



African Security Politics Redefined

KARIN DOKKEN



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Printed in the United States of America.

To my mother,
Inger Lise Dokken

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACDA	US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADB	African Development Bank
ADF	Allied Democratic Force
ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire
AEC	African Economic Community
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AHSG	African Heads of State and Government
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ANC	Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congolesse National Army)
ASF	African Standby Force
ATU	Anti-Terrorist Unit
AU	African Union
BCP	Basotholand Congress Party
BDF	Botswana Defence Force
BINUB	Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi)
BNP	Basotho National Party
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERUs	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration
DMCN	Drought Monitoring Centre in Nairobi

DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social, and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
ER	Early Response
ESF	West African Standby Force
EU	European Union
EW	Early Warning
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GNP	Gross National Product
G8	Group of Eight
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICPAC	IGAD Climate Prediction Applications Centre
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGAD-SRAP	IGAD Sub-Regional Action Programme
IGOs	intergovernmental organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MARAC	Mécanisme d'Alerte Rapide en Afrique Centrale (Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System for Central Africa)
MINURCA	Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic)
MINURSO	Mission des Nations Unies pour l'organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental (Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)
MISAB	Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui (Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements)

MJP	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (Movement for Justice and Peace)
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)
MPIGO	Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great West)
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MRU	Mano River Union
NAPs	national action programs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRA	New Regionalism Approach
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OMC	Observation and Monitoring Centre
ONUB	Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Operation in Burundi)
ONUC	Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo)
ONUMOZ	Opération des Nations Unies au Mozambique (United Nations Operation in Mozambique)
OSAA	United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
PCASED	Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PLANELM	AU Planning Element
PMCs	private military companies
PSC	Peace and Security Council (AU)
PSCs	private security companies
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RECs	regional economic communities
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSC	Regional Security Complex
RUF	Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community

SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UN/ISDR	Inter-Agency Secretariat of the ISDR
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSC/PRST	United Nations Security Council Presidential Statements
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNTAF	United Task Force in Somalia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces

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For all misunderstandings and errors, I am myself responsible.

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Introduction

In late December 2006, Ethiopia launched a large-scale offensive in neighboring Somalia, taking territory captured by the Islamists over the previous six months. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had been ruling Mogadishu since June that year, was forced to flee the Somali capital, and the transitional government of Somalia, supported by the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), was able to move in.

Less than two weeks after the first Ethiopian offensive, American air strikes targeting Islamic fighters in southern Somalia began. The intentions of these strikes were twofold: First, the United States had long maintained that al-Qaeda suspects linked to the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa had taken refuge in Somalia. From their Special Forces base in Djibouti, the United States had been watching three al-Qaeda suspects in particular. These three were among the targets of the air strikes. Second, by attacking the Islamist fighters in southern Somalia, the United States wanted to ensure that the members of the UIC did not regroup and pose a threat to the transitional government in Mogadishu. Most probably, “the American action was not a random affair but intended to minimize the likelihood of an Islamic insurgency developing” (Sally Healy, cited in Reynolds 2007). The American action was also a very clear sign that African politics was again high on the political agenda of the United States. Why? This is one of the many questions that inform this book.

Somalia has been without a central government since 1991. Repeated efforts to bring stability to the country have failed. Warlords and political factions have been in control of various territories. Despite many attempts by regional bodies such as the AU and the IGAD to restore peace, security, and order, Somalia has been dramatically accelerated toward a new and catastrophic war. Somalia has become an archetypical case of a failed state. The absence of a central authority has created an environment beneficial

to extremist groups and also to terrorist groups in many parts of Somalia, but as of today their strength and numbers are unclear. Ethiopian security forces have invaded Somalia on several occasions to disrupt the activities of such groups, particularly the activities of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya and its allies. Reportedly, Al-Itihaad operates both in Somalia and in the Somali-inhabited regions of Ethiopia, where several anti-Ethiopian groups are at war with the central Ethiopian government in Addis Ababa. And as far back as 1998, the U.S. government stated that al-Qaeda members were providing military training to Somali groups opposed to the U.S. military presence in Somalia (*ibid.*, 11).

The active involvement of the United States in relation to the Somali political reality illustrates well how the perception of international security has changed among the major political actors during the last two decades. By the end of the Cold War, there was a general perception that security was closely related to states and the sovereignty of states. In fact, ever since Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau introduced their classical works, security had been referred to as “the security of states,” with the military apparatus playing the most important role in its maintenance. Security was traditionally considered to be synonymous with military security because most challenges to a state’s integrity seemed to come from external violence (Dokken 1997, 69). The world has changed, however, not least as to the realities of human security. Particularly due to the rapid geopolitical changes the world has experienced since the end of the Cold War, such restrictive interpretations of security have become outdated. Recent years have seen an increasing focus on (1) threats to the international community as a whole, primarily linked to terrorism; (2) threats against the individual, against his or her physical survival, human rights, basic welfare rights, and so on; and (3) threats to countries at a regional level. This change of focus is central to the subject of this book.

The change has been of vital importance for countries throughout the world, not just Africa. Nevertheless, one may say that both causes and consequences have taken different forms in Africa as compared with Europe and the rest of the Western world. Whereas Western countries have been the main targets of terrorists, African countries have been among the most important “breeding places” for them. And whereas Western countries are hosts to large numbers of refugees from African countries, lack of development is steadily threatening peace and stability in many African countries, forcing inhabitants to flee their home ground for uncertain futures in the West.

Notwithstanding these differences, security worldwide has been redefined in the aftermath of the Cold War, and especially after 9/11. Africa, more than anywhere else, is the avatar of the new security challenges. The redefinition of African security is the main subject of this book.

Poverty and Conflict in Africa

Though debatable, poverty is continuously cited as one of the principal factors responsible for instability in many parts of Africa. For example, West Africa contains 11 of the world's 25 poorest countries and is currently one of the most unstable regions of the world. The World Bank defines poverty as "multidimensional and a situation in which people are unable to fulfill their basic human needs as well as lack of control over resources, lack of education skills, poor health, malnutrition, lack of shelter, poor access to water and sanitation, vulnerability to shocks, violence and crime and the lack of political freedom and voice" (cited in Draman 2003, 3). According to the UNDP, more than 1 billion people live in abject poverty (ibid.). A substantial number are African.

Conflict is generally defined as an interaction between interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and who expect interference from the other party if they attempt to achieve their goal. When a conflict turns into open combat, with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, it is described as "armed conflict." Armed conflict can be either interstate (i.e., between governments) or intrastate (i.e., between a government and armed groups or between opposing armed groups). Today, intrastate conflict is the dominant type of conflict in the world in general and in Africa in particular. Currently, 30 out of 53 African countries are experiencing some form of intrastate conflict.

There is a lot of disagreement about the relationship between poverty and conflict, particularly concerning the causal relation between the two. I argue that poverty is both a cause and a consequence of conflict, that the relationship is reciprocal. Based on a large number of statistics from the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADP), the UNDP, and so on, we can say that there is a tendency for poor countries to experience conflict. In 2003, of 63 low-income countries, 38 were located in sub-Saharan countries and, as expected, these are countries associated with conflict, as tables 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate.

Some writers argue that the precise link between poverty and conflict is "elusive, variable, and strongly conditioned by a wide range of non-economic factors" (see, for instance, Nelson 1998, 24). In short, these writers argue that poverty is not a sufficient condition for conflict. However, as argued by, for instance, Draman, there are a number of theoretical and empirical studies that have established links between poverty and conflict. These studies show that poverty, inequality, scarcity of resources, and external economic forces all combine to affect political stability (Draman 2003, 8). Such studies offer either psychological or economic arguments, such as frustration-aggression theory and relative

Table 1.1 Low-income economies

Afghanistan	India	Rwanda
Bangladesh	Kenya	São Tomé and Príncipe
Benin	Korea, Dem. Rep.	Senegal
Burkina Faso	Kyrgyz Republic	Sierra Leone
Burundi	Lao PDR	Solomon Islands
Cambodia	Liberia	Somalia
Central African Republic	Madagascar	Sudan
Chad	Malawi	Tajikistan
Comoros	Mali	Tanzania
Côte d'Ivoire	Mongolia	Togo
DRC	Mauritania	Timor-Leste
Eritrea	Mozambique	Uganda
Ethiopia	Myanmar	Ukraine
Gambia, The	Nepal	Uzbekistan
Ghana	Niger	Vietnam
Guinea	Nigeria	Yemen, Rep.
Guinea-Bissau	Pakistan	Zambia
Haiti	Papua New Guinea	Zimbabwe

Source: The World Bank Group (2007).

Table 1.2 Conflict-torn sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s and 1990s

	<i>Ongoing or recently ended large-scale conflict</i>	<i>Previous large-scale conflicts</i>	<i>New large-scale conflicts (began late 1990s)</i>	<i>Smaller-scale, more localized conflict</i>	<i>Political violence short of war</i>
Central state seriously impacted during conflict	Liberia Rwanda Sierra Leone Somalia	Chad Uganda	Congo Côte d'Ivoire DRC Guinea-Bissau		
Central state relatively intact during conflict	Angola Burundi Sudan	Ethiopia Eritrea Mozambique South Africa		Comoros Djibouti Mali Namibia Niger Senegal Zimbabwe	CAR Ghana Kenya Lesotho Mauritania Niger Togo

Source: Luckham et al. (2001, 15).

deprivation theory, and they are relevant in discussing the relationship between poverty and conflict in Africa. With poor government structures and unequal access and distribution of economic resources, certain parts of the population tend to have better opportunities than others. This inevitably alters power relations, “and in turn leads to the persistence of

poverty among certain groups with very serious consequences for social stability. When people perceive that poverty is being inflicted on them, then the frustration-aggression thesis becomes relevant in understanding why men rebel" (*ibid.*, 9).¹

Other studies that have received much attention during the last 10 years demonstrate that conflicts in Africa are fueled by greed rather than grievance. Among the most important studies within this field are Collier and Hoeffler 2000 and Berdal and Malone 2000. Collier, in another study, argues that the real cause of most rebellions is "not the loud discourse of grievance, but the silent voice of greed" (2000b, 101). He also notes that in most instances of conflict in Africa, rebel movements do not have any coherent political agenda that they seek to advance. Most rebel movements in Africa, such as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF), and the Mouvement patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI), for example, have no clear political agenda. The leaders of these movements are just as much doing business as political leadership.

Evidence of a relationship between poverty and conflict is clearly demonstrated in the correlation between low GDP and low Human Development Index and conflict proneness. Data from the World Bank, the UN Human Development Index, and the ADB support this argument.² In fact, concerning income a large number of people in Africa find violent battles and civil wars a step up rather than a step down. The comfort and stability of a middle-class life is completely unknown to them. They live in a world where every day is a struggle for survival.

In his famous article "The Coming Anarchy," Robert D. Kaplan writes that "crime is what makes West Africa a natural point of departure for my report on what the political character of our planet is likely to be in the twenty-first century" (1994, 1). Kaplan further adds that "West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental and social stress, in which criminal anarchy is becoming a real strategic danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism" (*ibid.*, 2).

Recent years have seen a growing attention to questions concerning the relationship between environmental degradation, demographic changes and security.

From 1995 to 2000, an annual average of around 600,000 Sierra Leoneans were registered as internally displaced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whereas 10,000 more fled to neighboring countries each year (UNHCR 2004, 464). In the period from

1995 to 2004, the number of internally displaced Liberians averaged 266,000 each year, with a peak in 2003 of 531,616. The average annual number of refugees in the same period was around 70,000 (*ibid.*, 378). These figures not only illustrate the effects of conflict, they also illustrate the region's demographic characteristics. "Part of West Africa's quandary," according to Kaplan, "is that although its population belts are horizontal, with habitation densities increasing as one travels south away from the Sahara and toward the tropical abundance of the Atlantic littoral, the borders erected by European colonialists are vertical, and therefore at cross-purposes with demography and topography" (1994, 5). The same probably goes for the environmental characteristics not only of West Africa, but also of other African regions. As the major European powers carved up African international borders at the Berlin conference of 1884–85, they failed to take ecological subregions into consideration. That is why today, most African ecological subregions cross international borders; as such, environmental degradation in one African country most probably will have an effect in another (Dokken 1997; Buzan et al. 1998). In recent years, environmental degradation has become one aspect of a widened security concept (Dokken 1997; Buzan et al. 1998). As Kaplan states,

It is time to understand "the environment" for what it is: the national security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possible, rising sea levels in critical overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh—developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts—will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting interests left over from the Cold War.

(Kaplan 1994, 7)³

The relationship between security and the environment is still debated among researchers. Nevertheless, we do not risk very much by saying that environmental scarcity or environmental degradation will inflame existing hatred and affect power relationships. And large-scale population movements as a result of environmental degradation and scarcity will almost certainly lead to crime surges and to growing regional disparities and conflict in countries with strong traditions of warlordism and weak traditions of central government—such as Africa.

Another phenomenon important for the reconsideration of our security concept is the changing status and role of the nation-state. In *The Transformation of War*, published in 1991, Martin van Creveld writes that "the period of the nation-states and, therefore, of state conflict is now ending, and

with it the clear ‘threefold division into government, army, and people’ which state-directed wars enforce” (van Creveld 1991, 50–51). According to van Creveld, the first step is thus to look back to the past immediately prior to the birth of modernism—the wars in medieval Europe which began during the Reformation and reached their culmination in the Thirty Years’ War. “In all these struggles political, social, economic, and religious motives were hopelessly entangled. Since this was an age when armies consisted of mercenaries, all were also attended by swarms of military entrepreneurs. . . . Many of them paid little but lip service to the organizations for whom they had contracted to fight. Instead, they robbed the countryside on their own behalf . . .” (ibid).

This could serve as a description of many present-day wars in Africa. In medieval times, there was no “politics” as we understand it today. In the same way, politics is less prevalent in many of the armed African conflicts of our day, such as those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. The lack of politics also makes distinctions between war and crime hard to determine. The crime comparison is also related to states’ loss of the legal monopoly of the use of armed force. Once the legal monopoly of armed force, traditionally the prerogative of the state, is lost, existing distinctions between war and crime will break down. This is very much the case today in Africa. Some would argue that many African states have never had such a monopoly. Consider countries such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for instance. Since their independence, strong military groups outside the reach of governmental forces have controlled large parts of each.

Moreover, as small-scale violence multiplies in many African countries, state armies will shrink, being gradually replaced by a booming private security business.

Another contemporary phenomenon a bit like the medieval situation is the instability of centers of authority in Africa today. Instead of a system with fixed, strong borders and geographically stable centers of power, which has been typical of Westphalian states, African states today have porous borders and shifting centers of power. The increasing privatization of security is exacerbating this phenomenon.

To cite Kaplan again, “[i]ssues like West Africa could yet emerge as a new kind of foreign-policy issue, further eroding America’s domestic peace” (1994, 19). In a post-9/11 world, Kaplan’s statement is more relevant than he could ever have imagined. “The spectacle of several West African nations collapsing at once” could make American politicians initiate security-political actions very similar to some of the most dramatic initiatives adopted immediately after 9/11. “Africa may be marginal in terms of conventional late-twentieth-century conceptions of strategy, but in an age of racial and cultural clash, when national defence is increasingly local, Africa’s distress will exert a destabilizing influence on the United States” (ibid., 20).

The Nature of African Conflicts

To gain a better understanding of what African conflicts are like, it is possible to classify them according to specific distinctions. Below, I shall give a brief introduction to African conflicts based on the following distinctions: (1) the scale of conflict; (2) their uneven geographical and social impact; (3) the historical variations in the nature and dynamic of the conflicts themselves; (4) their duration and how over time they become embedded in social, economic, and political structures; (5) transformations in the political economy of war and variations in the economic sources of conflict; (6) the survival of the state; and (7) the regionalization of war.⁴

The scale of conflict has been immense during the last decades in Africa. More than 50 percent of all African states have been in warfare of one kind or another during the past two decades.

According to table 1.3, sub-Saharan Africa has been the most conflict-affected region during the past two decades, and by a considerable margin. And “[t]en of the 24 most war-affected countries considered in a recent study of the causes of humanitarian emergencies between 1980 and 1994 are African, and four of these (Liberia, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia) are ranked within the five most severely affected” (Luckham et al. 2001, 7).

The uneven geographical and social impact of conflict

The spread of conflict in Africa has been uneven. Different parts of the continent have been differently hit, and areas within states differently affected. This is difficult to support with statistical data, however, and we know that conflicts that have seemingly struck an entire nation have had very different impacts on various segments of the population. This is true of the Liberian civil wars. On the other hand, conflicts that seem to be limited in their reach can have devastating effects on a state as a whole. But, generally, the impact has been greater where conflicts have penetrated core regions that are strategic for governance or have affected vital resources, rather than being confined to more peripheral areas where nothing much is at stake for the running of the country.

Historical variations in African conflicts

In many ways, the character of African wars has changed during the past 50–60 years. In the 1950s and 1960s, African wars were primarily related to the struggle for independence and to attempts to redefine national identity

Table 1.3 War casualties in a selection of sub-Saharan African countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>1900–70</i>	<i>1970–80</i>	<i>1980–90</i>	<i>1990–Present</i>
Angola	1961–75	1976–95		1998 <
Burundi		1972	1988–95	
Cameroon	1955–60			
CAR				1996–97
Chad			1980–94	
Comoros				
Congo				1993 <
Djibouti				1990–96
DRC	1960–65			1993 and 1996 <
Eritrea		1974–91		1998 <
Ethiopia	1935 1941	1974–9, 1976–91		1998 <
Guinea-Bissau	1962–74			1998 <
Kenya	1954–56			1991–96
Liberia			1985–88	1990–97
Madagascar				
Mali			1988–94	
Mozambique	1965–75, 1976–94			
Niger				1991–96
Nigeria	1967–70		1980, 1984	1991
Rwanda	1956–65			1992–97
Senegal			1982 (+/-)	
Sierra Leone				1991 <
Somalia			1988–95	
South Africa	1899–06	1976	1983–94	
Sudan	1963–72		1983 <	
Uganda	1966	1970–78	1980–87	1992 <
Zambia	1964			
Zimbabwe		1972–79	1983–84	

Legend:	Casualties
White dates	500,000 +
White dates	100,000–500,000
Black dates	50,000–100,000
Black dates	10,000–50,000
Black dates	< 10,000

Owing to insufficient data, strong estimates for Angola, Comoros, DRC, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and South Africa cannot be made at this time.

Since their independence, the following countries have witnessed minor conflicts (i.e., of less than 5,000 casualties): Togo, Ghana, Gabon, Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia, Western Sahara, and Zambia.

Note: Owing to insufficient data, strong estimates for Angola, Comoros, DRC, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and South Africa cannot be made at this time.

Since their independence, the following countries have witnessed minor conflicts (i.e., of less than 5,000 casualties): Togo, Ghana, Gabon, Comoros, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia, Western Sahara, and Zambia. < means “not yet finished.”

Source: Luckham et al. (2001, 5).

and sometimes the boundaries of the postcolonial state (as in the Congo, Nigeria, Western Sahara, Eritrea, etc.). During the Cold War there were a number of wars on the African continent directly related to the super-powers' efforts to use African states in their pursuit of global supremacy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, several wars were fought in an effort to overthrow postcolonial governments that had outlived their legitimacy (Uganda between 1979 and 1986; Ethiopia during the Derg⁵). These kinds of wars were then followed by the so-called new wars on the African continent, that is, wars associated with the fracturing of weak states. To a large degree, present-day wars in Africa are of the latter kind (Clapham 1996). In addition to being closely related to the fracturing of weak states, these new wars are more occupied with a civilian-motivated destruction than has been the case before. This is not to say that adverse consequences of warfare are new, but during the liberalization struggles of the mid-twentieth century, as well as during the so-called reform wars of the postcolonial period, conflicts were to a larger degree motivated by a political agenda than what is the case today. Let us recall here that analysts of the new African wars argue that the conflicts are motivated by greed rather than grievance (Collier 2000a).

The embeddedness of conflicts in economic, social, and political structures

It seems that conflicts in Africa are seldom resolved following the conclusion of a peace agreement. During the past 10–15 years, African wars typically ended only to break out again a few years later. This can be explained in several ways. Some argue that conflicts reoccur because of the continued failure of governments to solve underlying problems in society. Others argue that patterns of political violence tend to become embedded in economic, social, and political structures. Referring to the so-called political economy of war, they argue that many armed groups have vested interests in the wars, and for them warfare becomes a livelihood (Luckham et al. 2001, 11; Baregu 2002). Whichever explanation is correct, it is apparent that the duration and recurrence of new African wars is a typical feature. It seems that violent conflicts and the patterns of behavior sustaining them have been reproducing themselves over time.

Transformations in the political economy of war

Although we might say that most of the “new wars” in Africa “arose from deep crises of state legitimacy, aggravated by failures of governance, as well as economic dislocations,” the continuation or renewal of violence

“emerged as conflicts became embedded and were sustained over the longer-run by national and regional war economies” (Luckham et al. 2001, 11). In other words, the genesis of the conflicts was often political, but their reproduction was increasingly economic.

During the first two or three decades after independence, the African states controlled access to their economic assets and thus the sources of economic patronage. They also had more or less undisputed monopolies of violence. The violence was primarily from the top down and, for the most part, took the form of state repression of dissent and the maintenance of exploitative economic relations. Primarily because of acute fiscal crises aggravated by declining foreign aid, state control of patronage and of violence in several African countries became significantly eroded.

As the regimes lost control over their economic and political means, and henceforth their monopoly of violence, creative political entrepreneurs have sought other sources of power. In many cases, they have relocated their activities outside the state and built power bases through the creation of private armies and militias and control over the export of valuable minerals, oil, and timber. Parallel to this comes the fact that the states’ means of violence have often been privatized, partly because of a general international trend where armies are denationalized. This is not to say that the political elite did not control valuable resources and did not take advantage of this before the end of the Cold War. What is new is that elite control over these resources has become a direct input in the various violent conflicts on the continent. Control over valuable resources gives the the opportunity to engage in violent conflicts. Moreover, the possibility of generating great wealth from such control has increased significantly with greater access to global markets, which, in turn, has increased the likelihood of economic violence. Therefore, it may not be a coincidence that a number of recent wars in Africa have been concentrated in resource-rich countries such as Sierra Leone, Angola, and the DRC. Privatized military activity has been all the more likely when natural resources could be exploited with minimal technology and where control of the capital or the machinery of the state has not been necessary. The exploitation of alluvial diamonds in Angola is a good example of this. Moreover, we know that price changes are often conflict-induced, a fact that has presented lucrative trading opportunities for military entrepreneurs, a reason why economic agendas become more pronounced as civil wars develop.

As mentioned earlier, there is no agreement concerning the relative importance of greed versus grievance as explanatory factors for civil wars. However, influential (quantitative) studies conducted in the past ten years conclude that greed is the most effective cause among the two

(e.g., see Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Also, research shows that economic incentives have considerable explanatory power for many contemporary conflicts. One should not conclude that grievance does not matter; rather, the two probably interact. However, it is correct to say that “more attention should be paid to the economic sources of conflict and to the economic agendas that emerge to sustain them as they evolve” (Luckham et al. 2001, 14). Conflict represents an opportunity to groups of the society. They earn more from engaging in violent conflict than they do floating around unemployed.

The survival of the state in times of conflict

The state in Africa is the subject of Chapter 2. Here, though, I briefly address the direction of the causal arrow between violent conflict/civil war and the weakening or collapse of the African state.

One is right to say that, in relation to many of the ongoing or recent large-scale conflicts on the African continent, the central state of the relevant country has been seriously incapacitated. This is the case with countries such as Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Chad, Uganda, Congo (Brazzaville), the DRC, and Guinea-Bissau. We do not know for certain, however, whether the weakening of the state was a precursor for the outbreak of conflict or a result thereof. The arrow likely points in both directions, indicating a reciprocal relationship. Influential studies of recent years claim that members of weak regimes may have their own interests in allowing armed groups to proliferate and perpetuate instability.⁶

The regionalization of war in Africa

African conflicts of our times have a certain regional transformation (or transnationalization) attached to them.⁷

The political economy of war is dominated by so-called warlords and by weapons, minerals, and other natural resources that are sold through-out and out of the region by simple means. It is important to keep in mind here that it is the region and not the state that should be the unit for analysis, as Barry Buzan’s logic of the so-called regional security complex suggests (Buzan 1991, 190). This means that in regions like West Africa or Central Africa, the patterns of friendship and enmity are not tied to single incidents, but rather to a series of factors bound together by politico-economic relations, informal and formal trade, patterns of investment, natural resources, transnational armed groups, and the smuggling of arms and natural resources across national borders. Based on this, we can define a regional security complex as a group of states that are so closely bound that the security considerations of the various regimes cannot be considered in isolation from one another.

According to Daniel Bach, the expansive dynamics of trans-state networks that, depending on time and circumstances, are associated with survival and enrichment, or greed and plunder, lead to an increasing regionalization in Africa. This is why we can speak about a regionalization of civil wars in Africa (Bach 2003). The phenomenon is illustrated in table 1.4. We will return to this in Chapter 3.

Table 1.4 Sub-Saharan African regional conflict complexes (late 1990s to the first decade of the twenty-first century)

	Angola, Congo, Namibia (South Africa)
↕	
→	DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Congo (Brazzaville) [Botswana, Zambia, South Africa, SADC]
↕	
→	Rwanda, DRC, Burundi, Uganda [UN, France]
↕	
→	Burundi, Rwanda, DRC [Tanzania, East African Community]
→	Uganda, DRC, Rwanda, Sudan
→	Congo (Brazzaville), Angola, DRC
→	Sudan, Uganda, DRC, Eritrea [IGAD]
↕	
	Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen [IGAD]
↕	
	Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, U.S., UN
↕	
	Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, ECOMOG [ECOWAS]
↕	
	Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, ECOMOG, UN [ECOWAS]
↕	
	Guinea (Bissau), Senegal, ECOMOG [ECOWAS]
↕	
	Senegal (Casamance), Guinea (Bissau)

Note: 1. This table leaves out a few conflicts that were active earlier during the 1990s but have been more or less satisfactorily terminated—for example, those in Mozambique and Mali and the border dispute between Mauritania and Senegal. On the other hand, one or two of the conflicts listed in the table are not presently active, but are listed because the countries concerned are either still involved in their neighbours' conflicts (e.g., Liberia) or because the conflict is still not yet fully resolved (e.g., Eritrea-Ethiopia).

2. Countries and organizations in parentheses were previously participants in these conflicts but are no longer involved; those in square brackets are involved in conflict resolution, rather than in military operations.

Source: Luckham et al. (2001, 18).

Substate and International Terrorism in Africa

Africa is the continent most afflicted with terrorism—albeit domestic, not international, terrorism. If terrorism is defined as violent acts against a civilian population by nonstate actors, it is employed by many African groups, including paramilitaries in the DRC, the RUF in Sierra Leone, all the warring parties in Liberia, militias in the Republic of Congo, warlords in Somalia, and by the many other participants of Africa's numerous civil wars. Terrorism, or substate terrorism, is and has been a characteristic and deliberate strategy in many of the conflicts that have beset the continent. Guerrilla armies and warlords in Africa have adopted this tactic for decades, during wars predating and unconnected to the larger global terrorist threat.

In addition, numbers provided by the U.S. State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* indicate that international terrorism is on the increase in Africa, although from a very low base, with only 6 percent of international terrorist incidents committed on African soil between 1990 and 2002 (Cilliers 2003, 93). Evaluating the costs of international terrorism in terms of human casualties presents a different and more alarming picture, as stated by Cilliers (2003). Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 296 acts of international terrorism during the same period, second only to Asia (*ibid.*, 93). These attacks against international targets gained attention, in particular the attacks on U.S. embassies in August 1998 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. The two attacks killed 224 people and injured over 5,000 people (Dagne 2002, 5).

International terrorism networks and alleged al-Qaeda links to Africa

After 9/11, Africa and groups operating in Africa have been in focus for their alleged links to al-Qaeda, although the extent of the relationships is uncertain. One such alleged link is to the financing of al-Qaeda and its operations. A November 2001 *Washington Post* article asserted that the resale of diamonds purchased from African rebel movements, most notably the RUF in Sierra Leone and groups in Angola, had been used to fund international terrorism networks. The *Post*, which cited "U.S. and European intelligence officials" as sources, alleged that "diamond dealers are working directly with men named by the FBI as key operatives in Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network" (*Washington Post* 2001). A 2003 report from Global Witness, an international nongovernmental organization (NGO), endorsed the article's main argument. The report states

that “al Qaeda has been involved in rough diamond trade since the 1990s. Firstly in Kenya and Tanzania and then in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where they began to show an interest in diamond trading in 1998, following the crackdown on their financial activities in the wake of the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania” (Global Witness 2003a, 6).

Another alleged link is personal ties. The 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings were carried out by Saudis and Egyptians affiliated with bin Laden, including, it is believed, Muhammad Atef, bin Laden’s military chief (Shillinger 2005, 3). The June 1995 attacks in Addis Ababa that nearly killed the visiting Egyptian president, Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, was carried out by a Sudanese/Egyptian faction of the radical group Islamic Jihad, run by bin Laden’s closest associate, the Egyptian doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri (ibid.). Cilliers states that al-Qaeda cells located in and operating from Somalia participated in, among others, the bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa in 2002, and an attempted attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi in 2003 (Cilliers 2006, 65).

This kind of evidence shows that the most feared terrorist organization of the twenty-first century, al-Qaeda, is working from important bases in Africa.

A potential breeding ground? Poverty and state weakness

The links and connections between weak and collapsed state structures, poverty, repression, and international terrorism have led commentators to view Africa as a potential breeding ground for terrorism. Cilliers argues that the future threat to the continent lies in the complex mixture and intermingling of subnational and international terrorism, and she asserts that Africa may come to play a central role in international terrorism (Cilliers 2003). Central to this argument is that the absence of governance and the limited ability of African countries to maintain law and order have created an opportunity for nonstate military organizations. In his *Dilemmas of Weak States: Africa and Transitional Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, Tatah Mentan’s fundamental conclusion is that “the wellsprings of terrorism are widespread and deep,” obviously referring to “springs” in Africa (Mentan 2004, 364).

Compared with the Middle East, Africa, for the U.S. and Western administrations, has been on the political periphery in the war on terror. However, the continent is still a source of concern. Conditions endemic on the African continent have been linked to international terrorism.

According to the September 2002 *U.S. National Security Strategy*, the attacks taught the United States “that weak states . . . can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders” (White House 2002, v). In the same vein, Mentan states that “[w]eak or failed states are [therefore] incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. This outcome is troubling to an international system that demands a state’s capacity to govern its space. Failed or weak states easily become ‘breeding grounds’ of instability, mass migration and murder, as well as witting or unwitting reservoirs and exporters of terror” (2004, ix).

After 9/11, the debate over whether poverty causes terrorism has gained considerable momentum. Although certain studies refute the link between poverty and terrorism, others have found robust links between the two. A quantitative cross-country study by Li and Schaub finds that economic development in a country and among its major trading partners reduces the likelihood of transnational terrorism. They conclude that the effect of economic development in reducing transnational terrorism is significant and that “promoting economic development and reducing poverty should be an important component in the global war against terrorism” (Li and Schaub 2004, 253). Long recognized as the most impoverished continent, Africa has considerable potential; that is, it is a continent where a lot could be accomplished with relatively modest means.

Africa’s new strategic importance

Despite the decline in Africa’s strategic importance after the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terror have again increased the importance of the continent for the U.S. and other great powers. This is expressed in both words and actions.

In July 2003, President Bush visited Africa (Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda, and Nigeria), the first sitting Republican president to do so. Before his departure, the president stated that “many African countries have the will to fight the war on terror . . . we will give them to [sic] the tools and the resources to win [this] war” (cited in Nwazota 2003). The administration has also focused on increased aid and access to trade. The Bush administration has proposed a \$5 billion increase through the establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the \$15 billion American initiative to fight AIDS.

The Sahel area has been announced as the “new front” in the war against terror. The United States has ramped up its military presence in Djibouti to about 1,800 troops to better monitor the Horn of Africa and the lower Arab peninsula—Somalia and Yemen in particular. Military training exercises are undertaken in countries like Mali and Chad in order to enhance the security tools at ports and borders in East African states. American officials have also started to cooperate with various African financial institutions to improve the tracking and screening of funds. Thus, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror are important factors explaining how Africa’s role in international security has again become important. It is therefore even more important to understand the issue of African security and insecurity. This is the aim of the present book. I argue that in order to obtain such an understanding we must focus just as much on the *system* of states in Africa as on the will and capacity of the various political *actors*. Too much has been said and written about the will of African statesmen to fight terrorism, too little about the suitability of the African system of states and regions to resist the kind of activity that international terrorism represents. The system of states is related to social and economic development, for certain, but also to the development of sounder structures of governance, nationally, regionally, and continentally.

The Structure of the Book

This book is divided into two main parts: Part 1, “Defining African Security,” and Part 2, “The Institutional Response.” Empirically and theoretically, the characteristics of (in)security in Africa are very different from what we find in the Western world.

It is now commonly recognized that the state in Africa is quite different from its European counterpart. Whereas most European states can be described by reference to the Weberian model of modern states (see Chapter 2), African states are usually described by concepts such as neopatrimonialism, shadow states, et cetera. Moreover, the concept of state sovereignty does not make sense in Africa in the same way as it does in modern Westphalian states. The African state is often not autonomous, nor does its control over its population and its economic resources extend beyond the central parts of the country. This has led to the introduction of concepts such as “degrees of statehood” (Clapham 1998).

The way the state is built up and functions will, of course, have important bearings on the way it relates both to various groups within its own territory and to neighboring states and the international community. That is, the security politics of a neopatrimonial state with important transnational connections will necessarily be a lot different from the security

politics of a modern Weberian/Westphalian state. The development of the African state within a changing international context is the subject of Chapter 2.

The international system is generally considered to be anarchic and decentralized. Its most important unit for analysis is the state. However, almost all African conflicts cross international borders and have consequences far beyond the state in which they originate. In other words, African conflicts are transnational and regional. This phenomenon is key to understanding the security-political reality in Africa. The first section of Chapter 3 will be devoted to transnational processes related to African conflicts.

One way of describing the African states is that they are "weak states governed by strong regimes." The power of African political elites has usually been strong and long lasting. At the same time, the state apparatus has been weak and the state has had only limited control of the use of armed power. Most African states have very little real control of resource bases and international borders. This means that a civil war will often shatter a state, an example of this being the Liberian state toward the end of the 1990s. The collapse of Liberia brought the rest of the West African region into a political economy of war. This phenomenon has been referred to as regional implosion. Regional implosion can be defined as a situation wherein a regional state structure collapses, and other states of the region are pulled into the intrastate conflict and into the political economy of the collapsed state. It is a phenomenon typical of African civil wars. Acknowledging this, African political leaders have to a growing degree sought regional solutions to various conflicts. The regionalization of civil wars has brought about a growing regional cooperation, also in security politics. However, this relatively new trend is accompanied by a parallel process wherein the same politicians (clandestinely) are trying to enrich themselves by means of the transnational war economy of the region.

The regionalization of civil wars, the phenomenon of regional implosion, and other regional aspects of war in general are discussed in the second part of Chapter 3.

Part 2 of this book focuses on the institutional response to African security challenges.

With the end of the Cold War, African states have been forced to form a security-political strategy of their own. This new challenge, combined with the insight related to the regional character of most violent African conflicts, led politicians to focus more on regional organizations when trying to find solutions to ongoing conflicts. Chapter 4 is an introduction to three such organizations in relation to the security-political changes of the 1990s: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), IGAD, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Originally formed as an intergovernmental organization for trade and development, ECOWAS has become an important actor in West African security politics. The organization went through broad security-political reforms in the late 1990s and now has its own deputy secretary general for security politics as well as a department dedicated to security-political matters. The first section of Chapter 4 will be an introduction to ECOWAS as a security-political actor.

In the Horn of Africa, regional solutions to violent conflicts have become more and more common during the recent years. The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was formed in 1986. Originally IGADD was thought to be a forum to deal with problems related to drought and development. Over the years, its focus has widened to encompass environmental questions in general, food security, economic cooperation, and humanitarian issues. It now even plays a significant role in efforts of conflict resolution in the region. Its name has been changed to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). A Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established by IGAD in June 2003. The second section of Chapter 4 will be an introduction to IGAD as a security-political actor.

In southern Africa, the most important intergovernmental organization is the SADC. Originally formed as an organization to reduce the dependency of southern African “frontline states” on apartheid-era South Africa, today the SADC is a multipurpose organization with activities in most sectors of society, including a challenging role in the security politics of one of the world’s most conflict-ridden areas. The focus of the third section of chapter four is to examine the SADC’s role in the security-political reality of southern Africa. Is the organization well suited to handle the challenges related to one of the world’s most conflict-ridden areas?

In addition to the various (sub)regional intergovernmental organizations introduced above, the African states have also formed a continental organization that has peacekeeping and security as one of its main purposes, that is, the AU. The forerunner to the AU, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), never really managed to develop a functioning security policy. The principles of national sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states are largely responsible for that. The OAU’s charter, which dates back to the birth of that organization in 1963, cites the principle of noninterference no less than three times. Moreover, the OAU’s explicit focus on national sovereignty underscores how important the concept of state security was to the organization. OAU members were committed to respecting the territorial integrity and independence of all African countries. This has changed with the establishment of the AU,

the OAU's legal successor. An increased focus on human security and individual welfare marks the AU. Based on the recognition that solutions to intrastate conflicts necessitate a new emphasis on human security, African leaders adopted a Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy in 2004. The changes in security-political principles during the course of the transition from OAU to AU is the main focus in the first section of Chapter 5.

With the establishment of the AU, there was also a renewed focus on the relationship between the continental organization and the various subregional organizations, such as SADC, IGAD, and ECOWAS. This relationship has had a significant impact on the security-political effort of the AU. Without close cooperation between the continental organization and the subregional ones, security-political initiatives taken by the AU are not likely to succeed. Concerning, for instance, the focus on an early-warning mechanism, the subregional organizations are the most important suppliers of information to the AU. These units are to be "linked directly through appropriate means of communication to the Situation Room" and they shall "collect and process data at their level" (African Union 2002b, Article 12, 2b). The second section of Chapter 5 addresses the relationship between the AU and the subregional organizations. Are their efforts well coordinated? Do their activities move in the same direction?

In its first four decades, the UN sponsored only one peacekeeping operation in Africa: the UN operation in the Congo (1960–64). It was not until 1989 that the UN again sent military personnel to the continent, this time to Namibia. Then, in the 1990s, 17 UN operations were launched in Africa. The history of UN military intervention in Africa is rich in diversity and includes both successes (Namibia and Mozambique) and utter failures (Somalia). Chapter 6 offers an introduction to UN peacekeeping in Africa. The focus will be on the challenges of peacekeeping in Africa, the changes in UN peacekeeping over time, and the different needs in the various geographical subregions of the continent. We will also briefly analyze the degree of coordination/cooperation between the UN and one of the inter-governmental organizations in Africa, ECOWAS.

The end of the Cold War, the process of globalization, and the all-encompassing neoliberal strategy in world politics have created a whole range of new financial and economic opportunities for a variety of private actors, also in relation to violent conflicts in Africa. These opportunities, in combination with the phenomenon of weak, unconsolidated governments, has seen the emergence of national and transnational actors who are directly implicated in criminal economic activities such as illicit resource exploitation, drug trafficking, and the illegal proliferation of

small arms. The first section of Chapter 7 will focus on the phenomenon often referred to as “the business of war” in Africa.

Closely related to (or rather a part of) the economic aspects of war is the increasing use of private security/military firms in Africa. One study shows that 15 such companies were active in the period from 1950 to 1989, whereas 65 firms were active in the period from 1990 to 1998 (Holmquist 2005, 11). This increase could be a signal that the African state does not have monopoly of the use of armed force, which, according to Max Weber, is an essential feature of a modern state. The second section of Chapter 7 later analyzes the reasons why this monopoly does not exist. What driving forces lie behind this change in the African states’ way of organizing their own defense and security? What consequences can this have for the further development of the African states?

International Relations Theories and African Security Politics

We need analytical tools to be able to understand African security in a complex world. We need concepts and analytical frameworks that can help us organize a complex reality—that is, we need theories.

Most theories on international relations (IR) are based on the political experiences of the Western world. Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of students and researchers who have applied these theories directly to the study of African politics. It is primarily the theoretical bastions of realism and liberalism that have been used in this way. This, of course, is problematic. There are obviously aspects of both these theories that can be transferred directly to various parts of the world. However, there are also aspects of them that are so directly related to a European or American reality that transferring them to other parts of the world will give us a very misleading picture. The relevance and the limitations of realism and liberalism for the study of African security politics will therefore be discussed below.

Realism

The world has always been marked by insecurity, fear and conflict between groups. According to the theory of realism, these features are a result of the way both individuals and states relate to one another in international society. Classical realists like Hans J. Morgenthau (1973) attribute these problems to the nature of human beings. He bases this on the theory of Thomas Hobbes, who said that human beings by nature are conflict oriented. Classical realists transfer this human quality directly to the political system.

According to classical realists, there are three fundamental aspects of the international system. First, it is anarchical, that is, it is characterized by the absence of a superior authority or international government. It is also anarchical in the sense that it lacks a set of common norms to guide its behavior. The states are considered to be rational and unitary actors whose main goal is to strengthen their own national interests. Second, as conflict and war are rooted in human nature, conflict is the normal condition/state in international politics. This is primarily owing to a scarcity of resources, which leads to constant competition among states. To protect their own national interests (primarily defined as state survival), states will make efforts to hinder others and to increase their own possibilities and capabilities. Third, power is the central substantive focus of realism. The actors are primarily occupied with balancing their own power in relation to the power of others. Power is always unequally distributed among the actors. Some states are stronger than others.

The combination of these three elements generates a considerable degree of fear because states want to strengthen their own interests and their own power at the expense of other states.

As the anarchical structures of international society do not limit the actions of states, realism will emphasize conflict and competition in international politics. This is also reflected in the key concepts of realism, that is, “balance of power” and “security dilemma.”

Based on this understanding of the driving forces in international politics, we arrive at what R. B. J. Walker (1993) refers to as the “inside/outside” perspective of realism. Within the borders of the state there is peace and order. Social change is primarily related to development and progress. It is therefore meaningful to talk about a difference between the past and the present. Outside the state—that is, between the states—there is anarchy, disorder, and war. This structure reproduces itself eternally. It is therefore meaningless to talk about progress and change in the international society.

Liberalism

Like realism, liberalism is not a unitary theory. Nevertheless, we can talk about some basic understandings that most liberalists share.

The theoretical point of departure for liberalism is the individual, and liberalists have a positive view of human nature. Their focus of analysis is individuals and various collectivities of individuals, that is, first and foremost states but also corporations, organizations, and various kinds of associations. Liberals maintain that both cooperation and conflict shape international affairs.

Essentially, though, liberalists are optimists; they believe that when humans employ reason they can arrive at mutually beneficial cooperation. In this way, an end can be put to war. The optimism of this theoretical direction is closely connected with the rise of the modern state. Liberalists believe that modernization means progress not only within states, but also in international society.

Liberal arguments for more cooperative international relations can be divided into four different strands: sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, institutional liberalism, and republican liberalism (Jackson and Sørensen 2003, 135). For our purpose, it will suffice to consider only interdependence liberalism and institutional liberalism.

According to adherents of interdependence liberalism, modernization increases the level of interdependence among states. Consequently transnational actors are becoming increasingly more important at the same time as military force becomes a less useful instrument. Interdependence liberalists see welfare, not security, as the dominant goal of states. Generally, they foresee a world of more cooperative international relations (Keohane and Nye 1971; Jackson and Sørensen 2003).

According to adherents of institutional liberalism, international institutions promote cooperation between states. Institutions also alleviate problems concerning lack of trust between states, and they reduce states' fear of one another. Earlier institutional liberalists were far more optimistic than are present-day ones. Woodrow Wilson, for example, believed that building international organizations would transform international relations from a "jungle" of chaotic power into a "zoo" of regulated and peaceful intercourse. Present-day institutional liberalists are less optimistic. While they do believe that international organizations can make cooperation easier and far more likely, they do not claim that such organizations alone can secure qualitative reform of international relations. Institutional liberalists acknowledge that powerful states are not easily constrained (Jackson and Sørensen 2003, 117), but unlike realists, they believe that international organizations are more than mere handmaidens of strong states. They are of independent importance and they can promote cooperation between states (ibid.).

Realism, liberalism, and the African reality

As mentioned above, IR theories are primarily based on the political experiences and ideational traditions of Europe and North America. Among other things, this implies that IR theories use the Westphalian state as their point of departure. The concept of the Westphalian state stems from the

Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and introduced the European state system. The newly independent states were all given the same legal rights: territory under their sovereign control, the freedom to conduct relations and negotiate treaties with foreign powers, and the authority to establish whatever form of government they chose. The concept of "state sovereignty"—that no one is above the state—captures these legal rights. It is the Westphalian system that provides the terminology used to describe the primary units in international affairs (Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, 39).

The classical theories also refer extensively to Max Weber's definition of the modern state, which emphasizes three main aspects of the state: its territoriality, its monopoly of the means of physical violence, and its legitimacy. Weber argues that if a state lacks monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory, anarchy will ensue.

As we will discuss in Chapter 2, the African states do not fit in with these classical pictures of what a state should be. African states operate in a field between a legal and bureaucratic/rational framework and a person-based framework. The formal division between a person and his office, between politics and economics, seldom exists. And if it does exist, it might not be respected. In all practical respects, these spheres are woven together into different forms of relationships between equals or between patrons and clients. This creates a form of social order and organization, for sure, but a kind of order that follows a very different logic from that of classical models of the state.

This indicates that one of the most important problems related to applying theories developed on the basis of European or American experiences to the study of African politics is the unit for analysis. The unit for analysis in the classical theories is the state. In Africa, the state is organized in a very different manner from what these theories postulate. No doubt, there is a big difference between the kind of state that we find in Africa and the rational, unitary state that realism and liberalism regard as the central actor in international politics. Concerning constructivism, this is a little bit different. This theory focuses more so on the way in which the actors are socially constructed than on which actors we are supposed to study. However, looking at what research has been done based on moderate constructivism, we find that most scholars of international politics use the state as the central unit for analysis. In this way, constructivism ends up with the same kinds of problems as realism and liberalism.

It is not possible to consider the African state as a rational, unitary actor. Rather, there is a large variety of state and nonstate actors with different interests who interact in the national and international arenas of the African continent. This means that central concepts of the various

theoretical directions, such as “national interest,” must be handled with care. Take, for instance, the DRC. What are its national interests, those expressed by President Joseph Kabila, or those expressed by the two main rebel groups? Together, these three groups control their own vast areas, and it would be unreasonable to say that the area controlled by President Kabila is more representative of the Congolese state than the areas controlled by the rebel groups.

In what follows, theories applicable to African political realities will be introduced according to the focus of the various chapters.

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The State in Africa

To understand African security politics and all the challenges involved, we need to understand the characteristics of the African state. We need to know the background of the African states' creation and the struggles related to their survival. That is the purpose of this chapter.

The Modern State

The story of the emergence of the modern state can be told in different ways. It is, however, quite usual to use the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 as a point of departure for the story. The Westphalia treaties codified solutions to problems of political order that the Thirty Years' War had revealed to European countries. With these treaties, the concept of the modern state as a sovereign, territory-based entity saw the light of day.

Over the years, philosophers, political scientists, and other scholars have developed theoretical schemes for a closer study of the phenomenon of statehood. Among the most important theories of statehood is the one offered by Max Weber. According to Weber, a "political" society is one whose "existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff" (Weber, cited by Giddens 1985, 156). This does not imply that political organizations exist only through the continual use of force, merely that the threat or actual employment of force is an ultimate solution that may be utilized when all else fails (*ibid.*, 156). A political organization becomes a "state" where it is successfully able to exercise a legitimate monopoly over the organized use of force within a given territory (*ibid.*). This means that the concept of "territory" is important in relation to the state concept. From the outset, the modern state thus represented the *ideal* of sovereign territoriality to which rulers aspired, but

which they seldom achieved. (Even Western European states today do not always reach the Weberian pinnacle, in which a rationalized central bureaucracy enjoys a legitimate monopoly of organized violence over a given territory and population.)

Within its territory, there are certain functions that a state has to undertake successfully in order to be a full-fledged entity. The modern state has always been a work in progress. Still, there are some specific attributes that have always been associated with the concept of a state—the security of its inhabitants, the legitimacy and representativity of its rulers, its redistributive functions, and the administration of general justice to its citizens. It is against these attributes, or rather the aspirations to acquire them, that the success or failure of a modern state has been judged. Also, the current discourse of “failed” or “collapsed” states must be understood against these aspirations (see discussion in this below). Put differently, the three core activities of the state—providing security, representation, and welfare—offer a convenient way to sum up the functions a state is expected to undertake (Milliken and Krause 2002, 756).

The state as the solution to the problem of political order can be understood in different ways. Following Tilly’s understanding of war making as state making, state making can be seen as a process by which state elites, seeking to consolidate their power, offer security in return for extraction of resources (1985; Milliken and Krause 2002, 756). According to liberal political thought, state making can be seen as a process of “social contracting,” usually between rulers and subjects, where the subjects surrender their absolute freedom in return for a civil order that guarantees security.

Tilly’s understanding of war making and state making is closely related to the capability of institutions. Extraction, protection, war making, and state making are activities undertaken by the same kinds of institutions, and their capabilities in relation to one activity are close to their capabilities in relation to another. Institutions of war have also nearly always been used to serve political interests and have therefore served to advance state making.

Also, the ways in which states and regimes are made legitimate in the eyes of people can be related to different issues. Nationalism and democracy are regarded as the two most important means by which legitimacy is achieved. Theorists such as Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau were not primarily interested in the questions of nationalism and democracy, but focused on the way in which rulers entered into social contract with their people. The people grant the state the right to rule over them in return for the state providing security from disorder and war. In our time, the idea of social contract has been fused with the ideas of nationalism and democracy. The nation-state has become the institutional and political ideal. In the West, nationalism and democracy are intertwined narratives of the same concept.

Also, in other parts of the world, the idea of democracy, as it has developed in the twentieth century, is largely uncontested. However, we must recognize that there is a wide variety of institutional forms that a representative democracy can take on, that is, consociational, republican, federalist, parliamentary, and corporatist. Even in modern Western states there is still a debate as to what institutional form the democratic rule shall have (e.g., Northern Ireland and Quebec). There are also frightening examples from the twentieth century of what a combination of nationalism and state making can lead to, such as the role of nationalism in World War II. Adolph Hitler's combined focus on Nazism and the creation of the Third Reich led to the greatest and most destructive war of the twentieth century. Moreover, nationalism as the major foundation for state building can also lead to a situation where the majority within the state tyrannizes the minority.

It is now commonly recognized that the state in Africa differs quite a lot from its counterpart in Europe. This is true of both the history of the African state and the way it operates in day-to-day politics. In the following discussions, we will briefly present some major historical aspects common to African states. Thereafter, we will turn to present-day debates thrown up by the study of the African state and the methods to characterize it.

The History of the African State

Africa and African states today are first and foremost products of their own immanent characteristics—their precolonial history and trading relationships with Europe dating back to the fifteenth century (Davidson 1991, 18). For the state system in Africa, however, the colonization of the continent and the negotiations between the colonizers are very much to blame. Before the colonization of Africa, it was hardly possible to speak about a system of states on the continent as we know it today. Small insignificant kingdoms and larger wealthier kingdoms, such as the Asante in today's Ghana, were the typical form of power units. When the European imperialist powers started their rivalries in Africa, this system changed radically. The Berlin conference of 1884–85 was organized to solve the disagreements between the Europeans states in relation to their territorial possessions. “Its chief agreements on ‘spheres of interest’ and of intended occupation—the British securing monopoly over the lower Niger, the French over the Western Sudan, King Leopold being given the Congo basin, the Portuguese being allotted their limits of expansion in Angola and Mozambique—were followed by detailed border settlements” (ibid., 113–114). The agreements paid little attention to the “natural” borders between ethnic divides and ecological regions. As a result, the power

units that were created were “artificial” in relation to most traditional aspects of nation building and political development. The borders between the various states would probably have been different had they been the result of a political development within the African societies themselves.

Notwithstanding the limited role of Africans themselves in the creation of the national units, the borders set by the European imperialist powers were decided to be inviolable by postcolonial African heads of state. The principle of the states’ self-determination became the guiding principle. With the creation of the OAU in 1963, the commitment to territorial integrity was firmly implanted. The OAU Charter refers to “territorial integrity” no fewer than three times (Young 1991, 327). At the OAU summit in Cairo in 1964, the commitment to territorial integrity became even more explicit. According to the OAU report from this summit, the member states “pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence” (cited in Young 1991, 327).¹

By the middle of the 1960s, most European colonial powers had pulled back from their former territories, leaving these states to their own destiny. Before doing that, however, these powers, which retained interests in Africa, developed an infrastructural system on the continent that pointed mainly out of Africa, in the direction of Europe and North America. This infrastructure, along with a significant network of personal relationships, made the dominance of non-African powers in the postcolonial era relatively easy. Moreover, the Cold War made otherwise insignificant African states interesting to both sides of the ideological cleavage.

The Third World manifestation of the Cold War “was a proxy conflict between the West and the Soviet bloc (or between the USA and the former USSR) for influence and strategic position in the regions outside Europe and North America. The principal instruments deployed in this struggle, were diplomacy, economic assistance, ideology, and, more importantly, arms transfers and various forms of direct and indirect intervention” (MacFarlane 2000, 16). Both the superpowers approached the continent in the light of their own rivalry. Neither the United States nor the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was particularly attentive to the African realities. Rather, each interpreted African interests in terms of containing the other. Neither allowed African nationalism to take its own course. Both tended to become involved in those states where the transition from colonialism to independence was most turbulent. However, as Chazan et al. point out, “it would be misleading to suggest that the great powers took all the initiatives. On the contrary, competing African leaders often looked abroad for support against internal faction and external enemies” (1992, 389). The combination of the African need for support and

the superpowers' need for containment opened the door for intervention. As both superpowers were relative newcomers to the African continent, their activities and policies vis-à-vis Africa were often completely oblivious to contextual factors.²

At the end of the Cold War, there was great concern among African and international statesmen as to the possible effects on African politics of the radical change in the international environment. Would the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid dismantling of the communist states of Eastern Europe remove the former obstacles to democratic reform, national and regional reconciliation, and continental peace in Africa? There were both pessimism and optimism in the analyses and prognoses of this question. The optimists expected African states to move toward Western-style democratic systems of government. The pessimists feared that the removal of one set of problems for Africa would only make room for another. To support their view, the pessimists pointed to the fact that U.S.-Soviet competition and rivalry in Africa had only been superficial and that the departure of superpowers from the African scene would not have a decisive effect on the political development of the African states (Somerville 2000, 135). The end of the Cold War has not dissolved the many structural obstacles hindering greater democracy on the continent. In fact, the end of the Cold War has released forces or uncovered power struggles or undemocratic forces that the Cold War held in check. On the basis of these and other points, one realizes that the end of one form of global conflict does not automatically remove conflict in the developing world. What was removed, however, was a structural element in the international framework facing the developing countries—the global competition between the superpowers and their continuous search for allies in the developing world (*ibid.*, 136). The end of that competition meant a decisive change in Western policy toward developing countries. Particularly the poorest of the poor in Africa were hit by this change: “They could no longer expect to be able to use their strategic position, mineral resources, or political support in regional conflicts as bargaining chips with superpowers” (*ibid.*). The new geopolitical situation particularly affected economic and military aid to African countries. For economic aid, it meant that conditions were changed and sharpened. For military aid, it simply meant a substantial decrease. To a large degree, African states were now left in a security-political vacuum.

Characteristics of the African State

As already indicated, the African state differs a great deal from the one we are familiar with in the North, that is, the Weberian state. If the government of what is generally recognized as a state does not have the monopoly of the use

of force beyond the central areas of its territory, would it then, according to Weber's definition, be a state? Probably not. The Liberian state, the Congolese state, and the Sierra Leonean state, for example, are not "real" states with control over their borders and remote areas. Nor do they control the resources that are vital for safeguarding their respective states in the long run.

If the African states are not states in the Weberian sense of the word, then what are they? During the last ten years or so, we have seen numerous efforts to theorize on the characteristics of the African state. Influential scholars such as Jean-Francois Bayart, Christopher Clapham, Robert H. Jackson, Juan J. Linz, Jean-Francois Médard, and William Reno have provided us with concepts like "belly politics," "degrees of statehood," "quasi-states," "sultanistic regimes," "neopatrimonialism," and "shadow state" in relation to the study of the state in Africa (cf. Bayart 1993; Clapham 1998; Jackson 1990; Linz 1975; Médard 1996; and Reno 1995). In their research on African politics, all these scholars have underlined the close relationship between personal needs and political power, and also the fact that African states do not share the characteristics usually ascribed to ideal types of Western states. Let us have a brief look at some of these African states.

As far back as the early 1970s, Linz introduced the concept of "sultanistic regimes." At that time, political democracies were few and non-democratic regimes were numerous. Among the nondemocratic regimes, there were quite a few "totalitarian regimes" and they usually existed in the communist world. The concept of "authoritarian regimes" was used by many to describe all other nondemocratic regimes. This, however, turned out to be a too general concept, considering the vast structural variation among nondemocratic regimes worldwide. Using the same concept to describe both Franco's Spain and single-party regimes in the newly independent African countries was misleading. Linz felt that a few regimes appeared "distinct on all the major dimensions used in the conceptualization of nondemocratic rule and called them 'sultanistic.'" The differences between these and other authoritarian or totalitarian regimes are not merely a matter of degree of despotism but lie in "their rulers' overall conception of politics, the structure of power and relation to the social structure, the economy, and, ultimately, the subjects of such rule" (Chebabi and Linz, 1998, 3–4). Originally, the term "sultanism" was used by Weber to denote an extreme case of patrimonialism (1968, 231–232).

In a much-cited article, Clapham explores the relationship between statehood and the international system, with particular reference to sub-Saharan states. He argues that statehood should be regarded as a relative concept, "and that rather than distinguish sharply between entities that

are, and are not, states, we should regard different entities as meeting the criteria for international statehood to a greater or lesser degree" (1998, 143). On the basis of this view, he introduces the concept "degrees of statehood." He points out that entities that one has become accustomed to regard as states "sometimes fail to exercise even the minimal responsibilities associated with state power, while those who control them do not behave in the way that is normally ascribed to the rulers of states." On the other hand, entities that are not usually regarded as states, such as international organizations or even guerrilla groups, often behave in a much more state-like manner than formal states, that is, they take on "attributes that are normally associated with sovereign statehood" (ibid.).

In Jackson's terms, "quasi-states" are states that are recognized as sovereign and independent units by other states but that cannot meet the demands of empirical statehood, which requires the capacity to exercise effective power within their own territories and the ability to defend themselves against external attack. According to Jackson, such states have *negative* sovereignty, in that sovereignty is ascribed to them by the international system, but they do not have *positive* sovereignty that derives from effective control. An example is the DRC (formerly Zaire) after the Cold War. The state's control effectively ended some few hundred kilometers outside the capital, Kinshasa. The state was neither the sole nor the central harbinger of power (Bakke 2005; Dunn 2001, 52). Generally, international recognition based on preexisting colonial borders hinders domestic opposition, partly because uprisings cannot expect to gain international support, and partly because such recognition entails the principle of nonintervention. The supreme legitimate power in domestic affairs is left to the government. One of the main reasons why such weak states can survive as independent states is that they do not face classical security threats, that is, they do not face external threats to their own survival. Both states and regimes are protected from outside threats by strong international norms.

In *The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly*, Bayart (1993) analyzes the strategies of accumulation that have emerged across the African continent to consolidate power and to create a foundation of sorts for the nation-state. According to Bayart, Western observers have misconstrued the nature of African politics by trying to apply explanatory models on the basis of external political systems. From this perspective, postcolonial political and economic structures in Africa are regarded as failures. In contrast, Bayart proposes a view of African politics in which internal realities predominate, where corruption, specifically, is viewed as a complex, fluid phenomenon with roots in both past and present and shaped by basic issues of survival. The concept "the politics of the belly" (*la politique du ventre*) is borrowed from Cameroon. "In Cameroon they [. . .] know that

‘the goat eats where it is tethered’ and that those in power intend to ‘eat’” (ibid., xvii). Bayart continues by writing that

[w]e should be aware of the various shades of the meaning of the phrase ‘politics of the belly’. It refers chiefly to the food shortages which are still so much a part of life in Africa. Getting food is often a problem, a difficulty and a worry. Yet, very often, the term ‘eating’ conveys desires and practices far removed from gastronomy. Above all, it applies to the idea of accumulation, opening up possibilities of social mobility and enabling the holder of power to ‘set himself up’. Women are never very far from the scenario since in many ancient societies they were the substance of wealth itself. The politics of the belly are also the politics of intimate liaisons, and mistresses are one of the cogs in the wheel of the postcolonial State. ‘Belly’ also of course refers to corpulence—fashionable in men of power. It refers also to nepotism which is still very much a social reality with considerable political consequences. And, finally, in a rather more sinister way, it refers to the localization of forces of the invisible, control over which is essential for the conquest and exercise of power: manducation can perhaps be seen as symbolic of the dramatic, yet everyday, phenomenon of sorcery.

(ibid., xviii)

In his book Bayart describes a practice whereby individuals have so regularly used their positions of power to accumulate personal fortune that such redistribution of wealth has become expected. “[M]aterial prosperity is one of the chief political virtues rather than being an object of disapproval” (ibid., 242).

Reno has argued persuasively that the emergence of shadow states through criminalization and warlordism has created networks that are perhaps best understood as commercial syndicates (Reno 1999).³ According to Reno, warlordism occurs through policies of “elite accommodation,” by which leaders intentionally stymie development by outsourcing economic roles to outsiders and increase dependencies. The objective is to simultaneously deny power to those who may be an internal threat and to gain source of external wealth that can be used to pay off potential rivals. Because it lacks legitimacy among vast segments of its citizenry and does not serve collective interests, the weak state is compelled to privatize security. Politics is commercialized by leaders intervening in markets to accumulate wealth directly, and limiting access to potential rivals. Such leaders intentionally keep state institutions and bureaucratic structures weak, as they are potential sources of power for various rival elites. The kind of state that is the result of such practice—the “weak state” or the “quasi-state”—has increasingly less to do with the needs of the population and more to do with maintaining power in a patronage system. According to Reno, the weakening of

states can be profitable for certain parties: "The failure of state institutions allows non-state organizations to take advantage of economic opportunity and create new political alliances" (Reno 1998, 27).

Finally, the concept "neopatrimonialism" deserves our attention, as it is probably the most widespread of all these concepts. Neopatrimonialism is derived from the concept of patrimonial authority, which Weber used to describe the principle of authority in the smallest and most traditional polities (1968). In patrimonial political systems, an individual rules on the basis of his own personal prestige and power. Ordinary people are treated as extensions of the "Big Man's" household, with no rights or privileges other than those given to them by the ruler. Authority is entirely personalized, formed by the ruler's preferences rather than by a system of laws. Ordinary people are willing to fall in with such a system because in return the ruler ensures political stability and provides a zone of security in an uncertain environment and also because the ruler selectively distributes favours and material benefits to loyal followers (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 63). Weber distinguished patrimonial authority from rational-legal authority, in which the public sphere is carefully separated from the private sphere and written laws and bureaucratic institutions guide the exercise of authority and protect individuals and their property from the whimsical leaders. Weber's definition of patrimonialism may well be a description of small African communities in the precolonial period, but it does not adequately describe any of the national political systems existing in Africa in our time. Today, even the smallest and poorest of the African states have bureaucratic institutions and written laws (*ibid.*, 62). Nevertheless, many sub-Saharan states still retain a modified form of patrimonialism, a fact that has led political scientists to develop the concept of neopatrimonialism. There are three main characteristics of a neopatrimonial system of government: (1) presidentialism or presidential rule, (2) clientelism, and (3) lack of a clear division between what is public and what is private.

Public and private spheres overlap; even in cases where there is a formal division between what is public and what is private, this division is not respected. According to Médard, this is the most distinct feature of the neopatrimonial state (1996, 85). Moreover, power is personally exercised, and there is no clear division between politics and the economy. Economic and political resources, wealth, and political power can be exchanged freely (Médard 1996). The public offices are turned into the private property of the higher-ranking employees. People working for the state use their position to accumulate wealth—seeking power and seeking wealth are two sides of the same coin. Politics therefore becomes a kind of business with three main currencies: power, money, and connections (*ibid.*). Another

important feature of the neopatrimonial state is its lack of institutionalization, which creates transnational relations. Transnationalism is a kind of interaction across international borders between both state and non-state actors. The interaction is relatively regular and often (but not necessarily) hierarchically organized. This feature relates to the dynamics of a strong regime and a weak state (Bøås and Dokken 2002). The neopatrimonial state is usually characterized by a weak state (weak institutions and lack of state control) and a strong regime (an authoritarian elite with no obligation to redistribute the wealth they possess).

Patrick Chabal and Jean Pascal Daloz are critical of the concept of neopatrimonialism. In their much-cited book from 1999, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, they have analyzed this concept and two closely related analytical perspectives—"the hybrid state" and "the transplanted state" (9–11). As neopatrimonialism has already been presented to the reader, let us just have a brief look at the two analytical perspectives.

The hybrid state

This perspective focuses on the political effect of the mixture of Western norms, as introduced during the colonial period, and the inherited values of traditional African social systems. Where the neopatrimonial perspective emphasizes the lack of institutionalization on the continent, the hybrid state perspective underlines the development of a genuinely different African state. This perspective points to the *successful* adaptation of the Western state model to the African context. According to this perspective, the African state, which was developed within artificial national borders drawn by the colonial powers, has reshaped itself in accordance with local political practice.

The transplanted state

According to this perspective, the transplantation of the Western state model to an African reality has been unsuccessful primarily because of cultural factors. The modern West European state model cannot be transferred to a totally different sociocultural setting "just like that." This is because the institutions of the original state will function very differently in a different setting. What will happen, then, is that the political system is transformed by local conditions to such a degree that, after a while, it is used for totally different purposes than what was originally the idea. As a result, large parts of the original state often stop functioning.

All the three perspectives—neopatrimonialism, hybrid state, and transplanted state—take seriously the particular dynamics of African

societies/states. This has not always been the case with political analyses of the African reality. Nevertheless, Chabal and Daloz are critical of all three perspectives, particularly the first two, primarily because they put too much weight on the impact of the colonial rule. Instead, Chabal and Daloz underline the continuity of African political practice. They claim that the kind of state that has developed in Africa is something more than just a shadow of an ideal type. Undoubtedly, the colonial period led to extensive changes all over the African continent. However, the degree of change has been misjudged. Moreover, the various colonial powers had different practices for governing their colonies. The British way, that is, indirect rule through already established traditional authorities, obviously had less effect concerning changes in the continent than the French way, that is, direct rule and a much larger degree of physical presence by the French themselves.

According to Chabal and Daloz, the neopatrimonial perspective is useful only if we remember that bureaucratic institutionalization during the time of colonialism never managed to ruin the strong instrumental and personalized characteristics of the traditional African administration.

Neopatrimonialism in African States

Notwithstanding Chabal and Daloz's critique, it is probably the neopatrimonial perspective that has had the strongest standing in modern analyses of the state in Africa. Examples of neopatrimonial practices in postcolonial political life in Africa are numerous. Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone is legendary in this respect. "He envisioned himself as the head of the extended Sierra Leonean family and claimed roots in all major ethnic groups. He cultivated the picture of himself as 'Pa Siakie,' the father of the nation. As the neopatrimonial logic of Stevens' rule spread to more and more areas of the country's political economy, the boundaries between state and private interests deteriorated quickly" (Bøås 2001, 708).

From the beginning of the 1980s, Sierra Leone's economy started to decline and the country became more dependent on international aid to finance the neopatrimonial system. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, however, were not satisfied with the way Stevens had handled the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). They tried to secure a more transparent and accountable use of state resources, but the only thing they achieved by this effort was to reduce the number of actors on the civil service payroll. The shadow state was left untouched. Moreover, parallel to the declining economy and the decreasing importance of industrial mining, mining of alluvial diamonds by informal preindustrial methods grew in importance and soon became the country's main

source of wealth. This is a business that very much depends on quiet deals, ad hoc license arrangements, and political protection from the political elite, and, as such, it stimulates the neopatrimonial logic. And even though the Stevens's successor, Joseph Momoh, claimed that his regime represented a "new order," he was unable to resolve the contradictions between an official aid-supported state and the shadow state built on the clandestine diamond trade (ibid., 709).

Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire is another country widely referred to as an epitome of neopatrimonialism: "As his people's self-proclaimed *guide*, or as the personalist embodiment of nationalist leadership during the Cold War, Mobutu deployed the largesse of his American and other Western patrons to enhance his personal wealth, to heighten his stature over his countrymen, and to weave a tightly manipulated web of loyalties across the army and into all aspects of Zairian society. Every proper political and democratic institution was an obstacle to the edifice that he created" (Rotberg 2004, 12).

It has been remarked that Mobutu, during his period as president, achieved self-enrichment on a scale unsurpassed in Africa (Meredith 2005, 297). During the 1970s it was estimated that one-third of the total national revenues were in one way or another at his disposal. He used the central bank for his own purpose and was the largest shareholder in numerous companies and in the Banque du Kinshasa. He invested in multinational companies and was involved in diamond marketing, in the copper industry, and in mining enterprises. In 1977 Mobutu's family took \$71 million from the central bank for personal use, and by the 1980s, his personal fortune was estimated at \$5 billion (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier 2003, 7). An international observer reported in 1979 that no effective control of the financial transactions of the presidency existed; "one does not differentiate between official and personal expenses in this office" (Erwin Blumenthal, cited in Meredith 2005, 305).

In his *Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa*, Brian Titley assesses the reign of Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the military ruler of the Central African Republic from 1966 and the emperor of the Central African Empire from 1976 to 1979. Neopatrimonialism and clientelism were the concepts that underpinned Bokassa's motivations and activities during his reign, Titley argues. Bokassa was able to consolidate and exercise such authority in the Central African Empire (now the Central African Republic), Titley contends, through a variety of pragmatic calculations: he forged extensive networks of influence through clients and wives, eradicated all governmental institutions that would allow rivals to express their dissent, personalized all resources of the state, and juggled political alliances at different historical moments—first and foremost with France, but also with Libya, China, and a host of other countries (Titley 1997).⁴

In Nigeria, the regime of Ibrahim Babangida has been characterized as “patrimonialism *par excellence*” (Ikpe 2000, 155). Babangida came to power in 1985 following a palace coup and was the military ruler until his departure from office under heavy popular pressure in 1993. Among Babangida’s favorite manipulative strategies was “dispensing largesse to powerful groups and individuals to buy their support,” an activity that, in local parlance, became known as “settlement” (ibid.). For example, a complex network of “patron-client relationships” came to dominate the army: all officers “of doubtful loyalty” were retired, and Babangida’s favorites were appointed to political and command positions. In addition, “[f]ield commanders were given huge sums of money disguised as security votes, which they were not required to account for” (ibid.). As Ikpe puts it, “Loyalty and sycophancy were the criteria, not efficiency and proficiency” (ibid.).

Furthermore, private wealth accumulation for the president, his family, and close associates, at the expense of the nation, was evident. Babangida’s wife, Miriam, was reported to be worth about \$8 billion, while Babangida himself disposed of about 30 million French francs. Additionally, Babangida was also claimed to be in possession of significant amounts of money and property that were accumulated in Nigeria (ibid., 156). There were also signs of corruption on the part of top officers of the regime. Most specifically, “[s]ome [. . .] were involved in [. . .] large scale smuggling of petroleum products into neighbouring countries” (ibid.).

Babangida’s manipulative strategies were not confined to military officials. Influential persons in civil society, such as academics and intellectuals, were also incorporated into the regime: extensive offerings of “lucrative political appointments” took place, all for the sake of manipulating those capable of “enhancing the public image and credibility of [Babangida’s] regime.” The strategy included creating numerous directorates and agencies that were meant to employ men and women of resource, thus subjecting them to incorporation through “settlement” (ibid.). These tactics were not just particular to Babangida’s regime. Already, from 1966, under the military rule of Yakub Gowon, neopatrimonial practices—including patron-client relations and the expanding of the state into the economic and social sectors—had started to develop. Any dividing line between public and private disappeared; the state had the power to determine who would own shares in numerous enterprises and who would serve as directors and board members. For the state leaders, this increased the avenues for rewarding loyal supporters, patronizing kinsmen, accumulating personal wealth, and buying support from potential opponents (Ikpe 2000).

After the fall of the Babangida regime, the neopatrimonial practices continued. President Abacha continued to rule through “Big Man” tactics until his departure in 1998.⁵ According to Ukana Ikpe, the Abacha regime

could be regarded as having been even more patrimonial than its predecessor: "He [Abacha] surrounded himself with only very trusted loyalists and clients. Very few of his ministers could meet with him face to face to discuss state policies while a host of others had to approach the President through favourite ministers and Abacha's own close business partners. His major project as head of state was the accumulation of wealth for himself and for members of his immediate family and closest associates" (ibid., 157). An example of his efforts to that latter effect was the handing out of huge state contracts to relatives, often even without demand for subsequent execution of the projects (ibid.).

General Olusegun Obasanjo said, summarizing Abacha's rule: "Abacha used everything against the Nigerian interests, against the Nigerian people, and only for himself, his family and his cohort. Not just the security apparatus, even the political system, the economic system, everything that was there was used for him, his family and accomplices" (Obasanjo 1998, 10, cited in Ikpe 2000, 158).

The use of public recourses for self-enrichment and the disappearance of the line between private and public can also be illustrated with examples from other African states. In Gabon, Omar Bongo presided over the country's oil wealth for 22 years, making him one of the world's richest men. "The French newspaper *Le Monde* reported in 1989 that during the 1970s and 1980s one-quarter of public revenues had been diverted into the private hands of the elite, an amount nearly double the national debt that Gabon was struggling to repay. It calculated that 80 per cent of all personal income in Gabon went to 2 per cent of the population, mainly the elite and their extended families" (Meredith 2005, 381).

In Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi constructed a business empire for himself and his sons that included assets in transport, oil distribution, banking, engineering, and land. "His inner circle, known as the 'Karbanet Syndicate' after his hometown, became exceedingly rich, obtaining loans from banks and pension funds that they never intended to repay and huge kickbacks from government contracts" (Meredith 2005, 384–385).

In Malawi, Hastings Banda ruled the country as his personal fiefdom. "Using his control of government, Banda constructed a huge business empire, Press Holdings, which expanded into tobacco, ranching, transport, property, oil distribution, pharmaceuticals, insurance and banking; it eventually accounted for one-third of Malawi's gross domestic product and employed 10 per cent of the wage earning work force" (ibid., 380).

Examples of clientism and patterns of patron-client networks are numerous in Africa, and this is a fact pointed out by most writers on African politics. In their *Introduction to African Politics*, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg have described Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire

as an “anti-politician.” This is because he was a ruler who attempted to remove politics from the public realm (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 145). Any individuals occupying a position in the state below the president were merely the president’s personal clients. As such, politicians and bureaucrats who sought high office in Cote d’Ivoire could only achieve this with the explicit approval of Houphouët-Boigny. The president’s lieutenants used his patronage to build their own fiefdoms and client bases. If they failed to serve the leader loyally, then they would soon lose their position in the state and the wealth that it accompanied (*ibid.*). In the three key institutions of the state—the Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire’s Political Bureau, the National Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council—many individuals held interlocking positions. Tessilimi Bakary has calculated that just 320 individuals held 1,040 positions within these institutions between 1957 and 1980 (1984, 24).

Kaunda used his unlimited powers in Zambia to keep uncritical supporters in top positions, and built up a network of supporters. His political competitors were left without any real opportunities to attain power in the country: “When Kaunda came up for re-election in 1988, a former minister, Sikoto Wina, complained: ‘It is impossible to run against Kaunda. It is a watertight system to produce one candidate. There is no way in which anyone can actually challenge the president.’ In the 1980s Kaunda was estimated to control 40,000 patronage positions in Lusaka alone” (Meredith 2005, 380).

State Fragility, State Failure, or State Collapse?

Having seen how a number of African states have developed quite extreme versions of statehood, it is tempting to ask whether they are examples of failed or collapsed states.

Academics and policymakers have been interested in the phenomenon of state failure since the beginning of the 1990s, although Robert H. Jackson had been working on the same topic even before, under the label of “quasi-states” (*cf.* 1987).⁶ During the 1990s there were several important volumes on the subject, for example, Robert Kaplan’s *The Coming Anarchy* (*cf.* 1994) on failed states in West Africa and I. William Zartman’s edited work *Collapsed States* (*cf.* 1995). Despite the growing amount of scholarly literature on the topic, however, there is no one definition of the concept. The most widely accepted definition is probably the one offered by Zartman, which explains state failure as occurring when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed. According to another definition, “[a] failed state is one that has few or no functioning state institutions that can confer identity and assure security to the population. In the

process, the government loses its legitimacy, both nationally and internationally” (Francois and Sud 2006, 142). One of the most extensive studies of state failure, the report of the U.S.-government-commissioned State Failure Task Force, links state failure to widespread internal conflict of various kinds. The report lists revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides as the most important kinds of conflict that further destabilize an already weak regime. Brief definitions of these conflicts are given below:

- **Revolutionary wars.** Episodes of sustained violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region.
- **Ethnic wars.** Episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in their status.
- **Adverse regime changes.** Major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, severe regime instability, and replacement of democracy with authoritarian rule.
- **Genocides and politicides.** Sustained policies by states or their agents, or civil wars, which result in the deaths of a substantial number of members of a communal or political group (U.S. Government 2000, v).

Many writings on the subject of state failure tend to use the words “weak,” “fragile,” “failing,” “failed,” and “collapsed” interchangeably.⁷ In practice, these terms describe a continuum, with weak states at one end and collapsed states at the other. With regard to international action, it is important to differentiate between them, as do Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause in their article “State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies” (cf. 2002). Legitimate, representative, and redistributive or just governance are the aspirations against which the current discourse of “failed” or “collapsed” states must be understood. Milliken and Krause hold the view that “every claim that a state has collapsed, is failing, or is going to fail, contains usually two implicit definitions or benchmarks. One concerns the ‘stateness’ against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed (the *institutional* dimension of state *collapse*), and the other concerns the normative and practical implications of such failure (the *functional* dimension of state *failure*)” (2002, 753). According to Milliken and Krause, then, state failure is a “functional” event that occurs when a state does not fulfill its major responsibilities—security and public order, legitimate representation, and welfare. State collapse is a much more seldom “institutional” phenomenon

and occurs only when state institutions disintegrate completely (ibid., 754). "Full-blown cases of state collapse, which involve the extreme disintegration of public authority and the metamorphosis of societies into a battlefield of all against all, remain relatively rare; in recent years only states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Congo/Zaire and perhaps Albania seem to fit this definition" (ibid.). In other words, four out of five examples of *possible* state collapse, then, are from Africa.

Most scholars believe that the sovereign state remains the most appropriate solution to the problem of political order. Scholars also argue that state forms can vary from representative to authoritarian, "but even in the most repressive the state does not fail to emerge" (Milliken and Krause. 2002, 256). According to Milliken and Krause, there are two important observations to be made about this assumption. "First, a tension exists between the *institutional* and *functional* understanding of state failure: state institutions can persist even while the state fails to fulfil what we understand as key attributes. Second, [. . .] scholars are now beginning to recognize the role that war-making [. . .] can play in the process of state collapse" (2002, 757). This last point is related to three central questions: (1) what happens when an illegitimate government or a government that does not have popular support joins forces with agents of organized violence? (2) what are the forces leading to a strengthening or weakening of the state's monopoly over the use of violence? and (3) what are the trade-offs between ensuring order and security on the one hand and fulfilling the other major functions, that is, representation and welfare, on the other? (ibid.) In more practical terms, this has to do with the role of armed forces in society.

On the basis of these and other considerations, we can ask at least three questions touching upon the dilemmas and paradoxes that are directly relevant to the process of state formation, state failure, and state collapse in Africa:

1. Is a top-down and instrumental concept of nationalism an appropriate model for successful state- and nation-building projects?
2. What kind of nationalism emerges when the material conditions out of which the Western nationalism emerged are not present? This is particularly important in preindustrial societies with no traditions concerning state-society relationship.
3. Which of the different institutional expressions of representative rule are compatible or incompatible with which ideas of contemporary nationalism?⁸

The three questions all focus on the relationship between state and nation. They also touch upon the relationship between national identity and

representative rule. Both these relationships are dynamic products of political struggle, and the resulting balance between state and nation, and between national identity and representative rule, will be decisive for the success or failure of a nation-building process. In a country such as Nigeria, we can say that the representative functions of the state have failed considerably and that this could have important bearings on the stability of the state.

Now for the wealth and welfare narratives of the modern state. One can lean on Anthony Giddens and consider the emergence of the modern state as closely related to the development of modern capitalism (1985, 122–171). The modern state has an institutional form particularly well suited to serve modern capitalism. This institutional form has developed both because of the need for a stable political and legal framework to foster economic growth and because of the emergence of the welfare state as glue to bind citizens to their state (as only formal citizenship entitles individuals to the welfare goods).

A state can both fail to provide a stable politico-legal framework for economic growth and fail to provide welfare to its citizens. It is obvious that both uncertain rules of the game and the absence of rules act as a powerful disincentive to complex economic activity. As for the failure to provide welfare, it is important to know that the Western industrial welfare model differs quite a lot from the welfare model of the postcolonial state. Whereas the industrial welfare model is based on redistributive mechanisms and efficient taxation, the postcolonial model is based on price subsidies on core commodities or other indirect subsidies. The subsidies are usually paid for by commodity exports, international loans, and foreign aid. The ability of most poor states to fund stable social and economic development is therefore limited and uncertain. Moreover, as mentioned, the welfare structures operating in most poor African countries are often related to traditional patrimonial structures mixed up with modern bureaucracy. Such structures are usually not economically efficient and can therefore contribute to the emergence of social dissension/discord and intergroup conflict.⁹

As already mentioned, the state has been promoted as *the* answer to challenges related to social and economic development and to problems related to conflict and war. In the time of economic globalization,¹⁰ the welfare functions of poor states are not very likely to provide for the basic needs of their population. Still, scholars and policymakers have a vision of the role of the state in a postcolonial (eventually within a globalized) world that can combine all the three narratives related to the modern state. Such a state has never existed in Africa, and so it is much more the *vision* of a progressive developmental state (which has collapsed in the continent) than that of any real existing state.

The idea of statehood is very firmly rooted in the modern imagination of political order. The process of decolonization extended the concepts of self-determination to African countries, and the idea of independent statehood for former colonies became first the international norm and then the international legal principle. In fact, statehood was the only possible concept of governance for the international society, although many of the “new” states (such as former colonies in Africa) did not legally qualify for it under the international law in the 1930s. That is, a number of the new states did not have an “effective government, with centralized administrative and legislative organs” (Brownlie 1979, 75; Milliken and Krause 2002, 763). They were nonetheless treated as *bona fide* representatives of national communities. In Africa, as mentioned, this kind of postcolonial “state-building” has resulted in what Jackson refers to as “quasi-states” (1987, 526–529). “African states frequently lack the characteristics of a common or public realm: state offices possess uncertain authority, government organizations are ineffective and plagued by corruption. [. . .] Government is less an agency to provide political goods such as law, order, security, justice, or welfare and more a fountain of privilege, wealth and power for a small elite who control it” (*ibid.*, 526–527). These states were never really states in the formal understanding of the concept. And the question should therefore not be whether they fail or not, but why they exist at all. In the prolongation of this view, scholars have treated states in Africa not as agents for social and economic development, but as major impediments to it.¹¹

Related to the purpose of this book, it is noteworthy that state failure is causally linked to increased and widespread human suffering, regional instability, and transnational threats in the form of organized crime and terrorism. In other words, state failure is not just a threat to local population but is also a potential source of insecurity regionally and internationally. State failure in Africa can threaten core states of the international society and hence undermine the achievement of political order globally.¹² Emergent fears about globalization and its implications for state authority, in combination with regional and international security threats now associated with the breakdown of domestic law and order—in, for instance, African states—are a major reason for the growing interest in studies of state collapse.

Studies of collapsed states show that trade in conflict goods (goods that directly support the war effort of actors in conflict, according to Cooper [2002, 937]) has been a central aspect in state disintegration, that is, the process by which a weak or failed state becomes a collapsed state. This is the case in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the DRC. In his study of Nigeria, Doornbos has also shown that there is a potential in that country

for war over the control of strategic resources, “involving rebel groups and privatized armies, making state institutions irrelevant” (2002, 804).

Also, Reno (2002) focuses on Nigeria as a failed state that has a considerable potential of collapsing. But, unlike Doornbos, Reno traces this potential to the governmental rule in Nigeria, which is, and has been, hostile to state institutions and public order. Beyond more or less deliberately contributing to state failure, the malgovernance of the state elite prevents or limits change-seeking mass movements from gaining ground in Nigeria and also other countries. Instead, the government provides good conditions for narrow interests and (often) antisocial movements.

Some scholars hold the view that state failure is also connected to the various programs that have been introduced in a large number of African countries. The SAPs may have contributed to covering up corrupt political elites’ efforts to further privatize the state institutions. Western governments have also played important roles in what Cooper refers to as “conflict trade.” This way of prolonging conflict is of course important in relation to sustaining state failure or even accentuating it.

Finally, the organizational culture and interest of external actors who intervene in a weak state can contribute to significant failings in institutional development. According to Chopra (2002), the so-called peace-maintenance doctrine presupposes a political vacuum in weak states and thus overlooks local political dynamics. This is in line with Ottaway’s argument in her study of the international community’s efforts at democracy promotion in failed states. Ottaway (2002) shows that the main idea underpinning democracy promotion is the use of external assistance as a shortcut to achieving a Weberian state. Relying on internal processes of state formation would probably give a more sustainable result. This conclusion is especially relevant in relation to the *legitimacy* of state institutions. It may be easy to *create* the institutions, but it is definitely not that easy to make them *legitimate*.

With the events of September 11, 2001, and the release of President Bush’s National Security Strategy in September the year after, state failure took center stage in world politics (Carment 2003).

State maintenance (in either failed or weak capacity) is still the norm internationally. State collapse is the exception. This is true also of Africa, where we find the majority of extremely poor states as well as the majority of civil wars in our times.

Transnationalism

The existence of a strong regime and a weak state will most likely generate informal, transnational relations. One of the reasons is that the strong regimes make political opposition impossible, at the same time as the

weakness of the state makes the borders “porous” and paves the way for increased interaction across borders.¹³

This brings us to another central concept in relation to the state in Africa, purpose of this book, namely, “transnationalism.”

Transnational relations can be defined as “contacts, coalitions and interactions, across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government” (Keohane and Nye 1972, xi). Another definition has been offered by Risse-Kappen, who describes these relations as “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization” (1995, 3).

This definition implies that transnationalism can be a network between a state on the one hand and informal actors on the other. Keohane and Nye’s definition only says that transnationalism is interaction across national boundaries that is not formally controlled. The Risse-Kappen’s definition will be more appropriate for our purpose because it considers the state as one of the most important actors in transnationalism. As we shall see later in this chapter, this is highly relevant in relation to African politics. Risse-Kappen also points out that the internal structure of a state and the international institutions by which the actual state is influenced decide the ability of the transnational actors to influence the politics of the state. Internal structures are classified at three levels: political institutions, social structures, and policy networks. Risse-Kappen makes a typology out of these three levels, all with dichotomous variables. Based on this typology, he identifies six types of internal structures in a country. Of these six types, it is only one that is relevant to this study, namely, the one referred to as the “fragile state”. The fragile state has fragmented political institutions, weak social structures, and a low degree of social mobility (Risse-Kappen 1995). According to this typology, many African states are fragile states. The relationship between weak/fragile states and strong regimes mentioned earlier is useful to understand the notion of transnationalism in fragile states. To be able to influence the politics of a country, transnational actors must overcome two different hindrances. First, they must gain access to the political system of the actual state. Second, they must contribute to or generate a winning policy-coalition to be able to influence the politics the way they wish. Access to the political system is, to a large degree, dependent on the structure of the state. A strong state has a number of means to limit transnational actors’ access to its political system, such as visas, export licenses, etc. Fragile states usually have fewer such means, and transnational actors have easier access to such states. Concerning the second point, the reality is a bit different. Generally, it is more difficult to influence the politics of a weak state than that of a strong

state, primarily because the political institutions and the organizations are fragmented or badly organized (*ibid.*). However, if the political institutions are fragmented to the extent that it is impossible to cooperate with them, the existence of an informal sector is highly possible. In a noninstitutionalized country, it is easy for external actors to participate in the informal economy and the clandestine networks. The weakness of the state facilitates the growth of informal networks, and these networks are by nature transnational. The theory of neopatrimonialism complements Risse-Kappen's theory. A neopatrimonial state is never either centralized or fragmented. It is centralized when it comes to the regime, which is centrally placed and consists of a small elite, and it is fragmented when it comes to the regime's lack of legitimacy in the larger population (Trollstøl 2004). This coexistence of the centralized and fragmented state facilitates transnational relations. It can be argued that regional organizations in Africa have failed because they ignore the very extensive informal economy that exists parallel to the formal economy. The informal economy is transnational, and the phenomenon of "trans-state regionalisation" (Bach 1999; 2003) is based on the neopatrimonial state and its lack of institutionalization. Trans-state regionalization is not an institutionalized phenomenon, but at the same time, it is dependent on state policies. This form of regionalism is based on the existence of an informal economy. State officials are usually part of this economy in neopatrimonial states:

These trans-state networks [. . .] install and stimulate specific patterns of regionalism whereby the dynamics of networking usually associated with trans-national interactions coalesce with a capacity to instrumentalize inter-state relations and state policies through the treatment of public office as opportunities for private interaction.

(Bach 2003, 23)

This corresponds with Risse-Kappen's definition: one of the actors represents the state.

Transnationalism and trans-state regionalism both provide beneficial conditions for interactions of a clandestine, criminal, or violent character. As such, these ways of organizing political and economic activity in Africa are of great significance to our efforts to understand the dynamism of conflict in and between African states. The relationship between transnationalism and conflict is the subject of the next chapter.

Regionalized Wars: Transnationalism, Security Complexes, and African conflicts

Regionalization of civil wars in Africa is primarily related to various transnational aspects existent in the continent's regions. Moreover, regionalized conflicts are characterized by a complex interaction between localized rebellion, a clash of interests among countries in the region, and a weakened capacity (or will) of the international community to avert humanitarian crises. All these factors were present in relation to the development of the regionalized conflict in the Great Lakes region of Africa (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda). A decade of violence commenced with the 1993 civil war in Burundi and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Both conflicts resulted in large flows of refugees into the DRC. After only a short time, the conflicts spread further into the Congolese society and ended up as a large regionalized war involving seven states.¹ The neighboring countries intervened in the DRC with their own rationales, and several localized conflicts became regional.

In the following discussion, we will first present the civil wars in West Africa and in the Great Lakes region as "regionalized civil wars." We will then show how various transnational aspects in the two regions led to the regionalization of the wars. Finally, we will discuss the in the two regions in relation to two central theoretical concepts—those of "security complexes" (Barry Buzan) and "subaltern realism" (Mohammed Ayoob).

The Regionalization of the Civil Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone

The underlying reasons for the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are complex and stretch as far back as the eighteenth century. The start of the wars, however, can be dated to 1985. That year, Samuel Doe of the Krahn people won the presidential election in Liberia through what most people hold to be a massive election fraud.² In the immediate aftermath of the election, there was a popular uprising in the country, but it was brutally suppressed. The violence following these events in the years to come prepared the ground for the civil war to come. On Christmas Eve in 1989, a small rebellion army moved into Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire. The rebels called themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and were led by Charles Taylor.

As one of the central figures on the West African arena, Charles Taylor deserves a further presentation. Taylor has a Liberian mother and an American father. He grew up in Liberia but had his education in the United States, where he also worked for several years. He returned to Liberia after Doe's coup in 1980 and worked for the central administration of the military government. After some time, however, he fell out with Doe and had to flee the country. He first went to the United States, where he became imprisoned. He managed to escape from prison and thereafter travelled to Libya, where he received military training. He then went back to West Africa and started to mobilize support for an armed uprising against Doe.³

The small rebellion army of Taylor soon became pivotal to some of the most dramatic events ever experienced in West Africa. A main reason for this was Taylor's deep knowledge about the African state system, which is a combination of strong regimes and weak states and the contradictions built into such a system. The Liberian state was no real state in the Weberian or Westphalian sense of the word. The government had no real control, either over the international borders or over the more remote provinces of the country. As the war developed during the 1990s, the whole state fell apart. This breakdown of the state led the whole region of West Africa to implode into the developing Liberian war economy. One fallout was the war started by Foday Sankoh, a well-known rebel in the civil war in Sierra Leone, and others close to him, against the military regime in the Sierra Leone capital, Freetown, taking advantage of the unrest in the region. But Sankoh was not the only one who sought to use the Liberian civil war for his own purposes. Liberian warlords as well as civil and military governments of other West African countries, such as Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Togo, to mention the most active ones, also did so. This kind of regional dynamics that the civil

wars, first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone, triggered revealed a number of transnational relations between the various actors of the regimes of these countries. At the same time, the regional dynamics also led to the creation of new political situations.

These regional alliances turned out to be extremely unstable. They were to a considerable degree ad hoc and were not based on any established institutional structure. The following example from the beginning of the civil war in Liberia illustrates this point. In August 1990 the West African heads of state met within the ECOWAS framework to discuss the civil war in Liberia. Nigeria persuaded the other member states to establish a peace-keeping force officially to try to separate the combating parties. Its real objective was probably very different. The Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, was concerned that an armed insurgency was about to overthrow a military regime in a neighbouring country. His words to the other ECOWAS leaders illustrate this: "Today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could be any of you" (Adeleke 1995, 577). This possibility was alarming to the Nigerian military government as well as to the other authoritarian regimes of West Africa. In particular, they feared that a Liberia governed by Taylor would become a breeding place for other West African rebellion groups. The intervention in Liberia was therefore necessary, not primarily to protect the Liberian government but to protect the regimes of the other member states. General Momoh of Sierra Leone, for instance, felt a danger of the rebellion spreading from his closest neighbour and therefore offered his country as a base for the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operations in Liberia. Thus, Taylor, in view of the unity among dictators in the region, had an obvious motive to support fellow-rebel Sankoh and the RUF in the first phase of the Sierra Leonean civil war. This is an important element in the regionalization of the civil wars in the two countries.

Another similarly important element in the spread of the Liberian war was the challenges to the leaders' regional interests as a result of the war. At that time there were very close political and economic relations between Babangida's regime in Nigeria and Doe's regime in Liberia. This alliance had a counterpart in an alliance centered on former president of Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny. For many years, Houphouët-Boigny had had close relations with two leaders of Liberia, first with William Tubman and later with Adolphus Tolbert.⁴ One of his cousins was married to Tolbert's son. Both Tolbert and his son were killed in Doe's coup, but Houphouët-Boigny's cousin survived. She fled to Burkina Faso, where she married Blaise Compaoré (who later became the president of Burkina Faso). "The Doe-Babangida axis during the late 1980s was therefore seen by Houphouët-Boigny not only as the perpetuation of the personal humiliation he had suffered when the upstart Doe had been responsible for the

murder of his son-in-law, but also as the reversal of previous diplomatic alliance linking Abidjan [the capital of Côte d'Ivoire] and Monrovia [the capital of Liberia]" (Ellis 1998, 166).

The focus of attention of the regional networks was the question of who would be in control of the lucrative formal and informal trade networks in the region and the question of who would be in control of Liberia's natural resources.⁵ Particularly important was the large amount of iron ore in Nimba county. Nimba is reckoned to be one of the richest sources of iron ore in the world, and French, British, as well as American companies were eager to get admittance to the area.

Taylor argued that Nigeria's involvement in the conflict was an Anglo-American plot to undermine French influence in the region. This kind of political rhetoric is interesting, because it illustrates how alliances shift. Liberia had never been a part of francophone Africa. Traditionally, the country had been the closest ally of the United States in the region. When Taylor started to plan his insurgency against Doe, he therefore first went to the United States to ask for support. However, his appeal was rejected by the American government, which continued to support Doe even though it was aware of the extensive corruption and the violation of human rights committed by Doe's regime. Taylor turned to other sources of military, political, and economic support. He found such support in Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and France. All these actors had their own motives for supporting Taylor, but in the same way as Nigeria and the states were supporting ECOMOG, these motives were not the interests of the Liberian people. The regionalized civil war in West Africa was now a reality, and the regionalization was to a large degree propelled by the transnational relations facilitated by a system consisting of strong regimes and weak states.

Throughout the 1990s the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone became more and more interwoven. Officially, the first Liberian civil war was brought to an end in 1997, but this did not lead to significant changes in the regional conflict pattern. On the contrary, a series of events during the first few months of 1997 led to a strengthening of the regional aspect of the conflicts.

In May 1997 a group of young soldiers led by Johnny Paul Koroma undertook a coup d'état in Sierra Leone. The leaders of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), which had come to power in a disputed election in 1996, fled to Guinea. The new military government immediately started to negotiate with the RUF and, shortly thereafter, they together established a government named the "Armed Forces Revolutionary Council" (AFRC). This led to a greater involvement of Nigeria in the conflict through ECOMOG. Under ECOWAS's direction, peace negotiations between the AFRC and the SLPP were started, but because of the international condemnation

of the new regime in Freetown, these negotiations never really got off the ground to solve the underlying political conflicts. The United Kingdom, especially, was determined to help the SLPP come back to power. All this resulted in a strange alliance between Nigeria, the SLPP, the local SLPP militia (Kamajois), and the British private security company Sandline International. British diplomats and bureaucrats played a decisive role in the establishment of this alliance.⁶

"In view of the novel ethnical foreign policy and the EU [European Union] Code of Conduct on arms transfers, which the Labour government was championing, Sandline was discouraged from ferrying arms from the UK. Bulgaria, arguably the most notorious arms merchant in Europe, filled in [. . .] For the coup, Sandline brokered the shipment of 35 tons of AK-47 assault rifles, ammunition and mortars into a country already awash with weapons. The weapons were shipped from Bulgaria to Kano in Northern Nigeria on a relay to Sierra Leone via Ibis Airline, a company partly owned by the mercenary network. The moment the planes landed in Kano Nigeria took the baton and ferried them to Sierra Leone to arm the assault partnership" (Musah 2000, 99).

The most tangible proof of this alliance was probably the assault on Freetown on February 18, 1998, directed by ECOMOG and Kamajois. This assault forced the RUF and most of the coup makers to pull back from Freetown and go into the jungle.

Notwithstanding this retreat, the RUF was not beaten. The organization had close connections with East European and African weapon and diamond traders. It also had important partners in the region, such as Taylor of Liberia and Compaoré of Burkina Faso.

As mentioned, the alliances on both sides were ad hoc and were determined by particular situations rather than by any institutional structure. The various partners (local, national, regional, or transnational) changed sides according to the benefit they could possibly derive from a specific situation. Accordingly, the processes of negotiation in such situations were very complex.

The Regionalization of the Civil War in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Political realism can explain the reasons for the regionalization of the civil war in Congo. Security-political considerations were behind Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda's involvement in the war. Angola had been marked by more than 30 years of civil war between Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), which was in power from 1975, and its political rival, União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). The MPLA's motive in getting involved in Congo was no doubt

the presence of military bases of UNITA in Congo and the trade networks (illegal trade in diamonds and weapons) that the UNITA leaders had established in association with men in the closest circles around the Zairian dictator Mobutu. Strategic planners in the MPLA anticipated that their forces could beat UNITA if the external element of UNITA's warfare was removed. The rebellion against Mobutu was therefore a golden opportunity for the MPLA to realize this objective.

After the genocide and the civil war in Rwanda in 1994, Paul Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) came to power in Kigali. Kagame and his compatriot in Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, had a common problem: the complete fragmentation of the state apparatus in what was then named Zaire, which made it possible for both Ugandan rebellions and extreme Hutus to establish permanent bases in Zaire by bribing or cooperating with Mobutu and local warlords operating both within and outside Mobutu's control. Kagame and Museveni were therefore in need of cooperation with Laurent Kabila and his organization, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (ADFL). Kagame and Museveni wanted to get control over the border areas between their own countries and Zaire and establish a buffer zone to prevent rebellions from penetrating Rwanda and Uganda from Zaire. This is the main explanation for Rwanda and Uganda supporting Kabila in his fight against Mobutu. But when they found out how fragile the state of Zaire really was, they went for a more advanced goal—the reestablishment of the state in Zaire according to their own national interests. Kagame and Museveni wanted to repair the Congolese state in order to eliminate extreme Hutus and Ugandan rebellions from their bases in Zaire for good (Meredith 2005).

In May 1997 Mobutu fled the country and Kabila proclaimed himself DRC president. However, Kabila soon realized that he had difficulties consolidating his power base. The complaints were many both internally and among his former allies—Rwanda and Uganda. In August 1998 an armed rebellion took place in the Kivu province in the eastern part of Congo with the purpose of overthrowing Kabila. This rebellion was strongly supported by Kagame and Museveni as they were disappointed with Kabila's capacities to reorganize the Congolese state. Kabila was obviously not the man who could reform Congo and the state apparatus the way Kagame and Museveni wanted. The Ugandan and Rwandan interventionists, together with the internal rebellions, were soon joined by the important Goma garrison of the Congolese army. The idea was to take over the seat of power in Kinshasa, the Zairian capital, as quickly as possible.

However, the rebels and their allies had miscalculated the regional dynamics. They did not anticipate the interventions of Angola and Zimbabwe on Kabila's side. Angola defeated the Ugandan and Rwandan

troops in south-western Congo before moving up to Kinshasa. Zimbabwe, on its part, sent troops to help defend the Njili International Airport in Kinshasa (Nzongola-Ntalaja undated, 2). In addition, Kabila managed to get military support from Chad, Namibia, and Sudan. Kabila got support from Sudan because of Uganda's support to the resistance movement in Congo. Namibia and Zimbabwe involved themselves in the conflict primarily owing to the economic opportunities. The Namibian president, Sam Nujoma, and the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, were promised privileged access to huge deposits of minerals in Congo if they gave military contributions to Kabila's regime. In a way the troops from Namibia and Zimbabwe can be regarded as mercenaries who were paid through the access to deposits of minerals given by the DRC government to the inner circles of Nujoma and Mugabe. It is still highly unclear why Chad supported Kabila in the conflict. In any case Chad's contributions were small and limited to military equipment. Sudan has contributed some more kinds of equipment compared with Chad, but it is primarily the support from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe that enabled Kabila to hold on to power.

The result of all this was a total fragmentation of Congo. The country was separated into two parts—one eastern part controlled by the resistance movement supported by Rwanda and Uganda, and one western part controlled by Kabila's men in cooperation with troops from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. As the fronts got consolidated and there was no solution in sight, the civil war took on an even more transnational character, with economic motives growing stronger and stronger. As already mentioned, it was the possibilities of access to deposits of minerals as well as control over trade networks that drew Namibia and Zimbabwe into the conflict from the beginning. The economic dimension probably became more important also for the other parties involved as the war went on. As for Rwanda and Uganda, they were close allies from the beginning of the war. After a few years, however, they split up and ended up supporting two different rebel groups in the areas around Kisangani in Congo, a very important center for the trade networks of the region that both were eager to control. Thus, the fights between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in the eastern part of Congo were not fights related to political strategies concerning the regime in Kinshasa but fights to get control over the economic resources in the region (Bøås and Dokken 2002). This is why many have chosen to call the war at this stage a *war for resources* (Nzongola-Ntalaja undated, 3). At this stage there was little engagement between the belligerents, and even allies would fight for control of resources (as the fights between Rwanda and Uganda in 1999 and 2000 illustrate). Moreover, a war for resources is "a war of partition and plunder that is waged against

a territory and its civilian population, in which men are perceived as competitors or potential enemies and women are sexually violated” (ibid.). The report of the UN Panel of Experts, submitted in 2003, illustrates this fact:

In 1999 and 2000 a sharp increase in the world prices of tantalum occurred, leading to a large increase in coltan production in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Part of that new production involved rebel groups and unscrupulous business people forcing farmers and their families to leave their agricultural land, or chasing people off land where coltan was found and forcing them to work in artisanal mines. As a result, the widespread destruction of agriculture and devastating social effects occurred, which in a number of instances were akin to slavery.

(UNSC 2003, 5)

Transnational Aspects

There is a close relationship between the phenomenon of transnationalism presented in Chapter 2 and the characteristics of most African wars of our days. As already explained, transnationalism involves both state and non-state actors. This is also the case with the actors in the wars, say, those in the Mano River region (comprising Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea). We will start this section by presenting some main transnational aspects of two of the most gruesome African wars of our times—the wars in Liberia and the DRC. We hold the view that it is not possible to understand these wars without also understanding the regional/transnational aspects related to them. We will also introduce the concepts of “regional implosion” and “regional security complex” (RSC) to see if they are applicable to a conflict like the one in Liberia. Where necessary, or interesting, we will also draw on other examples from sub-Saharan Africa.

Toward the end of the chapter, we will apply the concept of “subaltern realism,” introduced by Ayoob (1998), to undertake a brief analysis of the Ugandan intervention in the civil war in the DRC.

Transnational aspects of the Liberian (and West African) civil wars

The solution to most civil wars is to be found in the country where the war is taking place. This is also the case in Liberia. At the same time, the various conflicts in West Africa are woven together through strategic elite alliances, through regional (formal and informal) economy and trade networks, through the steady stream of refugees, and through the large amount of mercenaries moving between the countries. The Liberian civil

wars have affected, and have been affected by, a number of other countries and conflicts, particularly in Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea (Sawyer 2004, 446). There are numerous reports of cross-border movement of natural resources, weapons, and mercenaries between these countries, with the political elites playing a central role in many of the activities. In the following subsections, we will point to some of the central aspects in relation to the transnationalisation in the Liberian civil wars.

Recycling of small arms and light weapons

It is estimated that half of the world trade in small arms is represented by illicit trafficking. An estimated 8 million weapons are circulating in West Africa alone, and 50 percent of them are probably illicit (Information based on interviews in the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, April 2000). Although the UN has guaranteed a sum of \$300 to each combatant handing in weapons in Liberia, the problem of small arms going out of control in the country is far from solved. One of the reasons for this is that small arms are one of the main features of illicit transnational activity in West Africa. The availability of small arms and light weapons is often linked to the changing nature or transformation of conflict since the end of the Cold War from predominantly interstate to predominantly intrastate. Arms transfers during the Cold War were primarily motivated by ideological and geopolitical considerations and primarily consisted of heavy, high-maintenance equipment. In the post-Cold War era, arms trafficking in light weapons in the gray and black markets has increased. These light weapons are low-maintenance durables, including AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, and land mines. The primary motivation for the suppliers in these transfers is economic gain (ibid., 225).

The accumulation and uncontrolled proliferation of SALW [Small Arms and Light Weapons] are also closely related to the high levels of crime and violence in many societies, even in times of peace. The popularity of such weapons can be attributed to their widespread availability, their durability (many weapons from the two world wars are still serviceable) and minimal maintenance requirements, their relative cheapness, and the ease with which most small arms can be carried, used and concealed (even by young children). These characteristics make SALW easy "currency" for smugglers, illegal traders, sanctions busters and terrorists. As the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola have demonstrated, small arms and light weapons are widely traded for diamonds, and used to protect the illicit trade in diamonds, which itself fuels the conflict.

(ibid.)

There is very little transparency in the small arms trade. Control of the arms trade in most international border areas is limited; so is the ability of West African politicians to move forward with arms control measures (if they should have the will to do so). The stream of small arms across West African borders is reportedly both in the hands of private dealers *and* subject to the strategies of political elites of the various countries.⁷ This involvement of the political elites in the small arms trade is an example of the fact that what they do is different from what they say. Although all the political leaders of West Africa have used words of honor in relation to the ECOWAS Small Arms Moratorium, most of them are known to have participated in the continued illegal proliferation of small arms in the region (Global Witness 2003b; 2004). The general rule is that the ECOWAS Secretariat is to be consulted before a state can import small arms. This rule is clearly not complied with (Takirambudde 2003). Still, illicit arms transfers rarely involve purely black market transactions. Instead, they rely heavily on so-called grey market transactions such as the one in which Taylor was involved. Taylor serves as a good example of a central political actor who used his personal power and wealth to influence the political situation in a neighboring country—clandestinely and against the provisions of international agreements. In his days as president, he was providing financial support, military training, personnel, ammunition, arms, and other support to the RUF in Sierra Leone. It is believed that Taylor supported the RUF in exchange for diamonds from the mining fields of Kono district and from the Tongo fields, which were under the control of the front. In 2003 Global Witness claimed to have “uncovered information showing the Liberian government is still actively involved in the illegal arms trade, and is the driving force behind the training, arming and deployment of the Ivorian rebel groups MPIGO [Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest] and MJP [Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix].” According to the NGO, in the same year, the “usual suspects,” including Taylor and former RUF commander Sam “Maskita” Bockarie, were involved in the Côte d’Ivoire crisis and were planning to undermine the fragile peace in Sierra Leone (2003b).

Another actor in the transnational arms network is Guinea. The government of Guinea has failed its obligations to regional agreements by supplying the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) with small arms. Actors at all levels are involved in the transnational arms trade: Global Witness writes that “[a]rms are often transferred from Liberia to Sierra Leone at sea from larger boats onto smaller ones that are then brought into a Sierra Leone port. These boats will also travel in at night via smaller Mano River boats run by ex-RUF combatants, or sailed up the mouth of the river. Arms are also brought over by land as the

borders are so porous" (2003b, 33). Thus, Sierra Leone is an important transit route for LURD weapons supply (ICG 2003).

Mercenaries and militarized refugees

Weapons are not the only commodity used by the West African political actors who are trying to shirk their formal obligations. Mercenaries and militarized refugees are, to a growing extent, also being "traded" between the various conflict-ridden regions. This is not usually not taking place as a result of any official decision by political elites. Rather, political actors are clandestinely supporting such trade initiated by members of a rebellion group of a neighboring country. The examples of this phenomenon are numerous, and we can look at one of them: the RUF invaded Sierra Leone from Liberian territory in 1991 (Sawyer 2004), with Sankoh—who was close to Taylor partly because of their common traineeship in Libya—leading the force. A large number of members of the force were Liberian mercenaries. In 1990 Taylor had sworn that Sierra Leone, one of the leading participants in the deployment of ECOMOG troops in Monrovia, would "taste the bitterness of war." In 1991 Sierra Leone and Guinea struck back, by gathering Liberian refugees into the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia, which became Taylor's main opponent on Liberian territory for the following five years (ICG 2002). In 1998 the ECOMOG general from Nigeria Maxwell Khobe organized a group of Liberian dissidents in Sierra Leone when the Sierra Leonean mission had reached the Liberian border. His aim was to suppress the Liberian influence on the RUF. He sponsored a group, named the "Justice Coalition of Liberia", to go into Lofa county,⁸ where it could form an alliance with the Sierra Leonean Kamajois hunter militias (an alliance that formed the basis of LURD). In 2002 the UN reported that former RUF members (according to UN Resolution 1343 [UNSC 2001a], all RUF members were to be expelled from Liberia) joined the warring factions in Liberia as mercenaries (UN 2002). These remaining RUF members were important for the military capabilities of the Taylor government. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Côte d'Ivoire's MPIGO and MJP rebels "were made up mainly of Liberian and Sierra Leonean mercenaries . . . [F]ighters were organized in Liberia before deployment into Côte d'Ivoire, and were commanded by close associates of Taylor."

A Global Witness report from 2003 refers to an interview with a close associate of Taylor in September 2002, in an account about a militia force meeting on October 17, 2002, led by Bockarie. At the meeting, Bockarie "briefed those assembled about the operations designed for both Sierra

Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. Approximately 2,000 men were designated to fight, split equally between the operations in the two countries. The group destined for Côte d'Ivoire was to return, upon successful completion of their aims, to reinforce the troops designated for Sierra Leone" (Global Witness 2003b, 28). One serious cause for concern has been the increased number of Liberian combatants entering into Sierra Leone, claiming to be fleeing from the fighting on the other side of the border. In February 2003, 251 combatants, claiming to be the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), were reportedly found at an internment camp at Mape, just outside Freetown. Further investigations showed that these troops were not the AFL, as they claimed, but in fact belonged to the so-called Anti-Terrorist Unit, that is, combatants specially chosen for the Liberian government's covert mission in Sierra Leone (*ibid.*, 35).⁹ Regional stability depends largely on stopping the flow of marauding fighters who migrate from conflict to conflict. This phenomenon of migration of fighters is widely known among the politicians of the region, and a recognition of the need to combat it should then be seen in the official regional action plans if the willingness of the politicians to resolve the regional conflicts is real. We will return to this issue in Chapter 7.

"Ordinary" refugees

Another serious obstacle to lasting peace in the West African region is the large number of refugees moving between and within countries at all times. The numerous conflicts of the region have driven civilians—mostly women, children, and the elderly—from their homes and frequently across borders to neighboring states, which are, in turn, impacted economically as they provide for the needs of the refugees. Refugees from the Liberian civil wars primarily sought refuge in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire. In addition to the economic impact on these countries, they may also have an impact on the general security situation there.¹⁰ Côte d'Ivoire has an estimated 500,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 69,000 refugees, mostly from Liberia. In Liberia, there are more than 350,000 IDPs and thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees waiting to be repatriated. In Sierra Leone, there are about 13,000 Liberian refugees at camps near the border. In Guinea, there are still about 6,000 Sierra Leonean refugees and about 89,000 Liberian refugees (Bernath and Martin 2004). At the outbreak of the Ivorian war, UN agencies reported 72,000 Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire. Of them, about 9,000 fled back home during the first few months of the war. Fearing the security and economic impact of the influx, the Liberian government strengthened its borders (Kamara 2003). By April 2003, an estimated 100,000 people, including Ivorians, Liberians, and other West African nationals, had fled into Liberia. A politically and

economically unstable country only becomes more unstable as a result of such an influx. This steady flow of refugees in the region is a transnational phenomenon of a special character. It is certainly an example of regular interaction across national boundaries. What is noteworthy is that the state is never directly involved. At the same time, it is heavily affected through its role as a provider of social and economic needs for the refugees. And the way the state handles the refugee problem is of considerable importance in relation to outbreak and continuance of conflict. Hence, one would expect the ECOWAS's security-political reforms to reflect the refugee issue. We will return to this issue in the sections below, also titled "Ordinary Refugees."

Trade in natural resources

Trade in natural resources is both an element of transnationalism in itself as well as one of the most important fueling mechanisms for other aspects of transnationalism in West Africa.

Both within and between the countries, the exploitation of natural resources plays an important role in prolonging the regional wars. In a briefing document submitted to the UN¹¹ Security Council (UNSC), Global Witness has highlighted how the tropical timber trade is fueling armed conflicts in the Mano River region. Given the role that natural resources have played in Liberia's 14-year-long conflict, controlling areas rich in resources is fundamental to securing lasting stability and peace for the country and its neighbors. According to Global Witness, "the onset of the Liberian timber sanctions in 2003, combined with the rainy season and ongoing conflict, significantly reduced the timber trade throughout 2003." Soon after the timber sanctions came into force, the warring parties began peace talks, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and formed the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) (Global Witness 2004, 8). Afterward, however, there has been a resurgence of logging activities, often carried out by smaller groups composed of ex-combatants (*ibid.*). As a result, the Liberian logging industry continues to generate significant amounts of illegal revenue for armed nonstate actors, further jeopardizing Liberia's nascent peace and threatening regional security. As for the regional consequences, both the Ivorian government and the Forces Nouvelles, a political coalition in Côte d'Ivoire, are profiting from logging in western regions of Liberia, taking the money raised through collecting taxes. They are also arranging logging activities and acting as security forces to sustain their war-making capacities. "This makes sanctions-busting exports of timber from Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire an increasingly lucrative enterprise for Liberian exporters and Ivorian warring parties. [. . .] [E]vidence suggests that [Liberian] timber

is crossing into neighbouring Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in violation of UN sanctions, and that Liberian timber may become an increasingly significant source of revenue for the Ivorian warring parties" (ibid., 10). Also, the uncontrolled Liberian diamond industry continues to pose a threat to regional security. By imposing diamond sanctions in March 2001, the UNSC has acknowledged the fact that trade in rough diamonds is fueling the civil wars in West Africa (2001a). The NTGL, however, does not have authority over diamond-producing areas, and important control systems have not been put in place. The NTGL's continued failure to function effectively has significant ramifications for the Liberia's long-term reconstruction prospects, as well as for the security of the country and its neighbors. According to Global Witness, Jacques Klein, the head of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), has called the NTGL a "coalition of the unwilling" (2004, 18).

Personal alliances and general relationships between the West African warring parties

Human Rights Watch (HRW) points to the fact that personal relationships have dictated much of West African foreign policy throughout the past decades. Three key regional figures became allies of Taylor, then a rebel, as he led the NPFL insurgency against Doe's regime in late 1980s. The first was Burkina Faso President Compaoré, who provided military training and support to a group of Liberian exiles, including Taylor, after receiving their support in the 1987 assassination of the then president, Thomas Sankara. The second was the Libyan leader Colonel Gadaffi, whose dislike of Doe stemmed from hostility to the United States and whose military support to Taylor in his rebel days continued throughout Taylor's presidency despite the UN arms embargo on Liberia. The third was Houphouët-Boigny, who supported Taylor after Doe's murder of Tolbert, the husband of Houphouët-Boigny's cousin, in 1980. Houphouët-Boigny also had personal links with Compaoré, who had married one of his nieces. Houphouët-Boigny's support for Taylor's rebellion included allowing the NPFL to use western Côte d'Ivoire as a base for Taylor's attacks on Liberia.¹² He was allowed to use the country as a supply route, because Houphouët-Boigny wanted revenge over Doe.

These very brief examples illustrate the fact that personal alliances are of considerable importance in the formation of the foreign policy of West African states. Although these alliances are relationships between the central actors of the various states, they, at the same time, are not officially linked with these actors' formal state policy. This mixture of formal and

informal aspects of relationships between the states makes these states good examples of transnationalism in the region.

Also, more generally, there have been regular interactions across national boundaries in the region, often between a state actor on one side and a nonstate actor on the other.

Guinea has openly supported LURD (Africa Confidential 2003). The Guinean mining and trading company Société Katex Mine Guinée has been involved in the procurement of weapons for LURD. In June 2003, as the battle of Monrovia was going on between Taylor's forces and LURD, the ammunition ran out and a pause in the fighting appeared. LURD received supplies via Guinea, which possibly originated from Iran (HRW 2003), and Taylor received supplies from abroad as well, probably from Burkina Faso (Takirambudde 2003). Guinea has been supported by the United States with military aid.

The connection between LURD and Guinea goes back to 1999, when LURD was founded. Sekou Conneh, the LURD leader, is married to Ayesha Conneh, the spiritual advisor of Guinean president Lansana Conteh. LURD members could move freely on Guinean territory and use Guinean border towns as transit points. In addition, LURD also recruited soldiers in Guinean refugee camps (HRW 2003).

In 2000, Taylor backed an invasion of Guinea (ICG 2002), but the invasion brought no success. An ally of Taylor, Tragen Wantee, is now reportedly recruiting former members of Taylor's armed forces, preparing for an insurrection in Guinea (IRIN 2004). Wantee comes from Nimba county, one of Taylor's strongholds, and was trained, together with Taylor, in Libya during the 1980s. Wantee was appointed Liberian ambassador to Guinea when Taylor came to power in 1997. He was expelled from Guinea in 2001 by the Guinean government, after being accused of complicity with the invasion supported by Taylor (*ibid.*).¹³

The peacekeeping operation in Liberia in the beginning of the 1990s affected the relationship between anglophone and francophone West African countries as well as the great powers' interference in West African affairs. Nigeria's capacity as the head of the peacekeeping operation, and the claims that it was providing anti-NPFL forces with weapons, increased the French foreign policymakers' interest in Taylor. Côte d'Ivoire, under French influence, tolerated the transport of weapons to Taylor through its territory (Reno 1995). Côte d'Ivoire was also a business center for Taylor and the NPFL (ICG 2003). Taylor had a vision of a "Greater Liberia," consisting of Liberia, parts of Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia's third neighbor, supported Taylor's business networks, which were the basis of his political power and control (Reno 1995). It understood the economic possibility of the extensive international network built up by Taylor.

According to Peter Takirambudde, executive director of HRW's Africa Division, the Ivorian government's recruitment of soldiers for the conflict on its own soil was made by the promise that they could "keep their arms and take them back to Liberia to fight Taylor" (Takirambudde 2003). The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) launched attacks from Toulepleu, a town in western Côte d'Ivoire.

In 2002 a rebel group launched a coup in Côte d'Ivoire. The group failed to capture the capital and was forced back by a rapid French intervention. Shortly thereafter, the MJP and the MPIGO emerged in the west as new rebel groups. These two groups were aided by Liberian government troops, including former RUF soldiers from Sierra Leone. Because of this, Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo armed LURD-MODEL and allowed his own forces to support a LURD-MODEL operation into Liberia aimed at overthrowing Taylor (ICG 2003).

Nigeria is the unrivaled superpower of West Africa, both economically and politically. Prikic (1999) argues that it staged the ECOWAS intervention as a cover for its own plan to intervene in Liberia. The military regime in Lagos, the then Nigerian capital, felt threatened by the uprising in Liberia, both because of the possibility of its own regime being overthrown and the threat of regional instability.

Several Nigerian citizens lived in Monrovia in 1990. When Taylor's NPFL forces reached Monrovia, they killed thousands of Nigerians who were hiding in the Nigerian Embassy. A few days earlier, the Nigerian state radio had announced that if Nigerian nationals were treated badly, the country would intervene in Liberia (Mays 1998). President Babangida said Nigeria's actions in Liberia were a matter of defense of "territorial integrity" (ibid., 110). Also during Obasanjo's presidency there have been personal relationships between the Nigerian political elite and the one in Liberia, and the Nigerian political elite has denied Taylor's guilt in relation to the civil war in Sierra Leone. The federal government of Nigeria, according to the Nigerian newspaper *Vanguard*, declared that Taylor "played no role whatsoever in the civil war in the neighbouring country of Sierra Leone, after all" (Ige 2004). This statement was issued in the context of the extradition of Taylor to the Sierra Leonean Special Court, where he was accused of war crimes in the Sierra Leonean civil war. It underlines the problem of regional security cooperation. Nigeria clearly sided with Taylor in the conflict. Nigerian President Obasanjo had a "personal relationship" with Taylor's sister (ICG 2002), and this was obviously an important feature of the relation between Liberia and Nigeria under Taylor's rule. It is important to consider such relations when analyzing the foreign policy of a neopatrimonial state.

Transnational Aspects of the War in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In the same way as for West Africa, the conflicts of the Great Lakes region are woven together through strategic elite alliances, through regional (formal and informal) economy and trade networks, through the steady stream of refugees, and through the large number of mercenaries moving between the countries. The wars in the DRC are no exception and conform to this complex picture. However, what is special in relation to the country is the enormous amount of natural resources, which makes it more attractive to transnational actors than most other countries. The end of the Cold War, and the privatization of former state enterprises that followed, only made it more special to such actors.

Even in periods of civil war, investors do not seem to shy away from the country. The DRC is still very attractive to transnational companies scrambling for concessions and exploration rights in the country. Particularly interesting are the mining opportunities related to copper, cobalt, gold, and diamonds. The investors do not respect national sovereignty or territorial integrity. They make contracts with whoever control the resources, be it warlords, invaders, or the government. And the rebel groups, such as the ADFL, have discovered that making deals in this manner is a very good way of raising money for warfare.

Another type of transnational actor in the DRC is crime networks of drug traffickers, arms merchants, and money launderers. These networks have clearly taken advantage of the crises in Congo and have made agreements with governmental actors as well as warlords to plunder Congo's natural resources. It is very hard to get detailed information of their activity. Still, the proliferation of small arms and the role of illicit finance to sustain armed conflict in resource-rich areas are clear manifestations of the active involvement of these networks. In the next few sections, we will briefly present the main transnational aspects of the wars in the DRC.

Recycling of small arms and light weapons

Though estimates vary widely, it is widely recognized that the Great Lakes region is inundated with SALWs—which allow conflicts to persist. In the DRC itself, an estimated one million SALWs are in private hands.

(Bekoe 2003, 16)

Most conflicts in Congo after independence in 1960 have been fueled by weapons sales and by military training. According to a Woodstock Report, “[t]he conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo [. . .] and its continuing effects on the Great Lakes Region [stand] as a vivid symbol of

the new threat caused by war and arms trafficking on the continent” (Goussikindey 2006, 2). Recent research shows that as much as 90 percent of the weapons entering the DRC come from Uganda. The rest comes from Rwanda, Sudan, the West, and ex-Soviet Union countries (Shamba et al. 2003, 18). The weapons are brought into the DRC clandestinely by night, on foot or by bicycle or other vehicles. There are no large markets as such, only points of sale along the frontiers, such as at Nabiapai and Kakesa. The users are DRC nationals, foreign soldiers, hunters, refugees, rebels and their allies, traders, businessmen, and army deserters (Shamba et al. 2003). The relationship between the proliferation of light weapons and the plundering of natural resources in the conflict areas and the criminalization of the economy is quite obvious. “All the warlords and their allies are fighting for territories rich in, for example, gold, diamonds, coltan, wood, with the objective of enriching themselves and continuing to supply these areas with weapons and ammunition” (ibid., 24). Thus, the transnational proliferation of SALW not only fuels the conflicts but also hinders sound economic development.

As already mentioned, there is very little transparency in the small arms trade. Control over the arms trade in most international border areas is limited and so is the ability of politicians to move forward with arms control measures. The stream of small arms across the Central African borders is—as was the case in West Africa—both in the hands of private persons *and* subject to the strategies of the political elites of the various countries. As for the activity of the political elites in relation to small arms, this is again an example of the fact that what they do is different from what they say. At the same time as all the political leaders of the Great Lakes region have used big words to show that they want to limit the proliferation of SALW, most of them are known to have participated in the continued illegal proliferation of small arms in the region.

Mercenaries and militarized refugees

The role of Rwanda in relation to the wars in the DRC is considerable. Rwanda’s activities in Congo have been in the backdrop of the 1994 genocide, in which more than 800,000 people, mainly Tutsi Rwandans, were slaughtered. The Hutu Interahamwe militia carried out most of the massacres. Afterward, they fled to the eastern region of neighboring Congo. From their bases in eastern Congo, they often launched attacks on their home country. This led the Rwandan army to invade the DRC after some time, claiming that this was necessary in order to secure its border.

Militarized refugees also came from the other countries of the region, particularly Uganda and Zimbabwe. Rebellions of various kinds fled from repressive regimes of their home countries and sought shelter in eastern Congo. Some of these groups joined in on behalf of the ruling regime in the DRC, whereas others joined Congolese rebellion groups in their efforts to overthrow the regime. Throughout the wars in the DRC, the presence of these militarized refugees has been one of the most important factors for the continuance of the violent conflict. War has become a way of life for many of these men and women. Moreover, the fact that they get entangled in complex networks of informal/illegal trade and smuggling and, in that way, become wealthier than they would be in their home countries, makes it tempting for them to continue this way of life.

Militant groups fleeing from their home country represent a constant threat to the regimes from which they flee. This is the reason why the presence of foreign armies in the DRC during the wars has been so extensive. Neighboring countries have sent their armies to try to hinder the rebellion groups from reorganizing themselves and building up their military capacity. After a while, these armies also became involved in the shady war economy of the war-torn country and it became more lucrative for them to stay there than to return to their home country.

The armies of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have been present in the DRC during most of the war. When they, according to the Pretoria and Luanda agreements, had to officially withdraw, their governments found different ways to secure their continued presence in the DRC, as this was of too high an economic importance to neglect. The Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), for instance, continues to provoke ethnic conflict, "clearly cognizant that the unrest in Ituri [in northeastern DRC] will require the continuing presence of a minimum of UPDF personnel. The Panel [UN Panel of Experts] has evidence that high-ranking UPDF officers have taken steps to train local militia to serve as a paramilitary force, directly and discretely under UPDF command, which will be capable of performing the same functions as UPDF" (UNSC 2002a, 5). Thus, the UPDF has the same control over trade flows and economic resources today as they had when they were officially present in larger parts of the DRC.

The Rwandan army has also officially withdrawn from the DRC. Before the withdrawal, however, the army put in place economic control mechanisms that do not rely on its explicit presence in the DRC. For instance, it has replaced Congolese directors of parastatals with businessmen from Kigali and local currency with Rwandan currency. Also, RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army) battalions that specialize in mining activities remain in place although they have ceased wearing army uniforms (*ibid.*).

A UNSC Panel of Experts also learned of other tactics for disguising the continuing presence of the armed force loyal to Rwanda: "Reliable sources have reported an initiative by the Chief of Staff of the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), Major Sylvain Mbuki, to reorganize the RCD-Goma [Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma] forces in order to accommodate large numbers of RPA soldiers inside ANC units and local defence forces made up of pro-Rwanda elements. Most of the ANC units have had RPA leadership for some time, and now, with this reorganization, a significant number of RPA soldiers will be integrated into the ANC rank and file" (UNSC 2003, 5–6). As we see, then, instead of departing for Rwanda, large numbers of Rwandan Hutus formerly serving in the RPA have now been provided with Congolese uniforms and assigned to the ANC as Congolese Hutus. Strictly, these soldiers cannot be considered to be mercenaries. Nevertheless, they are part of the same empirical picture, that is, a reality where soldiers of different armies, over time, serve in various countries in the same region according to the development of the regional conflict picture.

Another aspect of this picture is the fact that local militias and local politicians have now supplemented the role that state armies previously played in ensuring access to, and control of, valuable resources.

"Ordinary" refugees

Estimates of the number of refugees in the Great Lakes region vary. According to a relatively recent source, there are approximately 4 million IDPs within the seven countries usually referred to as the Great Lakes region, besides 600,000 refugees.¹⁴ This massive flow and dislocation of people should, of course, not merely be referred to as a social and humanitarian issue but as a symptom of a deeper crisis with broad economic, political, and security implications.

Refugee flows resulting from the various domestic conflicts in the states in the region interact with one another, with transborder groups and trading networks, as well as with various forms of institutions. The refugees become political and economic actors in their receiving countries. In many cases refugees strengthen the transnational identities of ethnic groups and strength entities such as informal transborder trading networks (Ntgeye et al. 2001).

Recalling what we wrote about a redefined security concept in Chapter 1, the issue of refugees in the Great Lakes region is probably well suited for an analysis on the basis of alternative concepts of security, an effort that has been done by, for instance, Mills and Norton (2002). They elaborate the nature of insecurity in relation to the refugee situation in the region within a framework that encompasses four different ways of conceptualizing

security—human security, societal security, national security, and international security. For the purpose of this chapter, they are all relevant, and we will briefly present this method of analyzing a regional refugee problem.

According to Mills and Norton, refugee crises, at their most basic level, are caused by threats to human security. “People become refugees because they fear for their personal safety and the personal safety of their loved ones. They may fear persecution, they may be fleeing war, or there may be some other threat to which they are vulnerable. As people become displaced, they also become vulnerable to other threats to their personal security. They will likely lack access to food, water, medicine, and shelter, and may become dependent upon others for these vital resources” (Mills and Norton 2002, 10). Refugees in the Great Lakes region—in the Hutu refugee camps in the DRC, for example—have also felt severe personal insecurity as a result of the presence of local militants. The DRC, as the host government of the Hutu refugees, could not, or did not, want to protect them.

As for societal security, this is a concept that is more problematic than that of human security, because of its state-centric quality. Not only must the state ensure the security of territory, resources, and population, it must also ensure protection to the “identity” of different groups of the population—an identity that includes such components as religion, culture, and language (Mills and Norton 2002, 12; Wæver et al. 1993, 23). Thus, refugee flows could, in themselves, be a threat to social security. On the other hand, refugee flows have often been the result of social insecurity in the Great Lakes region. Issues related to the identity and social cohesion of different ethnic groups have been at the core of what has been going on in the region. In the pregenocide period, for instance, the Tutsi minority, it was argued, was a threat to the state and to the Hutu culture. Genocide was the prescribed solution to this threat. And this is what is most problematic in relation to the concept of societal security, that is, the potential to use the concept as a justification for persecution of refugees or social minorities.

Many refugees and IDPs have so-called transnational identities, that is, their ethnic groups belong just as much in one country as in another. The presence of transnational identities in a region where borders are porous and where citizenship is a contested matter has intensified conflicts. For instance, the political grievances of the Banyamulenge in south Kivu (DRC) and the Banyarwanda in north Kivu involve questions about access to citizen rights and claims to resources based on such rights. These grievances came in the aftermath of the introduction of very narrow criteria for citizenship in the DRC, the effects of which were exacerbated by the high number of refugees from Rwanda (and to some extent Burundi). On several occasions refugees have been known to support rebel groups and militias, often as a means to advance their claims for citizenship, but also for economic purposes (Ntgeye et al. 2001).

“Throughout all phases of the conflict, the presence of large numbers of refugees [. . .] constituted threats to the state security of all the countries in the region” (Mills and Norton 2002, 12). The major reason for this is that refugee camps have also served as bases for militant groups. In Uganda, refugee camps have been the chief recruiting sources for the RPF, and they have also served as safe havens when violent operations in Rwanda have failed. The RPF’s presence has been seen as a potential threat to the Ugandan regime and has clearly also posed a threat to Rwanda’s political stability. As the civil war came to a close, Hutu refugee flows contained a considerable number of military personnel. This has also been the case concerning Hutu refugee camps in eastern Zaire. These camps have posed major threats to Rwandan state security, as they gave the militants a base from which to carry out attacks against the Tutsi-led government. The presence of these camps, which contained large numbers of militants, was also one of the major reasons why Rwanda and Uganda decided to intervene in Zaire’s internal affairs. And, as we know, this intervention resulted in the overthrow of the dictator Mobutu.

The reader will already have realized that the concept of state security cannot be separated from the concept of international security. The international security aspects of the Rwandan refugee crisis have been widespread—they have ranged from local cross-border destabilization to the regionalized war in the DRC, where more or less all the countries of the region have been involved. The web of allies and enemies is complex and far-reaching and includes actors at most levels of the society. As far as international security is concerned, it is the state actor that is in focus. Different states have intervened for different purposes: Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to address threats to their own security and Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Angola to support the DRC government. Meanwhile, leaders (military and civilian) from all the countries are enriching themselves and (to a limited degree) their countries from the vast resources of the DRC.

One aspect of the regional flows of refugees is related to HIV/AIDS, which becomes a transnational problem, especially during conflicts. In the Great Lakes region, where conflicts have been going on for more than a decade, the risk is particularly acute as large numbers of people cross national borders and as armed groups (also crossing borders) use rape and forced marriage as weapons of war.

Trade in natural resources

In view of the vast minerals and other resources in the region, the United States backed Mobutu in 1960 in his ouster of the previous leader, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.¹⁵

After 1965 the presidency of Mobutu made Zaire notorious for corruption and camaraderie, that is, personal alliances among those holding office. This was the beginning of a sustained period of institutionalised corruption and misappropriation of state resources. Instead of going to the state treasury, large proportions of the revenues from state-owned companies—for example, the copper and cobalt company Gécamines—went straight into the pockets of President Mobutu and his closest allies (Amnesty International 2003).

More recently, countries such as Rwanda and Uganda have been accused of using political events as an excuse to intervene in the DRC for economic purposes. For instance, critics of the Rwandan invasion of eastern Congo have accused Rwanda of using the Interahamwe attacks as an excuse to deploy 20,000 troops to take control of Congolese diamond mines and other mineral resources. One of the most controversial of all the natural resources has been the ore colombite-tantalite, or coltan. It is primarily the demand for the highly priced tantalum that comes from the refined coltan that makes the ore so valuable. Tantalum is a necessary component in the production of mobile phones. As the world supply was decreasing while the demand was increasing, the price of coltan increased substantially between late 1999 and late 2000. At the end of 2000, a kilogram of coltan of average quality was estimated at \$200. According to the estimates of mining experts, the Rwandan army was exporting at least 100 tons per month—worth approximately \$20 million per month—simply by selling coltan that intermediaries bought from small dealers at approximately \$10 per kilo. At the highest estimates of all related costs, the RPA must have made at least \$250 million over a period of 18 months. This is enough money to finance the war. And this is also where the vicious circle of the war lies. Coltan has made it possible for the Rwandan army to stay on in the DRC. At the same time, the RPA has provided protection and security to the individuals and companies extracting the mineral. They have shared the money with the Rwandan army, which then continues to provide a secure environment for the exploitation to go on (UNSC 2002a, 14–19).

Personal alliances and general relationships between regional warring parties

There are two issues that are of particular importance when talking about the alliances and relationships between the warring parties in the Great Lakes region. First, the alliances have been shifting, sometimes from one day to the next, all through the Congo war (Reyntjens 1999). Second, the explanation why a foreign state has intervened in the conflicts in the DRC is often different from the explanation for that country's continued presence in the war zones (Clark 2001).

The existence of strong leaders in the Great Lakes region has been both a blessing and a factor that has triggered conflicts. On the one hand, it is probable that Mobutu, with his dictatorship, prevented Zaire from disintegrating for a long time. On the other hand, strong leaders have been decisive in triggering and sustaining most conflicts of the region, alone and in alliance with one another. Alliances between the leaders of the region have been both covert and overt. Covertly, armed groups have received support from states and nonstate actors of the region for ideological, economic, ethnic, and strategic considerations. Political networks of this kind have been of great importance for the regional conflict dynamics. Overt political networks have been equally important, though possibly in another way. Together, Central African leaders have acted both as peace makers and as peace spoilers. One example is the pregenocide alliance between the presidents of Uganda (Museveni), Burundi (Pierre Buyoya), and Zaire (Mobutu). Because of their common interest in the repatriation of the Rwandan refugees, the presidents together played a significant role in the Arusha Accord for Rwanda.

Alliances have shifted all through the war as necessary to achieve economic exploitation and political advantages. On the one hand, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) has been a major guarantor of the security of the DRC government. On the other hand, the senior officers of the ZDF have enriched themselves from the country's mineral assets as part of arrangements set up to repay Zimbabwe for military services. Taking advantage of provisions of the Pretoria and Luanda agreements, the ZDF started to establish new companies and sign contractual arrangements, anticipating complete withdrawal of its troops. In fact, new agreements were signed just prior to the announcement of the withdrawal of these troops from the diamond center of Mbuji Mayi in August 2002. Toward the end of its mandate, the UNSC Panel of Experts received a copy of a memorandum dated August 2002 from the defence minister of the DRC, Sidney Sekeramayi, to President Mugabe, proposing that a joint DRC-Zimbabwean company be set up in Mauritius to disguise the continuing economic interests of the ZDF in the DRC. The memorandum refers to "the wave of negative publicity and criticism that the DRC-Zimbabwe joint ventures have attracted" (UNSC 2002a, 6). It also refers to "plans to set up a private Zimbabwean military company to guard Zimbabwe's economic investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after the planned withdrawal of ZDF troops. It states that this company was formed to operate alongside a new military company owned by the Democratic Republic of the Congo" (ibid.).

As already mentioned, the role that state armies previously played in ensuring access to and control of valuable resources has gradually been

supplemented by local militias, local politicians, and businessmen. Together, these actors form elite networks that have control over a range of commercial activities to generate revenue in the three separate areas of the DRC controlled by the DRC itself, Rwanda, and Uganda, respectively. According to the UNSC Panel of Experts, these networks consist of a small core of political and military elites and business persons and, in the case of the occupied areas, selected rebel leaders and administrators. Members of the network cooperate to generate revenue. The networks “ensure the viability of their economic activities through control over the military and other security forces that they use to intimidate, threaten violence or carry out selected acts of violence” (ibid., 7). In the case of the government-controlled area, the elite network of Congolese and Zimbabwean political, military, and commercial interests seeks to maintain its grip on the main mineral resources. No doubt, the network benefits from instability in the DRC. And so, its representatives in the Kinshasa government and the ZDF have fueled instability in the region, for example, by supporting armed groups opposing Rwanda and Burundi. According to the UNSC Panel of Experts, the elite network in the government-controlled area comprises three circles of power—Congolese and Zimbabwean government officials and private businessmen. Chief figures of the various branches were identified by the panel.¹⁶

African Security Complexes?

As we have seen in the previous sections, African civil/internal wars cannot be seen in isolation from the general sociopolitical situations in neighboring countries. That is, what happens in one country will easily have important positive or negative effects on the situation in a bordering country. In his *People, States, and Fear*, Barry Buzan (1983) argues that patterns of alignment and enmity, often regionally specific and historically conditioned, are more salient to the security calculations of a vast majority of states than many other factors: “Complex patterns of alignment and enmity develop from historical conditions in all types of anarchic systems, more so in those which are highly fragmented. Despite the subjective, perceptual element of security relations, these patterns are often fairly durable features of the international system, and it is they, rather than the grosser system structure overall, which define the security environment of most states” (1983, 105). By “alignment” Buzan meant a correspondence in interests and outlooks between states. He did not delimit it to mean only alliance or security-pact formation. In the second edition of *People, States, and Fear*, Buzan (1991) refers to enmity and *amity*, instead of enmity and alignment. This distinction is probably especially relevant for the analysis of Third World security relations, including those in Africa.

The concept of RSC was introduced by Barry Buzan in 1991 and defined as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (ibid., 190). Their identifying feature is “a high level of threat/fear which is felt *mutually* among two or more major states” (ibid., 193–194).

In 1998 Buzan redefined the concept, primarily because of the introduction of another central concept—“securitization.” He then defined the RSC as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan et al. 1998, 201). It is important for our purpose to note here that Buzan has replaced the word “states” with the word “units” in the definition. The 1998 version has a wider scope compared with the 1991 version. Replacing the term “states” with the more inclusive term “units” serves to acknowledge the fact that states are not anymore regarded as the sole important actor when analyses of security are concerned. Other important actors are organizations, groups, and individuals.¹⁷ Buzan did not include any precise criteria for identifying the members of a security complex. Rather, he argues that it is the intensity of state interaction within certain regions of the Third World that qualifies them as security complexes.

It is generally the case that security threats are more acute the closer they are to home, other things being equal. Moreover, geography also dictates that RSCs frequently include secondary states situated around the principal rival states at the core of the complex. In the case of the Horn of Africa, this would typically be states such as Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda. A secondary state is not in a relationship of *mutual* threat with a core state, but is still of some relevance for the latter’s security calculations to the extent that it aligns with other states. This leads to the idea of a web of security (sub)complexes, an idea of great relevance in Central and West Africa.

The idea that geographical proximity is of great importance in relation to conflict between states is, of course, not new. As numerous studies have pointed out, there is a great potential of shared borders to give rise to territorial and other types of disputes. What is special in relation to African security (sub)complexes is that there is a transnationalism related to civil conflicts that cannot be found in conflicts in other parts of the world. As we saw in relation to the war in the DRC, nonstate groups in a neighboring country are in close contact with the DRC state in matters directly related to the warfare itself. These kinds of relationships are of great significance to the dynamism of African (civil) wars.

Yet geographical proximity *per se* is not the criterion for identifying security complexes. In addition, there must be a certain thickness of interaction between the relevant units. According to Buzan (1991, 193), “[a] security complex exists where a set of security relationships stands out from the general background by virtue of its relatively strong inward-looking character, and the relative weakness of its outward security interactions with its neighbours.” In most cases this boundary criterion will be quite straightforward. For African RSCs, it can sometimes be hard to define the degree of thickness in interaction between units. The reason for this is, of course, the significant presence of informal actors in the overall security picture.

Buzan and Wæver (2003, 240) argue that West Africa does not qualify as an RSC. They see West Africa as a typical example of what they call a “proto-complex,” where there “is sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbours, but where the regional dynamics are still too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully fledged RSC” (*ibid.*, 239).

Others, however, argue that the weakness of the states in the region is not incompatible with its definition as an RSC. What matters is the weakness of the states in combination with the strength of the regimes. This can certainly be a threat to other states.

Buzan and Wæver have pointed out that the security interaction in West Africa is dominated by transnational interactions, support for insurgencies, proliferation of small arms, regional warriors, mercenaries, and refugees. This is in line with what I presented in relation to the Liberian civil wars. In addition to this are all the personal relationships between the state leaders of the various countries. The threats are thus primarily represented by transnational actors and not by states. It is hard to see, however, that this is not coherent with labeling West Africa an RSC. To understand the security dynamics and the security interdependence of West Africa, it is very important to focus on the informal processes as well as the formal ones. In West Africa, as well as in other African regions, transnational actors may possess just as much power as formal state actors. It is therefore of utmost importance that we recognize them as equally important as the state actors in relation to the overall security picture. It can be argued that Buzan and Wæver underestimate the importance of the transnational actors. They view transnational actors as substate or nonstate actors, and by doing that they give them too little importance in relation to regional security interdependence.¹⁸ As noted above, Buzan replaced the word “states” with the word “units” in his second definition of an RSC. As far as we can see, this only underlines our

argument that the (most) important actors of Central and West African civil wars are informal/nonstate actors.

Subaltern Realism

When explaining conflicts in the Third World, Ayoob's theory approach is also useful. He traces threats, conflicts, and state behavior of Third World states to the domestic-political venture of state building.¹⁹

Ayoob recognizes the inherent limitations of mainstream IR theory for explaining Third World security patterns, and he recognizes these limitations not as a mark of the Third World's strangeness but as weakness of mainstream theory. In his view, most of the so-called Third World approaches to the IR theory underestimate the importance of political variables. Using the term "political variables," Ayoob (1992) is primarily referring to the state and the role of the political elite. In relation to one of the main themes of this book, it is interesting to note that Ayoob is one of the most important advocates of the theory of security-development nexus, that is, he feels that security and development cannot be seen in isolation from each other but must be studied together because they are closely connected: "Development without security is at best a value that can be enjoyed only temporarily and may be easily lost in the face of mounting internal and external challenges that may threaten the very existence of political community" (ibid., 64). To a large degree, development is dependent upon security. Ayoob stresses that without domestic-political order provided by the state, not much development can come about. More explicitly, he sees a linkage between conflict and development, a linkage between warfare and state building. In fact, this is one of the central ideas of his theory, which he refers to as "Subaltern Realism."²⁰ He claims that state making must form the centerpiece of any theory that attempts to explain the internal and external behavior of Third World states and regimes: "[The] search for security is the overriding concern of Third World elites, and the management of internal security problems the main objective, within their overall preoccupation with security" (ibid., 66).

Ayoob's focus on state making and security in understanding Third World political behavior can also explain why African states get involved in internal conflicts in neighboring countries to such a large degree.²¹ One central reason why Uganda got involved in the internal conflict in the DRC in the first place was the process of state making. Zaire was no doubt a main breeding place for the enemy of both Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM)—the rebel group Allied Democratic Force (ADF)—in his own regime's heartland, the Luwero Triangle. Museveni's

legitimacy has, to a large degree, been based on his ability to provide security and economic growth to the population, above all, in the NRM heartland. Thus, the ADF, operating in this area, primarily Buganda and Ankole, was, at the same time, a massive threat to the regime's survival and legitimacy, which was built up on its ability to safeguard peace and security in these areas. If securing the regime demanded the NRM's presence in a neighboring country, so be it: the "NRM is waging war both in Uganda and in the region in order to protect its political project" (Bøås 2004, 297). The threats posed by the ADF were detrimental to the NRM and had to be neutralized, even if this meant crossing the border into Congo and getting involved in internal conflicts there.²²

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Intergovernmental Security-Political Efforts

The fact that most violent conflicts in Africa today have obvious regional aspects has made African politicians as well as members of donor societies realize that sustainable solutions to the conflicts must be regional in character.

As we have seen in previous chapters of this book, transnational factors are of great importance for the triggering and sustenance of violent conflict in Africa. To solve a violent conflict, it is therefore necessary to involve more than one country, even if the conflict has its epicenter in only one country.

The necessity of more countries working together in conflict prevention and peace building is recognized by most African intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). During the last ten years, several IGOs have established their own mechanisms for the prevention—and management—of violent conflicts. The question to be addressed in this chapter is whether regionalized conflicts in Africa can be adequately managed through these formal intergovernmental mechanisms. To what extent have the formal mechanisms of the various IGOs addressed the nature of the conflicts, that is, their transnational aspects, traditions, and culture?

Most of the IGOs that recently adopted conflict management mechanisms were established for the purpose of economic development. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the IGO leaders have recognized the link between development and security. In the following sections, we will analyze the conflict management mechanisms within three IGOs in Africa—ECOWAS, the SADC, and IGAD. As the organization that has by far engaged most extensively in regional conflict management, ECOWAS will be given considerably more attention than the SADC or IGAD.

We will point out the underlying reasons for the willingness to adopt conflict management as a part of the activities of an organization originally established for other purposes, and we will discuss whether the strategies of the various organizations are compatible with the nature of the conflicts in which the IGOs intervene.

Classical Theoretical Contributions

Before going into that, however, we will devote a few sections to some of the classical theoretical contributions related to regional integration within the issue area of peace and security. Previously, we have pointed to the possible applicability of the concept of security complex to the phenomenon of regionalized security in Africa. As for possible regional solutions to African security problems, there are primarily two classical theoretical contributions that cover the emergence of regional security cooperation within the already existing IGOs. They are Karl Deutsch's theory on security communities (Deutsch, Burrell, and Kann 1957) and Ernst B. Haas's theory on neofunctionalism (Haas 1964). Although different, both these theories conceive of security cooperation within an IGO as something that will emerge at a relatively advanced stage of integration.¹ As defined by Deutsch in 1957, a "security community" is "a group of people which has become integrated." Integration is defined as "the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population" (Deutsch, Burrell, and Kann 1957, 5). Elaborating on the "sense of community," Deutsch points to a "we feeling" and a dynamic process of mutual sympathy, consideration, loyalties, trust, and responsiveness in decision making (*ibid.*, 36; also referred to in Nathan 2004a, 2). According to this definition, contemporary security communities would include Western Europe, Canada, the United States, and the Nordic countries.²

Partly due to the Cold War and the dominant position of realism, Deutsch's work lay fallow for many years. However, after the end of the Cold War, researchers once again directed their attention to Deutsch's ideas—one of his most influential works is the edited volume by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett from 1998 (Adler and Barnett 1998). Here, the original ideas are refined and their possible applicability to different regional settings is explored (Nathan 2004, 2).

According to Nathan (2006a), the relationship between security communities and domestic stability has been neglected in the revival of Deutsch's ideas. Adler and Barnett construct "an analytical framework in which mutual trust and collective identity among a group of states are the

necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change, the benchmark of a security community" (ibid., 276). Instability is not given explicit attention in the framework offered by Adler and Barnett, and although other writers view instability as an impediment to the emergence of a security community, there is no systematic treatment of the problem at a general level (ibid., 277). In his article Nathan argues that "domestic stability, defined as the absence of large-scale violence in a country, is a necessary condition of a security community" (ibid.). According to him, domestic violence is an impediment to the emergence of a security community because it leaves people insecure and often leads to cross-border destabilization. It also generates "uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, inhibiting mutual confidence and a sense of collective identity" (ibid.). In contrast to Adler and Barnett, Nathan concludes that the benchmark of dependable expectations of peaceful change is necessary not only between the states of a region but also within them for a security community to emerge. If Nathan is right, then none of the African regions that we will focus on in this chapter are in the process of forming security communities.

In line with Nathan, Liisa Laakso (2005) holds the view that a minimal stability is a precondition for regional cooperation that leads to a security community. Most of the literature applying this concept to Africa has ignored this prerequisite.³

According to Ernst B. Haas, security cooperation in an integrating community is a phenomenon that will occur at a late stage in the process of integration. The original neofunctionalist school of thought believed that through incremental development and spillover from one issue area to another, security cooperation would automatically evolve. This idea was later modified by Haas, mainly because of empirical backdrops related to European integration. The later version of neofunctionalism points to a discontinuity between low-politics integration and high-politics integration. Security cooperation is no longer something that will occur out of necessity based on previous processes.⁴ I have made an effort to revise the neofunctionalist theoretical framework to make it more applicable to the African processes of integration. In the revised framework, particular emphasis is put on two aspects of neofunctionalism—its closeness to the actors (the perceptions, the purposes, and the will of the actors are basic to this theory) and its being the most issue-area-oriented of all the classical theories of integration. The system prescribed by neofunctionalists is not groupings defined by geographical borders, but areas defined by common issues (Haas 1964, 162). With these two aspects in mind, a framework based on three different stages of integration is developed. In phase 1 (the prefunctional phase), I presuppose that the "actors already have as

their goal some kind of community between them—and that they see the possibility of peace and development through this community. They are willing to go through a process to reach this goal, and they believe that this strategy is realistic. At this stage, it is primarily factors of high-politics character that drive the process” (Dokken 1997, 167). Spillover at this stage will usually be rather modest since the actors still lack the degree of confidence necessary for the process to take off. They will devote considerable attention to the development of a so-called security-political framework for further integration. That is, the actors have achieved sufficient clarification of their preferences with respect to vital matters in security and foreign policy. In contrast to, for example, European integration, Third World integration will normally have reached the arena of high politics before incremental development within welfare politics becomes extensive. This phenomenon has been referred to by theorists as “premature politicization.” Personally, I prefer to explain the phenomenon by the pre-functional phase, that is, a phase needed to sort out disagreements and uncertainties regarding security and foreign policy.

Phase 2 (the functional phase) represents neofunctionalism in its traditional sense, as introduced by Haas. This phase is marked by incremental development through spillover. Institution building and an increasing degree of formalized structures indicate a higher level of integration (*ibid.*, 170). Gradually, however, the integration process will reach a stage where high politics will have to be *formally* incorporated. The actors will now have to decide whether they are “mature” for political integration. If they are, then they will enter the postfunctional phase (phase 3) of the integration process.

In his original model, Haas was not willing to include high politics. “The ‘expansive logic of functionalism’ was used as a concept to explain why supranational economic integration in Europe had progressed as far as it had. If nothing disturbed the process, the incrementalism would necessarily lead to a political union” (*ibid.*, 171). In Europe this process was disturbed by de Gaulle’s “no” to Britain (de Gaulle’s refusal to let Britain join the EEC). In Third World integration, the process still has a long way to go before one can talk about a political union. Let me therefore return to traditional economic integration and discuss its relationship with the ongoing security cooperation in several African regions.

Trade liberalization has been the method of choice the world over, including in the Third World, to increase trade between countries in a regional integration process. And although liberalization is an important stimulus for increased trade and can even contribute to economic growth, there is no positive link between trade liberalization and economic integration in regions struggling with security problems (Laakso 2005, 3).

In fact trade in a number of commodities is more profitable in times of violent conflict than in times of peace.⁵ Moreover, as we have seen in West and Central Africa, wars fuel illicit exploitation of vital natural resources. The legitimate activity also gains from conflicts. "Throughout the 1990s export growth rates were higher in conflict-affected developing countries than in those not affected by conflict" (UNCTAD 2004, Chart 31, referred in Laakso 2005, 3). This means that the traditional form of regional integration—as understood by, for instance, Haas—does not necessarily lead to peace. On the contrary, integration could mean that authoritarian leaders might turn to leaders of neighboring countries for support, while violently defending their position against internal opposition (Laakso 2005). In fact, low-intensity conflicts might help them stay in power.⁶ This is probably one reason why the majority of the countries in a region such as West Africa, for most of its postcolonial period, have been ruled by military leaders supporting one another instead of working for peace and democratic development (*ibid.*). As shown in the previous chapter, non-state actors and rebel groups also profit from the regional trade networks related to warfare activities.

According to Fredrik Söderbaum, "there is evidence that many ruling political elites actively seek to maintain the status quo and prevent formal regionalism in order to enhance their private interests by way of informal 'trans-state regionalism' and 'networks of plunder'" (2002, 98).

Processes of regionalism in Africa are very different from those in Europe (Dokken 1997). This is true of security-political regionalism as well as of regionalism related to economic development and other issue areas. For a long time the theories used in the analysis of African regionalism were primarily those developed on the basis of European experiences, with the lack of applicability that involved (*ibid.*).

The concept "trans-state regionalism" has been introduced to describe the particular kind of regionalism existent in West Africa.⁷ Trans-state regionalism is not tied to an institutionalized and formal process, even if it often depends on political decisions within the state and on the political elites of the state. Trans-state regionalism would benefit more if the decisions of the formal integration processes were not implemented than if they were.

The concept may seem a bit confusing. On the one hand it signals that the state is involved. On the other hand one knows that this kind of regionalism consciously keeps aloof of official intergovernmental regionalism. The vitality of this kind of regionalism will depend very much on the lack of transparency in the state apparatus. Trans-state regionalism, to a large degree, undermines the regular capacity of the state. It is strengthened by the ongoing processes of privatization. Trans-state regionalism can also be

seen as a strategy of survival and adaptation that the state chooses in response to economic liberalization and SAPs.⁸ Various aspects of trans-state regionalism have proved to be of vital importance to large segments of the populations in West Africa and several times also for the very state apparatus of the countries (Bach 1999). Because of this the will and the effort to fight this kind of regionalism is rather weak.

The theoretical paradigm of “New Regionalism,” also referred to as the “Reflectivist Approach to Regionalism,” contains valuable insights in this respect. Most scholars within this new tradition understand regionalism as a heterogenic, plural, and diverse process.

New Regionalism, States, and IGOs

Even though they differ a lot in their various approaches to New Regionalism,⁹ reflectivist theories in general are much more reluctant to accept the central role of the state as a regionalizing actor as well as the formal IGOs than were the classical theories of integration. Andrew Grant and Söderbaum write that “[. . .] the NRA [New Regionalism Approach] looks beyond state-centrism. [. . .] The NRA suggests that in the age of globalization, the state is being ‘unbundled,’ with the result that actors other than the state are gaining strength. By implication, the focus should not be only on state actors and formal regionalism, but also on non-state actors and what is broadly referred to as ‘informal regionalism’ or ‘regionalism from below.’ This includes a wide range of non-state actors and activities, such as transnational corporations, ethnic business networks, civil societies, think-tanks, private armies, development corridors and the informal border politics of small-scale trade, bartering, smuggling and crime” (Grant and Söderbaum 2003, 4).

Scholars working primarily on New Regionalism are right when pointing to the fact that formal IGOs have been given too much attention by researchers on regionalism in the past. Theorists of New Regionalism are obviously right when they point to the fact that classical theories of integration, developed primarily for the purpose of studying the European process, are not able to catch the central elements of regionalism in Africa today.¹⁰ However, acknowledging this should not necessarily imply that formal processes are left out altogether by empirical studies of regionalism in Africa today. Notwithstanding the acknowledgment of both formal and informal processes, as well as the importance of both nonstate actors *and* the state, an eagerness to focus on informal processes and nonstate actors has been dominant among theorists of New Regionalism. This has often led to a neglect of the role of the formal processes and the state when studying regionalism in Africa today through the lenses of New

Regionalism. We argue that it is necessary to see the formal, state-driven processes *together* with the informal processes, that is, processes that are also driven by actors other than the state. However, even though researchers have acknowledged this necessity, scholars have failed to carry out *empirical* studies where formal and informal processes state- and nonstate-driven processes are seen together. Let us bear this in mind when we now move on to the presentation of three African IGOs and their efforts within the issue area of peace and security.

ECOWAS: Established for Economic Development, Reformed for Peace and Security

It was in relation to the first civil war in Liberia that the world society first witnessed an African regional peace effort. ECOWAS managed to establish a so-called monitoring group named ECOMOG, which consisted of soldiers from various member countries of the IGO. The group soon got into serious trouble, for a large number of reasons. Notwithstanding this, the peace-building efforts of the first ECOMOG mission were considered to be the beginning of a whole new era in Africa-based conflict resolution. Before analyzing the conflict management efforts of ECOWAS, we will briefly present some main aspects of the organization.

As those of other parts of the developing world, West Africa's efforts to achieve formal regional integration have also been largely driven by the desire to overcome the constraint of small economies, which has been hampering the countries' ability to industrialize efficiently. This is also the case with ECOWAS. The organization was established on May 28, 1975, by 15 countries of the West African region. Cape Verde joined in 1977. Both the original treaty (the Treaty of Lagos) and the revised version of 1993 include initiatives to promote cooperation and development within most issue areas of the societies. The 15 heads of states who signed the original treaty saw regional integration as a multistep (incremental) process that would eventually lead to a customs union and then a common market.

Specifically, the community aspires to "promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent" (ECOWAS 1993, Article 3.1). The treaty further declares that the Community shall achieve these aims by ensuring, *inter alia*, "the harmonisation and co-ordination of national policies and the promotion of integration programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture and natural resources, industry, transport and communications,

energy, trade, money and finance, taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, information, culture, science, technology, services, health, tourism, [and] legal matters" (ibid., Article 3.2).

The principal areas of cooperation have been

- expanding the regional market;
- harmonizing agricultural and industrial policies through production integration;
- ensuring the harmonious integration of physical infrastructures;
- promoting monetary and financial integration to facilitate trade;
- maintaining regional peace, stability, and security, and
- ensuring free movement of persons, including rights of residence and establishment.

(OECD 2001, 13–14)

Today, ECOWAS embraces over 200 million people in all 15 states of West Africa except Mauritania, which left the Community in December 1999. The Community is operated through a Conference of Heads of State, a Council of Ministers, an executive secretariat, a development and cooperation fund, and five specialized commissions.

The decision-making procedure of ECOWAS is usually referred to by the concept of "intergovernmentalism."¹¹ That is to say that the individual countries of the Community remain the ultimate decision makers. The Authority of Heads of State and Government (hereafter the Authority) is at the top of the hierarchy of the governing bodies. All the power to direct the organization comes from this body, which meets annually. The Authority also constitutes the court of last appeal.

Owing to various conflicts within the region, the original objectives of the organization were soon pushed to the background. "Because of distressing events in several of its Member States, ECOWAS soon realised that the case of economic development and progress can only be pursued in an environment of peace and stability. It found that it had to involve itself in conflicts in Member States to ensure that an environment conducive to the implementation of its economic programme was maintained" (ISS 2007a, Part 6).

Achievements related to peace and security

The history of ECOWAS in relation to conflict prevention and conflict resolution is relatively new, but during the last ten years the organization or its partners have undertaken a number of initiatives to maintain and consolidate peace, stability, and security within the region, such as ECOMOG's operations in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), and Guinea-Bissau (1999).

Since the ECOWAS treaty did not originally provide for regional cooperation on issues related to peace and security, the organization had to search for a legal justification in a doctrine outside the framework of the treaty to establish ECOMOG. This doctrine was the so-called solidarity achieved by consensus, evolved at the extraordinary summit meeting in Bamako, Mali, in 1990. It was the consensus reached at this meeting that paved the way for the intervention to stop the violence in Liberia. At the May 1990 ECOWAS Summit in Banjul, Gambia, the Authority established the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). The SMC, in turn, established ECOMOG. Although the decision to establish the SMC makes no reference to a particular conflict, it is clear that the committee was created to address the Liberian civil war.

Up until the turn of the century, ECOMOG operations were essentially run by the participating countries, and more precisely by the country that provided most resources in each case. A problem with ECOMOG has been that it has never been clear whether the forces were responding to initiatives by countries of the region or to initiatives by the UN. Details of the various ECOMOG operations have been given in the literature and will not be dealt with in this book.¹² The following is just a brief summary of the main activities of the body, pointing also to some of the problems the parties have experienced so far.

ECOMOG in Liberia

To a large degree, the establishment of ECOMOG was an improvised response to the Liberian conflict. The Authority's decision to establish the SMC with a very broad mandate and to make Nigeria a member of that body provided Lagos with an opportunity to influence the ECOWAS policy on Liberia. The way in which this happened exacerbated long-standing tensions between anglophone and francophone states in the Community. Several francophone states strongly objected to the deployment of the ECOMOG force, which, as it turned out, comprised almost entirely of anglophone states.

There were also tensions among the anglophone countries participating in the force (Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) on the disagreements between Nigeria on the one hand and the other states on the other over the nature of ECOMOG's mission. Ghana, with ECOMOG's First Force commander, Lt. Gen. Arnold Quainoo, viewed the mission as an interposition force, primarily intended to preserve the status quo. The force did not intend to support one faction over the other. In Nigeria's view, ECOMOG was meant to be a tool to save Doe and block Taylor's ascension to power. By consenting to a non-Nigerian force commander, Nigeria tried to camouflage its dominant role in the force. Nevertheless,

after President Doe was captured and killed, Nigeria's anti-Taylor policy became increasingly evident.

ECOMOG's deployment in Liberia was badly coordinated among the various participating contingents. The force commander described it as "ad hoc more than anything else" (Berman and Sams 2000, 92). Prior to the deployment, the troop contributors did not have knowledge of one another's needs and capabilities. No thorough logistical calculations were made. Moreover, "ECOMOG's concept of operations was not determined in advance of deployment. According to Quainoo, the force's rapid deployment was the main consideration, and staff duties and planning was secondary" (*ibid.*). So, when the forces landed in Monrovia, they had to cope not only with a hostile environment but also with a large degree of logistical and operational uncertainty.

There is a lot of disagreement and lack of information on Doe's capture, which took place in the ECOMOG compound. Nigeria, which had supported Doe all the time, blamed the force commander, whereas Quainoo himself claimed that he had not been aware of Doe's visit and had not assured him any protection. After the killing of the Liberian president, Nigeria pushed to assume a greater role in commanding the force. The first force commander was now replaced by a Nigerian (Maj. Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro), and for the rest of the 1990s, the ECOMOG force commander was Nigerian (Berman and Sams 2000, 95).

Dogonyaro's first initiative in his new position was to launch a "limited offensive" against Taylor's NPFL (*ibid.*, 94). This obviously contributed to making the possibilities of a diplomatic solution more difficult. Taylor was now becoming increasingly incensed by Nigeria's activities, and in February 1991, he called for that country's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Liberia. As fears of renewed violence increased, Dogonyaro (unexpectedly) was recalled to Nigeria. Under the leadership of Dogonyaro, ECOMOG had come closer to its military aims of defeating Taylor, but at the same time, the chances of a negotiated settlement had significantly decreased.

Taylor's relations with ECOMOG remained tense and conflict ridden throughout the war. He responded to the provocations by Nigeria and ECOMOG by launching a major offensive (Operation Octopus) in October 1992 to get control over Monrovia. ECOMOG suffered significant losses, but ultimately managed to defend itself and the capital. Some 3,000 people were killed and 8,000 wounded. Nigeria responded to this near victory of Taylor by reinforcing its troops and its engagement with ECOMOG. From now on, ECOMOG occasionally provided intelligence, transportation, and weapons to various factions opposing the NPFL.

In an effort to strengthen the force and address complaints of Nigerian domination of ECOMOG, the United States provided financial and logistical

support to Senegal to join the Community in 1991. However, the Senegalese participation was never a success, and Dakar withdrew its peacekeepers from ECOMOG in 1993.

In September 1993—more than three years after ECOMOG had become involved—the UNSC formally established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). But this introduction of countries outside West Africa was also a short-lived initiative that failed to achieve its objective. As a result of continued fighting throughout Liberia, the Security Council amended UNOMIL's mandate and reduced the strength to 160 observers.¹³

One of the main problems with the ECOMOG forces in Liberia has all the time been insufficient funding. And this, of course, had an adverse effect on troop morale and discipline. Junior officers sometimes went unpaid for several months, troops rotated infrequently, and soldiers increasingly sold equipment and supplies for personal enrichment. These financial constraints also prevented the ECOWAS Secretariat from providing logistical support to ECOMOG troops. ECOWAS was unable to fulfil its original commitment to take over the financing of the troops after one month, and the troop-contributing countries had to continue to supply their troops.

The ECOWAS Secretariat had little oversight over the troops' performance and provided only minimal political and economic guidance—political and legal advisory positions in ECOMOG were not filled owing to financial constraints. Finally, the legal status of ECOMOG was unclear throughout the Liberian civil war. It was only in June 1998, almost eight years after the initial intervention, that a status-of-forces agreement between the ECOWAS Secretariat and the Liberian government was finally signed.

Renewed crisis in Liberia in 2003 made ECOWAS initiate a second peacekeeping operation in the country. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached on August 18, 2003, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) began deployment outside Monrovia in the beginning of September with 3,563 soldiers from Nigeria, Mali, and Senegal. The UNSC approved conversion of ECOMIL into a UN International Stabilization Force from October 1, 2003 (ISS 2007a, Part 6.2.4).

ECOMOG in Sierra Leone

Most likely, ECOMOG's involvement in Liberia both exacerbated the civil war there *and* contributed to the civil war in Sierra Leone. Taylor assisted the RUF led by Sankoh, which began fighting the Sierra Leonean government and invaded eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia in March 1991. "By supporting the RUF, Taylor was able both to undermine Sierra Leone's

commitment to ECOMOG and to distract the ECOMOG force" (Berman and Sams 2000, 111). However, the RUF, together with the AFRC, did not succeed in gaining power until 1997, after six years of civil war and three military coups. In May that year, the AFRC overthrew the newly elected president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, and Sankoh ordered his RUF forces to support the AFRC.

Also, this time, ECOMOG's intervention in the conflict came about through Nigeria's previous involvement. Nigeria and Sierra Leone had signed a bilateral defense agreement two months earlier, in March, and Nigeria now intervened quickly in support of Kabbah's regime. Prior to the coup, some 900 Nigerian troops were present in Sierra Leone, and they responded with an effort to reinstate Kabbah. Smaller contingents from Ghana and Guinea were also called upon to make the force look more multilateral. Nevertheless, they failed to oust the AFRC and suffered significant losses during the first few weeks (*ibid.*, 113).

Nigeria, whose mandate for intervening in Sierra Leone was questionable, soon tried to characterize its intervention an "ECOMOG" action. However, ECOWAS had not authorized the military action. Formal ECOWAS authorization was not granted until three months after Nigeria intervened, in August 1997. Till then no institutionalised security mechanism had been established within ECOWAS, and the Community's efforts in Sierra Leone were once again *ad hoc*. After several unsuccessful negotiations, the foreign ministers of ECOWAS decided to "recommend the establishment of an ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group in Sierra Leone to be known as ECOMOG II" (*ibid.*, 115).

But even though they had formally approved the Nigerian-led intervention, several ECOWAS member states were worried about its implications, both because of financial implications and because of the specific Nigerian intentions that were more or less clear to everyone. In addition, the anglophone-francophone tensions in the region were still an issue. Several francophone states feared that ECOMOG II was another instrument for Nigerian domination in West Africa.

Originally, ECOWAS did not approve an all-out military offensive in Sierra Leone, but by late 1997, as several ECOWAS member states had lost faith in the AFRC as a negotiating partner, a Nigerian-led military intervention was justified. Nigeria therefore launched an offensive to restore Kabbah's government in February 1998, with substantial external assistance. ECOWAS was not explicitly approving this but we do not risk much by saying that the offensive was tacitly agreed by the member states. Kabbah was now reinstalled within a few weeks, and the RUF and the AFRC were driven into the bush. This, however, did not give an

advantage to the ECOMOG forces. A guerrilla war on foreign territory proved to be extremely difficult. A shortage of trucks and helicopters as well as of weapons and ammunition further limited the effectiveness of the forces. Troop-contributing countries also failed to coordinate their actions.

Because of the lucrative trade in diamonds and the possibility of engaging in other business ventures, a significant number of officers have reportedly continued to remain in Sierra Leone for personal enrichment. ECOMOG forces have also been accused of selling some of the equipment from the logistical support that has been provided to them. Thus, corruption, indiscipline, and lack of *esprit de corps* have all been central to ECOMOG's general problems. Financial constraints have also posed severe limitations; so also the member states' unwillingness or inability to contribute to the forces.

The combination of ECOMOG's shortcomings and the international community's lack of commitment to Kabbah made it possible for the rebel forces to make their way back to Freetown in September 1998. The Sierra Leonean Government, with the support of Nigeria, now decided to enlist former RUF rebels and AFRC soldiers in the Sierra Leonean Army to fight side by side with ECOMOG troops. This, however, proved to be a dangerous move. Many of these recruits were still loyal to the forces fighting Kabbah, and the situation became even more complex. In January 1999, the rebels launched a large offensive, inflicting significant losses on Nigeria—reportedly 500–700 were killed. Frustrated by this defeat, ECOMOG troops began to defend themselves, committing revenge killings. A UN human rights report told the world of ECOMOG soldiers summarily executing suspected rebels.

Later in the same month, ECOMOG forces regained control of Freetown and installed the Kabbah government. In the aftermath of the hostilities, ECOWAS, together with the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom, and the United States, initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aiming at opening up a dialogue with the AFRC/RUF rebels. Negotiations between the government and rebels commenced in May 1999 and resulted in the signing of the Lomé (capital of Togo) Accord on July 7. In addition to stipulating a broadening of the government's base to include rebels in a power-sharing deal and giving a blank amnesty to all perpetrators of the decade-long civil war, Article 13 of the agreement called for the revision of ECOMOG's mandate from peace enforcement to neutral peacekeeping and provided for its phased withdrawal and its replacement with an enlarged UN force. ECOMOG completed its withdrawal on May 2, 2000.

ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau

The background for ECOMOG's intervention in Guinea-Bissau was a coup d'état in June 1998, where former army chief of staff, Gen. Ansumane Mane, overthrew President João Bernardo Vieira.

As with the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone, there was some confusion as to when and how the force actually became an operation by the group. Immediately after the coup, Guinea and Senegal had intervened militarily in support of Vieira, and the ECOWAS foreign ministers had expressed their support for this rapid intervention. These ministers had also officially expressed their support for Vieira's regime and recommended that "the sphere of activities and mandate for ECOMOG should be broadened to include Guinea-Bissau" (Berman and Sams 2000, 129).

At the outset, it appeared that Guinean and Senegalese troops were to form the backbone of the ECOMOG forces in Guinea-Bissau. This raised the concern that ECOMOG could be "hijacked" by any country willing and able to finance an operation for its own purposes.

This time, however, the foreign troops did not stay in the country as long as they had done in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Following the November 1998 Abuja (Nigeria) Accord, Vieira and Mane agreed to the total withdrawal of all foreign troops from Guinea-Bissau. Simultaneously, an ECOWAS Military Observer Group interposition force was to be deployed in the country (*ibid.*, 131).

The force that ultimately deployed was much smaller than initially envisaged—only 712 in number—and relied heavily on French financial support. And despite the French assistance, logistical problems hampered the effectiveness of the force. When fighting restarted in May 1999, ECOMOG experienced a communication breakdown, and it was impossible to establish contact with the ECOMOG High Command. The rebels managed to carry out a coup d'état, and ECOMOG suffered a significant setback.

However, despite the lack of success, the ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau represented an important and welcome departure from its previous characteristics. First, the charge that ECOMOG is simply a Nigerian tool was disproved (Nigeria was absent from this mission). Second, this time ECOMOG operated in accordance with a clearly defined mandate. Third, ECOWAS now began to submit periodic reports to the UNSC, in response to Security Council Resolution 1216.

Security-political reforms

The framework for activities related to peace and security was reinforced in 1999 by the adoption of a permanent Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,

Management and Resolution (hereafter the Mechanism), including protocols establishing a regional mechanism for mutual assistance in defense matters. Based on the Mechanism, several institutions have been established within ECOWAS that deserve further attention. According to Chapter II of the *ECOWAS Protocol Relating to The mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security*, the main institutions of the Mechanism are

- a) the Authority;
- b) the Mediation and Security Council;
- c) the Executive Secretariat.

(ECOWAS 1999, Article 4, 8)

Other institutions may be established if and when the Authority finds this necessary.

Of the three institutions, the Mediation and Security Council is probably the most important for our purpose. "This Council shall comprise nine member states of which seven shall be elected by the Authority. The other two shall be the current chairman and the immediate past chairman of the Authority" (*ibid.*, Article 8, 9). The main functions of the Mediation and Security Council are to

- a) decide on all matters relating to peace and security;
- b) decide and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management, and resolution; peacekeeping; and security;
- c) authorize all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions;
- d) approve mandates and terms of reference for such missions;
- e) review the mandates and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations;
- f) appoint a special representative of the executive secretary and the force commander on the recommendation of the executive secretary.

(*ibid.*, Article 10, 10)

To assist the Mediation and Security Council, the following organs were established:

- a) The Defence and Security Commission
- b) The Council of Elders
- c) ECOMOG

(*ibid.*, Article 17, 14)

The formal role of ECOMOG has been described at this stage in the protocol (*ibid.*, Article 22, 16). It says here that ECOMOG is charged with the following missions, among others:

- a) Observation and monitoring
- b) Peacekeeping and restoration of peace
- c) Humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster
- d) Enforcement of sanctions, including embargo
- e) Preventive deployment
- f) Peace building, disarmament, and demobilization
- g) Policing activities, including the control of fraud and organized crime
- h) Any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council

Compared with earlier experiences with ECOMOG, it is obvious that its role in conflict prevention, management, and resolution has been both extended and revised. Before, ECOMOG was composed of those countries that had the will and capacity to support it. The troops were financed by member states. From now on, troops are financed by ECOWAS, and each member state is represented in the group. The problem with the command of the troops is solved: the commander is appointed by the Mediation and Security Council. Moreover, all countries have established standby units.

The protocol relating to the Mechanism also establishes a subregional peace and security observation (early warning) system. This system consists of an Observation and Monitoring Center located at the ECOWAS secretariat in Abuja and four observation and monitoring zones within the subregion (*ibid.*, Chapter IV, 17).

The zonal centers collect—on a state-by-state and day-to-day basis—data on indicators that impact on the peace and security of the zone and the subregion (*ibid.*, Article 24, 18).

Humanitarian measures

At the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government in Abuja in April 2000, the humanitarian situation in the conflict at Guinea's border with Liberia and Sierra Leone was on the agenda. In the Final Communiqué from the summit, we read that the presence of hundreds of thousands of refugees in Guinea constitutes a heavy financial, economic, ecological, and financial burden on that country. At the summit the Authority called upon the African countries and the international

community to lend every necessary assistance to Guinea to enable it to adequately meet the humanitarian needs of refugees and displaced persons. The Authority also noted the need to establish safe corridors to ensure better protection for refugees against rebel attacks and to enable them to be repatriated without danger. It urged three governments (those of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) to initiate appropriate action to protect the refugees in camps and called upon the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to help bring about an improvement in the humanitarian situation in the Mano River region.

As exemplified here, humanitarian questions are usually tied to the situation of refugees in ECOWAS terminology. But, apart from ad hoc communications to the high commissioner, such as the one on the protection of refugees, ECOWAS has no long-term strategy related to humanitarian problems in the region. Where humanitarian questions are concerned, ECOWAS is usually taken over by events as its protocol has a very general approach to such questions. According to the new Mechanism, however, ECOMOG will, from now on, not only deal with military issues but also with civil issues. Civil and humanitarian protection is introduced as a new task for ECOMOG.

Small arms

The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Light Weapons was signed on October 31, 1998 (cf. ECOWAS 1998). The moratorium has strong political support among ECOWAS member states, but the progress so far is not impressive. This, it seems, is primarily due to the fact that member states lack the capacity to put in place the measures required for implementing the moratorium. Since 1998 the moratorium has been renewed twice—in 2001 and 2004.

The goal of the moratorium has been to create a framework within which a secure environment for socioeconomic development can be obtained. More than 8 million light weapons are in illegal circulation in the region.¹⁴ The moratorium requires member states to put in place effective measures to

- control the import, export and manufacture of all light weapons;
- register and control the movement and use of legitimate arms stocks;
- detect and destroy all illicit and surplus weapons;
- permit exemptions to the moratorium only in accordance with strict criteria.

(ECOWAS 2000, 4–5)

A code of conduct, setting out the concrete actions to implement the moratorium, was approved by heads of state and government in Lomé in December 1999. Technical assistance to support implementation of the moratorium has been provided by the UNDP Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). The work of the project will focus on four major points (decided in May 2000):

- training and technical support
- research, database, and arms register
- information, publication and advice, including harmonization of legislations
- administration support, including the establishment of national commissions

Although the efficacy of the moratorium was not up to expectations, it nevertheless continued to be one of the priorities of ECOWAS. In 2002 the ECOWAS executive secretary commissioned an evaluation of the moratorium, which produced a number of recommendations that were submitted to the heads of state in 2003. One of the recommendations was to transform the moratorium into a legally binding convention. This recommendation was implemented in June 2006 when the moratorium was replaced by the more binding ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. As opposed to the moratorium, the new convention is intended to be a permanent arrangement.

The ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission meeting in Abidjan from August 14 to 18, 2002, approved a harmonized training program for ECOMOG standby units. This program will be run in three training schools in the region: the Peacekeeping School in Zambakro, Côte d'Ivoire; the Kofi Annan International Training Center in Accra, Ghana; and the National War College in Abuja, Nigeria. These three schools are supposed to respectively handle tactical, operational, and strategic programs. Each member state is obliged to have standby units, which are to be inspected regularly by the commission. The commission is also planning to set up two military bases for the storage of common user equipment. As for future financing of ECOMOG peacekeeping operations, the commission is planning to establish a regional peace fund similar to a fund set up by the AU.

Since September 2002 a military rebellion in Côte d'Ivoire has drawn ECOWAS into the peacekeeping operations in that country. The Mediation and Security Council met on October 26, 2002, and agreed to deploy West African troops to monitor a cease-fire signed on October 17. ECOMOG deployed approximately 1,400 troops from Ghana, Togo, Benin,

Niger, and Senegal. On February 28, 2004, the UNSC approved integration of these peacekeepers with the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). Several peace agreements that have been signed have failed (Marcoussis, Accra 1 and 2, and Pretoria agreements). In March 2007 a new peace agreement was signed in Ouagadougou, and in April the same year President Gbagbo declared that the war was over. Shortly after that the militia began to disarm (May 2007).

Why good intentions are not enough

The test of ECOWAS's new security-political structure came in the summer of 2003 when it intervened in the reeruption of the Liberian civil war. Liberia was the first real challenge for ECOWAS after the security-political reform because this country was considered to be the epicenter of the subregional conflict in the area usually referred to as the Mano River region. In the aftermath of ECOWAS's involvement in the second Liberian civil war, it is obvious that the reforms had addressed (and partly solved) some of the most problematic aspects. This is especially true of some of the specific or technical aspects such as strong Nigerian dominance and lack of military compatibility. However, when it comes to some of the more underlying problems—such as easy access to weapons among guerrilla soldiers and the close relationship between personal gain and warfare—the reforms have fallen short. Why? Is it the specific nature of the ECOWAS reforms that were inadequate? Or is it simply that formal processes (which are often modeled after such processes in the West), by their very nature, are unable to address the informal processes (e.g., informal economies, traditions, and culture) that are pervasive in African regionalized wars? Before answering this question, we will briefly present some main ideas of a relatively new theoretical direction usually referred to as trans-state regionalism.

The concepts of neopatrimonialism and transnationalism are brought together in the concept “trans-state regionalism,” which has been introduced to describe the particular kind of regionalism existent in Africa.¹⁵ It refers to processes of cross-border interaction that combine elements of interstate and transnational interaction (Bach 1999, 8). (See also Chapter 2 of this volume.) “Trans-state regionalization cannot be associated with an institutionalised process, although it is totally dependent on state politics and owes its prosperity to the involvement of state agents” (ibid.). Thus, on the one hand, the concept trans-state regionalism implies involvement of the state.

However, on the other hand, this kind of regionalism is kept intentionally separate from official intergovernmental regionalism. The informal

economy, for example, is crucial for this type of regionalism. The vitality of this kind of regionalism thus depends very much on the lack of transparency in the state apparatus and also on the degree of flexibility and adaptability of the activity that is part of the informal economy.

Bearing in mind the considerable number of transnational activities presented in Chapter 3, I hold the view that there is an incompatibility between this trans-state regionalism and the formal regional initiatives by ECOWAS.

The intervention of ECOWAS, even after its security-political reforms and light weapons moratorium, has not been as successful as hoped. Is it possible to trace its shortcomings to the informal processes that are working to counteract the formal processes? This section looks more closely at what exactly the ECOWAS reforms entailed in the light of the informal processes present in the conflict.

As suggested in the introduction, the role of ECOMOG was extended and revised as a result of the reforms. As already mentioned, ECOMOG was previously composed of those countries that had the will and capacity to support it. Member states financed the troops. After the reform, the troops have been financed by ECOWAS, and each member state is represented in ECOMOG. The problem with the command of the troops is seemingly solved, and the commander is appointed by the Mediation and Security Council. Moreover, all countries have established standby units. According to informants in the ECOWAS Secretariat, however, that the problems of ECOMOG are far from over. The financial situation both for individual member states and for the organization is problematic at all times. This means that although strong decisions have been taken, and even though there might be a genuine political will to follow up on them, it will always be an economic question whether or not a decision is implemented.

The problem of soldiers getting involved in informal, often illicit, trade networks is also addressed within the new system. From now on, ECOMOG soldiers are not supposed to be in the field for more than six months. Of these six months, two are supposed to be used for briefing the soldiers, two for active duty, and two for debriefing the soldiers. The idea is that a limited period of time for soldiers in each area would prevent them from getting involved in illicit networks. The main problem in implementing this idea is the lack of financial resources to pay for such a system, which would be expensive as it requires extensive transport arrangements. ECOWAS already suffers from enormous financial constraints, and it is highly doubtful whether the organization will find the means to pay for this system.

The problem of mercenaries and militarized refugees, more generally, is not properly addressed by the reforms. And even though measures are

taken to prevent soldiers from getting involved in illicit networks, the general phenomenon of mercenaries in Africa is growing and will not be affected by ECOWAS's security-political reforms. The reforms are also inadequate when it comes to "ordinary" refugees.¹⁶

Small arms are one of the most malignant problems in relation to the violent conflicts in the region, and the West African politicians have made a serious effort to solve it, at least officially. When established, the moratorium was probably one of the most promising peace-building initiatives that the region had seen. Although it has not resulted in the kind of progress that was hoped for, there are some achievements of considerable importance, including the training program for the ECOWAS standby units, although it is yet to be implemented. PCASED and the ECOWAS Computer Center in Lomé have also worked together on a small arms registration program and the creation of a database on small arms. National commissions will be established in all member states for registration and coordination. The commissions will consist of members of the government and the civil society, and they will decide on requests for exemptions from the moratorium. According to ECOWAS representatives, the national commissions could be more useful than the secretariat in Abuja in their effort to combat the proliferation of small arms. Guidelines for the commissions will be issued by the ECOWAS Secretariat.

Thus, the moratorium appears to be well intentioned but inadequate. Although the reasons are probably many, the one that stands out in this context—and relates to all the official peace-building initiatives—is that the reform presupposes a degree of transparency in the region that does not exist. As described in Chapter 2, one important characteristic of a state dominated by informal processes is that the general possibility for exercising control over the members of its societies is dramatically reduced. This means that even if the intentions of the politicians (at least, officially) are as good as could be, their prospects for achieving their goals are limited.

The moratorium holds a special position in relation to trans-state regionalism. As already mentioned, trans-state regionalism is very much dependent on the lack of transparency in the informal trade systems. One of the most important goals of the moratorium will be the initiation of efforts to create databases and registration systems. The exchange of information will be of vital importance. If these aspects of the moratorium are carried through, they will considerably increase the degree of transparency in the regional trade system. This means that trans-state regionalism and the small arms and light weapons moratorium are working in opposite directions: trans-state regionalism depends on lack of transparency, while the moratorium is working to increase transparency. It is hard to say which of the two will be the stronger force in West Africa in the years to come.

As it looks today, trans-state regionalism is probably much more profitable for a large number of people in the region.

The lack of transparency is not only relevant in relation to the small arms. It is equally relevant in relation to other types of illicit trade, such as that in timber, drugs, and diamonds, as elaborated above. And, as pointed out, these kinds of activities are among the most important aspects in relation to the culture of violent conflict in West Africa.¹⁷ Have the security-political reforms of ECOWAS been able to satisfactorily address these issues? The answer is probably “no.” Although ECOMOG is charged with “enforcement of sanctions, including embargo” (ECOWAS 1999, Article 22 (d), 16), there is no reason to believe that it will be able to follow up on this when the UN cannot.

What they say and what they do

Trade issues are not the only responsibilities that ECOMOG is unlikely to be able to handle. When it comes to “policing activities, including the control of fraud and organized crime” (ibid.), it is doubtful whether the organization will be able to fulfil its task. This is not only due to a general lack of financial resources but also probably due to a result of lack of genuine political will to follow up on official statements. What is the reason for this lack of political will? Because the politicians themselves are part of a system that they officially say they want to destroy—the system of illicit transnational activities. As long as the politicians can benefit from this system, and as long as this system is the most important source of income for the economic and political elites in the region, there is no reason to believe that they will make any serious efforts to destroy it. This is why there is a continuous flow of examples showing that what West African politicians say is different from what they do.

This raises the question of to what degree the possible incompatibility between ECOWAS’s security-political framework and conflicts such as the one in Liberia could be a result of political calculation. In other words, have politicians designed the framework this way knowing that it cannot capture the sociopolitical characteristics of West Africa? Have they designed it this way in order to be able to go on with their hidden agenda? These are, of course, questions that are very difficult to answer. The degree of incompatibility between the ECOWAS security-political framework and the sociopolitical realities of the region could have several explanations. For instance, it could be explained by the African politicians’ eagerness to please the donors. Western donors have their own visions for African institutional development—visions that not always coincide with the needs of

Africa.¹⁸ It could also be explained by a lack of systematized information about the central sociopolitical elements of the region.

Notwithstanding these alternative explanations, it is obvious that West African politicians have, on numerous occasions, come up with and proclaimed certain political solutions only to go out and do the very opposite (Sawyer 2004; Hoffman 2004). Whatever the reason might be, the failure to take the neopatrimonial structure of the state and the transnational characteristics of the region into account when preparing a regional security framework is evident in the case of ECOWAS, particularly with respect to ECOWAS's involvement in Liberia.

Transparency is a prerequisite for a functioning regional security organization, and it is one feature that is conspicuously lacking in a neopatrimonial state; in fact, the existence of an informal economy and networks of patronage depend upon a lack of it. The small arms initiative could be seen as an attempt to deal with these kinds of hindrances to a transparent regional peace building, but as has been pointed out, it is so far not a very successful attempt. Both as a result of practical obstacles and as a result of lack of political will, the small arms initiative has had limited effects.

As for the other transnational aspects of the West African conflict culture, personal alliances often seem to be more important obligations to individual politicians than do formal obligations related to regional (ECOWAS) agreements.

Also, in relation to mercenaries and militarized refugees, there seems to be a discrepancy between what politicians agree about in ECOWAS and what they actually do. The (illicit) trade in natural resources is probably the financial wheel of the transnational system and an activity where the politicians no doubt are very hesitant to give up their various interests. Both for personal enrichment and as a source for financing costly armed conflicts, this trade is among the most useful ones to the politicians. This is in sharp contrast to what they officially claim to be their vision for the West African region. Among the main objectives of the Mechanism is to "strengthen cooperation in [. . .] the control of cross-border crime" (ECOWAS 1999, Article 3 (d), 7) and to "set up an appropriate framework for the rational and equitable management of natural resources shared by neighbouring Member States which may be causes of frequent inter-state conflicts" (ibid., Article 3 (i), 8).

There is no doubt that the West African transnational processes influence the formal processes of integration related to peace and security in the region. As long as the politicians do not address the challenges related to transnationalism in West Africa, they will probably not succeed in the establishment of a sustainable regional security system.

SADC: Established to Fight Apartheid, Reformed for Economic Development

In Southern Africa, the SADC¹⁹ is the most ambitious IGO. Originally, the organization was named the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). It was established in 1980 with the objective of reducing the member states' economic and political dependency on the apartheid state of South Africa and to coordinate external aid and investments in the region. Today, the organization counts 14 member states, including South Africa, the former common enemy.

An analysis of the SADC's main activities uncovers a mixture of progress and decline/recession. As for the original efforts to reduce dependence on South Africa, progress was made particularly in relation to transport and communication. Earlier, South African harbors had been the most important for export from the landlocked countries of the region. But, only seven years after the establishment of the SADCC, approximately 75 percent of the import and export from these states went through non-South African harbors. This is largely explained by the SADCC's ability in this period to attract financial support from Western states. At the same time, a dependence on aid is one of the most problematic aspects related to the organization: by 1990 more than 90 percent of the financial resources of the organization came from external donor countries. The intraregional trade was very small at the same time—only about 5 percent of the total trade of the member states.

As apartheid came to an end, it was clear to the member states that the foundation and future activities of the organization would have to be reconsidered. As a result of this and of various forms of global and regional pressure, the member states developed a new treaty for the organization in 1992—the Treaty of Windhoek (cf. SADC 1992).

The Treaty of Windhoek contributed to a further formalization of the SADC and also made it a legal unit under international law. In 1994 South Africa became a member of the organization, and because of its much bigger size, it was soon given responsibility as the leading state in the struggle for economic development in the region.

Despite numerous efforts, the progress of the organization in relation to economic development has been relatively limited. What is the reason for this? First, as with ECOWAS, the SADC's lack of progress can be ascribed to a general lack of political will. There are reasons to believe that the politicians are quite comfortable with this lack of progress, knowing that they stand to gain more more by what we have referred to above as trans-state regionalism (Söderbaum 2002, 98). Apart from that, development within a regional economic organization usually requires a form of

regional identity, which is obviously not present in the region. Nationalistic tendencies have been important in several southern African states, but a regional identity operating across these tendencies has not yet been achieved in the region. Further, the lack of political will and regional identity has been accentuated by overlapping memberships in other regional organizations.²⁰

The difficulties of the SADC are also related to pure macroeconomic conditions that have been difficult to address with just regional solutions. Also, efforts to fulfil obligations to the World Bank as a result of extensive SAPs have been working against efforts to meet the obligations to regional integration. Finally, and again similarly to West Africa, the economies of the various member states are not complementary. Rather, they are competitive. This is why regional reductions of customs barriers are not very significant. The states are not economically interdependent, and so the most important foundation for a successful regional economic integration is absent.

SADC achievements related to peace and security

After the end of the apartheid in South Africa, the SADC agreed to create the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (hereafter the Organ). The Organ, however, immediately caused disagreement between various members of SADC. Officially, this disagreement concerned the relationship between the Organ and the SADC Secretariat. The relative status of the two institutions was not clear. Behind the dispute was Zimbabwe's fear that the country was losing its strong position in the regional organization to South Africa. The dispute led to the creation of two different "camps," that is, the South African camp (also including Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania), which viewed the Organ primarily as only a confidence-building forum, and the Zimbabwean camp (also including Angola and Namibia), which was in favor of a bigger role for the Organ in improving military cooperation.²¹

A new Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was approved in 2001. Under this new protocol, President Chissano of Mozambique replaced Mugabe as the chair of the Organ. At the same time, the SADC Treaty was revised, and the Organ was now defined as an institution within the SADC. At the SADC summit meeting in 2003, the member states approved the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.²²

These efforts and changes within the organization concerning peace and security must be seen in relation to a number of serious conflicts in the region after the end of the Cold War. (During the Cold War the various

states could rely much more on their respective patron country. That was not the fact after the end of the Cold War.) Among the most violent conflicts between the end of the Cold War and the turn of the century were the civil war in Angola that ended in 2002; the war in the DRC, which became a member of the SADC soon after the fall of Mobutu; and violence related to elections in Lesotho in 1998, in Malawi in 1999, in Zanzibar in 2001, and in Zimbabwe in 2002. There were also a failed secession bid in Namibia in 1998–99 and repeated tensions between Angola and Zambia between 1998 and 2000 (Nathan 2006b, 611).

Notwithstanding this large number of conflicts in the region, the SADC has only acted twice in the past ten years. In 1998, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola decided to send troops under the SADC's auspices to the DRC to help Kabila stay in power.²³ Instead of enhancing stability in the DRC, the SADC intervention contributed to further fragmentation of the country as well as to increased exploitation of the vast resources of the DRC.²⁴

The second time the organization acted in a security-political situation in the past decade was in Lesotho in the same year. In consultation with Mozambique and Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana deployed troops in Lesotho, again "under the auspices of SADC." Although the troops were invited by the government in Lesotho, sections of the army resisted it. This led to battles, killings, and public demonstrations. Afterward, many observers described the intervention as a military and political disaster (*ibid.*, 612).²⁵ The intervention also raised questions "concerning the necessity for intervention, the international legality of such actions, the credibility and consistency of South Africa's foreign policy, the effectiveness of South Africa's armed forces, and the appropriate role for SADC" (Southall 1998, 1).

In fact, the SADC had intervened in Lesotho once before—in 1994, to restore democracy. It was represented by South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. The military, which had long supported the Basotho National Party (BNP), had backed the dismissal of the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), which had triumphed in the 1993 election. The intervention by the SADC in 1994 resulted in the quick return of the BCP to power in mid-September that year.

This involvement of the SADC probably made it easier for it to engage with Lesotho once more in 1998. Also, there was, at that time, growing regional concern about the rising tensions in the country. Hundreds of civil protesters gathered in the areas around the king's palace at the same time as tensions were increasing within the military, a situation that culminated in the arrest of the army chief, General Mosakheng, and other senior army officers by junior officers on September 11, 1998.

Given the seriousness of the situation, the Lesotho government did not feel it could protest when the SADC, driven by the deputy president of South Africa, Tabo Mbeki, proposed to intervene. According to Mbeki, the best way to solve the problems was to appoint a commission to examine the conduct of the 1998 election. The SADC commission that was formed published its final report on September 17, 1998. The report found clear evidence of administrative deficiencies. Still, the commission felt that there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the election result (that the Lesotho Congress for Democracy, or LCD, was the winner) was invalid. This judgment was regarded as unsatisfactory by the opposition alliance, which demanded a fresh election and the formation of another government.

In the meantime, the army revolts had created rumors of a coup, and even though the government did what it could to assure the population that it was in control, it was steadily losing its grip on power. The BNP, the BCP, the soldiery, and the police were now working together to paralyze the functioning of the government (*ibid.*, 2). One of the most alarming aspects of the situation at that time was the fact that the soldiers were giving small arms to wayward youth and small revolt groups. Meanwhile, SADC diplomatic efforts continued under the leadership of South African Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufumadi. These efforts, however, proved more and more difficult, and on September 21, 1998, “[Deputy Prime Minister of Lesotho] Kelebone Maope issued a statement that the LCD was still in power, and that it had appealed to SADC for assistance. Whether this would extend to military action he could or would not say” (*ibid.*, 3).

On September 22, 1998, some 600 troops of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) crossed into Lesotho in order to create a safe environment to enable the Lesotho police to restore order. These troops were to be followed by 200 troops from the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). The anticipation that these troops together would meet little resistance from the opposition troops proved to be wrong. When the troops arrived at the Royal Palace, the armed opposition ran off and started heavy fighting in the center of the capital. Human losses were considerable and the intervention was heavily criticized afterward.

The SADC claims that the intervention was launched at the request of an elected and legitimate government to prevent a military coup by the BNP. From this perspective, the SADC was right in what it was doing. Its intervention prevented the fall of a legitimate democracy. Nevertheless, the intervention has been criticized for the way it was conducted. Obviously, a force of 600 SANDF troops was inadequate to confront the 2,000-strong opposition force. Moreover, the units were not the most suitable and entry was not coordinated between the SANDF

and the BDF. And although the rebels themselves were responsible for the heavy destructions in the capital, the SADC intervention was no doubt a trigger for such a development of the ongoing crisis. In the aftermath, there have also been debates as to whether the intervention was legal. The SADC claims it to be legal, referring to two formal arrangements—the South Africa-Botswana-Zimbabwe guarantee of Lesotho's stability and the SADC's interstate security arrangements, particularly Article 5 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. According to this protocol, an intervention is legitimate “where there is large-scale violence between sections of the population; if there is a threat to the legitimate authority of the government; or if any crisis could threaten the peace and security of other member states” (*ibid.*, 7). However, neither of the two formal arrangements was ratified at the time of the intervention.

Roger Southall is probably right when he writes that a cleanly conducted, successful operation might have avoided all the criticism later on. But, since the operation was a failure, the governments in the region have to live with the blame (*ibid.*).

Where is the SADC heading with regard to regional security cooperation? The member states' seriousness in implementing the objectives of the Organ is seen in three “delivery tools”—the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; the SIPO; and the Mutual Defence Pact. The mere availability of these tools, however, will not help the actors reach their objectives. According to analysts, there is still the problem of lack of political will in most member states as well as a general lack of financial resources (Fisher and Ngoma 2005). The very hard line taken by the United Kingdom and the United States concerning the internal situation in Zimbabwe is one reason why substantial donor money is held back, the result being a collision between the SADC and some of the most important external actors. Notwithstanding these significant limitations, we must not forget challenges from within the region itself, primarily those related to the relationship between the principle of sovereignty and broadened regionalism (*ibid.*, 3).

More concretely, there are three main challenges for the SADC with regard to security issues in the years to come. First, the relationship between cooperation on developmental issues and cooperation on security issues.²⁶ The member states have declared that there is a close connection between the two, but in specific cases, they have tended to prioritize development cooperation ahead of security cooperation. Second, it is unclear how the SADC Organ will fit into the demands of the United States and Europe, where democracy and good governance

are central. Third, it is a challenge to the SADC how to relate to the war against international terrorism waged by the United States and its allies. Zimbabwe is among those countries that have been referred to as “an outpost of tyranny” (*ibid.*).

IGAD: Established to Fight Drought, Reformed for Peace and Development

IGAD was created in January 1986 by six African states—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. Eritrea became the seventh member in 1993. Originally, IGAD—then known as IGADD—was created to enable the states on the Horn of Africa to have a forum for cooperation on problems related to the catastrophes of drought in the region. Throughout the years the organization has widened its scope and is now also working on issue areas such as the human environment, food security, economic cooperation, and political and humanitarian problems. Today the organization is also a forum for resolution of conflicts between the member states.

The long periods of drought during the 1970s and 1980s were the background for IGADD's establishment. The organization was established on a noneconomic foundation. The original member states were all, to various degrees, struck by drought and hunger, and IGADD's establishment was in response to the individual state's inability to handle the regular drought and the long-drawn hunger famines that came as a result. The region had also been in the focus of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) for a long time. The UNEP wanted the states to cooperate to find common solutions to the problems of the region. Considering the numerous interstate political conflicts in the region, the mere fact that the states came together to discuss common problems was a large step forward. The headquarters of the new organization was situated in Djibouti, a small state that was friendly to all its neighbors and did not have as many internal conflicts as the rest of the member states. The organizational structure of IGADD consisted of one superior body including the heads of state of the member states, a ministerial council, and a secretariat. Together, the heads of state would establish the official goals and programs of the organization. The council of ministers would develop the day-to-day policy and was also responsible for the election of the secretary general, who had a four-year tenure. The secretariat was responsible for the implementation of the programs and projects handed over by the council of ministers and also for the regional coordination of material resources and personnel.

Achievements related to drought and development

As mentioned above, ever since its inception, a central objective of IGAD/IGADD has been to reduce the economic, social, and environmental consequences of drought and desertification. Drought is a relatively frequent phenomenon on the Horn of Africa, with great potential for profound impact. Whether it spells disaster, however, depends upon the coping capacity of the affected society. If a drought's onset and end, as well as its severity, can be predicted in time and communicated effectively to the relevant parties, then disaster can be reduced or even avoided in many cases (WMO 2006, 4–5). Thus, the development of a viable *system for early warning* has always ranked high on the IGAD/IGADD agenda (UN/ISDR 2004, 152). A selection of the organization's activities to that effect will be presented here in brief fashion.

In January 1991, in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), IGADD launched a project to strengthen the food security in its member countries (FAO 1997, sections 1.1–3). The project was expected to “provide advance information on crop and animal production and food supply and to alert those concerned well in advance of impending food shortage and surplus so that timely and remedial action could be taken as appropriate” (ibid., Section 1.3).

This program successfully managed to educate national and regional IGADD staff in the use of software tools as well as in data analysis. Another major contribution was the development of “computerized databases for both historical and current data, agricultural statistics, agrometeorology, remote sensing, food prices, nutrition and other socio-economic parameters for each Member State” (ibid., sections 2.2–4).

Significant problems of implementation did occur, however, owing to reluctance on the part of some countries to abide by vital aspects of the program. Unwillingness to accept regional coordination and procedures for standardization was prevalent, and sufficient exchange of information between states did not take place (ibid., Section 2.7). Such hindrances to efficient implementation are recognized by UN/ISDR (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) as constituting a common, fundamental problem for regional disaster-reduction initiatives worldwide (UN/ISDR 2004, 176).

In response to prolonged, but unsuccessful, efforts to combat desertification in various regions of the world, the UN General Assembly established an Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INCD) in December 1992 to prepare a more integrated Convention to Combat Desertification—the UNCCD (or CCD). In June 1994 the INCD presented the CCD in Paris, and the convention came into force six months

later (UNCCD 1997). Detailed stipulations of the CCD's implementation were delegated to the parties to the convention.

Thus, shortly after the presentation of the CCD, the IGAD Secretariat began a consultative process with its member states, to "build consensus on the elaboration and implementation of the UNCCD" in the IGAD region (IGAD 1999a, 20). Three consultative meetings were held—in Khartoum in Sudan, Asmara in Eritrea, and Nairobi in Kenya—in the period between September 1994 and February 1997. The outcome was an agreement upon and adoption of the key areas for cooperation (*ibid.*). This created the foundations for the so-called IGAD Sub-Regional Action Programme (IGAD-SRAP) for the implementation of the CCD.

In its official document, the IGAD-SRAP is described as a dynamic process "through which partnership and cooperation are galvanized in order to achieve a harmonized approach, and to rationalize the available financial, human as well as technical resources" (IGAD 1998, 6). This reflects the CCD's definition of the purpose of a subregional program, which is "to harmonize, complement and increase the efficiency of national programmes" (UNCCD 1994, Part III (1), Article 11). As of 2003, all IGAD member states—save Somalia—had developed such national action programs (NAPs). Lack of funding, however, hindered their implementation (Costantinos 2004, 13).

In the following years, progress was made in some areas of implementation of the IGAD-SRAP. In its latest report on the CCD, IGAD claims to have achieved "enhanced opportunities and linkages with member states' NAPs" (IGAD 2004, Section I). According to Costantinos, IGAD has done "a lot of useful studies, which can be of help in implementation of CCD now and in the future." These include, *inter alia*, the development of a legal framework and studies on communication and media challenges in the IGAD subregion (Costantinos 2004, 13).

The strengthening of IGAD's system for early warning has been an ongoing effort. The implementation of the IGAD-SRAP clearly entered into that general objective. As of 2004, the IGAD information system included "a combination of market and food prices on the Internet, reports about food production prospects and requirements, as well as the use of remote sensing technology to monitor the behaviour and pattern of rainfall and biomass production in the region" (UN/ISDR 2004, 152).

In 1989 the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) established a regional Drought Monitoring Centre in Nairobi (DMCN). This center was the result of a joint effort by the WMO and the UNDP to reduce the negative impacts of extreme climate events on the Greater Horn of Africa. In 2003, the DMCN was incorporated into the IGAD system for early warning and renamed the IGAD Climate Prediction Applications Centre

(ICPAC). The main objective of the ICPAC is to “contribute to climate monitoring and prediction services for early warning and mitigation of the adverse impacts of extreme climate events on various socio-economic sectors in the region, such as agricultural production and food security, water resources, energy and health” (WMO 2006, 17).

Before the onset of the major rainfall seasons in the region, the ICPAC arranges workshops to develop consensual climate outlooks and strategies for mitigation (*ibid.*). These Greater Horn of Africa climate outlook forums gather a vast congregation of people, including those involved in the production of information (e.g., climate specialists), as well as in the consumption of it (e.g., farmers and public health officials). In addition, representatives of the media ensure that the results of the workshop are communicated to the wider public (UN/ISDR 2004, 152). According to the UN/ISDR, these workshops have proven to be “very useful in raising the understanding and the anticipation of potentially hazardous flood and drought conditions in the region” (*ibid.*).

Achievements related to peace and security

The Darfur conflict in Sudan and the clan violence and famine in Somalia are just two examples of the ongoing conflicts on the Horn of Africa. Internal conflict, environmental conflict, and political upheaval are prevalent in almost every country on the Horn. The causes of the conflicts are mostly deeply rooted in the society and the conflicts develop over a long time.

During the Cold War, the Horn of Africa was the scene of rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was particularly the case during the 1970s when all other conflicts were overshadowed by the rivalry between the two superpowers (Tadesse 2004). Therefore, the end of the Cold War gave hope for peaceful development in the region. This, however, did not happen. As the 1990s went by, conflict remained a serious problem, despite favorable developments internationally. In fact, the end of the Cold War created a power vacuum in the region, and this coincided with major political changes in various countries—the deconstruction of the state in Somalia, the fall of the Dergue regime in Ethiopia, and the independence of Eritrea.

Like in other parts of Africa, internal conflicts on the Horn are complex and their causes are difficult to trace with certainty. Generally, we can say that they are “mostly and primarily conflicts over governance, identity and resource allocation within a particular state” (*ibid.*, 3). To understand the conflicts on the Horn of Africa in particular, it is necessary to focus on the nature of the state and the way the various states have governed the economic

resources of their respective countries. As for underlying causes, studies of conflict on the Horn have identified the following: "identity fault lines derived from complex internal factors such as ethnicity, religion, culture and language, porous borders, competition for limited resources, [and] overpopulation" (ibid. 4). State insecurity has further been aggravated by vulnerability to external economic changes, weak institutions, and poor governance.

Even more than other African regions, the Horn of Africa has been particularly vulnerable to environmental degradation. All the countries are affected by various types of environmental problems such as drought, water scarcity, soil erosion, and desertification. These problems are intensified by a general overuse of scarce resources. We may say that most recent violent conflicts in the region form a triangle with widespread poverty and environmental degradation. The term "environmental security" has therefore been applied relatively often when conflicts in this region are analyzed. Water scarcity and soil erosion are identified to be the two major threats to environmental security. However, from a security perspective, it is also necessary to include population pressure. The combination of scarcity and mobility has, in many cases, made conflict inevitable. The province of Darfur is a good example. Ever since the drought period of 1983–84, the nomads of this region have been increasingly putting pressure on the fur farmers in the semiarid and humid mountain areas by driving their herds deeper, longer, and in greater number into the farmers' areas than in the past.

There are numerous examples of communal conflicts on the Horn of Africa that are related to cattle, in combination with degradation and depletion of natural resources. In many cases such communal conflicts are the starters of larger, in some cases, even international, conflicts.²⁷ To treat conflicts in this region purely as political and/or ethnical would therefore be to misunderstand them and limit the possibility of conflict resolution.

It is also in combination with environmental problems that ethnical issues come to play a role in the various conflicts. Scarcity of renewable resources transforms ecological boundaries into boundaries of ethnic and political conflict. Ethnical and cultural differences may be weak as root causes of conflict, but they come into play the longer a conflict persists, and they may fuel violence long after the original causes of the conflict have been solved.

Both factual and perceived scarcity emanate not only from environmental degradation but also from the inability (and unwillingness) of central and local governments to provide the access to vital resources. In almost all the armed group conflicts on the Horn, access to natural and social resources expressed in terms of equitable sharing and equal development was the primary concern of the people involved.

In addition to this comes the fact that the demographic composition on the Horn of Africa is changing. The annual growth rate of the population is about 2.5 percent. The Gross National Products (GNPs) are not increasing accordingly, and the per capita GNP is dropping sharply. Another dangerous aspect is the fact that the proportion of people under 15 years of age is increasing and is expected to reach 50 percent by 2025 (Tadesse 2004, 9). Demographic changes of this kind will almost certainly have serious destabilizing effects. A high proportion of young men without jobs and social safety nets will increase the risk of conflict. Moreover, the demographic changes are expected to be different for different ethnic and religious groups. This will most probably alter the ethnical, religious, and political balances in the region. One prominent example is the steady erosion of the Orthodox Christian population in Ethiopia and the simultaneous growth of the Muslim population.

The nature of the African state as described in Chapter 2 by no means softens all these potentially destabilizing factors. The African state as a political organization suffers serious deficiencies and is usually unable to meet the basic needs of the majority of the people. As a result, the governments on the Horn do not enjoy legitimacy and do not exercise sufficient political power to manage the complex affairs in their countries. The character of the state becomes a threat to domestic political stability, social cohesion, and economic development, and, as such, it constitutes a security threat not only at the national level but also at the regional and international levels. Domestic political structures are weak and they cause both domestic turmoil and regional instability. As we remember from the presentation of conflicts in West and Central Africa, there is no real separation between domestic conflict and conflict at a regional level. The two are interwoven.

When discussing causes of conflict on the Horn of Africa, it is impossible to avoid the subject of radical Islam and terrorism. Islamic movements are primarily a response to illegitimate political authorities, be it the colonial rule of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or the illegitimate governments of today's Africa. Generally, Islamic movements get stronger when they are subjected to political oppression. Islamic fundamentalism has proved to flourish when there is a dictatorial and repressive political system, as has been the case for long periods in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The widespread poverty in the region and the inability of secular ideologies to find solutions to it are further facilitating the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. Additionally, international connectedness is serving to strengthen already vibrant movements. Connectedness to movements in the Middle East has facilitated various kinds of financial support and has enabled access to Islamic philanthropic resources.

This, in combination with the weak institutions of the states in the region, has made Islamic movements relatively stronger than radical movements that do not have international connectedness.

Somalia, in particular, has been a breeding ground for militant Islamic movements. The country scores high on all factors known to facilitate the growth of fundamentalism. The formal political institutions of the country have not been functioning for a long time. This has made it possible for Islamic institutions to move in, sponsoring Islamic courts and developing their own militias and their own financial systems, all with the backing of international Islamic agencies. Thus, Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia can be understood in the context of the civil war and the contemporary political history of the country, including state collapse and international connections.²⁸

All these aspects of the anatomy of conflict on the Horn of Africa must be kept in mind when we now turn to IGAD's security-political efforts in recent years.

IGADD was revitalized in 1996 when the member states decided to rename and strengthen the organization. After it was renamed "IGAD," the focus on conflict resolution, peace, and security was made more explicit than before. For many years the actors had seen the role of conflict in relation to lack of progress within the other issue areas of the organization. The number of conflicts in the region was an important hindrance for further development. Other organizations, such as the OAU and the UN, had been pointing this out for some years already, but their respect for the national sovereignty of the states on the Horn made it difficult for them to get more actively involved in the resolution of the conflicts in the region, most of which are both internal and international.

When IGADD became a mediator in the conflict in southern Sudan in 1993, this new role gave a new dimension to the activities of the organization. At the same time, it was an explicit recognition of the close relationship between internal conflicts in the member states and catastrophes of drought and hunger. By intervening in Sudan, IGADD also demonstrated that it wanted to be something more than just a forum for discussion. This intervention led to the so-called Declaration of Principles in 1994, a document that served as a platform for further negotiations in the years to follow.

Despite these and other achievements during the first years of the organization, the member states (and the donors) were not satisfied. At the summit meeting in Addis Ababa in 1995, Ethiopia therefore suggested that the organization be revitalized and its scope widened. The Ethiopian initiative led to the signing of a new treaty in 1996. IGAD was now a reality. Its structure in relation to IGADD was very different. Also, the number of issue areas brought under it was significantly increased. It was

decided that IGAD would no longer be just a tool to combat drought and other environmental problems.

As part of the revitalization, the member states also agreed on three main issue areas for further cooperation: (a) food security and environmental protection; (b) economic cooperation; and political and humanitarian affairs (IGAD 1999b, 1). As for political and humanitarian affairs, IGAD developed the so-called Program on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management with five main functions:

- 1) developing capacity building for conflict prevention;
- 2) documenting demobilization and postconflict peace-building experience;
- 3) elaborating a culture of peace and tolerance;
- 4) developing a conflict early warning mechanism; and
- 5) creating an emergency relief fund.

(Berman and Sams 2000, 209)

Article 18 of the agreement establishing IGAD says that member states “shall act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress” (IGAD 1996, Article 18A).

Although the number of conflicts on the Horn of Africa is large, there are primarily two countries that have received IGAD’s attention—Sudan and Somalia.

IGAD in Sudan

As already mentioned, IGADD first started to undertake conflict management tasks when it got involved in the conflict in Sudan in 1993. In 1994, in an attempt to end the civil war, IGADD hosted and facilitated negotiating sessions between the Sudanese government in Karthoum and the rebel group from southern Sudan. A permanent secretariat on the Sudan peace process was soon to be established in Nairobi, to mount a sustained effort to end the conflict. In July 2002, talks in Machakos, Kenya, resulted in the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) signing the so-called Machakos Protocol, (this too under the auspices of IGAD). According to this protocol, there was to be a six months preinterim period during which cease-fire was to be maintained and sharia was not to be applied in the south (IGAD 2002a, Part C, Section 3.2.2). During this preinterim period, preparation for a final peace agreement was to be made, according to the protocol, which also contained specific agreements on structures of the government (IGAD 2002a, Part C), state and religion, and

the right to self-determination for the people of southern Sudan (ibid.). The parties returned to Machakos several times during the last few months of 2002, both to negotiate the cease-fire and to resolve other disagreements. The talks broke down several times, but on October 15, a memorandum of understanding was signed to cease hostilities for the duration of the talks. On February 6, 2003, the parties agreed on central points related to power and wealth sharing, and on September 25 the same year, an "Agreement on Security Arrangements" for the interim period was signed. The expectations were then that a final peace accord would be signed by the end of the year. However, complex issues related to wealth sharing and the disputed regions of Abyei, Nuba Mountains, and southern Blue Nile prevented the parties from coming to a final agreement. The cease-fire was extended until March 31, 2004. In the meantime, talks continued at the highest level between the Sudanese First Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army leader John Garang. In Nairobi the IGAD Secretariat for Sudan prepared a work plan to support the reconstruction and peace building in Sudan after a peace agreement was reached. On June 5, 2004, under the auspices of IGAD, the parties signed the Nairobi Declaration reconfirming their commitment to the peace process. By the end of the year the Sudanese Government and the SPLA finalized the peace negotiations, and on January 5, 2005, they signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This agreement drew together all the previous protocols regarding issues that the government and the SPLA had agreed upon in the previous years, including wealth- and power sharing.

IGAD in Somalia

IGAD first got involved in the crisis in Somalia following a two-day conference in Rome hosted by its member states in January 1998. That meeting reached an agreement to establish a committee to assist the peace-building efforts of Ethiopia in Somalia. The Summit and Ministerial Session of IGAD held in Djibouti in March the same year was completely dominated by the issue of Somalia. A major concern was the proliferation of initiatives, and so the member states agreed to channel all further initiatives through IGAD. In October 1998, Ethiopia hosted an international conference on Somalia under the auspices of IGAD. The conference agreed to establish what was named the Somalia Frontline States Technical Committee to spearhead a new peace and reconciliation effort. The committee had 15 members from the seven IGAD member states, the OAU, and the Arab League.

The committee convened a Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, which commenced in Kenya in October 2002. The conference led to the signing of the Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities, Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process. It agreed, *inter alia*, to create federal governance structures for Somalia. However, the talks broke down in 2003, and in October that year the IGAD Summit meeting asked the AU to assist in resuming facilitation of the reconciliation process.

On January 29, 2003, leaders of the various Somali groups signed an agreement in Nairobi to move the talks into the final phase and pave the way for the adoption of a Transitional Federal Charter. This charter, which came into force on March 13, 2004, provides the legal framework for a five-year transitional government in Somalia (ISS 2005).

Early warning

Early warning of conflict on the Horn of Africa is one of the main activities related to IGAD's work on peace and security. IGAD has therefore established the so-called Conflict and Early Warning Response Mechanism (CEWARN), by a protocol signed by the member states during the ninth summit meeting held in Khartoum in 2002. CEWARN has been operational in three member states (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda) with a focus on cross-border pastoral and related conflicts (CEWARN UNIT 2006, 7). In the region "there are thirty potentially threatening inter-communal conflicts; a collapsed state due to internal conflicts; a recent inter-state war between two of the member states; a great number of endemic violent cross-border pastoral conflicts; and the continued threat of inter-state wars arising from cross-border inter-communal and inter-clan conflicts" (Nitschke-Smith 2005, 22). To be able to handle these complex challenges, six strategic objectives have been identified in the CEWARN Strategy 2007–2011:

- expand the monitoring and reporting of pastoral and related conflicts in all IGAD member states;
- strengthen the early response side of the mechanism by fully operationalizing CEWERUs [Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units] in all IGAD member states;
- widen sources of information, enhance the information collection system, and strengthen the data analysis capacity of CEWARN;
- develop a public relations and communication strategy and promote awareness of CEWARN's work;

- strengthen the institutional and functional capacity of CEWARN using all enabling means, including research and training as well as administrative and financial support;
 - implement a sustainable long-term funding strategy that will ensure CEWARN's access to adequate resources to fulfil its mandate.
- (CEWARN UNIT 2006, 8)

According to the CEWARN Web site, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution provides unique early warning information on cross-border pastoral conflicts currently going on in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. CEWARN monitors violent incidents such as organized cattle raids and the social impacts of such incidents. For example, women and children are often the victims of raids: women are raped and children's schools are closed down as a result of an attack on villages. CEWARN also tracks the proliferation of small arms as the member states have recognized that these weapons exacerbate the violence and intensity of pastoral conflicts. Moreover, CEWARN monitors various environmental pressures in the region as they often serve as an early warning system. Drought, for instance, often forces groups to move into hostile territories. The monitoring is done through the so-called baseline reports from a large number of specified areas. In the CEWARN Strategy 2007–2011, we read that “[s]ince its establishment, and its focus on cross-border pastoral conflicts, CEWARN has succeeded in bringing to light the hitherto unmonitored heavy loss of human lives and loss of livestock taking place in the IGAD region. The plight of pastoral communities has now become a major policy issue in the Member States” (CEWARN UNIT 2006, 3). Emphasis has been put on the two key concepts of Early Warning (EW) and Early Response (ER). In CEWARN Strategy for 2007–2011, we can read that the main achievements of CEWARN since it began its EW and ER work are

- a unique database providing timely, constant, and accurate information on cross-border pastoralist conflicts;
- efforts to cope with the dynamism of conflicts and to combine quantitative with qualitative analyses of field data;
- reports that provide a good basis for developing intervention options and mechanisms for response;
- capacity building for conflict prevention, management, and response in the region through skill training of CEWARNs, national research institutes, field monitors, and local committee members in IGAD member states;

- awareness creation among governments, civil society actors, and other stakeholders regarding the nature, intensity, and magnitude of cross-border pastoralist conflicts;
- collaboration and adoption of strategies toward addressing violent cross-border pastoralist conflicts by bringing together state and non-state actors.

(Ibid. 20)

Compared with, for instance, ECOWAS's regional security initiatives, the security initiatives of IGAD in relation to the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia are of a purely diplomatic character. There is no use of force on IGAD's behalf. In contrast to both ECOWAS and the SADC, IGAD has focused on conflict management at the grass roots. Whereas the first two organizations apply a so-called top-down model focusing on the political elite, IGAD, to a considerable degree, bases its work on a so-called bottom-up model. Decision makers at the grass roots are involved in the work of the organization. Through the development of its capacity at that level, IGAD has the possibilities of working within a broad range of conflict management. The bottom-up model is also used by IGAD for its early warning system.

The Security Politics of the African Union

In March 2007 the president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, bid farewell to 1,700 troops going to Somalia as part of some 8,000 AU peacekeepers. The AU force was sent to Somalia to replace the Ethiopian troops that had ousted the Islamists in late 2006. By the end of February 2007, only Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria and Ghana had agreed to send soldiers for the mission.

At the same time, the crisis in Darfur, where 7,000 AU military observers had been stationed to oversee the implementation of the Abuja agreement, was another immense challenge for the organization.¹ The underequipped and underfinanced force was struggling to patrol a region the size of France. Moreover, the crisis has spread to neighbouring Chad, and refugees and soldiers are entering that country in growing numbers. Whether the AU is able to handle crises of this kind is going to be the first real test of the peacekeeping capacities of the organization. The AU's capacity related to conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and security is the main subject of this chapter.

The History of the African Union

The history of the AU goes back to the days of the liberation of the African colonies and the subsequent dream of pan-Africanism. By the 1950s and early 1960s, the so-called regional trend toward cooperation had become apparent worldwide. It was during this period that most African countries became independent. On the African continent, the idea of postindependent cooperation was combined with a common anticolonialist struggle: the idea of pan-Africanism was born. The underlying idea was the right of the African people to cultural, political, and economic independence – that is, the right to equality with other nations of the world. Linked with the anticolonial

struggle, pan-Africanism served as an instrument for the awakening of African nationalism. For various reasons, however, it remained a creed more than a real movement.² Nevertheless, the idea of pan-Africanism was among the main factors behind the establishment of the OAU in 1963.

The establishment of the Organization of African Unity

The OAU was established after intense diplomatic efforts to try to unify the divergent views of the African states on what the political organization uniting Africa should look like. While Kwame Nkrumah, the first elected president of independent Ghana, initiated a series of conferences and regional initiatives from 1958 with the objective of forming a federal “United States of Africa,” it became obvious in 1961 that a majority of the newly independent states—in particular, the governments of the former French colonies—were profoundly hostile to such a vision. They did not see the need for a single continental government as the basis for unity, after having struggled for a long time to achieve political independence (Francis 2006a, 18). Hence, in the political environment of the 1960s, any suggestions of giving up or surrendering the newly won political independence by African states were dismissed. A gradualist and cautious approach, reflecting this political reality, became the dominant principle affecting the creation of the OAU.

The divergent views on the practical expression of African unity were reflected in the division of the newly independent states into blocs such as Casablanca, Monrovia, and Brazzaville.³ Harsh diplomatic efforts to converge the views of the different groups resulted in a conference in Addis Ababa in 1963, where 30 states agreed to the establishment of the OAU Charter.⁴

The OAU Charter and principles

The charter and the OAU’s guiding principles were compromise documents to accommodate all the divergent views of the different groups. The “purposes” and “principles” enumerated in articles II and III of the charter placed a premium on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in member states’ internal affairs (OAU 1963, articles II and III). In addition, it was decided to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and to promote unity and solidarity among the African states.

Achievements and limitations

Although the OAU in many ways failed to fulfill some of its objectives, it provided a political platform for African leaders to continue dialogue and to conduct inter-African diplomacy. The organization’s role in promoting

regional integration, in West, Central, South, and East Africa, was described as effective. The creation of the African Development Bank (ADB) in 1964 and the decision to establish the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991 were also considered to be among its main endeavors.⁵ The outstanding role of the OAU in relation to the abandonment of apartheid in the then Rhodesia and South Africa was often highlighted.

As for its efforts to resolve Africa's conflicts and security problems, however, the organization was not successful. During its 39 years of existence, the OAU achieved very little in these issue areas. Problems in implementing plans, a lack of enthusiasm, and a rigid framework of principles and norms that prevented the OAU's active involvement in serious internal security and conflict issues caused the organization to be sidelined. The principles of nonintervention contributed to making the OAU a passive actor witnessing gross human right violations, suppression of rights, and brutality by many African state leaders.

The OAU's decision in 1963 to send military officers to supervise a cease-fire between Algeria and Morocco, withdraw troops, and create a demilitarized zone as a means to settle the disagreement between the two nations was never acted upon. Moreover, subsequent initiatives by the OAU to resolve the dispute over the next two years proved equally ineffective. In the end, the matter was settled bilaterally, without the OAU's active intervention (Berman and Sams 2000, 46). The OAU was similarly sidelined the following year in an attempt to address the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia as well as the civil unrest in the Congo (Pelcovits 1983, 267–268). In 1967 the OAU failed to intervene meaningfully in the Nigerian civil war. The OAU's first real peacekeeping action took place only in 1981 when the organization intervened in the conflict in Chad by deploying the so-called Inter-African Force. But afterward, the Chad peacekeeping “adventure” was described as a complete failure. Besides financial difficulties that limited the size of the force, the operation suffered from logistical shortcomings and an unclear mandate. Moreover, the nature of “the local political environment, the limitations and goals of the intervention force, and the interaction between domestic and external actors” contributed to making the operation particularly difficult (Christopher Clapham 2003, referred to in Francis 2006a, 123).

Francis, however, has described the operation(s) as “an innovative attempt to respond to regional peace and security” (2006a, 122). With the end of the Cold War and the changed international security and conflict environment in Africa, the OAU was forced to adopt a fundamental shift in its approach to evaluation of and responses to peace and security challenges (Francis 2006a, 123). The OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa of June 1990 (cf. OAU 1990) and the conclusions from the May 1991 Kampala Leadership Forum (cf. Africa Leadership Forum 1991) express

a redefinition of security and link peace and security with socioeconomic development, democratization, human rights, and good governance at national and regional levels. In addition, the document recognizes the need for a more direct and active African involvement in African conflicts. This changed mindset was modestly expressed through an effort to strengthen the institutional architecture for peace and security and through observer missions in Rwanda (1991–93), Burundi (1993–96), and Comoros (1997–99).

The efforts to strengthen the institutional structure were expressed in the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution adopted at the OAU's Cairo summit in June 1993. The Mechanism provided for a new decision-making body called the Central Organ and the establishment of a peace fund. These innovations came in addition to the Conflict Management Division, created in March 1992.

Notwithstanding the establishment of the new mechanism, it became evident that the OAU's new determination to take a more proactive stance in both inter- and intrastates conflicts on the continent was not universally embraced (Berman and Sams 2000, 61). Already, in the negotiations prior to the Cairo summit, a clear consensus against the involvement of the OAU in peacekeeping had emerged (*ibid.*).⁶ Hence, the focus of the Mechanism turned out to be more on prevention of conflicts than on their management and resolution, and only minor observer missions were created within its framework. For instance, the tasks of the OAU both in Burundi (1993–96) and in Comores (1997–99) were limited to overseeing the situation in these countries. The Mechanism did not have the strength and viability needed to intervene more actively in complex African conflicts.⁷ Nevertheless, it has been emphasized that the structures established through the Mechanism and the experiences from the operations within its framework provided an important base for the OAU's reform in issue areas related to peace and security on the continent.

Toward an African Union

There were particularly three African leaders that were eager to reform and reorganize the continental cooperation—Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Muhammad Gaddafi of Libya. Mbeki's eagerness to create a new drive for African integration was primarily founded in commercial interests. When he became the president of South Africa, he realized that it was necessary to improve the image of African states to attract foreign investment. In the same way as Nelson Mandela, Mbeki was aware of the fact that the spread of neoliberal ideas worldwide was an enormous challenge to the African continent. He also saw that South Africa was expected to play a leading role in Africa's concerted response to

this challenge. When he entered presidency, Mbeki “gave priority to the development of a coherent foreign policy that revolved around [...] liberal internationalism” (Tieku 2004, 254). However, Mbeki’s defense of liberal norms also included some vigorous condemnation of undemocratic African states. This generated considerable anger in some of the states concerned. It was therefore necessary for Mbeki to adopt a new approach to the promotion of liberalism in Africa (ibid.) “The new strategy entailed placing the neo-liberal message within a broader transformationalist agenda” (ibid., 254–255). Mbeki then chose to place the neoliberal ideas within a broader agenda for change. “Instead of open condemnation of illiberal governments in Africa, Mbeki called for the reconstruction of African identity in order, first, to conclude the work of the earlier Pan-Africanist movements and, second, to re-invent the African state to play its effective and rightful role on the global terrain. Mbeki cleverly reintroduced the phrase ‘African Renaissance’ to serve as the conceptual framework for the new approach” (ibid., 255). According to the South African government, “African Renaissance” was a “holistic vision [...] aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, democracy, sustainable development, progressive leadership and good governance” (ibid.). Mbeki soon realized that in order to go through with these ideas, it would be necessary to take up significant reforms of the OAU. He decided that time was ripe for the reformation of the organization and presented this idea at the OAU summit meeting in Algiers in July 1999. Mbeki also managed, with the support of Nigeria’s president Obasanjo, to influence the African heads of state and government of the OAU to take a number of prodemocracy decisions. Obasanjo’s motivations to support Mbeki were based on his own vision of a “new” Africa. He wanted to reposition the OAU at the center of Africa’s developmental issues. Obasanjo introduced a reform package that was (partly) built into the Memorandum of Understanding on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), which was adopted at the OAU/AU summit in Durban in July 2002 (cf. AU 2002a). The reforms were related to specifically four issue areas (or “calabashes,” as they were called in the memorandum)—security, stability, development, and cooperation. These principles were meant to reform the former OAU emphasis on security and sovereignty and to demand a certain “standard of behaviour [...] from every government [in Africa] in the interest of common humanity” (Obasanjo and Mosha 1992, 260, cited in Tieku 2004, 256). The memorandum underlined the inseparability of African states when it came to questions of security. One implication of this was that African leaders could no longer hide behind the curtain of sovereignty.

Obasanjo’s ideas for a new role for the OAU were primarily founded in security-political considerations. These ideas for reform provided criteria

for judging the behavior of African leaders in relation to the four specific issue areas mentioned above. Given the major themes of this book, it is interesting to note that Obasanjo, in the reform package, both treated security as human security (as opposed to state security) and underlined the interdependent aspects related to security in the African states.

Let us recall here what I wrote about redefining security in Chapter 1 and the ideas of the so-called Copenhagen school, which define security as a multidimensional phenomenon including economic, political, social, and environmental aspects (Buzan et al. 1998). In line with these kinds of ideas, Obasanjo's reform package also proposed that African leaders redefine their states' security to include economic, political, and social aspects. His ideas found expression in several of the declarations of the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the OAU in Lomé in the year 2000. For instance, in the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration the Heads of State and Government affirm that "[t]he concept of security must embrace all aspects of society including, economic, political, and social and environmental dimensions [. . .] [and that the] security of a nation must be based on the security of the life of the individual citizens [. . .]" (OAU 2000, Paragraph 10, Part b). In the memorandum of understanding the subject of interdependence was dealt with as the leaders were urged to see the security of their states "as inseparably linked to that of other African countries" (AU 2002a, 2). This means that although the AU still underlines that "[e]very African state is sovereign" sovereignty no longer offers the protection it used to do (ibid.).

What is also an important aspect of the reforms is the emphasis put on the participation of the civil society and the importance of nongovernmental groups in dealing with security, stability, and cooperation issues. Concerning what I earlier wrote concerning the character of the African state and the role of nongovernmental groups, this is of great importance.

As already mentioned, Obasanjo soon realized that the OAU did not have the institutional mechanism necessary to go forward with his reform package. It was therefore imperative for him to demand a total restructuring of the pan-African organization, particularly to improve its ability to deal with issues of security, stability, and development. And the president got his way. His ideas clearly manifest themselves in the institutional design as well as the legal underpinnings of the AU (Tieku 2004, 257).

What was the background, then, for Obasanjo's eagerness to reform the OAU? One main reason was the financial burden that Nigeria had been carrying because of its involvement in the civil wars in Liberia and in Sierra Leone. Obasanjo came back to power in Nigeria at a time when

domestic opposition to the country's peacekeeping operations in neighboring countries was at its highest. The enormous Nigerian expenditures on the functions of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone provoked the public so much that he realized that a drastic reduction of his country's involvement in Sierra Leone was absolutely necessary. At the same time, Obasanjo was not willing to abandon Nigeria's vanguard role in West Africa and he was also aware of the regional destabilizing effects of the violence in the neighboring countries. He decided to solve this dilemma by seeking external support through the pan-African organization. He also created a new Ministry of Co-operation and Integration in Africa. This ministry, together with the new Peace and Conflict Resolution Institute, was mandated to develop a policy that would help to institutionalize the ideas of the CSSDCA within the OAU. In Obasanjo's view, the integration of the CSSDCA memorandum with the OAU Charter would enable the organization to take a leading role in future conflict resolution and conflict management in Africa (*ibid.*, 259).

The third African leader of considerable importance for the establishment of the AU was Libya's president Gaddafi. Gaddafi had been sensing that two of the most powerful African leaders had started a process of reforming the OAU. Wanting to be a part of this process, he invited the OAU to convene an extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya, in September 1999. The purpose of the summit was to discuss ways and means of making the OAU effective. According to Tiekou, Gaddafi "wanted to use the platform of the summit to cement his full return to the geopolitics of black Africa, and to demonstrate his renewed commitment to the Pan-Africanism project" (*ibid.*, 261). As a bit of a surprise to the 33 African leaders attending the Sirte meeting, Gaddafi opened the summit with a presentation of his plan for a United States of Africa, including a continental presidency, a single military force, and a common African currency. However, he had to compete with the rival requests and interests of Mbeki and Obasanjo.

In order to accommodate the three rival demands at the extraordinary summit in Sirte, the African leaders decided to replace the OAU with a new organization. They asked the OAU Council of Ministers to take necessary measures to prepare the constitutional legal text for the new organization to be presented at the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Lomé in 2000. The extraordinary summit in Sirte in 1999 also agreed to integrate the CSSDCA with the institutional structure of the new organization.

As it turned out, South Africa had a dominant role in the drafting of a constitutive act of the new organization, and as the country was strongly against any united Africa, the idea of a United States of Africa was rejected altogether, and the draft constitutive act was placed on liberal norms similar to what Mbeki had introduced when he entered presidency. After the

Constitutive Act came into force in 2000, Gaddafi sought to change its provisions and sought another extraordinary summit to amend the act. But he could only present his proposal at the launching of the AU on July 9, 2002. As other African leaders also wanted amendments of the Constitutive Act, Libya's proposal was accepted. The committee that was established to work with the various amendment proposals ended up rejecting Gaddafi's proposal but accepting, for instance, Obasanjo's suggestion to make a peace and security council an organ of the AU. The rivalry and disagreement between the leaders were probably both for good and for bad. On the negative side was the fact that the disagreements slowed down an important improvement of continental African cooperation. On the positive side was the fact that the rivalry activated long-needed political will. Tieku writes that

another reason why the competing interests should make one guardedly hopeful is because they are, perhaps, the only way to solve the perennial lack of genuine political will on the part of African leaders to implement international agreements. The competing interests of Nigeria, South Africa and Libya demonstrate commitment to the entire AU process. With the leaders of Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt and Algeria gradually pushing for similarly pre-eminent roles in continental Africa, one can expect the AU summits to be more than talking shops.

(Tieku 2004, 266–267)⁸

The Establishment of the African Union

On September 9, 1999, the heads of state and government of the OAU issued the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of an African Union. The African leaders wanted to accelerate the process of integration in the continent to enable the African countries to play their rightful role in the global economy and to improve the abilities of the countries together to address the social, economic, and political problems plaguing most of the countries on the continent. At the 2000 OAU/AEC Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lomé, the Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted. Then, in Sirte, at the Fifth Extraordinary OAU/AEC Summit from March 1 to 2, 2001, a decision declaring the establishment of the AU, based on the unanimous will of member states, was adopted. In this declaration, it was specified that the legal requirements for the AU would be completed when 36 African countries, that is, two-thirds of the member states ratified the Constitutive Act. This happened on April 26, 2001, when Nigeria deposited its instrument of ratification. The act came into force on May 26, 2001 (AU 2003a).

The goals and the structure of the AU

The AU is designed to achieve three broad goals. First, it is intended to bring together the relatively large number of subregional intergovernmental organizations in Africa in order to achieve continent-wide cooperation among African states. Second, it is intended to create conditions to enable African states to engage in social, economic, and political relations in a way that will make war between them unlikely. Third, it aims at designing an institutional structure that will make it easier for African states to participate in the international markets and in international negotiations related to trade, finance, and debt. To work for these objectives, the AU has established 17 institutions. The most important are the following:

- the African Heads of State and Government, which is the supreme organ of the union
- the Executive Council, which is composed of ministers or authorities designated by the governments of member states (The council is responsible to the Assembly.)
- the Commission, which is composed of the chairperson, the deputy chairperson, eight commissioners, and staff members (Each commissioner shall be responsible for a portfolio.)
- the Permanent Representatives' Committee, which is composed of the permanent representatives of the member states accredited to the AU (The committee is charged with the responsibility of preparing the work of the Executive Council.)
- Peace and Security Council (PSC), which was added to the AU in December 2003 (see below)
- Pan-African Parliament, which is designated to ensuring the full participation of African peoples in governance, development, and economic integration of the continent (The Protocol Relating to the Composition, Powers, Functions, and Organization of the parliament has been signed by the member states and is in the process of ratification [January 2008].)
- the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which is an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the member states (The draft statutes of ECOSOC were adopted by the AU Assembly in Addis Ababa in July 2004. ECOSOC was then formally launched in Addis Ababa in March 2005.)
- the Court of Justice (The Protocol of the Court of Justice was adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Maputo on July 11, 2003. In January 2005 the AU decided to integrate the African Human Rights Court and the Court of

Justice of the AU. The election of judges for the integrated court took place in January 2006.)

- the specialized technical committees (Seven such committees have been established to address sectoral issues.)
- the financial institutions, that is, the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African Investment Bank.)

The Peace and Security Politics of the AU

Out of all these institutions, the establishment of the PSC is particularly important for our purpose. The process leading to the establishment of the PSC started in 2002, when the AU, realizing that Africa should develop military mechanisms to deal with the common security threats that hinder sound development and undermine the promotion of peace and security on the continent, adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council⁹ (hereafter the PSC protocol) (cf. AU 2002b). During the inaugural session of the AU in Durban in 2002, the Assembly called for an operationalization of the provision of the Constitutive Act regarding a common defence and security policy of the AU. As it turned out, the execution of that mandate was one of the main activities of the AU during its first year of operation. The American-led war in Iraq had shown the African leaders that the UN could no longer guarantee world peace and that alternative arrangements had to be sought, particularly for weak states such as those in Africa. They realized that future peace and security challenges could only be faced through a common defense and security policy. Thus, between July 2002 and January 2004, a considerable number of meetings were held with the purpose of developing a framework for such a policy.

In January 2004, African ministers of defense, meeting at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopted the Draft Framework for a Common African Defence and Security Policy (cf. AU 2004a). In Sirte, in February the same year, the African heads of state and government decided to adopt a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The CADSP aims to deal with conflicts both directly and indirectly, through preventive diplomacy and rapid intervention in conflict zones. The PSC of the AU is the implementation organ for the policy framework of the CADSP, “which is essentially a strategy based on a set of principles, objectives and instruments that aims at promoting and consolidating peace and security on the continent” (Touray 2005, 636). According to Touray, it was the end of the Cold War and the generalized international indifference to African problems that led to the adoption of the CADSP.

In Sirte, the African leaders signed a Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (cf. AU 2004b). This policy rests on

a set of principles, notions, objectives, and instruments that define it and, at the same time, constitute its substance. *Defense, security, and common threat* are the main underlying concepts of the CADSP. A common understanding of these three concepts is considered to be decisive for the AU's ability to implement its policy. The so-called Framework for the Common African Defence and Security Policy (cf. AU 2004a; 2004b) defines and elaborates on the policy principles. Among the most important aspects is the perception that defense encompasses both the traditional use of armed force *and* nonmilitary modes of protecting citizens. Moreover, the notion of common threat hinges on the principle that the security of each African state is linked to the security of other African states. Last but not least, the notion of security includes both traditional state-centric security *and* human security, based not only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well (ibid., paragraphs 5–7).

The objectives of the CADSP are essentially to respond to both internal and external threats effectively. These objectives are to be pursued on the basis of various principles, among which the principle of the indivisibility of the security of African countries is particularly important. In principle, all African countries are responsible for the implementation of the CADSP. But the immediate responsibility lies with the PSC, which was created by the PSC protocol. The objectives of the PSC are spelt out in the protocol and include the promotion of peace, security, and stability by anticipating and preventing conflict. To be able to carry out its tasks, the PSC has been given extensive power, including the authority to mount and deploy peace support missions and to recommend to the Assembly intervention in member states. The PSC is composed of 15 members. Five of them are elected for a period of three years, whereas the remaining ten are elected for a period of two years. The PSC has no permanent members and none of the members have veto power. The chairmanship is held in rotation by each member for one month, and decisions are taken by consensus. If consensus is not possible, the decisions are put to vote.

To facilitate the work of the PSC, the African leaders have equipped it with three main bodies: the Panel of the Wise, a continental early warning system, and a military standby force.

The PSC protocol introduces the so-called Panel of the Wise, to support the PSC, particularly in the area of conflict prevention. According to Article 11 of the protocol, the panel “shall be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent” (ibid., Article 11.2). The mandate of the members of the panel is advisory, that is, they “shall advise the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues

pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa" (ibid., Article 11.3). Members of the panel are to be chosen according to the principle of equitable regional representation (Touray 2005, 465).

The tragedy of the genocide in Rwanda showed the African leaders the importance of timely information and the ability to act on that information. Knowing that the AU's effectiveness in relation to conflict prevention will depend very much on the capacity to collect, process, and act on information, the African leaders wanted to equip the PSC with a continental early warning mechanism. This mechanism, referred to by the AU as the early warning system, will collect and analyze data "on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module" (AU 2002b, Article 12.2a). The system will be composed of an observation and monitoring center, that is, the "Situation Room," and observation and monitoring units of the "Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room" (ibid., Article 12.2b). The PSC foresees a close collaboration with regional intergovernmental organizations—often referred to as regional economic communities (RECs)—on the early warning system.

The third body established to facilitate the work of the PSC is the African Standby Force (ASF). According to the protocol, the ASF "shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components and their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice" (ibid., Article 13.1). It shall be called upon to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances such as genocide, war crime, and crimes against humanity or at the request of a member state to restore peace and security in accordance with articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act (Touray 2005, 646). The force can also be called upon in order to prevent a dispute or conflict from escalating into a full-scale war. Finally, the ASF shall engage in peace building, including postconflict disarmament and demobilization (ibid.).

Challenges related to the African Standby Force

The ASF is planned to be a multinational force empowered to intervene in serious conflicts around the continent. The force will deploy under the AU's auspices to intervene in border wars and international conflicts and will consist of five regionally based brigades of 3,000 to 4,000 troops each. A sixth formation will be based at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, taking the combined capacity from 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers (Neethling 2005a, 68–71). The ASF will be composed of multidisciplinary standby contingents, with civilian and military components located in

their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment on appropriate notice. According to the PSC protocol, the ASF shall

- observe and monitor missions;
- conduct other types of peacekeeping missions;
- intervene in the affairs of a member state during grave circumstances or at its request to restore peace and security;
- conduct preventive deployment;
- conduct peace-building operations, including postconflict disarmament and demobilization;
- provide humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of people in conflict and disaster areas;
- perform other functions the PSC or the AU mandates.

(AU 2002b, Article 13.3, parts a–g)

To facilitate the management of the military decisions, the protocol recommends the establishment of a military staff committee as an advisory body to the PSC. The committee shall be consulted in all questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

The so-called Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (cf. AU 2003b) outlines several possible conflict and mission scenarios that the ASF is likely to confront. Detailed decisions—concerning, for instance, the speed of deployment—are made in relation to the various scenarios. The policy framework is also quite specific concerning the cooperation with the UN on matters related to, for instance, standby information, doctrine and training material, and logistics. As for doctrine and training material, it says that “[t]he AU should consult closely with the UN to gain access to the latest UN peace operations doctrine and training material and modify this as necessary to suit African conditions. The UN should also be invited to participate in the planning and conduct of all forms of peacekeeping training and exercises” (ibid., Paragraph 9, Part c). As for standby information, “the AU should [where member states approve] ensure African standby information is included in UN standby databases” (ibid., Paragraph 9, Part b). The emphasis on the collaboration with the UN is no doubt partly inspired by the so-called Brahimi Report of 2000 (so named after the head of the expert panel that produced it, Ladhar Brahimi).¹⁰ Nevertheless, it is the subregional organizations, such as ECOWAS, that are suggested as the first respondents to crisis situations. Ideally, the subregional organizations should conduct short, robust stabilization or peace-enforcement operations and then undertake multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions. The policy

framework therefore calls on regions to develop standby brigades as reinforcements for classical peacekeeping missions and for complex, multidimensional peacekeeping missions. Already, several subregional organizations, such as ECOWAS and the SADC, have developed their own military apparatus and are moving closer to the existence of subregional standby forces. ECOWAS and its military arm, ECOMOG, is perhaps the best-known subregional example of an African organization that has been involved in peacekeeping operations. As mentioned, ECOWAS has already been heavily involved in civil wars and violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission has set up a West African Emerging Standby Force (ESF) of 6,500 soldiers that could deploy rapidly in response to crises and threats to peace and security in West Africa. No doubt, "ECOWAS has a firm desire to design, build, and maintain its own peace support operations capability" (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 6). The ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted in 1999, provides the main foundation for the development of such capability. The implementation of various specific decisions of the Mechanism has been delayed, as ECOWAS has had to respond to several crisis situations in the years following the adoption of the Mechanism. Therefore, ECOWAS was involved in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo before the Mechanism was fully implemented. The emerging trend, however, is the one of "hybrid operations," where the subregional organizations undertake the emergency response followed by the deployment of a multifunctional UN mission. ECOWAS now sees its role in relation to peace building as an interim one and expects to hand over the responsibility to the UN after six months, at the latest (*ibid.*, 7). This is in line with main principles of the ASF. However, from the beginning, ECOWAS had to develop its framework on peace and security outside the framework of any other organization, including the UN. So far the approach of ECOWAS to peacekeeping operations has been essentially military, notwithstanding decisions to make ECOWAS's peacekeeping capabilities multifunctional (*cf.* ECOWAS, 1999). As for the ESF, it is assumed that the ESF Task Force will have the capability to deploy for up to 90 days. Thereafter, one of the following options will be implemented:

- the task force elements will return to the troop-contributing nations;
- the force will remain deployed as an element of the ESF Main Brigade;
- it will become an element of an AU or UN mission;
- it will hand over its operations to a UN or AU force.

(Cilliers and Malan 2005, 7)

There is still much to be done on defining and meeting the training and logistics requirements of the ESE, not to mention the similar needs in the eventual process of making the ASF and the ECOWAS force compatible.¹¹

East Africa contributes to UN peacekeeping on a much smaller scale than West Africa, but the region has been the host to several large operations, including the UN mission in southern Sudan and the AU mission in Darfur. In March 2007, Uganda sent off troops for an AU peacekeeping operation in Somalia. In December 2007 around 100 Burundian soldiers arrived in the country. Other East African countries have also promised to contribute to this peacekeeping operation. This is a sign that contributions to peacekeeping from this part of Africa is about to increase. East Africa does not have an overarching and integrated conflict prevention and management framework similar to West Africa. The AU therefore mandated IGAD to coordinate the efforts of the region regarding the establishment of an East African standby brigade. As a result, defense chiefs from 11 East African nations have agreed to set up a 3,000-strong brigade for peacekeeping operations under the flag of the AU. "Troops for the East African brigade are to remain in their respective countries, but the force has its headquarters in Addis Ababa with a secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. Command of the brigades rotates annually in alphabetical order among the member states of Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda" (Neethling 2005a, 70).

Southern Africa is currently the host of the UN mission in the DRC, where South Africa is one of the largest troop contributors. South Africa was also recently chairing the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security and was prioritizing the establishment of a regional early warning system, an SADC standby force brigade (hereafter, SADC standby brigade), and support to the peace process in the DRC.

As for the SADC, the organization has come to terms with the challenges of establishing a standby capacity in two ways. First, in 2003, the member states agreed on a classical mutual defense pact, though this pact did not specifically provide for the establishment of a standby force. Then, in December 2004, following the decisions by the AU on the establishment of the ASF, the SADC Inter-States Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) met in Lesotho to consider the establishment of a brigade. The members committed themselves to creating an SADC standby brigade and gave the green light to its military chiefs to appoint a planning team to do so. However, there is still some way to go before all this is fully developed.

The SADC standby brigade will be a true multinational force. In the same way as in West Africa, the troops of the brigade will be stationed in their own countries but will be called upon when needed. The SADC expects that the brigade or its components will typically be deployed under

a UN or AU mandate. Planning and preparations, however, do cater for deployment under the mandating authority of the SADC itself. It is still unclear whether the brigade will be able to deploy alongside the UN within 30 days and meet the other AU timeframes. Moreover, the precise relationship between the brigade, its AU Planning Element, the standby brigade headquarters, and the SADC Secretariat is not clear (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 14).

How to plan for the creation of a standby force in northern Africa remains unknown to analysts as well as AU officials. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) would typically be the organization responsible for the establishment of the force. However, the organization's jurisdiction overlaps with that of the Community of Sahelian Saharan States, and three of the members of this community would find it natural to contribute to the ESF rather than to a force in northern Africa. In Central Africa some progress has been made toward the establishment of a regional standby force, but the process is understandably much slower than in West Africa, on the Horn, and in southern Africa (*ibid.*, 15).

The ASF is no doubt a major step forward, and if matters proceed according to plans, then, by the end of the year 2010, Africa should have a six-brigade, UN-style force ready to undertake conflict management on the continent, a task that was earlier expected to be done by the UN alone. This means that a dream is about to come true concerning Africa's ability to take care of its own security problems. There is still a way to go, however, not least concerning the financial aspect. This has led the African leaders to seek support from the international community. Also, a joint Africa/Group of Eight (G8) action plan has been developed to enhance African capabilities. The G8 has also contributed substantial technical and financial support (Kent and Malan 2003, 71).

Generally, the relationship between the AU and the RECs is important, so also with regard to cooperation on standby forces. The CADSP/PSC assigns important roles to RECs in as much as the regions are to provide troops in the form of regional brigades. However, there is a huge gap between aspirations and achievements/implementation. Most necessary legal documents are in place, and so are the institutional structures. What is still lacking is the concrete operational capacity. The single most important reason for this is lack of funding. Who shall be responsible for the funding of the regional brigades? None of the policy documents are explicit on this question. As for, for instance, the deployment timelines outlined by the AU, they are very ambitious, and this has obvious financial implications. A readiness to deploy within 14 days "will require regular joint field exercises with all units, a standing fully staffed brigade headquarters and support" (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 5). The alternatives would

be to deploy within 30 or 90 days, but that also would require expensive logistics that no single state is ready to pay for. Another unsolved issue concerns the relationship between the AU/PSC and the UN. The PSC protocol clearly provides for cooperation between the PSC and the UNSC. Detailed decisions on the relationship are listed in the protocol. The main problem, however, concerning the relationship between the PSC and the UNSC is again the issue of funding. It is still not clear who will bear the financial burden for the collaboration between the two.¹² Another problem concerns the inadequate capacity at the regional level. Although some of the state armies have participated in UN operations and thereby might have improved, their capability to undertake peacekeeping missions, individually or collectively, is highly doubtful. Moreover, collective peacekeeping in Africa is also troubled by the diversity of military cultures and administrative traditions on the continent. There is still a long way to go before the military systems are compatible and the doctrines and traditions are harmonized. One immediate concern should therefore be the development of a common military standard on the continent.

Challenges related to the Continental Early Warning System

According to Omar A. Touray, the Common African Defence and Security Policy marks a shift from realism or neorealism, where emphasis was placed on states' sovereignty, to liberalism, where states' welfare is more related to collective security embodied in international regimes (Touray 2005, 648). The principles of the CADSP rest on fundamental assumptions of the philosophy of common security. First, it assumes that conflicts can be prevented by military and diplomatic action. Second, it assumes that aggressors or perpetrators can and should be stopped. Third, it assumes moral clarity: aggressors and perpetrators are wrong, and all those who are right must act in unison to meet the aggression. Finally, it assumes that aggressors and perpetrators *know* that the continent will act in unison to punish them (ibid., 649).

Despite this degree of clarity, the CADSP is struggling with problems related to all collective security arrangements. For example, it is not always possible to identify aggressors. And if they are identified, the question of who is morally right and wrong does not have an obvious answer. In addition to these general problems, the CADSP will also have to deal with some more specific issues, one of which is the question of what to do if a particular crisis involves one or several of the member state governments. The efficiency of a proper early warning system could be a solution to this problem. It is probably less of a provocation to a country to be consulted

by the PSC at an early/nonviolent stage of a conflict than to be openly criticized at a later/possibly violent stage. To reach such efficiency, the early warning system will probably have to go far beyond the “situation room” of today.

This is directly related to another practical issue, that is, the relationship between the AU and the RECs within the area of peace and security. The collaboration between the PSC and the RECs must be pushed off the ground to ensure the efficient functioning of the early warning system.

One of the instruments through which the AU is to fulfill its substantially enlarged role in conflict prevention is the so-called Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). Article 12.1 of the PSC protocol stipulates that CEWS is one of five pillars of the PSC. This system will link the AU Commission with the various RECs, such as ECOWAS, the SADC, and IGAD.

In contrast to traditional intelligence systems, early warning systems use material available to everyone and generally aim to serve human security, not state security. Thus, early warning systems are rooted in new human-security thinking as discussed above. Early warning depends upon transparent methods and the sharing of information between various kinds of actors. The systems depend heavily on the civil society for information input and analysis. Moreover, it “requires a cooperative effort at international, regional, national and local levels; no single state or organization can do it alone or retain a monopoly over it” (Cilliers 2005, 1). What is also different from intelligence systems is that early warning systems require a much closer linkage between analysis and action.

The purpose of early warning is to formulate strategic actions so as to prevent further development of early-stage conflicts, or potential conflicts. Actions are taken for the benefit of common good. This means that in addition to the collection and verification of information, early warning requires the analysis of that information, the communication of the analysis to all relevant actors, and the formulation and fulfilment of actions (Schmeidl 2002).¹³

The “user” of CEWS is the PSC, and in this sense the aim of the system is to strengthen the capacity of the PSC to formulate relevant strategies to prevent conflict or to limit destructive effects of small-scale conflicts.

According to Cilliers, early warning needs to tackle the following questions:

- a) Which issues (manifestations, precipitating, proximate, and root cause) underpin and drive the conflict?
- b) Which factors put a brake on conflict and serve as the basis for peace?

- c) Who are the main stakeholders in the conflict? and
 - d) What are the practical options available to policymakers who wish to influence the emerging conflict, avoid human suffering in the short term, and move toward a sustainable settlement in the longer term?
- (2005, 2)

Admittedly, this is of course a simplified version of conflict analysis and response. However, it is not the purpose of this book to go into a detailed debate on different approaches, methodologies, and interpretations concerning early warning systems. Rather, we will point to the fact that, generally, early warning systems recognize the close relationship between good governance and conflict prevention, a principle that was also introduced by the OAU in the Cairo Declaration of 1995: "We recognize and resolve that democracy, good governance, peace, security, stability and justice are among the most essential factors in African socio-economic development. Without democracy and peace, development is not possible; and without development, peace is not durable" (OAU 1995, Paragraph 10).

One big difference between the AU and the OAU is that the AU's Constitutive Act gives the organization the right to intervene, without consent, in a member state in order to restore "peace and stability"; to "prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity"; and in response to "a serious threat to legitimate order." This is in sharp contrast to the OAU, which made the principle of sovereignty an inviolable rule. The OAU was built on consensus and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states. The organization was therefore restricted to conflict management and conflict resolution rather than conflict prevention.¹⁴ The AU has promised to change this, and although expectations are mixed regarding the ability of the new organization to make a difference, it has already made advances in framing its legal documents with reference to human security rather than state security. For instance, Article 2.2 of the PSC protocol defines its nature as "a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall be a *collective security* and early-warning arrangement" (AU 2002b, my emphasis).

The PSC protocol stipulates that CEWS shall consist of an observation and monitoring center—that is, "the situation room," which will be located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union—and be responsible for data collection and analysis (*ibid.*, Article 12.2, Part b). Even though it is generally recognized that early warning touches upon aspects related to most divisions of the AU, prevention and response primarily affect the sections dealing with peace, security, and political affairs.

As regards the methodology of CEWS, the PSC protocol says that the collection and analysis of data must be based on the development of “an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators” (ibid., Article 12.4). Throughout the years, the OAU and the AU have been offered a number of technologically advanced indicators module systems, which they have so far rejected. The idea of such systems is that some type of automated electronic process would give the staff of CEWS some kind of “electronic protection.” The question is whether the AU will adopt an already existing “indicators module” or invest in the development of a complex, new, and tailor-made system. This latter alternative would no doubt be a very expensive one, and it is not necessarily going to be very much better than already existing databases and systems. Notwithstanding the choice of system, CEWS will need to be politically apt and its analyses will have to be informed by sound political judgment (Cilliers 2005, 7).

Related to the methodology of CEWS is the kind of interaction between information collection and analysis and preventive action. Although there should be interaction between the sections carrying out the two functions, there should ideally also be a clear separation, primarily in order to resist the temptation of shaping the analysis to support a preferred mode of action. Moreover, the skills needed for early warning activities are probably quite distinct from the skills needed for conflict management.

The role of the subregional organizations in relation to CEWS

As already mentioned, the roles of subregional organizations such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and the SADC are considered integral to the overall security architecture of the AU. In the PSC protocol we read that

- a) “Observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms are to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room” (AU 2002b, Article, 12.2, parts a–b).
- b) “The Peace and Security Council shall, in consultation with Regional Mechanisms, promote initiatives aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts and, in circumstances where conflicts have occurred, peace-making and peace-building functions” (ibid., Article 16.2).
- c) “The Chairperson of the Commission shall take the necessary measures, where appropriate, to ensure the full involvement of

Regional Mechanisms in the establishment and effective functioning of the Early Warning System and the African Standby Force" (*ibid.*, Article 16.5).

Already, relatively well-developed early warning units can be found in West Africa, within the framework of ECOWAS, and on the Horn of Africa, within IGAD's framework. In southern Africa the SADC is also making some progress with respect to early warning, whereas in North and East Africa the two relevant organizations, the AMU and the East Africa Community (EAC), has not given priority to the establishment of early warning systems.

Chapter IV of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted by ECOWAS in 1999, is devoted to early warning. The Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security is the primary implementing structure, within the ECOWAS Secretariat, of the mechanism. The Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) is one out of four departments of the office.¹⁵ Reporting to the OMC are four observation and monitoring zones within the region of West Africa. The headquarters of these zones are located in Banjul (Gambia), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Monrovia (Liberia), and Cotonou (Benin). The zonal headquarters are responsible for gathering information from their focal area on a daily basis through contact with government authorities, local citizens, research institutes, and public media.

Although the early warning system under development by ECOWAS is in an early stage, it represents the most comprehensive and logically integrated system on the continent. Moreover, the conceptual maturity of the system reflects a high degree of commitment by the regional leaders. They have institutionalised, at least on paper, the linkage between good governance and conflict prevention. Nevertheless, there are still hindrances to the development of the early warning system in West Africa. Among the most important is the lack of adequate equipment to facilitate the process of data collection, processing, and dissemination. There is an obvious need for extension of financial and human resources in order to make the system work. The system also lacks a shared analysis framework based on more than situational country reports. Finally, the system still suffers from lack of clarity concerning central concepts. For instance, it is not clear what types of conflict the OMC considers to be political and what types it considers to be humanitarian.

The IGAD early warning system represents the most sophisticated system available among the subregional organizations. IGAD decided to establish an early warning unit in 2000 and gave effect to that decision

in Khartoum on January 9, 2002, when IGAD heads of state and government signed the Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). The aim of the unit is to tackle the instability in the region by identifying the areas and issues that can potentially lead to conflict. In the Annex to the protocol we read that “CEWARN shall rely for its operations on information that is collected from the public domain, particularly in the following areas:

- a) livestock rustling;
- b) conflicts over grazing and water points;
- c) smuggling and illegal trade;
- d) nomadic movements;
- e) refugees;
- f) landmines;
- g) banditry.”

(IGAD 2002b, Annex, Part II, Paragraph 1a)

The objectives of CEWARN include

- enabling member states to prevent cross-border pastoral conflicts from developing into armed violent conflicts on a greater scale;
- enabling local communities to play an important part in preventing violent conflicts;
- enabling the IGAD Secretariat to pursue conflict prevention and mitigative initiatives.

(CEWARN 2007a)¹⁶

CEWARN uses a sophisticated methodology and reporting tool developed by Virtual Research Associates Inc. In addition, CEWARN includes alternative news-feed from local information networks. The measures of conflict are based on a large set of indicators, currently counting 52, specifically designed for the IGAD region (Cilliers 2005, 14; CEWARN 2007b).¹⁷ IGAD has identified research institutions and civil society organizations in each member country, which appoint specific staff to undertake the monitoring activities. CEWARN’s focus is on cross-border pastoral conflicts, but the intention is to implement and expand the mechanism across the IGAD region for all types of conflict. For the time being, there is still a way to go for information sharing between CEWARN and IGAD. There is a gap between analysis, options, and actions, and information sharing will probably continue to be a problem as long as the two organizations are located in two different countries—IGAD in Djibouti and CEWARN in Ethiopia. Finally, the system needs transparency if it is going to work in the long run.

Given the nature of its work, it can only operate on the basis of open sources and the involvement of civil society.

In Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)¹⁸ is the most important regional economic community. As a part of the Peace and Security Council for Africa, established in 1999, there is an early warning observation and monitoring system for Central Africa (MARAC). MARAC will consist of an observation and analysis center and several zonal observation offices and will be responsible for data collection and analysis in order to prevent crises and conflicts. In later decisions national networks have been added to the original structure. MARAC still suffers from a number of staffing, financial, logistic, and other problems, and the system is not yet operational (ISS 2007b; Cilliers 2005, 16). Similar to other early warning systems in Africa, MARAC is meant to be an open-source mechanism rather than an intelligence system. Whether MARAC will work remains to be seen and has been the subject to some doubt, as most of the ECCAS states are weak. Also, the fact that the "mother organization," ECCAS, has not yet been fully operationalized is, of course, a reason for MARAC's lack of efficiency.

In southern Africa, the SADC decided to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 1996 with the general objective of promoting peace and security in the region. Unlike the AU and ECOWAS, the SADC does not have a peace and security council with reduced membership working on behalf of member states. Instead, all countries are involved in the peace and security framework of the organization, just below the heads of state level. The SADC Organ Protocol, in Article 11.3(b), provides for the establishment of "an early warning system in order to facilitate timeous action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict" (SADC 2001, Article 11.3, Part b). At an extraordinary summit meeting in Malawi in 2001, the heads of state mandated the SADC Organ to prepare the SIPO. This plan would provide guidelines for the implementation of the Organ protocol for the first five years. Among many other decisions, SIPO, which was eventually approved in August 2003, provides for the establishment of an early warning unit in each member state and for the definition of common standards to identify conflicts (SADC 2003, 19). Moreover, the newly established Department for Politics, Defence and Security will be composed of three subdivisions, where the third one is a so-called strategic analysis unit, consisting of two senior officers, one to deal with political and security threats and another to deal with socioeconomic threats. The unit will also be responsible for the Early Warning Situation Room (*ibid.*, 48). As chief of the SADC Organ, South Africa made the establishment of an early warning system a priority for 2004–05. The conceptual principles on which the SADC early warning system is to

be based have been approved, and the ISDSC has mandated a team of experts to initiate the establishment of the regional early warning system. After a number of meetings between the experts, the executive secretary of the SADC announced that the system would be established in March 2005. As for the methodological tools of the new system, the debate has not yet been settled. However, what has been decided is that the exchange of information with the AU will be restricted to strategic reports through the office of the president that chairs the SADC Organ. The SADC's early warning system is therefore different in character from the more open systems prescribed for CEWS and adopted by ECOWAS and IGAD. The reason for this might be that security in southern Africa is still much more associated with the security of the state rather than the security of the individual, probably because of quite recent political experiences such as the antiapartheid struggle. The emphasis on state security also implies that early warning in southern Africa is necessarily a function of government interests. In a way, the early warning system that the SADC is about to build looks more like an extension of the national intelligence service than the early warning systems of the other organizations. This difference is also reflected in the more general attitude of the two regions concerning regional systems on conflict prevention and management. West Africa is an example of a region more confident and open with regard to regional security politics. The way ECOWAS has developed its security-political framework tells us that this is an organization where new ways of thinking of security have gained terrain. In southern Africa, on the other hand, we see a region where traditional ways of looking at security, that is, state security, are still prevalent.

The case of CEWARN

The AU has long acknowledged five building blocks of African integration: AMU, IGAD, the SADC, ECOWAS, and COMESA. Of them, AMU is largely dormant and also focusing more on the Mediterranean than on sub-Saharan Africa, and COMESA does not have any commitments or ambitions to engage in peace and security issues at all.¹⁹ A major challenge with regard to moving forward in respect of peace and security questions, including early warning, is what the AU Commission refers to as the "cacophony" of overlapping regional structures. The EAC, which was recently acknowledged as the sixth pillar of the AU, is made up of COMESA and IGAD members Kenya and Uganda and SADC member Tanzania. The EAC makes no reference to the establishment of an early warning system. In West Africa the situation is somewhat easier. There, all

three members of the Mano River Union (MRU)²⁰ and all eight members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)²¹ are members of ECOWAS and, as such, they acknowledge the leadership of this organization in relation to questions concerning peace and security.

It is beyond the scope of this book to go into a detailed analysis of the cooperation between AU and all the subregional organizations on questions concerning peace and security. However, one field where the need for cooperation between the continental level (AU) and the subregional organizations has been specifically articulated from the beginning is that of early warning. And since the early warning system on the Horn of Africa is among the most accentuated ones, it is interesting to exemplify the cooperation between the continental and the subregional level by the example of the cooperation between the AU on CEWS and IGAD on CEWARN.

When compared with CEWS, CEWARN has progressed much further as it already has operations on the ground. Up until now the two mechanisms have developed independently, and the work of CEWS has moved more slowly than the work of CEWARN. Ideally, CEWARN shall serve as the channel through which the AU will collect information. "Regional Mechanisms are considered an integral part of the overall security architecture of the Union and the PSC is mandated with the task of harmonizing, coordinating and working closely with Regional Mechanisms" (ISS 2004, Paragraph 11, 5). Article 16 of the PSC protocol, in its whole, concerns the relationship between the AU and regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution. In Article 16.1a, we read that the chairperson of the AU Commission shall "harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union" (cf. AU 2002b). In Article 16.3, it says that "[...] Regional Mechanisms concerned shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, keep the Peace and Security Council fully and continuously informed of their activities and ensure that these activities are closely harmonized and coordinated with the activities of the Peace and Security Council" (ibid.). Moreover, the chairperson of the commission "shall take the necessary measures, where appropriate, to ensure the full involvement of Regional Mechanisms in the establishment and effective functioning of the Early Warning System and the African Standby Force" (ibid., Article 16.5). As we can see from these quotes, the AU has formulated a set of obligations vis-à-vis the subregional organizations concerning cooperation between the two levels. Obviously, such decisions by the AU cannot be binding on the subregional organizations as their various treaties are not legally integrated. At the outset, then, this will be a hindrance to increasing efficient cooperation between the two levels. Also, more

practically, it is obviously a problem that the continental system lags behind in relation to the subregional system. Even though CEWARN still only covers a limited number of local areas, the subregional mechanism is more developed than the continental one (Nitschke-Smith 2005, 25).

This is not the right framework for a detailed evaluation of CEWARN. Before continuing with the discussion of the relationship between CEWS and CEWARN, we will point only to some of the main prerequisites for the success of an early warning mechanism such as CEWARN and see whether what is considered to be the most important prerequisites are taken care of. For an early warning mechanism to be successful, it is, of course, necessary to match the indicators of the system's methodology with what is known to be the underlying causes of conflict in the region. In a region such as the Horn of Africa, the causes of conflict range from structural and political factors, to economic, social, and environmental factors, to cultural and perceptual factors. Moreover, many of the underlying problems are of a transnational character. Do the indicators of CEWARN's methodology match the main causes of conflict on the Horn of Africa? As for political and structural factors, these are not directly addressed by CEWARN. Still, CEWARN allows analysts to say something about the role the state plays with its policy in pastoral areas. Issues such as "harmful migration policy" and "harmful livestock policy" are analyzed. As for economic and social variables, the choice of indicators show that these issues are partly covered as CEWARN aims to look into, for example, cross-border trade, access to health care, and access to education. Also, environmental factors are given weight, as there are indicators on natural disasters and competition for land. Finally, CEWARN recognizes the potential for cultural and perceptual factors to trigger conflicts. Among the indicators related to these factors are intergroup marriage, interethnic group alliances, and religious communication.²² This very brief presentation of possible matches between the causes of conflict and methodological indicators does not, of course, cover the whole picture and does not rule out possible criticism of the system for not being extensive enough. In general, however, CEWARN can be said to cover a wide range of variables, and in this way, important prerequisites for eventual success are safeguarded. Knowing also that CEWARN seems to encompass many of the important transnational processes in the region, we have reason to believe that it has a sound and solid foundation. By looking into the activities of nomads, refugees, and pastoralists, the people behind the system have understood that group activities that cross borders have potential to trigger conflict on the Horn of Africa (*ibid.*, 80). Notwithstanding these obvious strengths of CEWARN, there are still potential hindrances related to capacity, decision-making procedures, financial resources, and administration. Last but not least, there is the relationship between scientific and political actors of the

system. The importance of knowledge production is emphasized by researchers studying regime effectiveness.²³ To a large extent the development of CEWARN has depended on cooperation with early warning experts. However, even though experts seem to be sitting at the CEWARN table, it is not clear whether they actually have any influence on the policymakers (*ibid.*, 87).

The cooperation between the continental and subregional early warning systems—CEWS and CEWARN—is perhaps the most problematic issue to analyze. For the AU to succeed with its early warning mechanism, it is essential that the cooperation between the continental and the subregional organization is smooth. So far, however, little progress has been made on linking CEWS with CEWARN. In many ways the two systems seem to exist in two different worlds. They have not yet established formal channels through which information shall be exchanged, and they have not agreed to a set of mutual variables to monitor. The capacity of the continental system will obviously be smaller if the cooperative link to CEWARN does not function.

One general problem is that after the creation of the AU, the new mandate, which made it possible for the union to interfere in the internal affairs of the member states, has created a lot of insecurity and tension in the various regions, including the Horn of Africa. A main concern for the AU is therefore that some countries in the region are not willing to give it the upper hand in dealing with, for instance, questions of early warning. It still remains to be seen whether the AU will be able to convince its member states to open up to external monitoring on all issues when this might result in warnings or other kinds of resources from the continental organizations. There is still no tradition for this on the African continent. Moreover, the fact that many African countries are not to be reckoned democratic will pose the AU difficulties in its efforts to establish an open continental warning system. The ruling elites of many African countries are engaged in activities that do not bear scrutiny.²⁴ Still, the AU has no time to wait for all the countries to become democratic. The organization has to work with the member states as they are today.

The subregional organizations are the very building blocks of the AU's security architecture. The RECs allow "the AU to build on the regions' comparative advantage, experience and—in the case of western, eastern and southern Africa—established frameworks and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution" (Powell 2005, 41). Therefore, the AU admits that the "need for harmonization and close cooperation between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms cannot be over-emphasized" (AU 2004c, Paragraph 27). The AU identifies lack of consistency as one of the main hindrances for this lack of cooperation and holds that decisions taken at the continental level should be upheld by the regional mechanisms (*ibid.*).

In the AU's communiqué from Addis Ababa in March 2005, we read that the AU member states had discussed a draft memorandum of understanding between the AU and the RECs in the area of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. "The participants underlined the fact that the draft MoU constitutes a viable basis for work and that necessary adjustments should be made to the document in order to make it more focused, and to ensure that it contributes efficiently to the overall coherence of the continental peace and security architecture" (AU 2005, Paragraph 8).

Summing up, we can say that there are still several hindrances to be overcome before the AU's CEWS finds its form and works as it is intended to. One hindrance is related to the fact that the AU might have identified wrong building blocks for cooperation with the various regions. Knowing that the AMU is largely dormant and that its policies are more oriented toward the Mediterranean than toward sub-Saharan Africa, it is hard to understand why the AU has picked this organization as a cooperative partner. Also, in relation to COMESA, it is hard to understand why the AU has chosen for security-political cooperation an organization that does not have any ambitions within peace and security issues at all.

Another difficulty with regard to AU's cooperation with the RECs is the high degree of overlap between the various RECs. As mentioned, the AU Commission itself refers to this situation caused by a lack of clear demarcation between these communities as the "cacophony" of regional structures. An obvious problem related to this myriad of structures is the shifting loyalties that the member states may experience.

"Clearly, the end of the cold war marked a watershed in African politics, just as it did for much of world affairs. It was celebrated for giving great impetus to liberalism and idealism in international politics. In Africa, it prompted the reappraisal of the hitherto sacrosanct principle of non-intervention in internal matters and the broadening of the individualistic, state-centric view of security to include human and collective security" (Touray 2005, 654). With this change of paradigm, the CADSP saw the light of day. As we have seen, the CADSP is a strategy based on a set of principles, objectives, and mechanisms established to reduce, and eventually eliminate, violent conflicts in Africa. The implementing organ of the CADSP, that is, the PSC, still has a way to go before it can function effectively. We have identified the main challenges of the PSC to be, first, the relationship between the AU and the RECs; second, the question of funding; third, the inadequate capacity at the level of the regions (although this varies a lot between the various regions); fourth, the diversity of military cultures and standards between the various regions; and finally, the uncertainty regarding the relationship between the AU and the UN.

United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa

In its first decades, the UN sponsored only one peacekeeping operation in Africa—in Congo in 1960–64. It was not until 1989 that the UN again sent military personnel to the continent, this time to Namibia. Then, in the 1990s, 17 operations were launched by the UN in Africa. The history of UN military intervention in Africa is rich in diversity and includes both successes (Namibia and Mozambique) and disastrous failures (Somalia). This chapter will offer an introduction to UN peacekeeping in Africa. Focus will be on the way the UN has changed in its general attitude to what is necessary to do in order to safeguard peace and security on the continent. The growth of the security-development nexus will be the central theme.

After a short introduction to the history of UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa, we will show how the organization has gradually adopted new ways of thinking and acting on African security.

The History of UN Peace Operations in Africa

While Western attention has been directed toward the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq in the past decade, Africa has emerged as the major arena for UN peace operations. Of the 18 peace operations currently managed by the UN, 8 are in Africa. Seventy-five percent of the approximately 100,000 military, police, and civilian UN peacekeepers currently deployed are in Africa. Looking at the UN peacekeeping budget, 77 percent of the \$5 billion budgeted for 2006–07 is for operations in Africa (Coning 2007, 1).¹ We will demonstrate how African experiences have been laboratories for testing out new peacekeeping concepts as well as catalysts for innovations related to UN's ways of thinking and tools for dealing with peace and security.

Table 6.1 UN peace operations in Africa

	<i>Name of mission</i>	<i>Start date</i>	<i>End date</i>
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo	July 1960	June 1964
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989	June 1991
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989	March 1990
MINURSO	Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	April 1991	present
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	June 1991	February 1995
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992	March 1993
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992	December 1994
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March 1993	March 1995
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993	September 1994
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993	September 1997
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October 1993	March 1996
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May 1994	June 1994
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	February 1995	June 1997
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission to Angola	June 1997	February 1999
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	July 1998	October 1999
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	October 1999	December 2005
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo	November 1999	present
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	July 2000	present
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	September 2003	present
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	present
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi	June 2004	December 2006
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan	March 2005	present
UNIOCIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	January 2006	present
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi	October 2006	present
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	July 2007	present
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	September 2007	present

We will also look at the reconceptualization of UN peacekeeping and how experiences of these operations have contributed to this reconceptualization. Thereafter, the emergence of a security-development nexus in the UN's thinking about peace and security and what changes this brought about in the UN's thinking about conflicts in Africa will be accounted for. Furthermore, the regionalization of peacekeeping and cooperation between the UN and African IGOs will be discussed. In the end, we will highlight aspects of three current peace operations in Africa, demonstrating the extended role of the UN in Sudan, Liberia, and the DRC and ask whether they entail just conceptual confusion or whether they in fact can be seen as recipes for successful peace consolidation on the continent.

UN peace operations have been the foremost conflict management and resolution mechanism in Africa. To date there have been 23 UN peace operations deployed in Africa since 1960 (see table 6.1).

The peacekeeping roles of the UN in Africa have varied. Norrie MacQueen (2006a, 180–233) demonstrates this diversity by classifying the different UN operations that have been completed in Africa according to the characteristics of the conflicts and the political environmental context in which these operations have been deployed. According to MacQueen, there have been operations responding to failed or collapsed states, aiming at restoring state capacity. Second, there have been operations responding to conflicts spurred by internal divisions and contested state legitimacy, where the state has come under challenge either from groups excluded from power within it or from the outside by other states or their clients. Third, the UN has assisted in conflicts spurred by decolonization and the transfer of power to postcolonial regimes. Last, the UN has deployed operations in order to oversee and implement peace agreements after territorial disputes between states. As MacQueen himself highlights, these are not watertight categories sealed off from one another (*ibid.*, 183). However, the categorization offers a tool for making sense of the enormous complexity of African conflicts and the peacekeeping response to them, and will here be adopted as a framework for offering an overview of the UN's tales of triumph and disaster on the African continent.

Peace operations in stateless terrain

The first operation deployed in Africa was in Congo in 1960–64. The operation deserves scrutiny because it posed some of the difficulties the UN was to counter in the 1990s in Somalia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC. In all those operations the UN found itself in a situation where no state or only a weak state existed.

The Congo operation (which took the acronym “ONUC,” from the French *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*) began in July 1960 and lasted until June 1964. Its scale dwarfed anything the UN had attempted hitherto. At its strongest, the ONUC force numbered 20,000; over the course of the operation, some 28 UN member countries contributed to the force (ibid., 80). However, the operation ended in failure. The Congolese state started to disintegrate during the second half of 1960, and war among the country’s about 250 separate ethnic groups proved unmanageable for the UN.² The ONUC force had been deployed under the mandate of traditional peacekeeping as provided for in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, the force gradually became embroiled in the civil war and was therefore authorized to use force against rebels in the Katanga province. The ONUC operation became a de facto, if not de jure, peace enforcement operation. The ONUC experience became a classic example of discrepancy between mandate and situation, and of the problems encountered when a peacekeeping operation is deployed in the absence of a peace to keep, a cease-fire to monitor, or a legitimate authority to grant consent to the operation (Bach and Hayes 1995, referred to in Francis 2006b).

This situation was similar to the one the UN experienced in Somalia. It reluctantly intervened in its first peace enforcement efforts since Congo, which was on the brink of collapse. In 1992, the operation, called United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) was deployed with a mandate to ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid (UNSC 1992, Paragraph 2). After the collapse of UNOSOM I and a short interlude when a United States–led intervention force was involved, UNOSOM II was deployed in May 1993. UNOSOM II ended in spectacular failure when the United States withdrew its forces in October 1993 after the killing of 18 U.S. Rangers in an unsuccessful attempt to capture one of the rebel warlords.³ Again, the difficulties in an operation in a stateless terrain were demonstrated. However, six months after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, the UN became involved in another operation where the state, as commonly understood, had “ceased” to function, namely, in Liberia.

Liberia was a quite different situation than Somalia, but was still intractable. A bloody civil war had erupted when in 1989 a group of rebels led by the Americo-Liberian Taylor crossed over the border from Cote d’Ivoire in order to overthrow Doe’s regime. By 1990 the state had effectively ceased to exist, and Doe had been murdered (MacQueen 2006, 220). For the first time ECOWAS established ECOMOG and sent troops to intervene in the conflict in 1990. This intervention was unsuccessful, and the UN was eventually brought in. In 1992 a peace agreement, known as the Cotonou agreement, was signed between the parties, and UNOMIL was deployed in 1993 to oversee its implementation in cooperation with

ECOMOG.⁴ This was the first UN peacekeeping experiment in Africa alongside a regional organization. The cooperation between UNOMIL and ECOMOG succeeded in stopping the killings, providing accesses for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and organizing and supervising democratic elections in 1997 that resulted in the victory of Charles Taylor. However, his regime was not a success. Despite continued ECOWAS and UN involvement in the peace-building process, nothing was done to bring about reconciliation between former warriors, and human rights abuses became the style of the Taylor regime (MacQueen 2006, 222). The UN withdrew from Liberia in 1997. The country soon relapsed into conflict, and the UN deployed a new operation in 2003. This operation will be discussed at the end of the chapter. In the words of MacQueen: “The lesson from 1997 for the UN was that premature withdrawal from the process, rather like the inadequate administration of antibiotics, could only create greater problems that demanded more far-reaching intervention in the future” (ibid., 224).

These three operations—in Congo, Somalia, and Liberia—alongside the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) from October 1999 to December 2005 and the current United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) deployed in November 1999 are examples of peace operations that have taken place in the context of the ultimate challenge Africa has posed to the international system: the disintegration of the state as a viable unit (ibid., 183). The achievements of UN operations under such circumstances have indeed been mixed, probably partly owing to a lack of understanding of the characteristics of the African state.

Dealing with contested state legitimacy in the postcolonial era

The UN’s experiences from dealing with the postcolonial crises of contested state legitimacy are also mixed. In Angola it failed to maintain the peace agreement between the rebel group UNITA and the central government from 1991 to 1995, while in Mozambique, from 1992 to 1994, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique succeeded in managing the process of reconciliation between the rebel group Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) and the central government.⁵

In Rwanda, too, the parties in the civil war—the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated rebel group the RPF—had arrived at an agreement, the 1993 Arusha settlement, that the UN was called to help implement. However, because of the West’s reluctance to commit itself, a weak UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) contingent

was forced to withdraw without being able to stop the genocide. Neither was the intervention that followed, the French-led *Opération Turquoise*, mandated by the Security Council as a Chapter VII operation, able to stop the killings. MacQueen puts the failure in Rwanda in the context of “peacekeeping overstretch” and the foreign policies of nations (*ibid.*, 204).⁶

In both the Central African Republic (CAR) and Côte d’Ivoire, the postcolonial crises took a different form than in Angola, Mozambique, and Rwanda. In CAR the UN took over for the French-led Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui (MISAB), which, in 1996, had been established to oversee the implementation of the “Bangui Accords.” The Bangui Accords provided a framework for a settlement between the government led by Ange-Félix Patassé and various groups that threatened to destabilize his regime because of discontent over the persisting political clientelism and the underlying culture of patrimonialism. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA, from the French name of the mission, *Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine*) was deployed in 1998 after France had decided to exit and wished to involve the UN. The UN succeeded in overseeing elections and, by its own account, contributed to “curbing threats to the country’s stability” (MINURCA 2001, Paragraph 4). Morris, however, argues that when MINURCA was replaced by the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the CAR in 2000, its achievements had been limited, and it left the CAR in a situation that was hardly closer to a final settlement to the conflict than the country had been when MISAB first had been deployed (MacQueen 2006, 208).⁷

As in CAR, the UN in Côte d’Ivoire took over from French and regional attempts at conflict resolution. When the UN reluctantly eventually offered a commitment to a peace operation in the country in February 2004, both France and ECOWAS had been trying, since September 2002, to restore peace in the civil war between factions loyal to the government of Laurent Gbagbo and various groups. The UN operation, UNOCI, was mandated to observe, monitor, and facilitate the implementation of a cease-fire agreement signed in 2003 and to liaise with government and rebel forces in order to establish stability. The operation is still going on.⁸

More than a decade after the genocide in Rwanda, the UN was again faced with the task of implementation of another agreement between Hutu and Tutsi factions—in Rwanda’s neighboring country, Burundi. Having determined that the situation in Burundi continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, in May 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Burundi—*Opération des Nations Unies au Burundi* (ONUB). ONUB was launched after the AU’s

African Mission in Burundi, deployed in 2000 to oversee the implementation of the Arusha agreement of August the same year, had had only limited success and had not managed to fully avoid sporadic eruptions of violence between the parties (ibid., 206). ONUB was closed down in 2006, after having had considerable success with the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) process in the country. It was followed by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi—Bureau intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (BINUB)⁹—which continues to function.

Successes and failures in dealing with decolonization

Just as the UN has assisted in postcolonial crises as shown above, so also has the organization been involved in managing decolonization processes. The Congo experience described above can also be seen in this context, in addition to the independence of Namibia from South African rule and the efforts to settle the status of Western Sahara by a referendum.

In Namibia, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was deployed with the specific mandate to assist in the Namibian transition to independence and in the implementation of the peace agreement between the liberation movement, the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), and South Africa. Deployed from 1989 to 1990, UNTAG was the first major peace support operation to be launched after the end of the Cold War. Despite resembling a traditional peacekeeping force, the UNTAG contingent, which comprised soldiers, civilians, police, and electoral observes, was also a multifunctional peace operation. UNTAG succeeded in monitoring the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, the disarmament of SWAPO forces, and the return of refugees. The Namibian model became a blueprint for UN multifunctional peacekeeping and peace support operations in Africa and other parts of the world (Francis 2006b, 104).¹⁰

In contrast, in Western Sahara, the dynamics of the conflict between the Moroccan government and the group Polisario (from the Portuguese Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro, or Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro) over disputed territories in the country was not configured to settlement the way that the conflict dynamics had been in Namibia (MacQueen 2006, 193). Morocco, which had had a long-standing historical claim to Western Sahara predating Spanish colonialism, was not resigned to seeing the territory become an independent state under the Polisario.

In 1975, Spain came to an agreement with Morocco and Mauritania, by which “independence” of Western Sahara in February 1976 would

be followed by the partition of the territory between its two neighbors, with the northern two-thirds going to Morocco and the southern third to Mauritania. Forces within Western Sahara confronted the Moroccan and Mauritanian force build-up and formed a government in exile and declared the formation of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. But Morocco claimed the whole territory in 1979 with the withdrawal of Mauritania.

A UN-brokered agreement stipulating that a referendum would be held in the territory to determine its future status was accepted by the parties—the Moroccan government and Polisario in 1988. However, the UN operations were not put in place by the Security Council until April 1991, when the Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO, from the French *Mission des Nations Unies pour l'organisation d'un référendum au Sahara Occidental*) was authorized. The scheduled date of the planned referendum, January 1992, proved too optimistic. Even now, no referendum has taken place, and the UN is still involved in the area.

Peacekeeping in Western Sahara has been largely successful as “peace-keeping.” There has been very little overt violence during the period of MINURSO’s deployment. MINURSO’s observation and interpositionary functions along the Algerian border have no doubt deterred confrontations between Moroccan and Polisario forces. But a settlement is still missing, and as a conflict resolution mechanism, MINURSO has not succeeded (*ibid.*, 193).¹¹

The exception: Interstate peacekeeping

As this chapter demonstrates, the rarity of interstate peacekeeping in Africa is striking. Only two interventions of the many peacekeeping ventures in Africa have been concerned with border disputes between sovereign states (MacQueen 2006, 183). These are between Chad and Libya over the Aouzou Strip and between Ethiopia and Eritrea over a patch of land in northern Ethiopia.¹²

Ownership of the Aouzou Strip—an area between Chad and Libya—was contested by the two countries from the beginning of 1973. The issue was submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration, and both Chad and Libya were confident of a finding in their favour. The ICJ determined that the Strip belonged to Chad and called for the withdrawal of Libyan troops and installations from the area. Libya reluctantly agreed to the withdrawal and the monitoring of this process by the UN. The United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group oversaw the successful withdrawal in a short mission in May and June 1994.

The UN's task in Ethiopia/Eritrea, however, was not so easily accomplished. In 1998, fighting between Eritrea and Ethiopia erupted over a 400-square-kilometer patch of land in northern Ethiopia. After a cease-fire in 2000, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was deployed to form a buffer in the security zone between the two countries. The UN presence in the first years provided a very effective and secure line of separation between the sides, and despite regular peaks in tensions, there have been no return to war on the border. However, there have been no moves toward a permanent settlement (*ibid.*, 186).

This overview shows the variety and complexity of UN involvement on the continent. "These peacekeeping experiments are notable for the impact they have had on the concept and practice of UN peacekeeping. Indeed, Africa has provided 'fertile ground' to experiment with some of the more controversial and challenging aspects of peacekeeping" (Francis 2006b, 102). We will now turn to discussing how these operations have contributed to a reconceptualization of UN peacekeeping, and look at how the emerging assertion that security and development are interlinked has affected the UN's way of thinking about peace and security in Africa, in addition to discussing the trend of the regionalization of peace operations.

Conceptual developments—generations of peacekeeping and the reconceptualization of the underlying principles of consent, impartiality, and minimal use of force

UN peacekeeping is an elusive concept that has undergone reconceptualization and changes since the first UN peacekeeping operations—in 1948 to oversee an Arab-Israeli and in 1949 to monitor an Indo-Pakistani cease-fire. Peacekeeping was neither mentioned nor envisioned in the UN Charter and had no clear legal standing as it occupied a middle ground between the provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes in Chapter VI of the Charter and provisions for enforcement mechanisms in Chapter VII. Dag Hammarskjöld, the former UN Secretary-General, described peacekeeping as nestled in a nonexistent "Chapter six-and-a-half" in the Charter (Sens 2004, 142).

Nevertheless, UN peacekeeping acquired a number of political and operational conventions that came to define what would later be called "traditional" or "first-generation" peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions were created under the authority of the UNSC or the UN General Assembly and were under the operational control of the Security Council and the UN Headquarters. Missions were deployed between states in support of a cease-fire or a peace settlement. Accordingly, peacekeeping operations were to be impartial and deployed with the consent of the host state or states.

Nonhostile and lightly armed only for self-defence, peacekeepers were not a coercive force.

Exceptions to these conventions existed (notably in the Congo, where the UN force became embroiled in the civil war). However, by the latter half of the Cold War, there was an implicit understanding of what UN peacekeeping entailed. Fundamentally, this type of peacekeeping was about maintaining peace between states, according to the principles of consent, impartiality, and minimal use of force, and with a firm commitment to the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity (*ibid.*).

The end of the Cold War brought about developments that challenged this conception. In response to increasing intrastate wars, humanitarian crises, human rights abuses, and the collapse of civil order in a number of states, UN operations became both more numerous and more complex, involving a wide set of political, military, and humanitarian tasks. While traditional peacekeeping missions still would be established, these new operations were fundamentally different in both nature and scope. Freed from the political divisions of the Cold War, the Security Council repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, which enabled the UN to intervene in intrastate conflicts and in “failed” or “collapsed” states under the rubric of responding to threats to international peace and security (or sanctioned coalitions or regional organizations to do so). As a result, UN peacekeeping missions were deployed within (rather than between) states into environments where host state consent was partial or absent and there was either no peace to keep or cease-fires were sporadic and of short duration. UN peacekeeping operation thus did not deploy into postconflict situations, but rather attempted to create them (Francis et al. 2005, 15).

Thus, while peacekeepers’ goals before had been to serve as a buffer between opposing armed forces, these now extended to the more complex task of addressing directly conflicts’ underlying causes, which included peace making, preventive diplomacy, and peace building.¹³ The second-generation operations allowed for a much broader operational scope, including peace enforcement.

It soon, however, became clear that the post-Cold War enthusiasm for peacekeeping and for the doctrinal innovations of “second-generation” peacekeeping would be short lived, as many missions ran into severe difficulties. The failures, from among others, Rwanda and Somalia, as described above, spurred debate and recommendations on how the UN could improve its peacekeeping capacities. “The Report of the Panel on UN Operations,” also known as the Brahimi Report of 2000, attempted to formalize and systematize the reform process to improve the UN’s capacity

to undertake second-generation peacekeeping operations. The report emphasized the importance of a “robust force posture and a sound peacebuilding strategy” as key conditions for success in future operations (UN 2000a, Part 1, Paragraph 4). The report included a new classification of UN peace operations that entailed three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peace keeping, and peacebuilding. The panel also proposed several administrative and operational improvements. But in regard to the peacekeeping doctrine and strategy, the report concluded that “the Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping” (*ibid.*, paragraphs 48–64).

However, as Coning argues, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice differ from the Cold War conception:

Consent still implies that the parties to the conflict must invite the UN presence and agree on its role, but it is now recognized that strategic consent at the level of the leadership of the parties to the conflict does not necessarily translate into operational and tactical consent on all levels in the field. Impartiality still implies that UN peace operations will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict. It does not imply, however, that the UN will stand-by while civilians are in imminent threat of danger (if the mission has a civilian protection mandate), nor that it will not record and report (for instance to the International Criminal Court) human right abuses that may have or are still taking place, including by the parties to the conflict. Minimum use of force still implies that UN peace operations will use the minimum use of force necessary to protect itself, but it is now understood that UN peace operations should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including to those it has been mandated to protect.

(Coning 2007, 7–8)

The operations of the UN in Africa have contributed to reconceptualization as to what variables make peace building and peacekeeping particularly challenging. The Brahimi Report highlighted a need for change and better ability to conduct peace operations. This need was spurred by the “recent events in Sierra Leone and by the daunting prospect of extended United Nations operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (UN 2000a, Paragraph 4). According to the report, the risks and costs of operations that must function in transnational environments—as have been the more common in African conflicts in our days—are much greater than those of traditional peacekeeping. Because of this, complex and risky mandates have been the rule rather than the exception since the end of the Cold War (*ibid.*, Paragraph 19). These could be mandates to protect civilian

victims of conflict and mandates to control heavy weapons, and in “two extreme situations, United Nations Operations were given executive law enforcement and administrative authority where local authority did not exist or was not able to function” (ibid.). Missions with such mandates have been particularly hard to accomplish, so much that they have had to work in situations where conflict was still existent. In other words, these kinds of UN operations have not deployed *into* postconflict situations. They have been deployed to *create* such situations. “That is, they work to divert the unfinished conflict, and the personal, political or other agendas that drove it, from the military to the political arena, and to make that diversion permanent” (ibid., Paragraph 20). What are the main variables that make UN operations of these kinds particularly challenging?

First, there are the so-called spoilers, that is, “groups (including signatories) who renege on their commitments or otherwise seek to undermine a peace accord by violence” (ibid., Paragraph 21). Groups and individuals obviously sign peace accords for a variety of reasons, some of which are not favorable to peace. According to the Brahimi Report, spoilers threw Angola, Sierra Leone, and Somalia back into war, and spoilers also orchestrated the murder of 800,000 Rwandese in 1994. To be successful the UN must be open minded as to the possibilities of signatories with other motives than peace and development.

Second, and related to the first point, is the availability of alternative sources of income to the parties in the conflict. The incentives to spoil peace accords are significantly greater when there are alternative sources of income that pay soldiers, buy guns, and enrich faction leaders. These alternative sources may even have been the motive for war at the outset. “[W]here such income streams from the export of illicit narcotics, gemstones or other high-value commodities cannot be pinched off, peace is unsustainable” (ibid., Paragraph 22).

Third, neighboring states can effectively spoil a peace accord if they allow free passage to conflict-supporting groups or individuals, if they provide bases for fighters, or if they serve as financial or political middlemen in the conflict. It is probable that this phenomenon will be significantly reduced if the peace accord is supported by major regional powers or great powers. The necessity of backing from such powers should therefore be kept in mind by the UN.

Fourth, the sources of the conflict will affect the difficulty of peace implementation. The sources can be related to economic issues, political issues, or environmental issues. Some of these issues (such as economics and politics) are probably more open and subject to compromise than others (such as resource needs, ethnicity, or religion).

Fifth, difficulties with peace implementation are related to the number of parties included in the conflict and the degree to which the goals of these parties diverge. The DRC conflict is an example of a conflict with a high number of parties who have also strongly divergent aims.

Finally, the brutality of the conflict, or the degree of suffering, will affect the difficulty of reconciliation. If the level of casualties is high, the number of displaced persons large, and the damage to infrastructure extensive, the reconciliation will probably be more difficult. The conflicts in the DRC, Liberia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone are all examples of such conflicts.

The worst-case scenario, then, for the probability of a successful peace implementation is a situation with “three or more parties, of varying commitment to peace, with divergent aims, with independent sources of income and arms, and with neighbours who are willing to buy, sell and transit illicit goods” (ibid., Paragraph 25). The insight in relation to all these points is based on earlier experiences with UN operations in Africa. The experiences from African operations, therefore, were imperative for the reconceptualization within the UN with regard to peace building and peacekeeping.

The Growth of the Security-Development Nexus and the Focus on Peace Building

The reconceptualization of the underlying principles of peacekeeping—consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force—has coincided with another reconceptualization, namely, that of security itself. In the early 1990s, a security paradigm away from the state-centric security thinking of the Cold War started to emerge. A wide consensus emerged that the security thinking of the Cold War had become insufficient for coping with the new security landscape. This development was clearly seen within the UN. In 1994 the UNDP Development Report stated that “[t]he concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression [. . .] For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs?” (UNDP 1994, 22). The same report launched the concept of “human security,” which entailed individuals’ right to, *inter alia*, economic and social well-being.

Prevalent in the concept of “human security,” and in the new security thinking, in general, was the emerging consensus that security and development were interlinked and that a sufficient level of development, in particular, affects a society’s ability to cope with and prevent tensions that may erupt into open conflict. “[W]hile underdevelopment may not directly cause violent conflict, poor social, economic and environmental

conditions as well as weak or ineffective political institutions certainly diminish a society's capacity to manage social tensions in a non-violent manner" (UNDP 1994, cited in Neethling 2005b, 38).

This thinking was also clearly visible in the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's reform paper "An Agenda for Peace" of 1992 and his follow-up report "A Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" three years later. The changed security context is emphasized in the former report, the objective of which was to introduce tools to "address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression" (UNSG 1992, Paragraph 15). In the latter, the secretary-general expressed with satisfaction that his "Agenda for Peace," together with the then ongoing work "An Agenda for Development," had "served to advance international consensus on the crucial importance of economic and social developments as the most secure basis for lasting peace" (UNSG 1995, Paragraph 3). He also emphasized "the dramatic changes in both the volume and the nature of the United Nations activities in the field of peace and security" and stated that "new and more comprehensive concepts to these activities, and their link with development work, are emerging" (*ibid.*, Paragraph 4).

The concept of peace building is the utmost important UN tool related to this linkage (Thakur 2006, 75; Neethling 2005b). According to the secretary-general, peace building consisted of "sustainable, co-operative work to deal with the underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems [. . .]" (Neethling 2005b, 40).¹⁴ It was intended to "identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (UNSG 1992, Paragraph 21).¹⁵

While the concept of peace building has come to include measures to secure good governance and DDR processes, it has also brought development policy into the realm of security. During the Cold War, a security conception that presented a paradigm that defined development assistance as external to security dominated. "Development policy" was only indirectly tied to the issues of security in the form of guaranteeing political support or preserving the spheres of influence of the great powers. Importantly, the policy tools of development were never employed specifically to reduce the potential for violent conflict (Neethling 2005b, 39). Through the concept of peace building, this has changed.

One visible expression of this change is the renewed role for development agencies in peace building operations. Many development-related agencies in the UN system established or designed focal points for peace building in order to facilitate communication, consultation, and coordination. For example, in 1994, the UNDP established an Emergency Response Division tasked with developing and coordinating the UNDP's role in peace building activities (Sens 2004, 145).

The concept of peace building has been criticized for a lack clarity and specificity. As a rule, peace-building operations are characterized by their complexity, and coordination between the different involved agencies and actors has often been a problem. Since the concept was launched, the UN has striven to improve its peace-building strategies. The commitment to the underlying paradigm of security and development has been firm, and when the Security Council in 2005 launched the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the recognition that “development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing” was repeated (cf. UNSC 2005). The commission was established as a tool for better coordination and should function “across the full range of political-security-humanitarian-development activities” (UNSG 2005, 2). Alongside with the growth of the security-development nexus in the UN’s way of thinking, the organization’s attention to and focus on the most underdeveloped continent, namely, Africa, changed. In 1998 the secretary-general and the Security Council recognized that Africa was a region with special needs and that it needs special attention. Till then, both the UN and the international community in general had been unable to create good conditions for sustainable development and unable to deal with the basic causes of conflict (UNSG 1998, Paragraph 5). Moreover, being the least developed continent, the critical nexus between security and development was in particular relevant for Africa. The 1998 report of the secretary-general—“The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa” (cf. UNSG 1998)—makes a firm effort to analyze the sources of conflict on the continent, which, in the words of the secretary-general, had been neglected so far by both the international community and the UN. Furthermore, the report recommends ambitious measures to prevent conflicts, eradicate poverty, and promote development (*ibid.*).

However, Africa has also had to struggle to get the Security Council’s attention. While the Kosovo crisis in 1999 was on everyone’s lips, the situation in the DRC deteriorated without any concrete action. Since then there have been numerous debates in the Security Council and expressions of concern over the situation, but little by way of concrete action has been generated (Boulden 2003, 27).

In the post-9/11 environment, this has started to change. In comparison with the weak and small UN missions of the late 1990s, the complex peace operations of the UN today represent a significant shift in the political will of the international community to invest in peace operations in Africa and to use the UN as the vehicle of choice for these type of interventions (Coning 2007, 1). This is not, however, only due to the security-development nexus gaining resonance among Western policymakers. Rather, this willingness has been generated, and will probably be sustained, by the post-9/11 belief that

failed states are ideal training, staging, and breeding ground for international terrorists (ibid.).¹⁶

However, these post-9/11 changing imperatives for focus on Africa have caused concerns about their implication for achieving sustainable peace. In a 2005 report from the UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), highlighting challenges and opportunities for peace consolidation in Africa, we read that the emphasis on the stabilization of failed states may undermine peace consolidation because it is “externally driven and do not address the root causes of conflict” (OSAA 2005, 3). It warns that “the desire for stability as a bulwark against terrorism and transnational crime ought not defeat or stifle the pursuit of lasting peace in Africa” (ibid., 7). Whether the focus on underlying causes of Africa’s conflicts is put aside for a quest for Western-friendly rulers in strong, stable states remains to be seen. It is evident, however, that Africa’s complex conflicts cannot be solved through “quick fixes.” An approach including developmental issues is crucial for lasting peace.

Regionalization of peace operations—regional codeployment

From its inception in 1945, the UN anticipated the involvement of regional/subregional organizations and arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter acknowledges the importance of such groupings and urge members to seek pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council. In his “Agenda for Peace,” Boutros-Ghali acknowledged the need for cooperation with regional/subregional organizations and arrangements, and said that “regional actions as a matter of decentralization, delegation and co-operation with United Nations efforts could [. . .] lighten the burden of the Council” and, most importantly, “contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs” (UNSG 1992, Paragraph 64). In his “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,” Boutros-Ghali outlined the forms that cooperation between the UN and regional organizations should take. These included consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, codeployment, and joint operations (UNSG 1995, Paragraph 86).

In his report of 1998, the then secretary-general, Kofi Annan, maintained the view expressed by Boutros-Ghali in “Agenda for Peace” and emphasized that “providing support for regional and subregional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the United States lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa” (UNSG 1998, Paragraph 41).

This cry for development of regional capacity and African solutions to African problems grew out of the acknowledgement that the most frequent approach where military enforcement tasks were concerned, that is, to confer mandates upon those states willing to form a "coalition of the willing," had its severe shortcomings.¹⁷ In the cases of Kuwait in 1991 and Haiti in 1993, this approach proved successful. However, this was not the case in Somalia and Rwanda during the early 1990s. "The willing" were so limited. "It was only due to the willingness of France to lead the Operation *Turquoise* in Rwanda, and the UN to spearhead the UNTAF [United Task Force in Somalia] operation in Somalia, that any response was possible in these situations" (Wilson 2003, 92). According to Wilson, "[i]t is relevant to ask whether regional organizations may be capable of playing a greater role in UN sanctioned military operations than they have to date, and whether there may be advantages to using them, as opposed to 'coalitions of the willing'" (ibid., 90). The reliance on the use of coalitions of the willing has also given rise to significant problems. One of them is what seems to be the necessity of the participation of a major power. In the cases of Kuwait, Haiti, and Korea, the dominant role of the United States was crucial for the success of the action. Another, and probably even more serious, problem is that there is no guarantee that the resources available will cover what is required for effective action. As only those who are willing are contributing, the Security Council has no real control over the resources for the various operations. Rwanda in 1994 is the classic illustration of this problem. As the crisis in Rwanda escalated, the UNSC decided to authorize a peacekeeping operation for the country. However, sufficient offers of forces by member states were not forthcoming. Such lack of willingness to contribute with forces is often grounded in a perceived lack of seriousness or closeness to potential contributors. In the cases of Somalia and Rwanda, it is apparent that states' perceived national interests were not sufficient for them to be willing to contribute militarily. In contrast to these cases, key U.S. interests were at state in the cases of, for instance, Korea and Haiti. Therefore, the success of actions by coalitions of the willing seems to be closely related to whether or not a major power is willing to undertake appropriate action as a result of a perceived threat to national interests (ibid., 94). Related to this is the problem that a perceived threat to national interests may be counter-productive to a state's ability to act in an objective manner in operations of this kind. That is, their motives for engaging in the operation are not as altruistic as they ought to be in a UN connection. France, for instance, had close relationships to one of the parties in the crisis in Rwanda and was therefore probably not the ideal leader of Operation *Turquoise*.

With these problems in mind, we now turn to the regional solution. Is the use of regional arrangements a better alternative? Article 53 of the UN

Charter states that “[t]he Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority” (cf. UN 1945). The specific details of this option, however, are not clear. For instance, the Charter gives no guidance as to what is “appropriate,” and no precise definition of regional arrangements or agencies is provided. It is therefore up to the Security Council itself to decide on the appropriateness as well as on the specific details related to a regionally based military action. This leaves the council as well as the regional grouping with a certain flexibility that can be valuable for the possible success of an enforced action.

Is the regional military enforcement action able to remedy some of the problems that arise in relation to ad hoc multinational operations? Ideally, the institutional aspects of regional arrangements would also include military infrastructure and thereby make them more effective military actors than coalitions of the willing. In reality, however, most regional arrangements do not possess military capabilities beyond the ones of the single member states. The military structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are exceptional. No other regional organization today has the same source of well-trained, adequately armed, and logistically equipped troops as does NATO. This means that the operational problems related to ad hoc multinational coalitions are just as possible in relation to military actions undertaken by regional groupings.

A major reason why regional arrangements have been considered suitable for military enforcement action is their geographical closeness to the conflicts in which they are supposed to intervene. As of today, however, NATO is the only regional organization to have led enforcement operations pursuant to express Security Council authorization. It was only *ex facto* that the Security Council commended ECOMOG for its actions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Wilson 2003, 97). Notwithstanding this belated recognition, ECOMOG’s willingness to take action suggests that ECOWAS may be an organization that can be called upon by the UN for later enforcement operations. However, in the same way as for coalitions of the willing, regional operations are to a large degree dependent on the presence of a major power, as the importance of Nigeria, the hegemon of West Africa, in most ECOMOG actions illustrates.

Other intergovernmental African organizations, including the OAU, have never undertaken a military enforcement action on behalf of the UN. Whether this will change with the development of the security-political aspects of the AU remains to be seen.¹⁸

As for the neutrality of the actors and their true motives for contributing to a regional peacekeeping mission, this question is no less relevant to

regional arrangements than to coalitions of the willing. Take, for instance, Nigeria's dominant role in ECOMOG's intervention in the first Liberian civil war. Few people doubt that Nigeria's president had strong personal interests in the outcome of the operation. Nigeria could therefore not be regarded an impartial actor within the conflict. Thus, there is a danger that regional groupings will conduct operations in a manner that conflicts with the collective ideals of the United Nations, and thereby undermine the authority of the global organization in the long run.¹⁹

The various (sub)regional organizations in Africa are now in the process of developing stronger focus on security-political issues than before. Most of them still have a long way to go and so has their possible interaction with the UNSC in the case of conflicts within their respective region. Therefore, we are still in lack of empirical material for a proper analysis of the relationship between the UNSC and African IGOs in military enforcement actions. Notwithstanding this lack of material, we do not risk much by saying that the (sub)regional organizations in their peace-building efforts need to take the same precautions as do the coalitions of the willing.

Current Complex Peace Operations in Africa

Africa is currently a huge recipient of, and contributor to, UN peace operations. The UN is currently deployed in Burundi (BINUB) since 2007, Sierra Leone (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone) since 2006, Sudan (United Nations Mission in the Sudan) since 2005, Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) since 2004, Liberia (UNMIL) since 2003, Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE) since 2000, DRC (MONUC) since 1999, and Western Sahara (Misión de las Naciones Unidas para el Referéndum del Sáhara Occidental) since 1991.

The various UN operations have contributed to a reconceptualization of UN peacekeeping. In what is usually referred to as "first-generation" peacekeeping, operations were impartial and were deployed with the consent of the host state or states. Peacekeepers were nonhostile and lightly armed only for self-defence. There was a firm commitment to the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The end of the Cold War brought about developments that changed this conception. UN operations now became more numerous and more complex and were now mostly responses to intrastate wars, humanitarian crises, and human rights abuses. However, these "second-generation" peacekeeping missions soon ran into severe difficulties. The principles of consent and impartiality had a renaissance, but with a different interpretation and application from what had been the case during the Cold War. Impartiality, for instance, did still mean that the UN would not take sides in a conflict.

It did not mean, however, that the UN would stand by while civilians are in imminent threat of danger.

In the early 1990s, a new security paradigm away from the state-centric security thinking started to emerge—the notion of human security. Prevalent in this concept was the emerging consensus that security and development were interlinked. The concept of peace building became a tool of an utmost importance for the UN in relation to this linkage. This concept has come to include measures to secure good governance and so-called DDR processes and has also brought development policy into the realm of security.

Today there is a general agreement that there are certain pillars of post-conflict reconstruction that need to be obtained in order to safeguard long-lasting peace:

- 1) Security, including all aspects of public safety;
- 2) Justice and reconciliation, that is, dealing with past abuses through formal and informal mechanisms in order to resolve grievances that have arisen from conflict and to create an impartial system for the future;
- 3) Social and economic well-being, that is, safeguarding fundamental social and economic needs;
- 4) Governance and participation, including the creation of legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes.

(Sørum 2004, 3)

Achievements in all fields are necessary in order to prevent the remobilization of ex-combatants and to curb the demand for weapons (*ibid.*). This means that the role of the UN in peace operations is much more complex than used to be the case. There are tasks expected to be undertaken by UN peace-building operations today that were not part of UN peace and security activities before. That is, for instance, assistance in relation to elections and good governance, and assistance in the development of sound economic structures. The question is whether the UN is successful in these “new” efforts.

Among the current UN operations are the ones in the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire. Long considered a haven of peace and prosperity, Côte d’Ivoire was victim, on September 19, 2002, of an attempted coup d’état. This sent the country into a war whose consequences have threatened the stability of the whole region. In February 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1479 establishing UNOCI. A cease-fire line watched over by multinational forces under UN mandate now marks the geographical

division of the country. In November 2004 the national armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire attacked the French *Licorne* forces that were also present in the country. The Security Council condemned these attacks and confirmed that French forces and UNOCI were authorised to use all necessary means to carry out their mandate. The politics is primarily divided into two opposed camps: on the one hand is a rebellion occupying the north of the country, seconded by the major opposition parties, grouped together since 2003 under a loose coalition, and on the other, the Gbagbo regime, a badly organized group of youth organizations and militias, largely controlled by power holders at the presidency and in Laurent Gbagbo's party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007, 81). Theoretically, the two camps are working together under a reconciliation government put in place after peace talks in Linas-Marcoussis in France and in Accra, but in reality they confront one another in a zero-sum game (ibid., 81–82). On March 4, 2007, President Gbagbo and the rebel leader Soro signed the Ouagadougou peace agreement under the aegis of President Compaoré of Burkina Faso. This pact set a new timeline for organizing elections and reuniting the country. On July 16, 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1765, which renewed the UNOCI mandate until January 15, 2008, to support elections and to fully implement the Ouagadougou agreement (IRIN, 2007).

Despite the UN peacekeeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire as well as in Liberia, "we observe the extension of the "system of conflicts" crystallized around the Liberian war of 1989 . . ." (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007, 96).

In the DRC, one of the problems of the peace builders is the provinces in eastern part of the country. According to Tull, it was only in 2003 that MONUC belatedly recognized that the provinces in eastern Congo represented the key to a peaceful peace process in the country. And even if they recognized this fact, nothing concrete was done to address the local conflicts. The UN solution was only the deployment of additional peacekeepers to the north and south Kivu (Tull 2007, 130). "Kivu's local conflicts were not at the root of the second Congo war, but the rebel alliance buttressed societal divisions along ethnic lines. [. . .] Unfortunately, international interveners and mediators (e.g. the United Nations and its mission, MONUC) seeking to resolve the DRC war neglect this local dimension, thereby effectively undermining their attempts to build peace on the national and regional level" (ibid., 124). Another problem with relation to peace in the DRC is violations of embargos. "Rwanda stands accused of having recurrently violated the arms embargo that the United Nations Security Council imposed on eastern Congo in 2003 by providing weapons to the RCD [Rally for Congolese Democracy] renegade commanders who

briefly captured the capital of South Kivu (Bukavu) in May 2004. [. . .] All of this suggests that Rwanda has little intention of relinquishing its at least indirect political control over Kivu, particularly its northern part. Tending to regard the province as its backyard, Kigali does not hesitate to use its security concerns as a convenient cover for its continued resource exploitation" (ibid., 127).

These are only a few of a considerable number of frustrations related to UN peace building and peacekeeping in Africa. The various operations have functioned according to different working models. Is it the contents of the models that are misleading or is the limited success of present UN operations a result of confusion regarding one or more of the pillars mentioned above, lack of coordination between them, or maybe shady economic motives undermining official peace processes? In more extensive analysis of the UN's peace operations in Africa today, these are questions that would have to be answered.

Why What They Say Is Not What They Do: Economic Aspects of War and the Privatization of Security in Africa

Economic Aspects of African wars

Notwithstanding all genuine efforts to create peace on the African continent—like we have seen in chapters 4 through 6—African countries are still where most violent conflicts take place today. Too many attempts at resolving conflicts in Africa have failed. One reason for this is probably the economic opportunities many actors see in violent conflicts. In wars they have possibilities that they would never have in peace. Among such economic opportunists are those that have not been properly identified by peace-seeking actors, such as the subregional organizations, the AU, and the UN. One fundamental cause of the repeated failures of these organizations is probably that their identification of actors is insufficient, both in relation to who they are and in relation to their particular interests in a possible prolongation of war. The notion of “political will” has often been used to draw attention to the role of the political elites and their lack of genuine efforts to end a violent conflict. Mwesiga Baregu argues that the “logic of interest” rather than “political will” ultimately determines the fate of any peace initiative (2002, 29). “Imperialists, plunders, warlords, gunrunners, drug barons, and such other predatory actors, in particular, tend to thrive in chaos in a relatively anarchic environment” (*ibid.*, 11). And it is the economic interests of this kind of actors that are among the main

driving forces in the continuance of African civil wars. Their fiscal resources are diamonds, gold, coltan, copper, cobalt, timber, and wildlife reserves. The empirical evidence for this argument is extensive. It is well established, for instance, that in April 1997, the U.S.-based mining company, American Mineral Field, provided money for Kabila's military campaign in return for future diamond-mining rights and exploration rights for cobalt, zinc, and copper (*ibid.*, 12).¹ The situation in Congo during the Laurent and Joseph Kabila regimes has been characterized by an intensification of competing and predatory economic interests revolving around the exploitation of the resources of the country by a whole range of economic agents. In order to protect, defend, and prolong their interests, some of these actors have fueled the war and obstructed the peace process in the DRC (*ibid.*).

The final report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC (UNSC 2002a) found that even after the withdrawal of the armed forces of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zimbabwe, the elite networks that had emerged and specialized in exploiting the DRC's resources would not pull back voluntarily because they had built up a self-financing war economy centered on mineral exploitation (UNSC 2002a, 14–22). This suggests that although many actors or parties may be genuinely interested in promoting peace, they may well be hindered by the interests of other actors. The assumption that every party in a conflict has a vested interest in peace building and the resulting preoccupation with negotiating peace agreements is, therefore, mistaken. Major actors have a vested interest in other resources such as mineral wealth, and for this sake they often work to prolong a conflict if that is for their benefit.

An important conceptual issue in relation to conflict transformation and peace building is the definition of stakeholders in conflicts. Some of the stakeholders are easy to recognize as they are immediately and visibly involved in the conflict. Others are hard to identify as they operate in a shady environment and are not visibly involved in the conflict. Nevertheless, this second kind of actors is often just as important for the dynamics of a conflict as the first kind. Therefore, we must not make the mistake of counting only the openly involved political parties, for instance, as actors in African conflicts.

If less visible but often quite powerful actors with interests in the conflicts are left out of the negotiations, then this might easily affect both the process itself and also the outcomes of the process. Moreover, some actors may present themselves as impartial mediators in a peace process while they, in fact, are involved and acting in defense or pursuit of a particular interest.

Another conceptual issue related to conflict transformation and peace building is the question of the scope of the conflicts. Traditionally, and in close relation to the concept of Westphalian states, conflicts are narrowly defined by territorial boundaries. However, as we also recall from Chapter 3 of this volume, most African conflicts today transcend and/or defy international borders.² It is rare that a conflict is restricted to particular areas of national territory, and even if it is, it usually has some kind of spillover effects for neighboring countries. Explicit linkages and interactions, either overt or covert, between actors in conflict have led to the introduction of such concepts as security complexes and systems of war (see also Chapter 3). The most visible examples are interactions between warlords, drug barons, gunrunners, and money launderers.

At the bottom of all this lies the fact that conflict formations are always defined by actor interests, whether these are based on geography, politics, economy, ethnicity, or other factors. And as such interests may be fluid, so may be conflict formations.

The failure of many peace initiatives in relation to African conflicts may well be due to the fact that important actor interests have not been taken seriously, particularly if these interests have been related to rather covert (but nevertheless known) economic interests. Moreover, many of actors of this kind are not to be found solely in the countries of conflict, and they may very well not be committed to peace making. On the contrary, they may be what Baregu refers to as peace *spoilers* (2002, 23–28).³

In the ongoing debates on causes of war in Africa, it is important to distinguish between root causes, driving forces, exacerbating factors, and trigger events. Quite often, the interests of the various kinds of actors described above are interests that serve to exacerbate a conflict rather than being the root cause of one. This is in line with what Paul Collier (2000a) argues in his “greed vs. grief” thesis: he contends that it is not so much the articulated grievances such as inequality that propel a conflict in Africa. Rather, it is the economic opportunities created throughout the conflicts that drive and prolong them. Several UN reports of this decade have revealed a complex web of interactions between warlords and various kinds of plunderers, smugglers, and dealers.⁴ The war in the DRC is perhaps the most used example to illustrate such interactions, but in Angola also we have numerous examples of close relationships between diamond dealers and the rebel group leader Jonas Savimbi on the one hand and oil dealers and the governmental elite on the other.⁵

It has been debated whether the real reason for neighboring countries’ invasion of the DRC was the security concerns or the riches of the country. Whatever the answer to this question, it is clear that the riches of the country have served to prolong the war and that there have been parties

other than the various regimes and the numerous opposition groups that have taken advantage of the prolongation. These other parties include private military and security companies, drug dealers, arms merchants, and money launderers. They all most likely work to subvert peace. Recognizing that such actors are often determinative in conflicts dynamics should mean that we also take them into consideration in processes of peace. Much too often the tendency has been to treat them as peripheral actors.⁶

The following are of the most important actors of this kind:

- 1) Robber barons—individuals, companies, and states involved in plunder and pillage. They prefer to operate under conditions of relative anarchy, with little or no government control over licensing or taxation. In the DRC they are the central actors in an international network plundering resources, financing the war, and hindering the peace process.
- 2) Drug barons—individuals or companies involved in drug trafficking networks. Usually they collaborate closely with arm dealers, mercenaries, private military/security companies, warlords, and money launderers, and they thrive under conditions of relative anarchy.
- 3) Gunrunners—individuals or companies involved in the procurement and supply of arms and ammunition either legally or illegally. They usually collaborate with drug barons, mercenaries, private military/security companies, warlords, and weak states. In general, gunrunners play a pivotal role in prolonging violent conflicts in Africa.
- 4) Mercenaries—individuals or companies of professional soldiers hired to take part in hostilities. These actors are also referred to as soldiers of fortune. They work closely with weak states, private military/security companies, plunderers, and warlords. They have operated on almost all sites of large-scale violent conflicts on the continent. They are usually invited to participate in a violent conflict as a result of state fragility and political instability.
- 5) Private military/security companies—companies providing a range of military and security services in conflict situations. The major clients of such companies are weak states, globalizers (gigantic multinational companies with huge financial resources continuously searching for resources and markets), plunderers, imperialists, and drug barons. They are often called upon to protect actors of large-scale criminality.
- 6) War lords—individuals or bands of rebels who organize and lead armed opposition. They operate either as bandits or as conventional forces. Most African conflict zones feature two kinds of

warlords—those in power and those out of power. Both kinds work closely with plunderers, drug barons, arms dealers, mercenaries, and private military/security companies.

- 7) Weak states—states that do not have sufficient capacity to exercise authority, including capacity to administer government, defend state sovereignty, and provide social services. Weak states are usually highly penetrated by foreign interests and are therefore unable to take independent decisions regarding most kinds of governmental issue areas, including peace building. They are easy prey for the activities of imperialists, warlords, drug barons, plunderers, private military/security companies, and so on.
- 8) Money launderers—network of banks and other companies involved in activities intended to “clean” “dirty” money obtained from criminal activities. They usually work in close collaboration with arms dealers, drug barons, plunderers, and mercenaries.

In addition to these actors, whom I consider to be the most important economically induced actors in the prolongation of violent conflicts in Africa, there are also a number of other actors, most of whom are involved in activities related to development aid of some kind (including peace building). These are actors that are not so obvious peace spoilers, but who nevertheless find some kind of interest in the prolongation of war. We can refer to them as peace opportunists, promoting peace as easily as spoiling it, according to what serves them best. Among them are

- Blue Berets, that is, soldiers of the United Nations;
- a number of international humanitarian organizations that respond to natural and man-made disasters, including the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UNHCR, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies;
- “lords of poverty,” that is, self-serving individuals and organizations that have thrived on poverty through aid and donor organizations;
- money bags—international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and international commercial banks, all interested in fast and free movement of capital into areas where profit can easily be made;
- globalizers—gigantic multinational companies, as described above, whose opportunities are often enhanced in weak states.

All these actors are linked together in complex networks stretching not only throughout countries but also throughout regions and sometimes throughout the globe. They all play important roles to keep the network

intact, and we should be careful not to claim that some of them are more important than others. For our purpose here, however, I would like to draw particular attention to the role of the warlords.

Originally introduced by Reno (1999), the notion of warlords has become a major concept in the analysis of the mixture of power politics and economic fortune in violent conflicts in Africa (see Introduction in Reno 1999). There are at least two kinds of warlords—the ones in political power and the ones struggling to attain political power. The ones struggling to attain power may be defined as “individuals or bands of rebels or dissidents who organize and lead armed groups operating either as guerrillas or conventional forces carving out pieces of territory in a country which they control and exploit by military force either with the intention to secede or as a base to capture the whole country. They may impose or earn legitimacy in the areas they control but more often they rule by force” (Baregu 2002, 34). The other group of warlords may be defined as “the highest leaders in a regime which, having come to power by military force, maintains itself by the same means” (*ibid.*). African conflicts are usually driven by both kinds of warlordism.

Behind vicious circles of violence lie very powerful interests. In the Great Lakes region, for instance, powerful economic interests are tied up with the exploitation of coltan, an invaluable resource for the production of mobile phones. The 2001 UNSC report (UNSC 2001b) points to situations where individual and corporate plunderers are provided protection and security by the RPA. In return, the RPA gets to share the profits of the exploitation. In the year 2000 the demand for coltan was rising at the same time as the supplies were falling. A kilogram of coltan was then internationally priced at \$200 while the obtaining price in the DRC was only \$10. As the RPA was one of the main exporters of coltan from the DRC at the time, its efforts to keep control over the valuable resource became even stronger. This created a vicious circle of plundering, exploitation, and violence (*ibid.*).

The problem of militarism in Africa is not new. Armed struggles for national liberation as well as military coups are phenomena that we have seen all the time since the end of colonialism. What is new is the phenomenon of warlords seeking power and personal fortune, instead of political leaders with some kind of a national vision such as national or social liberation. The Great Lakes region is full of warlords of this kind, either in power or in search for power. In the region there are several examples of endless spirals of violence. Both Uganda and Rwanda have been the scenes of series of military coups all the time since they became independent states.

Using the concept of “military princeships,” Achille Mbembe underlines the fact that when actors of this kind come to power, they are characterized by the persistent use of force. “Having come to power through violence

and faced with internal disorder they are obsessed with security. So they build rampart around themselves against groups they have earlier driven out by force" (Mbembe 1999).

Notwithstanding the large variety of actors, what most of them are out to get hold of are limited but valuable natural resources, oil and diamonds in particular. Philippe Le Billon (2001) examines the significance of the political economy and geography of these two resources for the course of the Angolan conflict. According to Le Billon, it is evident that for the two main parties of the conflict—the MPLA and UNITA—the spatial distribution of these valuable resources guided and financed their military strategies. The exploitation of oil and diamond financed and motivated the military operations and also affected the legitimacy of the government and the economy of the country.

The global economic development of the twentieth century created a demand for the kind of resources that Angola was in possession of. This turned out to be much more a curse than a blessing for the people of the country. That is neither to say that wealth is a curse in itself, nor that greed is the main motivating factor in the Angolan conflict. Rather, the resources have been decisive factors for the long duration of the conflict. Oil and diamonds became the fuel for the war machinery of the MPLA and UNITA.

The general relation between abundant natural resources and the economic development of a country has been analyzed by, for instance, M. L. Ross (1999). He shows that rents generated by narrow and mostly foreign-dominated resource industries allow ruling groups to dispense with economic diversity and popular legitimacy. This often results in a rent-seeking policy and poor economic growth and in the social mobility outside the elite politics and state patronage remaining small. If such a political economy is institutionally mismanaged, it risks developing into a violent conflict, as marginalized politico-military actors will fight for political and economic reforms that are resisted by the more benefiting groups in the inner circles of the state.

The duality of wealth and misery in Angola has been the subject of much reporting. The country is blessed with an abundance of some of the most valuable resources any country could dream of. As an oil producer, Angola is the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the country is ranked the fifteenth most underdeveloped in the world. The per capita GNP is no more than the sub-Saharan average. The two main reasons for this are, first, that the wealth is highly concentrated amongst the elite of the country, and second, that the earnings from diamonds and oil have gone directly into the financing of the war, not into the socioeconomic development of the country.

Throughout the conflict, access to oil and diamonds has been divided between the MPLA and UNITA. The MPLA elite in Luanda and abroad has controlled the oil revenues, while UNITA has controlled most of the diamond occurrences. This duality of economic power is related both to the geographical spread of the resources and to the technical methods tied to their exploitation. The oil occurrences are primarily offshore and in the coastal zones controlled by the governmental party (and out of the reach of UNITA attacks), while the diamonds occurrences are primarily in the hinterland dominated by UNITA. The exploitation of oil requires advanced technological methods available to the official regime through its international relations, whereas a large degree of the diamonds are so-called alluvial deposits (riverbeds) requiring relatively little input for exploitation, an obvious advantage for guerrilla groups. For this reason, diamonds have been the main source of revenue for UNITA since the late 1970s. For the MPLA, throughout the 1990s, the oil sector provided 90 percent of official exports and 80 percent of revenue. As such, oil is the key resource for the Angolan economy and the government (Le Billon 2001). The earnings from oil export have only seldom been used to diversify the economy or to create employment for larger groups of people outside the governmental administration and the military. The governmental elite is eager to keep the oil fortune to itself for use for personal expenditure, clientelism, and military build-up. The MPLA has so far been sheltered from democratic political reversal. Nevertheless, it is aware of the possibility of popular uprising and, for that reason, it maintains a much-feared and predatory security apparatus. Critics of the regime are known to have been killed. The MPLA has built up a capital-intensive war machine that has placed government forces at the center of Angola's political economy (ibid.). With such a strong army, the government has been able to intervene militarily on several occasions to root out support for UNITA even in neighboring countries, such as Congo Brazzaville and the DRC in 1997 and Namibia in 1999 (ibid.). Moreover, the stability of oil as a source of income for the governmental elite has made it far easier to carry on its clientelist activities. A less stable income source would have made the clientelism less attractive. "The clientelist redistribution of oil and state rents has targeted the presidential entourage, the state *nomenclatura*, and privileged sections of the population through mechanisms sustaining a relatively stable internal political order" (ibid., 65). The main clientelist mechanisms include privatization of state assets, business licenses, resource concessions, and access to cheap loans.

As for diamonds, they have a uniquely important role within UNITA's political and military economy (UN 2000b). As already mentioned, diamonds that occur in Angola are, to a large degree, alluvial diamonds.

As such, and in addition to the spatial distribution of their occurrence, the diamonds have been difficult to integrate into a formal economy controlled by the state. UNITA has safeguarded its control over the diamonds through various means. In the beginning of the war in Angola (late 1970s) it concentrated its attacks on existing mines and raided and racketed companies as well as freelance diggers (so-called *garimpeiros*). Later on (mid 1980s) UNITA professionalized its diamond operations and started to train its own staff for the diamond exploitation. This included investments in mining equipment. From the second half of the 1980s UNITA extended its diamond activities to include quasi-industrial establishments and strengthened its commercial networks both domestically and abroad. The guerrilla war now reached the Luanda provinces, partly as a result of US assistance which allowed UNITA to operate from military bases in Zaïre. This, however, came to an end relatively soon, as US and South African support was withdrawn. In the years to follow this withdrawal the reliance of UNITA on diamonds became even stronger. However, the absence of new investments and to a limited degree the impact of UN sanctions reduced the revenue from diamonds for UNITA.

One central aspects related to the diamond mining in Angola is the degree of criminality related to it. Although UNITA reportedly has conducted crack-down on corruption the diamond sector remains highly criminalized, mainly because armed units shift their activities from politico-military objectives to economic ones. Another explanation for this is that local UNITA commanders are increasingly becoming isolated and self-reliant, making the chain of command weaker. Closely related to the criminality within the mining sector is the increasing use of private military/security companies. Both private corporations and UNITA and the MPLA are in constant need of armed protection for continuing the exploitation of diamonds. For the government, the use of private security companies (PSCs) has extended its sovereignty and control over the rebel-controlled resources and also allowed the incorporation of diamonds into the political elite's patronage politics. In general, this kind of political economy has benefited from the lawlessness and lack of transparency that come as a result of war.

It is hard to judge the specific influence of diamonds on the war in Angola. It is probably going too far to say that without diamonds, UNITA would have lost the war a long time ago. However, what is certain is that the abundance of this valuable resource improved Savimbi's perception of personal security (as he was always able to pay for protection) as well as his ability to return to military campaigns again and again. It is also reasonable to believe that UNITA's military capacity in the future will continue to erode, parallel to the difficulties of resupply of diamonds, the increase in defections, and the continuing loosening of the chain of command.

The influence of both diamonds and oil for the prolonged war in Angola has been well known to all main foreign actors who have cooperated with the warring parties in Angola for decades.⁷ Demands for greater transparency within both the oil and the diamond industry has been high on the agendas of donor countries, financial institutions, as well as the UN. However, it is evident that President dos Santos has had other and more pressing priorities than transparency and reform. Moreover, the abundance of natural sources has made it relatively easy for the president to secure financial contributions and loans from other institutions, such as multinational enterprises and private banks, than, for instance, the Bretton Woods institutions. Moreover, the Fowler Report points to several cases of sanctions busting by authorities in Congo Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Togo, Burkina Faso, and the DRC (UN 2000b, paragraphs 18–25). The authorities in these countries busted the sanctions imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions. Togo and Burkina Faso, in particular, were known to have facilitated arms purchases and diamond and financial dealings, as well as offered travel facilities and protection to individual UNITA members. There were mainly three methods that UNITA used to deal with sanctions. First, Savimbi instructed that UNITA's funds be withdrawn from banks and other financial institutions. Second, increased emphasis was placed on the use of rough diamonds as a currency by UNITA. Third, "significant sums of money were deposited with a handful of friends, trusted supporters and key UNITA representatives abroad" (*ibid.*, Paragraph 120). For example, the UN Panel of Experts received evidence that \$5 million was deposited with President Eyadema of Togo and also that Savimbi had arranged for money to be deposited with the former President of Côte d'Ivoire, Henri Konan Bédié. This money was to be used in case of cash crisis for the organization (*ibid.*).⁸

Continuing oil and diamond revenues no doubt have worked as strong disincentives for all major parties to put an end to the war. For rival groups there has been much more to earn from a continuance of the war than from lasting peace. International rent-seeking enterprises play important roles in this situation, but though the diamond industry (such as the Belgian company De Beers) is now confronting its responsibility for the prolonged war, the oil industry has so far remained rather impervious to accusations of responsibility. Most oil companies continue to stress that their role in Angola is purely economic and that political matters are beyond their reach. Others even admit that they cannot risk the financial cost of potential political reforms in Angola (Le Billion 2001, 77). There are also oil companies that are known to have had a direct role in financing the war and facilitating arms trade. Elf, for instance has, according to reports, acted as a facilitator in oil-for-arms deals (*ibid.*, 78). It is evident

that most international corporations are more interested in a favorable political order than in seeking the protection and welfare of the population. Important here are the so-called oil-collateral loans to the government of Angola. Apparently, the financial and oil-trading institutions participating in this business have no moral dilemma in doing so. One of the recommendations by the Fowler Report is that institutionalized exchange mechanisms should be established between oil companies and governments in order to facilitate the flow of information regarding possible illegal diversions of fuel (UN 2000b, Paragraph 71).

The role of resources in large-scale violent conflicts in African countries points to the necessity of relating resource exploitation and fiscal reforms to political commitments during peace processes. So far this seems to have been a major lacuna in such processes. According to Le Billon, this “goes beyond cutting the links between oil, diamonds, and arms; constitutional reforms and new corporate practices must ensure that the population’s share of revenues renders obsolete the control of state rents for personal enrichment and violent political survival” (Le Billon 2001, 80).

Also, generally, there is strong evidence that states with abundant resource wealth perform less well than resource-poor states. For sub-Saharan Africa, where three-quarters of the states are still heavily dependent on the export of primary commodities, it would be of great importance to understand this phenomenon. The explanations, however, vary a lot and can be divided into two main categories—economic explanations and political explanations. For a long time, it was the economic explanations that dominated the debate on why resource-exporting governments seemed to manage their economics badly. One explanation, which was influential for a long time, was that primary commodity exporters suffered from a decline in the terms of trade, which widened the gap between the rich industrialized countries and the poor developing countries.⁹ A second kind of economic explanations focused on the fact that international commodity markets were subject to unusually sharp price fluctuations, and that these international fluctuations were easily transferred to the domestic economy of the country, making economic development planning extremely difficult. A third group of economic explanations argued that resource industries were unlikely to stimulate growth in the rest of the economy, as these industries had few positive linkages to other parts of the economy. Numerous case studies and qualitative studies have been undertaken on the basis of all these theoretical explanations. The results of these studies, however, point in different directions.

For the subject of this book, the political explanations for the so-called resource curse are probably of even greater interest. According to Ross, theories of political failure can be divided into three groups: cognitive theories, which blame policy failures on the shortsightedness of state

actors; societal theories, which cite the harmful influence of certain groups of the society, for example, privileged classes and client networks; and statist theories, which blame the institutional weakness of state, for example, its disability to extract and deploy resources, enforce property rights, and resist the demands of rent seekers (Ross 1999, 308). In societies where the rule of law is already weak, such as in war-torn societies, the probable effects of all these factors are even worse.

For the quantitative evidence of the relationship between abundant resources and violent conflict in a society, the works of Paul Collier are particularly interesting. Some of Collier's main contributions are based on studies undertaken by the Development Research Group of the World Bank. During the period 1965–99, the risk of civil war was systematically related to a few economic conditions, “such as dependence upon primary commodity exports and low national income” (Collier 2000a, 2). Parallel to this, measures of the relationship between the risk of conflict and social grievances, such as inequality, lack of democracy, and ethnic and religious divisions were also undertaken. The studies of the Development Research Group were based on a sample of 47 civil wars. Astonishingly, these grievance variables had no systematic effect on the risk of conflict, whereas “countries which have a substantial share of their income (GDP) coming from the export of primary commodities are radically more at risk of conflict” (ibid., 6). Collier's main argument is the following: “[W]hat matters is whether the organization can sustain itself financially. It is this, rather than any objective grounds for grievance which determine whether a country will experience civil war” (ibid., 4). It is not necessarily the resources themselves that are the objectives of the conflict. Rather, the resources are necessary in order to finance the fighting. It is the feasibility of predation that determines whether a country will experience civil war or not. There are several variants of this theory, the most cynical one being the one that claims that rebellion is motivated by greed, so that it occurs when rebels can do well out of war. Another variant is the one claiming that rebels are motivated by the lust for power, but that rebellion will only occur where rebels can do well out of war, that is, abundant resources will finance their fight for power. A third variant is the one claiming that rebels are motivated by imagined or real grievances, but that war will only take place where rebels can do well out of it, that is, abundant resources finance their fight for a more just society. All in all, it does not matter whether rebels are motivated by greed, power ambitions, or grievance. What causes conflict is the feasibility of predation. Collier underlines that we will not be able to tell by the discourse of the rebels whether conflict is caused by greed or grievance. The discourse would be the same. The rebel organization will usually generate a sense of grievance and claim this to be their

main motivation for fighting, even if their real objective is different. If the rebel organization fails to generate such a sense of grievance, it will probably not succeed as an organization and will tend to fade away.

Empirically, the World Bank studies show that the risk of rebellion is strongly related to three economic conditions: dependence upon primary commodity exports, low average income of the country, and slow growth.

First, primary commodity exports are particularly important because they are especially vulnerable to looting. The main reason for this is that their production relies heavily on assets that are long lasting and immobile (*ibid.*, 9). Under such circumstances the opportunities for predation are much higher. This holds true in the case of the transportation of the commodities. Along the route of transportation there are many possible “choke points” that rebels may control. However, the state itself will also try to control such points and will therefore do what it can to defend the commodities from rebel attacks. The rebel groups must therefore be prepared to confront substantial government forces. For this purpose, rebel groups need extensive security arrangements and they need to be much larger in number than, for instance, mafia groups.

Second, low-income societies are particularly at risk either because the poor have little to lose from joining a rebel group or due to the fact that in low-income countries the government extracts only a small percentage of its income from taxes. In low-income economies, governments will typically derive most of its income from taxes on primary commodities—in other words, they have more or less the same source of revenue as do the rebel organizations. According to Collier, this reduces the capacity of the government to spend money on defense, and rebel predation becomes easier. Collier underlines that rebellion does not seem to be the rage of the poor. “Indeed, if anything, rebellion seems to be the rage of the rich” (Collier 2000a, 10).

Third, slow economic growth, particularly in combination with rapid population growth, makes rebellion more likely. Both these variables are related to the opportunities for recruitment. In order to survive against the army, the rebel organization needs to build up its capacity quickly. In a country where there are few job and schooling opportunities and many young people are out of work, recruitment is easy.

Finally, the existence of a large diaspora living in the United States is another variable that substantially increases the risk of violent conflict. The reason is probably that they are much richer than their friends and family in their country of origin and therefore can afford to finance rebellion.

Related to our focus on the link between security and development, it is particularly interesting to note that the economic characteristics—dependence on primary commodity exports, low average incomes, slow

growth, and large diasporas—are the most powerful predictors of civil war. The main grievances, on the other hand—inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious divisions—provide no explanatory power in predicting rebellion. Thus, what is necessary in order to avoid armed conflict would be rapid economic growth and the spreading of risk in relation to number and kind of export articles (*ibid.*, 15–20).

Ganesan and Vines (2004) argue that the “greed vs. grievance” theory is provocative and compelling only to a certain point. They point to several weaknesses of the theory. First, there is evidence that greed is not the determinative component for rebel-group behavior. Civil wars in, for instance, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, and Côte d’Ivoire were wars where resources were not the motive. And, even in Angola, the prime example of the greed vs. grievance theory, the civil war had been going on for about 20 years before UNITA started to finance itself by the illicit diamond trade. Moreover, the war came to an end at a time where, according to the UN, UNITA was still able to earn enormous sums from illicit diamond trade.

Another aspect underlined by Ganesan and Vines is that most of the activities in which rebel groups are involved are, by definition, illegal, and so they have to finance their activities through illicit business.

Third, and this is the main point for the authors, a missing element in the greed vs. grievance theory is the role that governments of resource-rich states play. All too often, government control of abundant and valuable resources goes hand in hand with corruption, lawlessness or weak rule of law, a culture of impunity, and inequitable distribution of resources. For such governments, prolonged armed conflicts are considered to be an advantage.

There are several aspects to this situation. First, control over this kind of resources becomes a very strong incentive to stay in power. Governments will do all they can to stay in control, even if this is at the expense of ordinary people. The regime becomes predatory and commits abuses to maintain power and control the resources. A well-known World Bank report uses the term “predatory autocracies” to describe this phenomenon. In predatory autocracies, regimes “tend to act as ‘roving bandits’, state power faces few constraints and the exploitation of public and private resources for the gain of elite interests is embedded in institutional practices with greater continuity than individual leaders. Such regimes are nontransparent and corrupt: the civil service runs entirely on patronage as public office brings with it a host of rent-seeking opportunities. Little financial and human capital flows into productive occupations, whose returns are depressed by a dysfunctional environment. Government itself is a fundamental obstacle to fiscal restraint and reform” (Eifert, Gelb, and Borje Tallroth 2002, 7). The report cites Nigeria to be a predatory autocracy.

Another one is, by definition, Angola. Funds lost to corruption or otherwise unaccounted for far exceed the amount spent on the population.

Second, unaccountable governments with such abundant resources have a considerable number of opportunities to divert their revenues for illegal purposes. Liberia is an example of a regime where large amounts from resource-based revenues—particularly government-controlled diamond and timber trade—have been used for funding illegal arms purchases or rebel organizations in neighboring countries such as the RUF of Sierra Leone. For many years, Charles Taylor used off-budget money to pay for illegal weapons. The IMF estimated that, in 2002, off-budget revenues from shipping and timber came to about \$ 26 million (Ganesan and Vines 2004, 4). In 2002, prior to the introduction of the sanctions one year later, the UN passed a resolution including a requirement to audit revenues from shipping and timber (cf. UNSC 2002b). This was done in order to ensure that the revenue was used for such legitimate purposes as social and humanitarian development. According to Human Rights Watch, little has been done in response to the resolution.

Third, armed conflict can be exacerbated by the actions of governments in neighbouring countries seeking to profit from the resource abundance. Foreign governments that provide political, material, financial, and/or military support to governments or rebel groups in another country in furtherance of their own economic interests are an important, but often overlooked, aspect of the resource-conflict link. The most frequently cited example here is the way in which the governments of Uganda and Rwanda have intervened in the conflict in the DRC. But the involvement of Liberian forces in Sierra Leone and in Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 and 2003 was also probably driven in part by a desire to control valuable resources (Ganesan and Vines 2004, 2). In the same way as during colonial times and during the Cold War, foreign governments are so eager to safeguard their admittance to strategically important resources such as oil that they often ignore poor governance or human right abuses. The maintenance of good relations with the commodity provider is their first priority.

A country such as Uganda has benefited largely from the abundance of valuable resources in the DRC, particularly gold and diamonds. According to the UN Panel, Uganda has little or no production of its own of diamonds or gold, but the country became an exporter of both these minerals after it became involved in the conflict in the DRC. In the experts' own words: "Uganda has no known diamond production; Diamond exports from Uganda are observed only in the last few years, coinciding surprisingly with the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo" (UNSC 2001b, Paragraph 98). The same goes for production and export of gold (*ibid.*, Figure 1, Page 20).

Notwithstanding the focus of the UN on the illegal acquirement of products for export, the problem has not been acknowledged by the international financial institutions (IFIs). On the contrary the IFIs tend to praise the economic development of Uganda. “[I]n recent years, the Ugandan government’s economic policies have proven quite successful in containing inflation and promoting strong economic growth—The IMF has fully supported this program with advice and lending” (Ganesan and Vines 2004, 5).¹⁰ The same UN panel reported that for Rwanda the situation was more or less the same as for Uganda. Although the country has no diamond production of its own, the export of diamonds began after Rwanda became involved in the war in the DRC. The panel found that portions of the income from diamond export were used to finance the military involvement of Rwanda in the DRC. In addition to commercial exploitation of resources, Rwanda also got involved in shareholding in business operating in the DRC and received payments from the rebel group RCD-Goma.

Section C of the UN panel’s report deals with special features of the links between the exploitation of natural resources and the continuance of the conflict. The analysis of battles and skirmishes recorded from 1999 to 2001 shows that the number of skirmishes is growing relative to the number of battles. Only eight confrontations on the official frontline were reported in the first quarter of 2001. As for the role of resources the UN reports that

[c]urrent big battles have been fought in areas of major economic importance, towards the cobalt- and copper-rich area of Katanga and the diamond-rich area of Mbuji Mayi. Military specialists argue the Rwandan objective is to capture these mineral-rich areas to deprive the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the financial sources of its war effort. Without the control of this area, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot sustain the war. This rationale confirms that the availability of natural resources and their exploitation permits the continuation of the war. This may be true for all the parties. In view of the current experience of the illegal exploitation of the resources in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo by Rwanda and Uganda, it could also be thought that the capturing of this mineral-rich area would lead to the exploitation of those resources. In that case, control of those areas by Rwanda could be seen primarily as an economic and financial objective rather than a security objective for the Rwandan borders.

(UNSC 2001b, Paragraph 175)

Skirmishes also take place close to or around coltan- and diamond-mining or coltan-rich areas. According to some sources, numerous reports

and accounts of eyewitnesses mention the presence of Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers providing security around coltan and diamond mines (UNSC 2001b).

The UN panel underlines that the link between the conflict and the exploitation of natural resources would not have been possible without the participation of some actors not part in the conflict but still playing a key role as facilitators. These are bilateral and multilateral donors and also certain neighbouring and distant countries. The role of private companies and individuals has also been important for the continuance of the conflict. There were also reports of the direct and indirect involvement of some staff of the embassies and cooperation agencies of developed countries.

As we can see, then, links between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the continuance of the conflict in the DRC are obvious. Moreover, it is quite evident that there are a considerable number of actors who are benefiting from continued war, as this makes the society less transparent and illegal exploitation far easier. "The wealth of the country is appealing and hard to resist in the context of lawlessness and the weakness of the central authority," says the UN panel's report (UNSC 2001b, Paragraph 213). And by saying that, the experts also point to the pivotal role of the leaders of the countries involved.

Although the panel refrained from making allegations about the personal involvement of the presidents of Uganda and Rwanda until further investigations were carried out, there was still considerable evidence concerning the objective elements of the two presidents' political responsibility. President Kagame of Rwanda, for instance, was reported to have had close relationships with a number of top Rwandan businessmen—all they had in common was that they were directly involved in the exploitation of natural resources in the areas of Congo in which Rwanda was in control. Where the Rwandese army is concerned, Kagame is responsible for having reorganized both the army and the Ministry of Defence at the time when he himself was the minister of defence. Through that reorganization, a Department for External Relations was created, and it is this department that has been the cornerstone of the RPA's financial transactions in relation to the war in the DRC. Seen together, these and other elements prove that the president is aware of his role in the illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has played a similar role. According to the UN panel's report, Museveni's role in the illegal exploitation of the resources in the DRC can be situated at several levels, that is, "his policy towards the rebel movements, his attitude towards the army and the protection provided to illegal activities and their perpetrators" (UNSC 2001b, Paragraph 201). It has been reported that the president's

family has been very much involved in business in the occupied zones of the DRC. The president has been informed about various kinds of illegal activity but has chosen not to act.

Privatization of security in Africa

Closely tied to the economic assets of war in Africa is the privatization of security on the continent. There has been a tremendous increase in the use of private military/security companies and individuals in Africa during the past 50 years. Explanations for this phenomenon vary, but are usually closely related to the phenomenon of weak or failed states on the continent. This suggests that a principal reason is the inability of many fragile war-torn states to provide security within their societies. The aim of this part of the chapter is to analyze the reasons why the African state does not (anymore) have the monopoly of the use of armed forces, which is one of the criteria of a modern state according to Weber. What driving forces lie behind this change in the African states' way of organizing their own defence and security? What consequences can this have for the further development of the African states and for the security political efforts of the intergovernmental organizations?

Between 1950 and 1989, 15 private military/security companies were operating on the continent. Between 1990 and 1998, 65 such companies were operating (Holmquist 2005, 11). Most PSCs are like any other private companies. That is, they have normal corporate structures, maintain Internet sites, and operate as legal entities. Many of them are parts of larger industrial conglomerates (*ibid.*, 4). The services offered by private security and military companies are varied and include provision of operational support in combat, military advice, military training, arms procurement and arms maintenance, logistical support, housing, assistance in communications, general security service, and intelligence.

"The current fashion of privatising services that, up to a century ago, were the sole preserve of the state, has seen the commercial sector move into areas such as the provision of domestic and professional security, including armed response, and even the running of prisons" (Cilliers and Cornwell 1999, 4).

"Private security groups" can be used as a generic term to encompass mercenary forces, private security, and military forces. "Mercenaries" refers to those who fight for financial gain in armed conflicts in which their conflicts are not involved. Mercenaries have been a common feature of military history. Nations often choose to employ foreign forces instead of their own men to fight their wars. Ancient Greece, for instance, employed Macedonian soldiers to fight many of its wars. And during the American

War of Independence, the United Kingdom sent Hessian soldiers to fight. However, with the rise of nationalism and with the new, Weberian, understanding of a sovereign state, national conscripted armies became the norm. The employment of mercenaries underwent a decline and was now considered inimical to state sovereignty.

Several hundred years later the employment of mercenaries is again becoming a common practice in Africa. Only a few years after their independence, countries, for instance, Congo and Nigeria, began the use of mercenaries. At that time mercenaries were usually operating individually or were organized in small bands. Several decades later, the mercenary trade has changed and the activities of mercenaries are now primarily known through the activities of, for instance, Executive Outcomes (EO) and Sandline International in Sierra Leone. According to Abdel-Fatau Musah, "Sandline International and EO epitomize the new mercenaries—the extension of traditional mercenary activities into the yet uncharted territory of big business, made possible by increasing market fundamentalism and asymmetric warfare in the least developed parts of the world. Neo-mercenaries or private military companies have become the advance shock troops that pacify rich enclaves for resource exploitation by extraction companies which are closely tied to them" (2002, 913).

The private military companies (PMCs) of our time are companies whose activities include the provision of multipurpose security-related products and services. They organize mercenaries into temporary armies for combat operations in foreign conflicts. They operate either on behalf of the government or on behalf of rebel groups in a country. They may offer war material and logistics, provide military advice, undertake intelligence work, and strengthen the already existing forces of their clients. A general characteristic of the present-day military companies in Africa is their close relationship to business establishments, primarily companies specializing in the extraction of natural resources and financial services.

The main difference between PMCs and PSCs is that the PSCs usually do not participate in direct combats. The primary task of a PSC is lifeguard services. Another way to distinguish between the two is to say that the PMCs provide *offensive* services, designed to have a direct military impact, while the PSCs provide *defensive* services, primarily intending to protect individuals and property (Holmquist 2005, 5). Notwithstanding the definitions, the collaboration between PMCs and PSCs in resource-driven conflicts in Africa is close.

Quite similar to the activities of PMCs and PSCs are the operations of the commercialized armies of a number of African countries. The armies of,

for instance, Mugabe and Museveni have, on several occasions, supported internal factions of civil wars in neighbouring countries, just as much for economic gain as for ideological reasons. The army of Zimbabwe, for instance, which is just as much Mugabe's private commercial army, supported Kabila in the war in the DRC in return for mineral deals for the president and his family. Also, in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, this kind of "diamonds-for-guns" deals were evident. That is, the mineral resources of the countries were illegally exploited in return for military support from the army of a neighbouring country.

Floating between the various categories presented here are individual mercenaries. They are usually ex-combatants or ex-soldiers who, at short notice, will enter on one side of a violent conflict. They either operate as regular soldiers or they undertake various kinds of shady activities such as debt collection, besides other criminal activities. Individual mercenaries of this kind are of different nationalities within a region. They are often soldiers who have deserted their former warlord or national army because of disillusionment or lack of remuneration, or they are demobilized soldiers who have not been properly reintegrated into their home society.

No doubt, the global liberalization of economics and politics is an important explanation for the tremendous increase in private security/military activity. However, there would not be a need for soldiers at all if there was no conflict. Some scholars would argue that the strong presence of soldiers all around the African countries in itself is enough to create conflicts. Most scholars agree, however, that the majority of the violent conflicts on the continent come from within the societies and are related to other phenomena, such as the weak state structures of most African states. Before we move on to elaborate on the importance of global liberalization to the growth in private security, we will therefore focus on the relationship between weak or failed states and the extensive use of private solutions in military situations.

The African state and the privatization of security

Let us recall here the main characteristics of the state in Africa (see Chapter 2). Most African states are states with a not-too-successful mixture of modern bureaucratic norms (as understood by Weber) and traditional ways of organizing a society in Africa. The term "neopatrimonialism" is often used to describe such states and refers to a state where there is no division between the private and public spheres of society, and if there is a division, it is not respected. Politics and economy are two sides of the same coin. Leaders of such states usually lack the popular legitimacy typical of modern democratic states of the developed world. The state is, therefore, to be considered a shell. And because the leaders have no real roots among

the majority of the people, they are often extremely preoccupied with their own and their regime's security. The moves toward modern democratic institution building have usually been blocked, as the leaders consider them as direct threats to their security. The personnel for providing security to the leader were selected on the basis of either ethnic affiliation or personal loyalty, and they were, or became, military heavyweights who could easily become a threat to the leader they were supposed to protect. In other words, the rulers who organized their "personal army" were liable to be replaced by its members. The numerous coups d'état in postindependence Africa are a result of this method of organizing the state. In West Africa alone, there were six coups between 1980 and 1986, which were all carried out by junior officers of the president's army.

The personal rule and regime security is one of the main characteristics of the African state today and explains why in Africa the state is the primary source of violence and not the primary protector of human security.¹¹ The question of the relationship between war and state making is relevant at this point. Tilly's famous quote "War makes states" expresses the idea that the activity of war making is a vital ingredient in state making. That is because the ability to prepare for and fight a war requires leaders of a country to get involved in actions that are usually also conducive to state making (Tilly 1985). Musah uses the expression "extreme Tillian statehood" to describe those African states where the characteristics of the Tillian state have become deepened and pronounced. These states "are marked by very high levels of repression, internal fractionalization, extreme manipulation, poverty of leadership, institutional incompetence and graft" (Musah 2002, 918). According to Musah, Zaire, under Mobutu (1965–97), represents the most obvious case of an extreme Tillian state. Yet there are a number of other countries on the continent that share many or all of the same characteristics (Somalia under Siad Barre and Liberia under Tubman and Tolbert are good examples.). These are states where the neopatrimonial system is perfected, states in which the personal armies and security agencies of the leaders could easily be mistaken for mercenary companies. In these countries, no serious attempts have been made to develop educational facilities, health, or infrastructure. Large sections of the population are left without livelihoods. Zaire, Somalia, Angola, and Ethiopia (and many other African states) became major arenas of Cold War confrontations. The struggle for power in such countries was fought within a narrow political elite "and expressed through the will of rival warlords and the military. In many of these countries the process of state reconfiguration mimics seventeenth century state building in France and elsewhere in Europe [. . .], and are characterized by security rackets, predation and mercenary activity in an unending cycle of violence"

(Musah 2002, 919). Extreme Tillian states are typically resource laden and predatory, thus making them major arenas for illegal resource exploitation, arms proliferation, and private military intervention (*ibid.*, 920).¹²

Liberalization and the privatization of security

Notwithstanding the primacy of internal factors for African conflicts and their military solutions, what goes on in Africa does not go on in a total vacuum. In other words, the characteristics of the international society and the way these change are of great importance for security-political development within the various African states. This is particularly true of the liberalization of politics and economy worldwide.

The first years after the decolonization of most African states as well as most of the Cold War period were characterized in most African states by some variant of neopatrimonialism. The international competition between the communist and the noncommunist world also created an advanced system of patronage between wealthy superpowers and needy African states (or rather state leaders). In return for their loyalty, African leaders received enormous economic and military support from their patron—either the United States (or some of its closest allies) or the USSR (or some of its closest allies). That is, the neopatrimonial system covered not only the single African country but more or less the whole international system. Even before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, it was clear to the USSR that the costs of engagement in Africa were too high. As American interests in supporting African regimes were also diminishing, it was clear toward the end of the 1980s that the superpowers were not prepared to devote the same amount of resources to Africa as they had been devoting some decades earlier (Clapham 1996, 158). The end of the Cold War finally brought an end to the patronage by the rich countries and also to a period of hypermilitarization that affected almost the entire world. In Africa, the end of the Cold War is reflected, for instance, in the arms procurement figures—in the downgrading of sub-Saharan countries in the eyes of the leading powers. The countries that had before been on the foreign or military policy agenda of the United States and the USSR now became worthless for them. The main suppliers to and paymasters of the African countries' military posture now pulled back. "At the height of the Cold War, sub-Saharan countries absorbed military equipment worth more than US \$5 billion in some years, or up to fifteen or twenty per cent of the value of the region's exports. By 1995, recorded values were estimated at only US \$270 million for arms transfer deliveries" (Lock 1999, 13–14).¹³ These numbers illustrate both the phenomenon of military downsizing

worldwide and the loss of strategic importance of African countries for the most important actors of the international society. Moreover, they reflect the fact that the military apparatus of most African countries went through an internal repositioning. After the end of the Cold War, military equipment in Africa has increasingly consisted of cheap infantry weapons. Air forces and navies now had to manage with the equipment inherited from the Cold War period. Beyond that they were merely equipped with essentials.

The end of bipolarity in the world order was greeted with regret by most African leaders. "The opportunities which it had given them to impose the project of monopoly statehood were abruptly removed" (Clapham 1996, 159). Instead, the states were now exposed to what can be referred to as the monopoly diplomacy of the triumphant Western world (*ibid.*). That is, it was the political and economic ideology of the West that was now presented to the African leaders, with the message that they could either take that or nothing at all. Central to the Western ideology was the idea of the primacy of the market, that is, economic liberalism.

One dominant element of economic liberalization for African states has been the introduction of the SAPs by the World Bank. These programs were "intended to eliminate unproductive forms of economic behaviour and rent-seeking corruption, as well as to reduce the influence of political interest in economic life and decision-making. The results, however, have been varied. The privatisation of public companies and banks and the promotion of a minimum state at the instigation of aid donors have led to the privatisation of many of the sovereign functions of the state including tax collection, customs services, the issuing of bank notes, the maintenance of internal security and shortly, national defence" (Cilliers and Cornwell 1999, 4). The international neoliberal agenda has resulted in commercialization and outsourcing of power that traditionally used to be held by the state, such as the safeguarding of personal security, so also among weak unconsolidated governments in Africa. This has created new opportunities for private military/security companies. The creation of new economic opportunities has also encouraged national and transnational actors who are directly involved with criminal economic actors engaged in drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, trade in stolen arms, and smuggling. In general, the commercialization and outsourcing of power in unconsolidated states in Africa have not been able to heal the problems that Africa has had with lack of capacity, corruption, and poor delivery of public services.

"Organized crime is traditionally viewed as group activities with hierarchical relationships that permit the leaders to earn profits or control territories or markets, internal or foreign, by means of violence, intimidation or corruption, both in furtherance of criminal activity and to infiltrate the legitimate economy" (*ibid.*, 5). Many elements of this definition can be

associated with the way in which multinational enterprises communicate and collaborate with the domestic political elite in weak African states. That is why the phrase “the criminalization of the African state”—that is, the invasion of the political arena by criminal practices—is applicable to the study of African politics (*ibid.*).

In a globalized world, state- and nonstate actors alike are guaranteed easy access to war technology, including night-vision equipment, satellite communication equipment, and rocket-propelled grenades. This way, most African countries have become the destination for deadly merchandise. As the age of globalization coincides with the end of the Cold War, we have two parallel processes—relatively free movement of manpower, goods, and services and (as a result of the downsizing of armies) a large number of demobilized qualified soldiers without any proper alternative civilian training and reintegration (Lock 1999). This has created a huge pool of potential mercenaries, particularly in the countries which had the biggest armies during the Cold War, for example, Eastern European countries and South Africa. Moreover, and to fill out the picture, the weapons industry has become important in countries such as these, and the weapons they produce often fall into the hands of mercenaries, and then end up, for instance, in African countries. There is a tremendous increase in the manufacture of small arms in the post-Cold War period. If there were 99 manufacturers of small arms in 1966, by 1999 this figure had grown to 385 (Musah 2002, 920). In economic terms, global private arms sales of around \$3 billion per year during the Cold War had increased to \$25 billion in 1996 (*ibid.*, 920–921).

The dominant paradigms in politics and economics of our days have also been expressed by the World Bank, as it has urged the African countries to radically trim down their military apparatus. In many cases this has led to a substantial slimming of the states’ armies at the same time as the leaders have built up extensive private military entities to secure themselves and their regimes. As they are included in other budgets, these private security arrangements have then not become the focus of the financial institutions and donor countries. Such private armies may be composed of national soldiers but are often trained and led by private foreign companies. They will focus on sectional interests, not on the security of the state as a whole. And the armies are financed through the leaders’ looting of valuable natural resources.

Consequences for the further development of the African state

In the words of Annan, “the world may not yet be ready to privatise peace” (Annan, cited in Holmquist 2005, 8). These words signalize a certain reluctance to relinquish the state as the main provider of security. Still, most of

us have realized that states are not the only actors in relation to the tackling of international security threats. Moreover, we have probably also admitted that other actors than the state can be well suited to tackling, for instance, the “new” kind of security threats such as transnational crime, serious environmental hazards, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Actors such as intergovernmental or multinational organizations and nongovernmental organizations do have certain advantages when such threats are concerned. Without any fundamental redefinition of the states’ security capacity, we have therefore seen, during the past 50 years or so, the development of a broader structure of security governance. Nevertheless, the state is still considered to be the major security political actor and the main source of legally binding international regulations. For this situation to be maintained in an age of privatization of security, the use of private military/security providers needs to take place within agreed structures. As of today, such structures do not exist—in Africa or elsewhere.

The civil war in Sierra Leone gave insight into the link between PMCs and the proliferation of arms. Best known are the activities of Sandline/EO. This transnational mercenary conglomerate and its mining wing, the Branch Heritage Group, were, to a significant degree, involved in the political economy of Sierra Leone. Sandline/EO/the Branch Heritage Group dictated terms in the security market, and they won lucrative mining and security contracts, such as the Koidu diamond concessions. When EO was forced to leave the country in 1997, the organization left behind its field brigade, Life Guard Systems, to protect its possessions in Koidu. At the same time, rumors had it that Life Guard Systems was responsible for a shipment of arms to the AFRC/RUF junta (Musah 2002, 925). The AFRC, in collaboration with the RUF overthrew President Kabbah of Sierra Leone later that year. The UNSC then prohibited the supply of weapons to Sierra Leone (UNSC 1997). Nevertheless, “Sandline International brokered the shipment of 35 tons of AK-47 assault rifles, ammunition and mortars into Sierra Leone in February 1998 under a military contract signed with the exiled government of President Tejan Kabbah” (Musah 2002, 925–926).

Porous borders and lack of sea and air surveillance capacity make Africa south of the Sahara a haven for arms smuggling. Mercenary pilots from Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe have taken advantage of this opportunity. In cooperation with aviation companies such as Ibis Air, Sorus Airlines, Sky Air, and Occidental, they have contributed to the import of large amounts of SALW into African conflict zones (*ibid.*, 927). Moreover, actors in the arms business easily get involved in other kinds of shady businesses, such as the guns-for-diamonds trade. The network of activities going on without the control of central authorities is growing steadily.

For some time at the end of the 1980, it seemed as if mercenaries of the classical type were going out of fashion to be replaced by modern well-organized PMCs. That did not happen. On the contrary, the PMCs are probably working as stepping stones for the rebirth of traditional mercenary activities. PMCs spawn mercenaries, and when these mercenaries finish service for one PMC in one country, they move on to another conflict in another country, often as lonely wolves, offering services to local warlords.

On the basis of this kind of evidence, we can conclude that there is a causal link between weak African states, the involvement of private military companies, and worsening security environment in Africa. Also, the alliances between PMCs and extracting companies in conflict zones are primarily profit driven, and most of the time they impact negatively on conflict dynamics and security in general. This buying and selling of vital services only serves to increase the mix-up between economic and political issues in the African countries. What is politics and what is business is hard to say. This is, of course, very important for the prospects for further state building in Africa. And, what is equally important, the privatization of security in a conflict zone serves to exacerbate the conflict. Also, the larger and more varied a private security structure is in a given conflict zone, the more gruesome and more unmanageable does the conflict become. One reason for this is that private military companies transfer their deadly expertise to uncontrollable local militias. This happened in Sierra Leone, for instance, where EO transferred its knowledge to the Kamajois militia (*ibid.*, 929).

A final phenomenon in relation to the consequences for the African state of privatizing security is the creation of multiple centers of power. As PMCs have been responsible for the distribution of small arms and light weapons, this has brought into play a growing number of armed actors. In many (local) societies, this has taken on a life of its own as individuals tend to group around the most powerful leader. We often therefore refer to multiple or floating centers of power in Africa. This is, of course, of great importance for the further development (or lack of development) of the African state. On the other hand, knowing the immense richness of African state elites, we would expect that, if their power basis were threatened, they would not hesitate to use their fortunes to further strengthen their own armies. This way the regime continues to live, although the state remains weak.

Conclusions

The point of departure for this book was the renewed importance of African stability to Western powers in a post-9/11 world. In the so-called war on terrorism, Africa seems to regain the importance it used to have during the Cold War.

Africa is the continent most afflicted with terrorism—albeit not international terrorism. Terrorism, defined as violent acts against a civilian population by nonstate actors, is widely used by many African groups, including rebel groups in the DRC, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Terrorism has been a deliberate strategy in many violent conflicts on the African continent. In addition, international terrorism is on the increase in Africa. Poverty and corruption make parts of Africa a very attractive destination for terrorist organizations. There are opportunities on this continent for the recruitment of terrorists and attainment of bases for operation, as well as valuable sources for financing terrorist activity. The links between weak and collapsed state structures, poverty, repression, and international terrorism have led to commentators assessing Africa as a potential breeding place for terrorism. The resale of diamonds and other highly valued natural resources purchased from African rebel movements is used to fund international terrorism networks. There is little doubt, therefore, that the African continent will have to be one of concern in the so-called war on terrorism.

Throughout the book we have underlined that the African political reality, including the characteristics of African violent conflicts, differs a whole lot from the political reality of the Western world. Therefore, if we are to understand the driving forces of African conflict, we have to use another set of analytical concepts different from that we would use in the analysis of conflicts in other parts of the world.

The introductory chapter of the book started out by presenting the nature of African conflicts based on a set of distinctions:

- 1) the scale of conflict;
- 2) the uneven geographical and social impact of conflicts;
- 3) historical variations in the nature and dynamics of conflicts;
- 4) the duration of conflicts and how they have become embedded in social, economic, and political structures;
- 5) transformations in the political economy of war and variations in the economic sources of conflicts;
- 6) the problematization and survival of the state; and
- 7) the global and regional interconnectedness of African conflicts.

Particularly, the expansive dynamics of trans-state networks, associated with survival and enrichment or greed and plunder, have led to an increasing regionalization of conflict in Africa. Indeed, we may speak about a regionalization of civil wars in Africa.

The System of States

Chapter 2 of the book focused on the state in Africa, its problematization and survival. We argued that to understand the facets of African security and insecurity, we must focus just as much on the *system* of states in Africa as on the will and capacity of the various political *actors*. Way too little has been said and written about the suitability of the African *system* of states and regions to resist the kind of activity that international terrorism represents. We argued that the lacunae in the system are related to a lack of social and economic development and a lack of sound structures of governance, nationally, regionally, and continentally. The way the state is built up and functions will, of course, have an important bearing on the way it relates to various groups both within its territory and to neighboring states and the international community. It is now commonly recognized that the state in Africa differs a lot from its European counterpart. Whereas most European states can be described with reference to the so-called Weberian state model, African states are described by concepts such as sultanistic regimes, neopatrimonialism, and shadow states. The concept of state sovereignty does not make sense in Africa as the state not always controls its population and its economic resources beyond the central parts of the country. One way of describing the African states is to say that they are weak states governed by strong regimes. The power of African political elites has usually been strong and long lasting. At the same time the state

apparatus has been weak and the state has had only limited control of the use of armed power, resource bases, and international borders.

Transnationalism

According to van Creveld, the period of nation-states and, therefore, of state conflict has ended, and with it the clear division into government, army, and people that state-focused wars enforced. In premodern European wars, political, social, economic, and religious motives were very much entangled (van Creveld 1991). This is also the case in present-day violent conflicts in Africa. Moreover, and in the same way as different motives are mingled together, so are countries, bringing about processes of regionalization, not only for benign purposes, but also in relation to violent conflicts and war. The regionalization of civil wars is now a well-established phenomenon in Africa. This phenomenon is closely related to what we have referred to as transnationalism in Africa, defined as a kind of interaction across international borders between both state- and nonstate actors. The interaction is relatively regular and frequent, but not necessarily hierarchically organized. Both formal and informal transnational processes have considerable influence on security politics between African states. Chapter 3 of this book first presented the wars in West Africa and in the Great Lakes region as regionalized wars. We then showed how various transnational aspects working in the regions had led to this regionalization of violent conflict. These aspects included recycling of small arms and light weapons, mercenaries, and militarized refugees, ordinary refugees, trade in natural resources, and personal alliances and general relationships between the warring parties. For both regions we showed that all these aspects worked to weave together the countries of the region into one conflict zone. It is quite obvious therefore that civil/internal wars in an African nation cannot be studied in isolation from the general sociopolitical situation in neighboring countries. A relevant question, then, is whether we need specific concepts to study the complex reality that African wars represent, or whether we can do with concepts designed for the study of violent conflicts in general. We concluded that for a better understanding of African conflicts, concepts particularly developed for African purposes will give us a deeper insight. One such concept is subaltern realism.

At the end of Chapter 3, we discussed the conflicts in relation to two central theoretical concepts, one developed for universal purposes, the other primarily to study African politics, that is, security complexes and subaltern realism. The concept of a regional security complex was introduced

by Buzan in 1991 and then redefined in 1998 primarily because of the introduction of another central concept, securitization. The 1998 definition of an RSC denotes "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 201). Compared with the definition of an RSC from 1991, the 1998 definition replaces the term "states" with the term "units." This replacement serves to acknowledge the fact that states are not anymore regarded as the only important actor where analyses of security are concerned. Other groups, such as organizations and individuals are important too. Although Buzan himself does not recognize West Africa as an RSC, we argue that both this region and Central Africa are examples of security complexes. In both cases we saw that there is a transnationalism related to the conflicts that cannot be found in other parts of the world. In both cases nonstate actors in neighboring countries are in close contact with the state in war in matters directly related to the warfare itself. In addition to geographical proximity, Buzan holds that there must be a certain thickness of interaction between the relevant units. This thickness of interaction can be hard to identify in African complexes owing to the significant presence of informal actors. Problems of this kind often occur when we apply general theoretical concepts in the analysis of African concepts.

When explaining African conflicts, Ayoob's theoretical approach also proves to be fruitful. He traces threats, conflicts, and state behavior of Third World states to the domestic venture of state building. Ayoob is also one of the most important advocates of the security-development nexus. According to him, development is, to a large degree, dependent upon security. Ayoob's focus on state making and security in understanding Third World political behavior did also prove to be fruitful in our analysis of the regionalized war in Central Africa. For instance, one central reason why Uganda got involved in the internal conflict in Zaire in the first place was the process of state making. Zaire was a main breeding place for Museveni's worst enemy, the ADF.

Acknowledging these characteristics related to the African states and the African international system, the second part of the book set out to analyze the institutional responses to the African security challenges. Were these responses compatible with the particular needs of African structural/governmental systems?

The Regional Responses

Chapter 4 gave an introduction to regional intergovernmental organizations trying to find solutions to violent conflicts in their respective regions. After a short introduction to classical and newer theories of regionalism,

three such IGOs were analyzed—ECOWAS, the SADC, and IGAD. All these IGOs were originally established for other purposes but have recently adopted conflict management mechanisms. We elaborated on the underlying reasons for their willingness to adopt conflict management. We also discussed whether their security-political strategies were compatible with the nature of the conflicts in the various regions.

Among the IGOs analyzed, ECOWAS is the organization that has by far done the most in relation to regional conflict management. Today, ECOWAS is an important security political actor, although it still has a long way to go to become fully developed for the needs of West African countries in times of violent conflicts. There are several reasons for this. At the outset, the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group was an improvised response to the Liberian conflict in 1990. As such ECOMOG also went into a lot of trouble because of lack of planning and lack of compatibility between the contributing states' military systems, and also because of the dominant role Nigeria played in the mission. Throughout the 1990s the ECOWAS member states recognized both that there was a definite need for a regional conflict mechanism and that the present system had serious deficiencies. The ECOWAS framework for activities within peace and security was reinforced in 1999 by the adoption of a permanent Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Based on this Mechanism, several institutions were established within ECOWAS, among which the so-called Mediation and Security Council is of particular interest for our purpose. Through this council, ECOMOG was given a more specifically defined role. According to the protocol of the Mechanism, ECOMOG now has the responsibility for eight kinds of missions, including observation and monitoring, humanitarian intervention, enforcement of sanctions, peace building, disarmament, and demobilization. However, although the intentions might have been good, that is not enough. A main reason for ECOMOG's lack of effectiveness is probably that what we referred to as trans-state regionalism was not taken into consideration. This kind of regionalism is probably kept intentionally separate from official intergovernmental regionalism. The informal economy, for example, is crucial for this type of regionalism. The vitality of trans-state regionalism depends very much of lack of transparency in the state apparatus, whereas formal intergovernmental processes depend on transparency. In conclusion we said that the two kinds of regionalism pull in different directions. The failure to take the transnational aspects into account when preparing a regional security framework is also evident in the case of ECOWAS.

In conclusion we argue that as long as the politicians do not address the challenges related to transnationalism in West Africa, they will probably not succeed in establishing a functioning regional security system.

As for the SADC and IGAD, both these IGOs lag behind ECOWAS although they are both in processes of development as security-political actors. After the end of apartheid in South Africa, the SADC agreed to create the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. The establishment of the Organ, however, revealed several important disagreements between the member states with regard to regional security cooperation. This may be one explanation why the SADC has met with only modest success as a security-political actor in a region where violent conflicts flourish. The SADC as an organization has only acted twice in the period from the end of apartheid till today, and neither of these operations can be said to be very successful. One reason why the SADC has not got involved in the various violent conflicts is probably that, similarly to West Africa, the political elites have hidden agendas with regard to the duration and resolution of violent conflicts and wars. Notwithstanding the Organ, the SADC still has a long way to go to become a full-fledged security-political actor. There are also several disagreements and uncertainties that have to be resolved before the member states are willing to allow it to play an effective role. One such uncertainty is over the question of the status of the two hitherto strongest countries in the region—South Africa and Zimbabwe. With the establishment of the Organ and the steadily growing status of South Africa internationally, Zimbabweans fear that their country is going to lose its strong position in the region. There are also specific disagreements as to the understanding of what purposes the Organ is going to serve. One camp, led by South Africa, regards the Organ primarily as a confidence-building forum. The other camp, led by Zimbabwe, is in favour of military cooperation through the Organ. Until these kinds of disagreements are solved, the Organ cannot be expected to play an important security-political role in the region.

The anatomy of conflicts on the Horn of Africa differs a lot from the anatomy of conflicts in West and southern Africa. The link between a vulnerable environment and violent conflict is evident in this region. The term “environmental security” has therefore often been applied in analyses of conflicts in this region. This has also colored the way IGAD has developed its security-political agenda and the security-political efforts of the organization in general.

Although the number of conflicts on the Horn is extensive, there are primarily two countries that have received the attention of IGAD—Sudan and Somalia. In both cases, however, the security initiatives of the organization have been of a purely diplomatic character. There has been no use of force on behalf of the organization. Apart from these efforts, conflict early warning on the Horn of Africa has been one of the main activities within IGAD’s work on peace and security. A Conflict and Early Warning

Response Mechanism was established in 2002. This mechanism has had a particular focus on cross-border pastoral and related conflicts. CEWARN monitors violent incidents of various kinds and environmental pressures in the region and tracks the proliferation of small arms. It has also recognized the importance of local conflict resolution. Compared with both ECOWAS and the SADC, IGAD has focused on management of conflicts at the grass roots. Whereas ECOWAS and the SADC apply a top-down model focusing on the political elite, IGAD, to a considerable degree, bases its work on a bottom-up model. We concluded that with regard to early warning, this is of utmost importance.

The Continental Response

In addition to the various subregional organizations, the African countries have also formed the African Union, a continental organization that has peacekeeping and security as one of its main purposes. The capacity of the AU within conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and security was the main subject of Chapter 5. The chapter started out with a short introduction to the predecessor of the AU, the Organization of African Unity. Although the OAU failed to fulfill some of its objectives, it provided a political platform for African leaders to interact and to conduct inter-African diplomacy. As for the ability to resolve Africa's conflicts and security problems, however, the OAU was not successful. The principles of nonintervention contributed to making the OAU a passive actor witnessing gross human rights violations, suppression, and brutality by many African state leaders. Compared with its predecessor, the AU has a much firmer and more outspoken attitude to peace building and peacekeeping, and the notion of national sovereignty does not have such a strong standing as used to be the case with the OAU, a matter that leaves the AU with a much greater space for action. To be able to reach its objectives, the AU established 17 institutions, out of which the so-called the Peace and Security Council is the most important for our purpose. The PSC is the implementation organ for the policy framework of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, which defines a set of principles. Among the most important aspects is the perception that defense encompasses both the traditional use of armed force *and* nonmilitary modes of protecting individuals. Moreover, the notion of common threats hinges on the principle that the security of each African state is linked to the security of other African states. Last but not least, the notion of security includes both the traditional state-centric security *and* human security, based not only on political values but on social and economic imperatives as well. The immediate responsibility to implement these principles lies with the PSC. To facilitate its work, the AU leaders have

equipped the PSC with three main bodies: the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Continental Early Warning System. Particularly for the ASF and CEWS, there are still important challenges in order for the systems to work according to expectations. As for the ASF, it shall be called upon to intervene in a member state in the event of grave circumstances such as genocide, war crime, and crimes against humanity, or at the request of a member state to restore peace and security. The force can also be called upon in order to prevent a dispute or conflict from escalating into full-scale war. Finally, the ASF shall engage in peace building, including postconflict disarmament and demobilization.

Generally, the relationship between the AU and the regional economic communities is important, so also that between the AU and the ASF. The Common African Defence and Security Policy/PSC assigns important roles to RECs in as much as the regions are to provide troops in the form of regional brigades. However, there is a huge gap between aspirations and achievements/implementation. Most necessary legal documents are in place, and so are the institutional structures. What is still lacking is the concrete operational capacity. The single most important reason for this is lack of funding. Who shall be responsible for the funding of the regional brigades? None of the policy documents are explicit on this question. Moreover, what should be the relationship between the AU/PSC and the UN? The protocol of the AU clearly provides for cooperation between the PSC and the UN Security Council. Detailed decisions on the relationship are listed in the protocol. The main problem, however, concerning the relationship between the two organs is again the issue of funding. It is still not clear who will bear the financial burden of the collaboration between the two. Another problem concerns the inadequate capacity at the regional level. Although some of the states' armies have participated in UN operations and thereby might have improved, their capability to undertake peacekeeping missions individually or collectively is highly doubtful. Moreover, collective peacekeeping in Africa is also troubled by the diversity of military cultures and administrative traditions on the continent. There is still a long way to go before the military systems are compatible and the doctrines and traditions are harmonized. One immediate concern should therefore be the development of a common military standard on the continent.

About the Continental Early Warning System, we can say that there are still several hindrances to be overcome before the system can find its intended form and role. One hindrance is related to the fact that the AU might have identified wrong building blocks for cooperation with the various regions. Knowing that the AMU is, for instance, largely dormant and more focused on Mediterranean affairs than on sub-Saharan Africa,

it is hard to understand why the AU has picked this organization as a partner for cooperation. Also, in relation to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, it is hard to understand why the AU has chosen an organization for security-political cooperation that does not have any ambitions related to peace and security issues at all.

Another difficulty with regard to AU's cooperation with the RECs is the high degree of overlap of functions between the various RECs. As mentioned, the AU Commission itself refers to this lack of demarcation as the "cacophony" of regional structures. An obvious problem related to this is the shifting loyalties that the member states may experience, a matter that no doubt creates the difficult situation of having to go in different solutions for different RECs.

The Response of the International Society: The UN

The UN, more than any other IGO, has been associated with efforts to create peace and stability throughout the world, so also in Africa. Chapter 6 offered an introduction to the history of UN efforts in peacekeeping and peace building in Africa. We moved on to show what impact these peacekeeping experiments had had on the concept and practice of UN peacekeeping. We concluded that the various operations contributed to a reconceptualization of UN peacekeeping. From impartiality and primarily self-defensive operations, the UN moved on to a stronger focus on humanitarian crises and human rights abuses. However, these second-generation peacekeeping missions soon ran into severe difficulties. The principles of consent and impartiality had a renaissance but with a different interpretation and application than what had been the case during the Cold War. Impartiality, for instance, did still mean that the UN would not take sides in a conflict. It did not mean, however, that the UN would stand by while civilians are in imminent threat of danger.

In the early 1990s, a new security paradigm away from the state-centric security thinking started to emerge, that is, the notion of human security. Included in this concept was the emerging consensus that development and security were interlinked. The concept of peace building became a tool of utmost importance for the UN related to this linkage. This concept has come to include measures to secure good governance and so-called DDR processes and has also brought development policy into the realm of security.

Alongside with the awareness of the security-development linkage in the UN way of thinking is also an increased attention to the most under-developed continent, namely, Africa. Africa had to struggle for long to get the attention of the UNSC. The Kosovo crisis was on everyone's lips while the catastrophic situation in the DRC was hardly known. In the post-9/11

world, this has started to change. But there is now concern that this externally driven attention to the problems in Africa does not address the root causes of conflict. It is possible that the desire for stability as a bulwark against terrorism does not lead to long-lasting peace in Africa.

By the end of the 1990s the UN also reinforced its focus on the possible contributions of subregional intergovernmental organizations in Africa. The reliance on the use of the so-called coalitions of the willing had given rise to significant problems. Subregional arrangements were considered to be suitable for military enforcement actions not least because of the geographical closeness to the conflicts. However, we are still in lack of empirical material for a proper analysis of the relationship between the UN and the various African IGOs (also referred to as RECs) in military actions.

Why What They Say Is Not What They Do

Notwithstanding all genuine efforts to create peace on the continent, African countries are still where most violent conflicts take place today. Too many attempts at resolving conflicts have failed. One reason for this is probably the opportunities many actors see in violent conflicts. Although many parties may be genuinely interested in promoting peace, they may be hindered by the economic interests of other actors. In fact, major actors have vested interests in, for example, mineral wealth and for that sake they may work to prolong a violent conflict if this were for their benefit. The definition of stakeholders in a given conflict is therefore of utmost importance to be able to develop sustainable peace agreements. Moreover, economic stakeholders in an African conflict often transcend or defy international borders. This too must be kept in mind in processes of peace building. The failure of many peace initiatives in relation to African conflicts may well be due to the fact that important actor interests have not been taken seriously, particularly if these interests have been related to covert (but nevertheless known) economic interests. Economic interest in African wars was the subject of the first part of Chapter 7. We also underlined the importance of distinguishing between root causes, driving forces, exacerbating factors, and trigger events. Quite often, it is the economic opportunities created throughout the war that drive and prolong it. A complex web of interactions between warlords and various kinds of plunderers, smugglers, and dealers develops parallel to the development of the war itself. This is particularly so if the country is rich in natural resources. Chapter 7 offered a list of possible actors in relation to the prolongation of war for economic reasons. Indeed, there is a large variety of actors, but what most of them are out to get hold of are the limited but valuable natural resources, particularly oil and diamonds. These resources have

been decisive factors for the long duration of the conflict in, for instance, Angola. On the basis of this and other cases, researchers have developed the concept of “resource curse” to describe the duality of wealth and misery. Blessed with an abundance of some of the most valuable resources that any country could dream of, Angola is one of the most war-torn countries in modern history. The influence of both oil and diamonds in the prolonged war is recognized by most commentators. To be able to limit the war-prolonging functions of such resources in violent conflicts, greater transparency is a must. Demands for greater transparency have been high on the agenda of donor countries, financial institutions, and the UN. Sanctions have been introduced in several cases in Africa, but there is evidence of sanctions-busting by countries such as Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Togo, Burkina Faso, and the DRC. Again, what politicians say is not what they do. We argue that this is so because of the way the African state is organized. In a system of neopatrimonialism, an actor has more than one motivating factor.

The role of resources in large-scale violent conflicts in Africa points to the necessity of relating resource exploitation and fiscal reforms to political commitments during peace processes. So far this seems to have been a major lacuna in such processes.

Closely tied to the economic assets of war in Africa is the privatization of security on the continent. This phenomenon was analyzed in the second part of Chapter 7 with particular reference to two broad variables—the African state and global liberalization. Having described how these variables led to the development of private military systems, we moved on to describe what consequences they have for the further development of the African state. The state is still considered to be the major security-political actor and the main source of legally binding international regulations. For this situation to be maintained in an age of privatization of security, the use of private/military security providers needs to take place within agreed structures. We concluded that, as of today, such structures do not exist—in Africa or elsewhere.

By examples from, for instance, Sierra Leone, we showed how private military companies had contributed to the proliferation of small arms in Africa and that this activity and other shady activities were closely linked. The buying and selling of vital services serve to increase the mix-up between economic and political issues in African countries. It is difficult to differentiate between politics and business. We concluded that this is important for the prospects for further state building in Africa.

A final phenomenon in relation to the consequences of privatizing security for the African state is the creation of multiple centers of power. Private military companies have been distributing small arms and light

weapons, and this has brought into play a growing number of armed actors. In many (local) societies, this has taken on a life of its own as individuals tend to group around the most powerful leader. We often therefore refer to multiple or floating centers of power in Africa. This is of course of great importance concerning the further development (or lack of development) of the African state. On the other hand, knowing the immense riches of African state elites, we would expect that, if their power basis were threatened, they would not hesitate to use their fortunes to further strengthen their own armies. This way, the regime continues to live, although the state remains weak.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. In short, the frustration-aggression thesis says that “the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” (Dollard et al. 1939, cited in Draman 2003, 9).
2. See also Luckham et al. 2001.
3. For research on the relationship between security and the environment, see Homer-Dixon 1991, 1999; Dabelko 1999; and Dokken 1997.
4. The classification is based on a similar classification done by Luckham et al. 2001 (4 ff).
5. The Derg (or Dergue) was a military junta that came to power after the ousting of Haile Selassie I. The Derg ruled the country from 1974 to 1987.
6. See, for instance, Bayart et al. 1999 on the criminalization of the state in Africa, and Reno 1998 on the increasing convergence between warlords and certain types of African government.
7. Transnationalism is a kind of interaction across international borders between both state and nonstate actors. The interaction is relatively regular and often (but not necessarily) hierarchically organized. Both formal and informal transnational processes have considerable influence on security politics within and between African states.

Chapter 2

1. For a discussion of self-determination, territorial integrity, and the African state system, see Young 1991.
2. See Chazan et al. 1992 for more details on Cold War politics in Africa.
3. Reno’s approach is very similar to the one developed in Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999.
4. Bokassa and his regime were also referred to by Linz as an example of a sultanistic regime (Chebabi and Linz 1998, 16–17).
5. “Big Men” or “Strong Men” are defined by Sandbrook (1985, 90): “The Strongman, usually the president, occupies the centre of political life. Front and centre stage, he is the centrifugal force around which all else resolves;

not only ceremonial head of state, the president is also the chief political, military and cultural figure: Head of government, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, head of the governing party (if there is one) and even chancellor of the local university. His aim is typically to identify his person with the ‘nation.’”

6. Jackson writes that “[t]he state in Africa is [. . .] more a personal- or primordial-favouring political arrangement than a public-regarding realm. Government is less an agency to provide political goods such as law, order, security, justice, or welfare and more a fountain of privilege, wealth and power for a small elite who control it [. . .] Many governments are incapable of enforcing their writ throughout their territory. In more than a few countries [. . .] some regions have escaped from national control [. . .] [and the states] are fairly loose patchworks of plural allegiances and identities somewhat reminiscent of medieval Europe” (Jackson 1987, 527–528).
7. That is the case in the reports of the so-called State Failure Task Force from 1998, led by Ted Robert Gurr (cf. Gurr et al. 1998).
8. These are a slightly revised version of questions posed by Milliken and Krause 2002, 759.
9. See also Cramer and Goodhand 2002, particularly 899–900.
10. Economic globalization can be defined as “a set of economic transformations that increase the relative power of mobile factors of production—capital or, to a lesser extent, labour—and whose benefits are distributed in widely unequal fashion across a population” (Milliken and Krause 2002, 761–762).
11. See, for instance, Hyden 1999.
12. In a special issue of *Development and Change* (33, no. 5 [2002]) devoted to state collapse, all the case studies refer to international and global dimensions of the phenomenon.
13. Another concept describing these features is Jackson’s concept “negative sovereignty.” A state holding negative sovereignty does not have control over territories outside the most central parts of the country, and its regime only has limited control over the use of armed forces (Jackson 1990).

Chapter 3

1. These states are the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Angola.
2. Doe came to power through a military coup in 1980, and he used his position as the leader of the military government to win the elections in 1985.
3. For more information about Charles Taylor and his role in Liberia, see Huband 1998.
4. Tubman and Tolbert are both former presidents of Liberia.
5. For further analyses of this kind of economic questions, see Duffield 2001.
6. We do not know for sure, however, how far up in the UK Ministry of Foreign Affairs the activities stretched. Robin Cook, the former minister of

- foreign affairs, denies any knowledge of Sandline 's activities in Sierra Leone.
7. See, for instance, Fleshman 2001; Musah (undated); and Global Witness 2003b and 2004.
 8. An area bordering Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia.
 9. Amos Sawyer (2004) has several examples based on personal interviews, showing that the mercenary system is quite widespread in the region. See also Hoffman 2004.
 10. For an elaboration of the relationship between refugees and security, see, for instance, Dokken 1997.
 11. The UN recognized the integral role natural resources played in the Liberian conflict by first sanctioning the export of Liberian diamonds in 2001 and later sanctioning the Liberian logging industry in May 2003.
 12. The HRW refers to Stephen Ellis 1999 (160–164). See also Sawyer 2004 (446n5, 460).
 13. For an elaboration of the relationships of the West African warring parties, see also Sawyer 2004.
 14. These numbers are rough estimates derived from the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2006, annex (cf. UNHCR 2006).
 15. Lumumba was also nonaligned in relation to geopolitical and Cold War questions. As such, he was not considered favorable by the United States.
 16. See UNSC 2002a (paragraphs 25–34) for their names.
 17. See also David Kinsella 2002.
 18. See also Bråten 2006.
 19. For a general elaboration of war making as state making, see Chapter 2 of this volume.
 20. Ayoob is partly influenced by the works of Antonio Gramsci. "Subaltern" (meaning "of inferior rank") is a term adopted by Gramsci to refer to those groups in society that are subject to the hegemony of the ruling classes. Subaltern classes are groups denied access to "hegemonic power" (cf. Gramsci 1971).
 21. I am also indebted to Thea Martine Ottmann for this method of applying Ayoob's ideas.
 22. The explanation for Uganda's continued presence in Congo after the regime change may well be different. See Chapter 3 for a discussion.

Chapter 4

1. See Dokken 1997.
2. See, for instance, Adler and Barnett 1998.
3. See, for instance, Ngoma 2003.
4. For a thorough presentation of this development within neofunctionalism, see Dokken 1997 (128–156).
5. See also Hegre 2000.
6. See also Söderbaum 2003.

7. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Risse-Kappen 1995.
8. Trans-state regionalism is, in this way, seen as a part of the general reduction of formal state roles in economics and politics, a result of changes in creditors' conditions for loans. See, for instance, Reno 1998.
9. Theories of new regionalism are usually divided into three main contributions, namely, the World Order Approach, the New Regionalism Approach, and the New Regionalism/New Realist Approach.
10. Grant and Söderbaum write that the NRA "[...] obviates the artificial separation of state and non-state actors associated with traditional or conventional regional approaches and recognizes that formal and informal aspects of regionalization are often intertwined" (2003, 5). Here they seem to be unaware of the fact that neofunctionalism as presented by Haas also pays attention to the possible role of nonstate actors in the process of integration. See Haas 1964.
11. For a theoretical introduction to this phenomenon, see Andrew Moravcsik 1993.
12. See, for instance, Berman and Sams 2000.
13. The number of UN observers actually deployed was even smaller. For part of 1996, UNOMIL's strength ranged from five to ten observers (Berman and Sams 2000, 103).
14. The number is based on interviews in the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, 2000.
15. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Risse-Kappen 1995.
16. See, for instance, Leander 2005.
17. See also Sawyer 2004 (445).
18. African institutional development, like humanitarian interventions and theoretical treatments of the continent, often suffers from importation of strategies and models discerned from elsewhere. See also Hoffman 2004 (226).
19. The first part of the following presentation is based on Boås and Dokken 2002.
20. In addition to the SADC, the region has several other IGOs—Southern African Customs Union and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).
21. According to Nathan, Mugabe even foresaw the Organ developing into a kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nathan 2004b, referred to in Liisa Laakso 2005, 6).
22. See Laakso 2005 and Nathan 2006b.
23. The three countries made this decision without consulting South Africa, which had emphasized conflict resolution through mediation.
24. An elaboration of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola's intervention in the war in Congo is given in Chapter 3 of this book.
25. For an extensive analysis of the SADC intervention in Lesotho, see Southall 1998.
26. The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and SIPO have been described by the SADC as two complementary "road maps" (Fisher and Ngoma 2005, 4).
27. See also Markakis 1998.
28. For scholarly articles on political Islam in Somalia, see, for instance, Menkhaus 2002.

Chapter 5

1. The Abuja agreement, officially named the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed on May 5, 2006, by the government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army faction led by Minni Minawi. The agreement, which covers security, wealth sharing, and power sharing, was the result of two years of negotiations mediated by the AU.
2. For a brief introduction to the history of African regionalism and pan-Africanism, see, for instance, Mazzeo 1984. See also Dokken 1997.
3. The Casablanca group was regarded as radical and included Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Mali, and the Algeria provisional government. The Monrovia group was named after the Monrovia Conference and included conservative governments such as those of Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). The Brazzaville group consisted of mainly francophone countries that met in December 1960 to reaffirm their commitment to close cooperation with France, and they also opposed communism in Africa (Francis 2006a, 19–20n23).
4. At the OAU's inception, its charter was signed by 30 out of the 32 independent African countries (with one country absent and one abstaining). Togo, which was not represented because of a recent coup, signed the charter two months later, in July 1963. Morocco, which originally abstained (because of its opposition to the independence of Mauritania), subsequently signed the charter in September 1963. Morocco, however, formally withdrew in 1985 after the OAU bestowed membership on the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) of Western Sahara in 1984 (Berman and Sams 2000, 45).
5. The AEC was founded through the Abuja Treaty of 1991 and came into force in 1994.
6. Berman and Sams here refer to a speech delivered by Siad Djinnit at the "Meeting on Enhancing Africa's Peacekeeping Capacity," New York, December 5, 1997.
7. Chris Bakwesegha is one of those who have admitted that the Mechanism had its flaws. In 1997 he wrote: "The Organization cannot assume that it has achieved much in its efforts to operationalize the Mechanism since its adoption [in 1993], nor can one assume that the Mechanism as it is today is without its shortcomings" (Bakwesegha 1997, 14, cited in Berman and Sams 2000, 73).
8. Tiekou here refers to the disagreement between Mbeki, Obasanjo, and Ghadaffi concerning the establishment of the AU.
9. The protocol was adopted in Durban in 2002 and came into force in December 2003.
10. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305, August 21, 2000) is usually referred to as the Brahimi Report (cf. UN 2000a).
11. For detailed suggestions by the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission concerning the ESE, see Cilliers and Malan 2005, 9.
12. During recent years both the EU and the G8 have contributed quite a lot to AU peacekeeping. So there is innovation and progress with regard to funding,

- although there is still a long way to go before the ASF will be “properly trained and fully resourced” (Denning 2005, 116). See also Neethling 2005.
13. For a detailed approach to conflict analysis, see, for instance, O’Brien 2002.
 14. See, for instance, the formulation in the Cairo Declaration: “The Mechanism [on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution] will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter; in particular, the sovereign equality of Member States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism. It will also function on the basis of consent and the cooperation of the parties to a conflict” (OAU 1995, Paragraph 14).
 15. The other three are the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of humanitarian Affairs, and the Department of Defence and Security.
 16. This is an earlier version of the CEWARN Web site (www.cewarn.org). The present version does not have these exact formulations.
 17. For an analysis of the potentials of early warning systems, see also O’Brien (2002).
 18. The member states of ECCAS are the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe, the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and Chad.
 19. The membership of COMESA overlaps with that of a number of other organizations such as the EAC, the SADC, AMU, and IGAD, some of which are already engaged in peace and security matters.
 20. The members of the MRU are Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.
 21. The members of the UEMOA are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
 22. For a description of CEWARN indicators, see, for example, CEWARN UNIT 2006 and IGAD/CEWARN UNIT 2004a and 2004b.
 23. See, for instance, Wettestad 1995.
 24. There is a considerable amount of academic research that stresses the fact that the development of democratic institutions is one way of preventing the conditions that might trigger violent behaviour from materializing. See, for instance, DeRouen and Goldfinch 2005.

Chapter 6

1. Calculated from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Background Note of March 31, 2007. The term “peace operation” will mainly be used throughout this chapter. It will refer to the whole spectrum of operations (chapters VI, VII, and VIII) authorized by the United Nations to monitor cease-fire agreements and/or support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. The UN itself referred to the term “peace operations” as encompassing all of its peace and security activities (cf. UN 2000a).
2. For an account of the background of the crises and the details around the establishment and development of ONUC, see McQueen 2006a, 79–92.

3. For more on the UN in Somalia, see Sitkowski 2006, 97–189; MacQueen 2006a, 212–219.
4. ECOMOC had been involved in Liberia since August 1990. For more on the operations in Liberia, see Cleaver and Massey 2006, 179–99; MacQueen 2006, 220–224.
5. For a fuller discussion on the comparison and contrast between the conflict resolution processes in Angola and Mozambique, see MacQueen 2006, 200–201. For a more detailed discussion about the conflict and peace operations in Angola, see MacQueen 2006b, 135–152. For a more detailed analysis of conflict and conflict resolution in Mozambique, see Alden 2006, 153–165; MacQueen 2006, 197–200.
6. For a historical background of the events of 1994, see Mamdani 2001. For more on Rwanda, see Sitkowski 2006, 111–124; MacQueen 2006, 201–205.
7. For more on UN involvement in CAR, see MacQueen 2006, 206–210.
8. For more on UN involvement in Côte d'Ivoire, see MacQueen 2006, 206–210.
9. For more on UN involvement in Burundi, see MacQueen 2006, 205–206.
10. For more on UN involvement in Namibia, see MacQueen 2006, 187–191.
11. For more on UN involvement in Western Sahara, see MacQueen 2006.
12. For accounts of the background to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict and the international responses, see Lata 2003, 153–184; MacQueen 2006, 185–186.
13. According to "An Agenda for Peace," "preventive diplomacy" is defined as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." "Peacemaking" is "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as foreseen in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations" (UNSG 1992, Paragraph 21). The term "peace building" will be accounted for in subsequent sections in this chapter.
14. Neethling quotes the Report of the UN secretary-general pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992 (cf. UNSG 1992).
15. Since the promotion of the concept of peace building in 1992, the norm has developed within the UN. In 2001 the Security Council described peace building as "aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the practical needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable institutions and process in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance and, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence" (UNSC/PRST 2001, 1–2).
16. See Traub 2004; Chesterman 2004, 105; and Jones 2004.
17. The originally intended standby arrangements system of the UN Security Council was never implemented, and after the end of the Cold War, when the Security Council became a stronger voice, this was felt as more of a problem

than before. The council now had to rely on a decentralized approach and entrust operations to those actors willing to conduct them on its behalf (Wilson 2003, 89–90).

18. In the Darfur province of Sudan, the collaboration between the UN and the AU is closer than before (August 2007). This may be a sign that the UN in the future will lean more on the AU than what has been the rule so far. On the other hand, the willingness of the Sudanese government to allow new United Nations-led force of 26,000 military personnel and police is primarily an admission that the 7,000 AU troops are overstretched.
19. Nigeria has a much more limited role within ECOMOG today than what was the case during the first decade of the existence of the body.

Chapter 7

1. See also Nzongola-Ntalaja undated.
2. See also Gleditsch 2007.
3. The two other peace orientations that Baregu identifies are peace makers and peace opportunists (Baregu 2002, 15).
4. See, for instance, UN 2000b.
5. See, for instance, the Global Witness report on Angola (cf. Global Witness 1999).
6. Baregu's classification is the point of departure for the following list. See Baregu 2002, 23–28.
7. Notwithstanding this knowledge, sanctions against UNITA's diamond trading were imposed as late as 1998.
8. For more on sanctions busting in Angola in this period, see also Human Rights Watch 1999.
9. It is particularly Raul Prebisch and Hans W. Singer who are associated with this theory. See, for instance, Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950.
10. Ganesan and Vines here quote Thomas Dawson, the director of the IMF's External Relations Department.
11. This is not to say that we do not have examples among African leaders of genuine efforts to develop their countries. Presidents such as Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Sekou Toure (Guinea), Modibo Keita (Mali), and Leopold Senghor (Senegal) all worked to improve the standard of living for the nation as a whole, not only for a small elite.
12. See also Sørensen 2001.
13. Lock's numbers are based on two time series taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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