic Success', *Public Choice*, 116(1–2): 205–223.
- Gilloch, G. (2002) *Walter Benjamin. Critical Constellations*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Glassman, A.M., Moore, R.W., Rossy, G.L., Neupert, K., Napier, N.K., Jones, D.E., and Harvey, M. (2003). 'Academic Entrepreneurship: Views on Balancing the Acropolis and the Agora', *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 12(4): 353–374.
- Guillaume, X. (2012). 'Criticality', in Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu (eds.) *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies. An Introduction*. London: Routledge. pp. 29–32.
- Guillaume, X. and Kessler, O. (forthcoming) (manuscript). 'The Materiality of Time and the Sociology of International Relations'.
- Haraway, D. (1988). 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', *Feminist Studies*, 14(3): 575–599.
- Hickey, A. (1996). 'Double Bonds: Charles Lamb's Romantic Collaborations', *ELH*, 63(3): 735–771.
- Hoskin, K.W. (1993). 'Education and the Genesis of Disciplinarity: The Unexpected Reversal', in Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway and David J. Sylvan (eds.) *Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. pp. 271–304.
- Hyland, K. (2000). *Disciplinary Discourses. Social Interactions in Academic Writing*. London: Longman.
- Kleine, A., and Bussmann, M. (2011). 'The Analysis of European Research Networks: Cooperation in the Seventh Framework Program', paper presented at the ECPR General

- Conference in Reykjavik, August 2011. Available at: [www.ecprnet.eu/MyECPR/proposals/reykjavik/uploads/papers/1268.pdf](http://www.ecprnet.eu/MyECPR/proposals/reykjavik/uploads/papers/1268.pdf). Accessed 22 April 2012.
- Landow, G.P. (2006). *Hypertext 3.0. Critical Theory and New Media in an Era of Globalization*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Law, J. and Urry, J. (2004). 'Enacting the Social', *Economy and Society*, 33(3): 390–410.
- May, T. (2005). 'Transformations in Academic Production. Content, Context and Consequence', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 8(2): 193–209.
- National Research Council (1993). *National Collaboratories. Applying Information Technology for Scientific Research*. Washington, DC: National Academic Press.
- Rabinow, P. (2006). 'Steps Toward An anthropological Laboratory', *ARC Concept Note*, no. 1.
- Slaughter, S. and Leslie, L.L. (1997). *Academic Capitalism. Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Slaughter, S. and Rhoades, G. (2004). *Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Markets, state, and higher education*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Star, S.L. (2010). 'This is Not a Boundary Object: Reflections on the Origin of a Concept', *Science, Technology & Human Values*, 35(5): 601–617.
- Star, S.L. and Ruhlender, K. (1996). 'Steps Towards and Ecology of Infrastructure', *Information Systems Research* 7: 111–134.
- Stone, M. and Thompson, J. (2006). 'Contexts and Heterotexts: A Theoretical and Historical Introduction', in Marjorie Stone and Judith Thompson (eds.) *Literary Couplings Writing Couples. Collaborators, and the Construction of Authorship*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. pp. 3–37.
- Urry, J. (2007). *Mobilities*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Weingart, P. (2010). 'A Short History of Knowledge Formations', in Robert Frodeman, Julie Thompson Klein, Carl Mitcham, and J. Britt Holbrook (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 3–14.
- Wulf, W.A. (1993). 'The Collaboratory Opportunity', *Science*, 261(5123): 854–855.
- Zimmer, C. (2012). 'A Sharp Rise in Retractions Prompts Calls for Reform', April 16, *New York Times*. Available at: [www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retractions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?ref=science](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retractions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?ref=science). (Accessed 22 April, 2012).

# INDEX

- academic research 119–23, 132–4, 148–51;  
collaboration 191–4, 196–8, 200–3, 205;  
distance 153; genealogy 162, 169, 174,  
177–82
- accountability 78–9, 132
- actor-network theory (ANT) 24, 37–49,  
69, 122–3, 134
- Adorno, T.W. 106–7
- aesthetics 89–90, 92–3
- affect 94, 100–5, 112–13
- Afghanistan 87
- Africa 41, 49, 126
- Agamben, G. 172–4
- agency 17, 59, 61–4, 70, 72–80, 107, 205
- Agnew, J. 25
- Ahmed, S. 102
- Airport Operators Association 57
- airports 57, 65, 74
- Alker, H. 8
- Alvesson, M. 129
- Andersen, R.S. 85–117
- Anderson, B. 103
- Anthropological Research on the  
Contemporary 190, 195
- anthropology 12, 15, 38, 119, 124, 128,  
131, 134
- apparatus 64, 172
- appropriation 24, 27, 31–2, 36–40, 42,  
44–5, 133, 147, 164
- Aradau, C. 1–22, 57–84
- archaeology 19, 64, 160, 164–7, 179
- archives 165–6, 174, 179–82
- Arendt, H. 192
- arts 89–90, 92, 98–9, 103, 106, 108, 111
- assemblages 7, 10, 16–18; genealogy 160,  
173–5, 183; mapping 24, 37–9, 41–6,  
48; materiality 63–4, 67, 73–4;  
proximity 128
- associations 38
- Austin, J.L. 32, 119
- authorship 190–3, 200–2, 204–5
- aviation industry 57
- banal power 94, 105–12
- Barad, K. 17, 58, 62, 69, 72–6, 164
- Barthes, R. 94–5, 97–9, 105
- Baudrillard, J. 106, 161
- behaviourism 161
- Bellanova, R. 43
- Benjamin, W. 94, 106–8, 111, 190, 192–3
- Bennett, J. 17, 72–4, 78
- Berger, J. 96
- Bialasiewicz, L. 69
- Biebricher, T. 171
- Bigo, D. 24, 34–6, 44
- biometrics 12, 17, 43, 59, 64–8, 72, 74
- black boxing 43, 47, 66
- Bonditti, P. 159–88
- Booth, K. 10, 61, 177
- Bos, N. 197–8, 203
- boundary practices 78
- Bourdieu, P. 9, 17–18, 24; collaboration  
193; distance 142, 145–6, 149, 154;  
mapping 26–36, 38, 44, 46–9; visuality  
119
- Bourne, M. 44

- Brazil 18, 124–5  
 Bredekamp, H. 96  
*bricolage* 3, 7–10, 16, 173  
 Britain *see* United Kingdom  
 Brown, M. 122  
 Bueger, C. 43, 118–41  
 Bull, H. 161  
 Burgin, W. 94  
 Bush, G.W. 76  
 Butler, J. 17, 69, 103  
 Buzan, B. 177
- Caldeira, T. 124–5  
 Callon, M. 70, 121  
 Campbell, D. 60–1, 89–90, 92, 96  
 Cape Bojador 41  
 capitalism 30, 41, 63, 103, 107, 132, 145, 194  
 capitals 28, 30, 32–5, 66, 107, 153, 191, 194–5  
 captioning 95, 100  
 Carroll, P. 41  
 cartography 5, 35–6, 38, 40, 93  
 cascading approach 2–3, 73, 110  
 case studies 120–1, 200  
 CCTV 45, 127  
 central banks 126  
 climate change 18, 77, 98, 100, 143–4, 151  
 Cohen, A. 30  
 Cohn, C. 128  
 Cold War 25, 133, 177  
 Coleman, L.M. 142–58  
 collaboration 9, 14, 16–17, 19, 175, 179–82, 189–207  
 collaboratories 193–204  
 Colombia 12, 18, 144, 152  
 colonialism 27, 41–2, 131, 161  
 Communism 132  
 communities of practice 119, 198  
 Community Data Systems 198  
 Community Infrastructure Projects 198  
 complexity theory 147  
 complicity 131–3  
 composite agency 73–4  
 Connolly, W. 102  
 constitution of truths 94–100  
 constructivism 60–1, 96, 105  
 context 24, 26–7, 30; distance 145; genealogy 162, 175, 181; mapping 35, 37–40, 42, 44–5, 49; proximity 130, 132–3; visibility 97, 101  
 contingency 80, 95, 130, 147, 161, 163–5, 167–9, 174, 176–8  
 Copenhagen School 34–5, 143, 177–8
- copyright 107  
 correspondences 192  
 Coward, M. 57–84  
 Cox, R. 118, 121, 196  
 criminology 43–5, 95–6, 124, 170  
 critical security studies (CSS) 1–22; collaboration 190; genealogy 159–61, 163, 169, 171, 176–8; materiality 58–63, 66, 69, 72–3, 75, 79; method 159–60, 183; proximity 118–41; visibility 85–94, 99, 112  
 critical theory 2, 6, 9, 16, 60, 118  
 criticality 47–9, 77–9, 91–3, 112–13, 123, 134, 154  
 critique 6, 8, 49; collaboration 194, 201, 204; distance 148, 152, 154; genealogy 160–2, 166, 176; proximity 128; visibility 91–2, 105, 107  
 crowd-sourcing 180  
 cultural industry 106–7  
 cyberspace 198–9
- Damasio, A. 102  
 Darwin, C. 166  
 Davis, D.-A. 130  
 De Certeau, M. 110  
 Debord, G. 106, 108  
 deconstruction 2, 25, 36, 73, 107, 112, 148  
 deep/deeper webs 180  
 Deleuze, G. 65, 102, 160–1, 172, 174, 181  
 Denmark 87, 104  
 Der Derian, J. 92  
 Derrida, J. 25, 32, 161  
 development studies 124  
 Dewey, J. 18, 120–2  
 Dezalay, Y. 30  
 digitization 100, 105–12, 160, 179–82, 199–200  
 Dillon, M. 147  
 discourse analysis 2, 4, 8; genealogy 159–60, 163–6, 182; materiality 57–84; proximity 119; role 11, 16–18; visibility 85–6, 90, 95–6, 101  
 displacement 94  
*dispositifs* 17, 19, 40; distance 153; genealogy 160, 164, 175–6, 178, 181, 183; materiality 59, 61, 63–70, 72–80; strategy 172–5  
 distance 18, 34, 42, 142–58  
 distributed agency 73–7, 79  
 Distributed Research Centres 198  
 Doomsday Clock 88, 104  
*doxa* 32, 35  
 Dreyfus, H.L. 165

- Dropbox 180  
 drugs 59, 70–2  
 Durkheim, E. 27  
 dwelling 127, 132
- Edkins, J. 102  
 Egypt 41  
 elites 13, 32, 125, 203  
 emotional processes 94  
 English School 161  
 Enloe, C. 176  
 entangled agency 73–7, 79  
 entrepreneurship 194, 196–7  
 epiphenomena 166  
 epistemes 64, 173  
 epistemology 2–3, 7–9, 13; genealogy 161;  
   mapping 30, 35; materiality 59–60, 67;  
   role 18; visuality 88–9, 97, 100  
 ethics 18, 30, 59, 126, 131, 149  
 ethnography 8, 11, 13–15; distance 144,  
   149; mapping 38–9, 44, 46, 49;  
   proximity 119, 125–6, 132–3; role 18  
 Euclid 30  
 Europe 3–4, 37, 41, 43, 126, 161–2, 197  
 European Parliament 125  
 European Union (EU) 3–4, 36, 44, 57, 126  
 Evans, B. 147  
 exclusion 66–8, 76, 78, 131  
 experimentation 7–10, 17
- Facebook 107  
 false consciousness 111  
 Feldman, G. 43  
 felicity conditions 189, 193, 195  
 feminism 8, 13–14, 58, 69, 72, 161, 164  
 Fenno, R. 125  
 field theory 27–36, 47–8  
 field-effects 28, 30  
 fields of dispersal 99  
 fieldwork 18, 44, 119, 124, 126–30, 132–4,  
   142–54  
 force of problematics 143–9, 151  
 foreign policy 2, 90, 92, 101, 160  
 Foucault, M. 17–19, 25, 34–5; distance  
   142, 147–9, 153–4; genealogy 159–61,  
   163–5, 167, 169–70, 172–6, 179–82;  
   mapping 40, 48; materiality 63–5, 68,  
   78; visuality 108  
 frameworks of analysis 15–19, 143, 150  
 France 41, 125, 161, 167  
 Frankfurt School 6  
 Freeman, R. 123  
 Fujii, L.A. 124, 127  
 Fuster, G.G. 43
- game theory 161  
 Garth, B. 30  
 gatekeeping 4  
 gaze 5, 27, 30, 46, 89, 145, 151  
 gender 69, 76, 87; collaboration 189, 193,  
   204; genealogy 161, 164; proximity 124;  
   visuality 89, 93  
 genealogy 18–19, 28, 64–5, 118, 149,  
   159–88  
 genocide 124  
 genres 91–3, 96–7, 100, 111  
 Germany 106, 181  
 Gilloch, G. 192  
 globalisation 25  
 Goede, M. de 5  
 Google 180  
 Google Books Library Project 179  
 governance 25–6, 42, 44–6; distance 145,  
   147–8, 153; genealogy 169; materiality  
   58, 64–7, 72, 77; visuality 88, 92  
 Graham, S. 76–7  
 Gramsci, A. 40  
 Guantanamo 89, 93  
 Guattari, F. 102  
 guilds 36  
 Guillaume, X. 189–207  
 Gusterson, H. 44, 126, 133
- habitus* 4, 6, 10–12; collaboration 195;  
   distance 145–6, 149, 152, 154; mapping  
   28–9, 31–2, 35; role 14  
 hand luggage 57  
 Hansard 180  
 Hansen, L. 2, 86–7, 93–100, 177  
 Harding, S. 59  
 Harley, J.B. 25, 42  
 Heathrow Airport 57  
 Heck, A. 87, 96  
 hegemony 41, 73, 94, 130  
 Hekman, S. 58  
 Herschinger, E. 57–84  
 heterogeneity 37–9  
*hexis* 28  
 history 162–8, 177–8, 183  
 Hobbes, T. 161  
 homeland security 76  
 homology 30, 36  
 Horkheimer, M. 106–7  
 Hughes, H.R. 142–58  
 Hultin, N. 126  
 human rights 181–2  
 human security 177  
 human trafficking 11  
 Hungary 131

- Hurricane Katrina 76–7  
 Hussein, S. 109  
 Huysmans, J. 1–22, 121  
 hygiene 4
- identity 2–4, 44, 60, 66–70, 89, 177  
 ideology 49, 98–9, 193, 204  
 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 17  
 India 12, 59, 64, 66–8  
 infralanguage 122, 129  
 infrastructure 58–9, 63, 72; collaboration 198–200; genealogy 174, 178; materiality 74, 76–7; proximity 119, 127; visibility 90  
 inscription 24, 26–7, 29, 31, 39, 45  
 insecurity 7, 10–11, 13; genealogy 175, 177; mapping 25–6, 36, 44–6, 49; materiality 57, 61–3, 69, 71–2, 75, 78, 80; proximity 119, 125; role 17; visibility 89–90  
 intentionality 78, 97  
 interdisciplinarity 195  
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 151  
 International Collaboratory on Critical Methods (ICCM) 190, 198, 205  
 International Political Economy (IPE) 40  
 international relations (IR) 2, 4, 6; collaboration 196; distance 143–4, 146–7, 149, 153; genealogy 160–2, 164, 176–8, 183; mapping 25, 27, 29, 34–5, 37, 43, 45; materiality 58–62, 69–70; proximity 124; role 8, 11–12, 14–15, 19; visibility 88, 91, 102–3  
 internet 92, 108, 110–11  
 interpretive communities 111–12  
 intertextuality 13, 90, 93, 96, 100, 110, 191, 194  
 Intifadas 124  
 intra-action 62–3, 75–6, 79  
 Iraq 92, 109–10, 180  
 Israel 18, 124  
 Italy 131
- Jones, R.W. 177
- Kant, I. 161  
 kettling 12, 90, 100, 130, 160, 167–9, 171–6, 181–3, 201  
 Kjørup, S. 96  
 Klare, M. 60  
 Klein, B. 10  
 Koselleck, R. 166  
 Krause, K. 177–8
- Latour, B. 17–18, 24, 26–7, 37–49, 72–3, 107, 110, 120–3, 129  
 Law, J. 5, 40–1, 59, 69  
 Leander, A. 34  
 liberalism 145, 147, 160–1, 169  
 Libya 104  
 linguistics 13, 35, 58, 61, 64, 95, 99, 101, 160, 166, 204  
 liquids ban 57–8, 62, 76, 78  
 Lisle, D. 89  
 Loughlan, V. 23–56  
 Lyotard, J.-F. 161
- Machiavelli, N. 161  
 MACOSPOL 26  
 Magritte, R. 106, 108  
 Mangano-Ovalle, I. 109  
 mapping 5–6, 14, 16–17, 23–56, 64, 94  
 markets 70, 194, 196, 203, 205  
 Marx, K. 14, 27  
 Marxism 14, 105  
 Massumi, B. 101–3  
 materiality 17, 26–7, 37, 42, 45–6, 57–84, 172, 203  
 meaning making 58, 63–4, 75; distance 151; genealogy 170; proximity 127; visibility 85, 88, 92, 98–9  
 media 7, 15, 87; collaboration 198–9, 201–2; genealogy 167, 181; visibility 92–3, 97, 100–1, 105–6, 111  
 mercantilism 66  
 Mercator's projection 41  
 Merleau-Ponty, M. 39  
 method 1–22, 48, 148; distance 153; genealogy 159–60, 163, 183; materiality 58–9, 73, 77–9; proximity 122; visibility 91  
 methodology 2–3, 17–18, 23–4; collaboration 189–92, 195–7, 202, 204–5; distance 143, 145, 154; genealogy 160, 162, 165, 169, 171, 176; mapping 26, 29–31, 33, 35, 40, 42, 44–7, 49; materiality 58–68, 70, 72–5, 77–80; proximity 119, 122–3, 125, 129, 134; visibility 85–7, 93–113  
 Michels, R. 32  
 migration 43–4, 69, 95  
 military 27, 35, 44; distance 148; genealogy 159, 175, 177; materiality 69, 77; proximity 132; visibility 87, 90, 92, 98  
 Miller, P. 42  
 mimesis 111  
 Mireanu, M. 118–41  
 Mirzoeff, N. 92

- Mitchell, T. 41  
 Mitchell, W.J.T. 108  
 mobile engines 17, 23  
 Mol, A. 122  
 Möller, F. 89–90, 92  
 morality 162–3  
 Morris, E. 108  
 mosaic methodology 190, 192  
 Mosca, G. 32  
 multi-sited research 128  
 multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) 29  
 Muslims 87  
 Mutlu, C.E. 2, 85–117  
 myths 94, 99, 105–12
- National Science Foundation 198  
 nationalism 89, 98  
 Native Americans 42  
 NATO 44, 104, 146  
 Nazis 106  
 Neal, A. 1–22, 159–88  
 negotiation of selectivity 128  
 neo-colonialism 79  
 neo-conservatism 76  
 neo-gramscianism 40  
 neo-liberalism 11, 19, 42, 49, 60, 169, 194  
 neo-realism 60, 161  
 Neocleous, M. 145  
 Netherlands 41  
 networks 64, 72, 90; collaboration 191, 196–7, 205; genealogy 173–5, 180; proximity 119–23, 127–8; visibility 99  
 Neumann, I. 129  
 Newcastle Airport 57  
 Nicolini, D. 122  
 Nietzsche, F. 160, 162–4, 179  
 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 11  
 non-representational theory 101–2, 104  
 normativity 2, 10, 15–16, 38, 69  
 North America 74  
 Norway 129  
 Nullmeier, F. 125
- Ochs, J. 124  
 oil 77  
 Olsson, C. 23–56  
 ontology 2, 7–9, 24–5; genealogy 161, 183; mapping 31, 37–40, 44, 47; materiality 59–60, 72; proximity 122; visibility 108  
 Open Community Contribution Systems 198  
 Opitz, S. 159–88
- order 31  
 Other 69, 99
- Pareto, V. 32  
 Paris School 27, 34  
 participant observation 123–35, 149, 151  
 peace and conflict studies 60, 176  
 Pentagon 126  
 performativity 17, 25–6, 31; mapping 42, 46, 48; materiality 59, 61, 63–4, 68–76, 78–80; proximity 119, 121–2, 127, 130–1, 134–5; visibility 89, 108, 110–12  
*Phantom Truck* 109–10  
 phenomena 8, 12, 26; distance 144, 149; genealogy 169–71; mapping 39, 42, 46; materiality 63, 75; proximity 122; visibility 97, 100, 113  
 phenomenology 101  
 philosophy 14, 62, 102; distance 148; genealogy 161, 163; proximity 118, 134; visibility 105–6, 111  
 photography 94–5, 97–100, 103, 105  
 pictorial power 94–100, 112  
 Plato 29, 49  
 Policante, A. 130  
 political economy 40, 62  
 politics 17–18, 23–7, 29; collaboration 204; distance 142–4, 147; genealogy 160, 167–72, 176, 179–81; mapping 34–5, 39–46, 48–9; materiality 63, 65–7, 69, 72–3, 77–80; method 10–15, 148; proximity 124, 130–4; visibility 85, 87–8, 92–100, 102–5, 108–12  
 polysemy 86, 88–9, 91–2, 94–100, 112  
 Portugal 41  
 positionality 130  
 post-colonialism 14, 161  
 post-humanism 69, 72  
 post-Marxism 49  
 post-structuralism 2, 13, 60–1, 69, 91, 95, 106, 121, 161  
 Pouliot, V. 44  
 poverty 68, 79, 125  
 Powell, C. 109  
 power relations 11–14, 16, 18; collaboration 203; distance 144; genealogy 163, 165–7, 169, 172–3, 175–7, 183; mapping 29–30, 32, 35, 38–42, 44, 47–9; materiality 65–6; proximity 131–2; visibility 89–90, 94–100, 107  
 power/knowledge 172, 174, 179, 182–3  
 practice 3–7, 23, 27; collaboration 193, 195; distance 142, 145–54; genealogy

- 170, 173–4, 176, 178, 182; mapping 34–5, 37–8, 42; proximity 119–20, 123–5, 127–8, 134–5; visibility 112
- pragmatism 18, 119–23, 134
- praxiology 119
- private security 90
- problem-solving theory 6, 19, 118, 134, 196
- problematics 142–9
- problematization 6–7, 10–11, 18–19; collaboration 202; distance 142–3, 149–50, 153–4; genealogy 160, 163–4, 167–73, 176–8, 180, 182–3; materiality 70; proximity 121, 123, 135; role 33
- process 23–4, 26, 31, 38, 40, 43–4, 48, 196
- production 24, 26–7, 30–1, 37, 39, 42, 44–5
- profiling 11, 71, 95–7
- propaganda 106
- prosopography 28
- proximity 18, 34, 36, 118–41, 150
- Rabinow, P. 65, 165, 197
- Rancière, J. 89–90, 93, 106, 108, 110
- RAND Corporation 76
- rational choice theory 161
- rationalism 2, 60–1
- reception studies 92–3, 96, 111
- reflexivity 3, 12–13, 15; collaboration 193–5, 201–2, 204; distance 143, 145, 148, 150, 152–3; genealogy 159, 161, 170–1, 176; mapping 31, 36, 48; materiality 59; proximity 121, 125, 130–3; visibility 85, 89, 111
- regimes of truth 166–7, 171, 173, 176
- Reid, J. 147
- relationality 17, 24, 31–3; distance 150; genealogy 172; mapping 35, 39–42, 47–8; materiality 61–8, 72, 78–80; proximity 120
- reputation 190–1
- Rhodes, R.A.W. 125
- Roma 131
- Romania 132
- Rose, G. 89
- Rose, N. 42, 169
- Routledge, P. 150, 152
- Ruppert, E. 5
- Russia 44, 60
- Rwanda 124
- Salter, M. 2, 4
- Saurette, P. 101
- Savage, M. 5
- Scheper-Hughes, N. 124–5
- Schlag, G. 87, 96
- scholastic illusion 193, 204
- Scholem, G. 192
- Schouten, P. 23–56
- Schwartz-Shea, P. 129
- Science of Collaboratories (SOC) project 198
- science and technology studies (STS) 9, 45, 69, 72
- Scott, J.C. 41
- sea-level rise 77
- securitization theory 46, 87, 178
- Security Council 109, 164
- securityscapes 126–7, 131
- Sekula, A. 94
- semiotics 90, 97–8, 105–6, 166
- September 11 2001 25–6, 77, 89, 98, 101–2, 104, 173
- Shapiro, M.J. 92, 94–8
- Shared Instruments 198
- Shepherd, L. 2–3
- signification 98–9
- Singleton, V. 69
- Skoldberg, K. 129
- Skype 180, 182, 198–202
- slavery 11
- social construction 8, 37, 44, 46, 60, 178
- social network analysis (SNA) 5, 11, 33–4, 38
- socialisation 28, 126, 193
- Socialism 132
- sociology 4–5, 12, 16; collaboration 198; mapping 27, 30–4, 36–7, 48–9; materiality 61, 70; proximity 120; visibility 105, 108
- sole authors 190–3, 204
- solidarity 131, 152, 169
- sonograms 75
- Sontag, S. 92
- South Africa 45
- sovereignty 68, 160, 166, 176
- spatiality 23–4, 27, 29, 31, 35–6, 45, 47
- spectacles 105–12
- Spinoza, B. 102
- state maps 25–7, 30, 41–2
- statistics 11, 45, 47
- stereotypes 92, 97, 132
- strategic studies 10, 176
- strategy 65, 68, 77, 128, 171–5, 199
- Stritzel, H. 43
- structuralism 29–31, 34, 40, 47–8, 111
- surveillance 1, 43, 62, 90, 127, 132–3, 173, 175
- symmetry 37, 39–40, 44–5

- terrorism 5, 12, 57–8; genealogy 178;  
 materiality 62, 66, 76, 78; proximity  
 126; visuality 93, 99
- testimony 127
- Thailand 43
- third space 131, 150
- Thomas, O.D. 57–84
- Thrift, N. 101
- Tickner, A. 8
- TIME* 87
- topography 35–6
- topology 35–6, 39, 44, 47–8, 128–9
- transnational collaborative genealogies 180,  
 198
- Transylvania 132
- Unique Identification Authority of India  
 (UIDAI) 67
- unique identification numbers (UID) 66–7
- United Kingdom (UK) 5, 12, 57; distance  
 143–4, 146, 152; genealogy 167–8,  
 171–2, 175, 181; materiality 60;  
 proximity 125
- United Nations (UN) 70, 109, 126, 164,  
 177
- United States Army/Marine Corps Field  
 Manual 33
- United States (US) 57, 60, 76–7, 102,  
 125–6, 128, 173, 198
- Urry, J. 59
- Van Veeren, E. 89
- Vaucher, A. 30
- Verdery, K. 132–3
- vexillology 99
- Veyne, P. 163
- Virilio, P. 161, 180
- Virtual Communities of Practice 198
- Virtual Learning Communities 198
- visuality 17–18, 85–117
- Voelkner, N. 1–22, 43, 57–84
- Vuori, J.A. 85–117
- Wacquant, L. 125
- Waever, O. 143, 178
- Walters, W. 43–4
- Waltz, K. 118
- war 88–92, 100, 103, 106, 124, 147, 159,  
 178, 180
- war on terror 5, 12, 93
- Wasinski, C. 44
- weapons of mass destruction 76, 88, 109–10
- Weber, M. 27, 30, 49
- welfare state 125
- Wendt, A. 60
- Wenger, E. 119
- West 41, 43, 97, 99, 125, 161–3
- Whitehead, A.N. 48
- Wight, C. 43
- Wikileaks 180
- Wikipedia 180–1
- wikis 198–202
- Williams, M. 93, 177
- Wodak, R. 125
- workshops 201–2
- World Trade Organization (WTO) 168,  
 175
- Yanow, D. 129
- YouTube 107
- Zebrowski, C. 159–88